


A
Tale of the British
Authority in Bengal

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T A T E

OF THE.

BRITISH AUTHORITY IN BENGAL

UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF

MR. HASTINGS.

To make the following Papers intelligible to the Public, it may be necessary to introduce them by a short State of the Facts to which they relate.

19th October, 1774.

WHEN Gen. Clavering, Col. Monson, and Mr. Francis, arrived in Bengal, they found the Nabob Mahomed Reza Cawn, who had for many years filled the first offices of the state, in the greatest distress, and living in a small miserable house near Calcutta, a prisoner at large. He had been divested of his employments, and brought down a prisoner to Calcutta, in a manner the most disgraceful to a person of his high rank, soon after Mr. Hastings's accession to the Government in May 1774. Various charges were then brought against him of embezzlement, mal-administration, &c. and

particularly of being concerned in monopolies, which contributed to the famine. On these charges he was publicly tried by the President and Council : And notwithstanding the known and avowed disposition of the Court of Directors (as constituted at that time) to accomplish his ruin ; and in spite of the influence of the Government in Bengal, he was honourably acquitted, but not reinstated. His accusers, and their abettors, irritated at their defeat, left this great and good man, (for such he is, if ever a native of India deserved that character) overwhelmed with debts, and ruined by his long attendance in Calcutta, to perish in misery and oblivion ; that is, to suffer all the penalties, except loss of honour, which could have been inflicted upon him, if his innocence had not been established as clear as the Sun.

In this condition he remained until the Company's orders of the 3d of March, 1775, were received by the Governor General and Council. In their letter of that date they say, “ that they
“ are well pleased in finding him able to excul-
“ pate himself from all the charges brought
“ against him, to the satisfaction of their ser-
“ vants.” They say they can have no objection to his total enlargement ; and, in the end, they direct, that “ if he can, with propriety,
“ accept of the office of Roy Royan, he should
“ be forthwith appointed thereto.”

On

On the 18th of October, 1775, the Governor General and Council considering the general intent of the preceding orders, and observing that the Court of Directors had fallen into a mistake with respect to the office of Roy Royan, which could not be held by a Mussulman, determined to recommend Mahomed Reza Cawn to that of Naib Subadar, on the same principles which the Company themselves had adopted, and precisely on the plan which they had positively ordered to be pursued, in their letter of the 28th of August, 1771, for the administration of the affairs of the country government. The resolution of the Board was opposed by Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, but highly approved of by the Court of Directors. In their letter of the 24th of December, 1776, they say, " That his abilities have been sufficiently
 " manifested; that official experience qualifies
 " him for so high a station, in a more eminent
 " degree than any other native with whom the
 " Company has been connected: That, as no
 " proofs of mal-administration have been esta-
 " blished against him, during the strict investi-
 " gation of his conduct, or since his retire-
 " ment, they cannot but approve of the Board's
 " recommendation of him to the Nabob, to con-
 " stitute him his Naib: That they are well
 " pleased at his having received that appoint-
 " ment; and that they authorize the Board to
 " assure him of their favour."

On the 23d of February, 1778, a letter, in the name of the young Nabob, Mobarick ul Dowla, notoriously fabricated at Calcutta, was produced at the Board. In this letter he is made to assert, that he is arrived at years of maturity, and to demand possession of all the offices held by Mahomed Reza Cawn. The 2d of March was appointed, by agreement, for taking it into consideration. On that day it was resolved, by a majority of the members present, that the Nabob's letter should be referred to the Court of Directors for their determination.

On the 5th of March, the preceding resolution was reversed by the casting voice of Mr. Hastings, united with that of Mr. Barwell, who attended; and all the Nabob's requisitions complied with.

On the 4th of May, the Nabob wrote to the Governor to inform him, that he had appointed Sudder ul Hoc Cawn (a poor superannuated dependant of Mr. Hastings) to be his Naib, and Raja Gourdas (the son of Nuncomar) to the office of the Nizamut. He also desired that the salary allotted by the Company to the support of a Minister of the Government, and lately enjoyed by Mahomed Reza Cawn, might be distributed in the following manner :

To his mother-in-law, Munny Begum,	72,000,0
To his mother Baboo Begum, -	36,000,0
To Sudder ul Hoc Cawn, - -	78,000,0
To Gourdots, - - - -	72,000,0

Sicca Rupees, 2,58,000,0

It is to be observed, however, that this sum exceeds the amount of Mahomed Reza Cawn's salary by 18,000 rupees, which the Nabob desires may be given by the Board, in order that his own revenues may suffer no diminution.

On the 11th of May, 1778, all these requests were complied with by the majority. The Company's orders, on the parts of this transaction which had come to their knowledge, were received at Calcutta the 13th of November, 1779. The following extracts from their letter of the 4th of February, 1779, contain an exact copy of them.

*Extract of Company's General Letter to Bengal,
dated the 4th February, 1779. No. I.*

PARAGRAPH 8.

We by no means approve your late proceedings on the application of the Nabob Mobareck ul Dowlah for the removal of the Naib Soubahdah. The requisition of Mobareck ul Dowlah was improper and unfriendly, because he must have known, that the late appointment of Mohamed Reza Kawn to the office of Naib Suihdah [Minister] had been marked with the Company's special approbation, and that the Court of Directors had assured him of their favour, so long as a firm attachment to the Company's interest, and a proper discharge of the duties of his station, would render him worthy of their protection. We therefore repeat our declaration, that to require the dismissal of a prime minister thus circumstanced, without producing the smallest proof of his infidelity to the Company, or venturing to charge him with one instance of maladministration in the discharge of his public duty, was improper and inconsistent with the friendship subsisting between the Nabob of Bengal and the Company.

PARAGRAPH 9.

Admitting the Nabob's complaint, that Mahomet Reza Kawn is not connected with him by

relative ties, to be well founded, it by no means follows that he has been deficient in duty or sincere attachment to him, or that his power is oppressive and dishonourable to the Nabob and his family; nor can assertions of this nature, unattended by proof, have any weight with us.

PARAGRAPH 10.

In regard to the Nabob's claim, to take charge of his own affairs merely because he is of age and thinks himself capable of conducting them, we find it declared by one of your members and not contradicted, that he knew with certainty, that the Nabob is in his own person utterly incapable of executing any of those offices which were deemed of essential importance to the welfare of the country; and we are sorry to find that neither this declaration, nor the Protests of two Members of the Council, seem to have been thought worthy of an answer by the majority of the Board.

PARAGRAPH 11.

The Nabob hopes from your favour and justice, to be delivered from the authority of Mahomet Reza Khan. He ventures to declare the Company solely indebted to the warm support of his ancestors for their present greatness and advantages. He claims the management and administration of the Soubahdastrie as his right, and says it will be highly inequitable in the Company to refuse their approbation to his request.

PARAGRAPH 12.

We pass over these extraordinary suggestions of the Nabob without reply; only observing, that in justice to him and ourselves, we must take the best care in our power of the peace and internal good government of the country; and we are not disposed to hazard the effects which might be occasioned by committing the entire management thereof to his inexperience, without enjoining him to accept such assistance, and to employ such ministers about his person, as may be deemed necessary on the part of the India Company.

PARAGRAPH 13.

The 23d of February we find the Nabob's letter and a question thereon was circulated to the different members of the Board for their opinions to be taken at the next meeting of Council, which meeting happened on the 2d March; but one of the members being indisposed, did not attend at that Board.

PARAGRAPH 14.

We have carefully noticed your debates upon the subject. The resolution of Council of that day, that the Nabob's letter should be referred to the Court of Directors, for their decision, and that no resolution should be taken in Bengal on his requisitions without our special orders and instructions, appears to us very proper:
we

we must therefore express our disapprobation on finding the said resolution rescinded, on the frivolous pleas urged by the majority of the Board three days afterwards.

PARAGRAPH 15.

If the absence of a member of Council were sufficient to preclude the discussion of any subject which might have been referred for consideration by a former Board, or to invalidate resolutions taken during such absence, it would be in the power of any member effectually to defeat the ends proposed by the institution of a Council, and to put a total stop to public business. We shall not waste time in refuting claims of privilege advanced on this occasion, because they appear to us unworthy of consideration, and beneath all argument.

PARAGRAPH 16.

The Nabob having intimated that he had repeatedly stated the trouble and uneasiness which he had suffered from the Naibship of the Nizamut being vested in Mahomed Reza Khan, we observe one of the members of your Board desired the Nabob's repeated letters on the subject might be read ; but this reasonable request was over-ruled, on a plea of saving the Board's time, which we can by no means admit as a sufficient objection.

PARAGRAPH 17.

The Nabob's letters of the 25th and 30th of August, of the 3d of September and 17th of November, leave us no doubt of the true design of this extraordinary business being to bring forward the Munny Begum, and again to invest her with improper power and influence, notwithstanding our former declarations, that so great a part of the Nabob's allowance had been embezzled or misapplied under her superintendence.

PARAGRAPH 18.

Instead of your declaring that the Nabob's demands were grounded on positive rights, which will not admit of discussion; that the Nizamut is his inheritance; that the dependants of the Nizamut, Adawlet, and Phousdarry appertain to that inheritance; that as he is pleased to demand and assert the positive rights of his office as Nizam of the provinces, there is no ground for denying his request; and that a reference to the Company would be an evasion unbecoming the honour of government, the Nabob might have been reminded that a Naib Subahdar was appointed, and the office continued without interruption or objection during the government of his ancestors, who must have been supposed more capable of governing the provinces than a youth of twenty years of age.

PARA-

PARAGRAPH 19.

You have requested this unexperienced young man to permit all the present Judges and Officers of the Nizamut and Foujedarry, Adawlets, or courts of criminal justice; and also all the Foujedars or officers appointed to guard the peace of the country to continue in office until he, the Nabob, shall have formed a plan for a new arrangement of those officers; and it is with equal surprize and concern that we observe this request introduced, and the Nabob's ostensible rights so solemnly asserted at this period by our Governor General, because, on a late occasion, to serve a very different purpose, he has not scrupled to declare it as visible as the light of the sun, that the Nabob is a mere pageant, and without even the shadow of authority. No circumstance has happened since that declaration was made to render the Nabob more independent, nor to give him any degree of power or consequence; you must therefore have been well apprized that your late concessions to Mobareck ul Dowlah were unnecessary, and as such unwarrantable.

PARAGRAPH 20.

As we deem it for the welfare of the country that the office of Naib Soubahdar be for the present continued, and that this high office be

filled by a person of wisdom, experience, and of approved fidelity to the Company; and as we have no reason to alter the opinion given of Mahomed Reza Khan, in our letter of the 24th December 1776, we positively direct, that you forthwith signify to the Nabob, Mobareck ul Dowlah our pleasure, that Mahomed Reza Khan be immediately restored to the office of Naib Soubahdar; and we further direct that Mahomed Reza Khan be again assured of the continuance of our favor so long as a firm attachment to the interest of the Company, and a proper discharge of the duties of his station shall render him worthy of our protection.

London, 4th of February 1779.

Extract

Extract from the Proceedings of the Board.

Pub. Dep. Consult. 22 Nov. 1779.

Sir EYRE COOTE, absent.

Mr. BARWELL, retired.

Mr. Francis. I move that the Company's orders, for the immediate reinstatement of Mahomed Reza Cawn in the offices he held in January 1778, be carried into execution, and that a copy of the last paragraph of the Company's letter of the 4th of February 1779, together with an exact Persian translation thereof, be transmitted to the Nabob Mobarruck ul Dowla, and to Mahomed Reza Cawn, with a requisition on the part of the Governor General and Council to the Nabob, to conform to the injunctions of the Court of Directors expressed in that paragraph. This motion of course supposes that the Governor General shall be requested to signify the resolution of the Board on this subject, in the usual manner, by Letter to the Nabob.

Mr.

Mr. Wheeler. I agree to the motion.

Governor General. I must beg leave to decline an immediate answer to the motion, which I will deliver at our next meeting, which it has been agreed shall be held to-morrow morning.

Mr. Francis. I must beg that a formal resolution on the motion may be taken now. It could not be unexpected, and the more so, as I particularly requested Mr. Barwell to stay. I cannot therefore be suspected of want of candor in pressing for the resolution now. I came determined to propose it.

Governor General. Since Mr. Francis, taking an advantage of the absence of one of the members, has insisted on an immediate decision of the question, I am compelled to give my affirmative or negative to it. I have declared that I am not come prepared to deliver my opinion upon a subject of so much delicacy, and involving so many consequences. I should have been glad to have been allowed some time to consider the nature and tendency of the order, and to have accommodated the execution of it to all the circumstances which ought to be taken into consideration in the determination upon it: the time that I have required is but the short interval between this hour of three in the afternoon, and the hour of ten to-morrow morning;
I however,

however, as this privilege is now denied me, I shall in this place, and at this time, simply content myself with delivering my negative to the motion in the terms in which it is made.

Mr. Francis. I could have no idea of availing myself of Mr. Barwell's absence. Every Gentleman at the Board I believe heard me solicit him to stay; much less could I have a view of surprizing the Governor General on a subject on which he might be unprepared. The Company's Letter was received on Saturday the 13th instant, though it has happened that I myself did not see it till Friday last.

Resolved in the affirmative.

Council,

Council, 23 Nov. 1779.

P R E S E N T,

The GOVERNOR GENERAL,

Mr. BARWELL,

Mr. FRANCIS,

Mr. WHEELER.

The Governor General moves, That the 8th, 9th, 10th, &c. to 20th paragraphs of the separate general letter by the Barker, dated the 4th February, 1778, with Mr. Francis's motion, and the resolution of the Board thereon be again read.—Agreed.

The Governor General moves, That the Opinions of the Board be taken, whether the above resolution shall be approved.

Mr. Wheeler. I should be glad to ask the Governor General, whether he makes this motion upon the principle of confirming the minutes of the former Council, or on account of the absence of Mr. Barwell at the time when the Question was debated?

The Governor General. I have put the question in conformity to the constitution and actual existing

existing rule of this Government, that all acts and orders passed at any meeting of the Board shall be approved in the succeeding Council, to give them their sanction; and I avail myself of this right, on account of the advantage which was yesterday taken on account of Mr. Barwell's absence.

Mr. Wheeler. I am very sorry to be under the necessity of observing, that although I have had the honour of sitting at this Board near two years, it is, to the best of my recollection, the very first instance that the order, necessary to give a sanction to our proceedings, as described by the Governor General, has been complied with, in the sense I believe it is now meant. I see no occasion for the present question, and therefore I am against it.

The Governor General. It is not necessary that this form should be observed in every instance. It is always supposed, when the Members of the Board tacitly agree to the omission of it, the formula p[re]face of every consultation being sufficient to imply it.

Mr. Wheeler. The minutes of every Board or Public Assembly that I have had the honour to attend, are constantly read at a subsequent meeting of such Board or Assembly, in order that every

every member may be fully satisfied that what he has said or entered upon the records is faithfully represented or transcribed. But I know not a single instance when the minutes of any Board or Assembly have been read at a subsequent meeting with a view to overset the resolutions of a former meeting; if that was admitted in numerous assemblies, no question could ever be finally decided. The objection, in my opinion, if it is so meant, holds equally strong, and I am convinced will be treated with equal disgust by our superiors, as they have already treated an act not very dissimilar to this.

Mr. Francis. The resolution taken yesterday was legal and compleat; it wants no confirmation, though it may be reversed. The official form observed in the proceedings of a former Government, and continued under ours, is merely a form, and so little is it ever regarded, that the orders of one Council are constantly executed, if the time permits, before the meeting of the next.

Mr. Wheler has assigned the true and only reason for the observance of such a form: whatever use or convenience there may be in continuing to observe it, it cannot operate against a positive provision of an act of Parliament, made since the form in question was first instituted, and
which,

which, of course, supercedes it, if in reality it had ever had the effect and operation which the Governor General now attributes to it.—
 The law says, “ That in all cases whatsoever, “ wherein any difference of opinion shall arise “ upon any question proposed in any consulta- “ tion, the Governor General and Council “ shall be bound and concluded by the opinion “ and decision of the major part of those pre- “ sent.”—— The conclusion, by which the Council is bound, is instant and absolute ; there is no reference to the confirmation of a subsequent meeting. I am sorry the Governor General should repeat an objection, already, as I think, compleatly answered. I am not to blame if Mr. Barwell, notwithstanding my urgent request to the contrary, left the Board yesterday at an early hour. I should have been much better pleased if he had staid, because I should then have had the labour of one debate only, instead of two. On this subject I need say nothing more, since the Court of Directors themselves have taken it up in a similar instance, and given their opinion decidedly upon it, in the 15th paragraph of the letter now before us,

Mr. Barwell. Had the resolution simply gone to the execution of the Company's orders, from the sentiments delivered by the Governor General at the last meeting, the present question would not have been agitated. His objection

to Mr. Francis's motion strikes me as confined to the mode that motion prescribes for carrying those orders into execution. Mr. Francis's motion, in my opinion, conveys such sentiments as are not authorized by the Company's letter. In the body of the motion I find these words, "with a requisition of the Governor General and Council to the Nabob, to conform to the injunctions of the Court of Directors." I know of no injunctions that the Court have laid on the Nabob, and I imagine the use of any offensive terms or improper management on a subject of so delicate a nature, would be highly reprehensible. I therefore vote for rescinding the resolution of the last Council, so far as regards the mode of executing the orders of the Council, but no farther. I agree to the motion, that the order be executed, but am for leaving the manner of doing it to the discretion of the Governor General. From nothing that the Governor General has urged in the course of the debate of yesterday, do I perceive the least disposition in him to decline the instructions which the Court of Directors have been pleased to give relative to a Naib Soubah.

Governor General. With all the respect and submission, which I owe and feel for the authority of the Court of Directors, I must declare, that I shall not yield, even to that authority, in any instance, in which it shall require my concession

cession of the rights which I hold under an act of Parliament. Those rights are formal obligations, with which I am not permitted to dispense; neither can I optionally relinquish my own claim to a practice which was followed by Mr. Francis himself, when he formed one of the majority of the Council, and which receives the approbation of the Court of Directors themselves. I acknowledge the obligation I owe to Mr. Francis for the trouble he has taken in helping me to one instance in consultations 14th September 1775, in which a resolution passed at the preceding consultations, which was contrary to the sense and general tenor of the measures proposed by the ruling members of the Board, was rescinded by a following motion, formally introduced and made by myself. If this mode is illegal or irregular, it was equally so as at that time; but Mr. Francis then made no objection to it, but, in the opinion delivered upon my motion, simply said, He thought the order should be repeated. I recollect also, that in a similar instance motions were made, either by Mr. Francis or by the other members of the majority in concert with him, for reading and confirming the proceedings held by them during the absence of Mr. Barwell and myself, both in this and in the revenue department. I will not take up the time of the Board in looking out for the instances, but shall desire the

secretary to annex them to this minute. The evident intent of these motions was to authenticate all the acts which were considered by the members of the majority as the legal acts of the Board, but were disputed and disavowed by Mr. Barwell and myself; and, by obtaining such a formal approbation of them, to remove the objections which had been made, or which might lie against their validity. Respecting the question now before the Board, I disapprove of the Resolution, as not being warranted by the Orders of the Court of Directors; and I think it would be disingenuous and unjust in this Board to exceed the positive orders of the Company, in annulling a concession made by them to the Nabob, and acknowledged as his due.

Mr. Francis. The Governor General has very fully proved a proposition which has never been disputed; that a resolution taken at one Board may be reversed at the next. I must have lost my memory and my senses if I had denied it. I do not make profession of such extraordinary candour, as to furnish an opponent with arguments against myself. In pointing out to the Governor General the consultation of the 15th September 1775, I meant to give him an instance in point, which I thought established a conclusion directly the reverse of that which he has drawn from it. The Court of Directors will find, in the proceedings of that day, that I entered a Dissent and Protest against a Resolution taken

taken at the preceding Council, but that I neither disputed its validity, nor proposed to reverse, or even to reconsider it. The proposition for that purpose came from the Governor General himself, and was strictly regular and legal. It would have been in point had he proved that, in the case in question, I insisted that the resolution of the preceding day wanted the confirmation of the next, and that on that ground I had proposed to reconsider it. With respect to the present question, the instance proves nothing. In the other examples quoted by the Governor General, and which I perfectly remember, the fact was this : The legality of the separate meetings held by General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and myself was expressly and formally denied. That reason alone, I presume, induced General Clavering to propose, and Colonel Monson and myself to agree, that the resolutions taken in such separate meetings should be confirmed at the next full meeting of the Board. Whether such confirmation was necessary or not, the example does not support the Governor General's argument. The question now is, Whether acts done at a meeting of the Board confessedly regular and legal, require any subsequent confirmation ; not, Whether such meeting was or was not in itself legal. But, setting aside this sort of argument ; precedents prove nothing against a positive right, especially where that

right

right itself is not in issue. We may go on for any length of time, by negligence or agreement, in following forms which nobody regards. The question is not fairly in issue, until they are formally insisted upon and denied, and some important use attempted to be made of them. If the motion I made yesterday did not correspond with the Governor General's idea of the sense of the Company's orders, I should have held myself indebted to him for any amendment he might have thought fit to propose; and assuredly I should have given it the most respectful attention. The profound silence he observed made it impossible for me to judge whether his objection went to the whole of the motion, or to any part of it, or merely to the form proposed of carrying the Company's orders into execution.

Governor General. Whatever doubts were entertained of the legality of the acts done by a part of the Board, after my declaration of the dissolution of the actual meeting, these doubts were not entertained by Mr. Francis, who declared the acts to be legal; therefore, with respect to him, the subsequent motion and order, to read and approve their proceedings, could not be construed as intended to give them that legality which they wanted, though they might be covertly intended so, by the application of an ancient constitutional form to that effect. But
I will

I will here close my part of the argument, since I perceive that we dispute only on words, Mr. Francis admitting that a resolution taken at one Board may be reversed at the next. I offer to his option that motion which I have already made, or the motion which I now make, That the former resolution be reversed. And I hereby declare my opinion for reversing the former resolution. Mr. Barwell has already done it in terms. I confess that in this proposal I am irregular, but I had rather incur that imputation than suffer the time of the Board to be any longer wasted by a fruitless and a verbal dispute.

In this place I shall beg leave to contrast my own conduct with Mr. Francis's; that, since I have been a member of this or any other government, I have never, in one single instance, if I may trust to my own memory, and the fullest conviction of what I assert, descended to a practice which I should have held unworthy of my own principles, of which I have had too frequent occasion to complain in Mr. Francis, by taking the advantage of an occasional and accidental majority to carry any measure contrary to the sense of the ruling members. Even in the first instance, which I have quoted, I introduced a question, for the sake of giving consistency to the orders of the Board, although it was productive, and so intended, of the repeal

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of

of a resolution of the Board, which had received my concurrence at the former meeting of 1776

Mr. Francis. I object to both the motions, though for different reasons. I object to reversing the resolution of the last Board, because I deem it a most unwarrantable exercise of a power, the existence of which I am obliged to admit. No specific reason is yet assigned for it. To the latter part of the Governor General's last minute I shall only say, that I hope I shall not always suffer in a comparison between his principles of action and mine. If he has had *too frequent* occasion to complain of my taking advantage of accidental majorities, the word *frequent* must refer to more instances than two. It will rest with him to produce more instances, if there are any. I myself know of none, in which he has lost any question by Mr. Barwell's absence, but that of the one before us, and the former one of the 2d of March 1778, on the same subject. The resolution which the Governor General proposed to have reconsidered on the 14th of Sept. 1775, interrupted a series of measures formed on a different principle. I think he did right in proposing to reconsider it. This is a single act, which has no connection with any thing else.

Resolved, That the resolution of yesterday be reversed.

The Governor General moves, “ That the pleasure of the Court of Directors, signified in the 20th Paragraph of the general letter of the 4th February last, and the assurance therein directed to be given to Mahomed Reza Cawn, be communicated to the Nabob Mobareck ul Dowlah in the words of the general letter.”

Mr. Francis. I have no objection to the motion as far as it goes ; but, if the communication of the Company’s intentions be not accompanied by a formal requisition from this government, it is not impossible that they may be defeated. I therefore move the following addition to the motion, “ That the Governor General be requested to signify to the Nabob Mobareck ul Dowlah, in the usual form, the requisition of the Governor General and Council, for his immediate compliance with the pleasure of the Court of Directors.”

Mr. Wheeler. I agree to the motion, and likewise to the amendment.

Mr. Barwell. I agree to the motion. I cannot be a judge of the terms that Mr. Francis would have used in the letter proposed to be written by the Governor General to the Nabob from the general terms in which his amendment is expressed. The Governor General can have

no objection to submit the terms, in which he makes the communication of the Company's sentiments to the Nabob and Mahomed Reza Cawn, to the Board before the letters shall be sent. If those are at all defective, such additions may be proposed to them, as, in the judgment of any of the members, may appear necessary. I think Mr. Francis is premature in following the Governor General's motion with another. It seems to speak some preknowledge of the difficulties to which our government is subjected, and that no small degree of coercion must necessarily support the recommendations of the Company. I give my vote simply for the Governor General's motion, reserving my opinion for any amendments that may be offered to the letters proposed to be written, when such are offered in precise terms, as essential to answer the intentions of the Company, and consistent with those intentions.

Mr. Francis. The motion is confined to a bare communication of the Company's orders; how it may operate I do not know; but, as this government is the medium through which all the Company's orders are carried into execution, it seems to me unusual at least, to leave them, in this single instance, to execute themselves. As for the rest, I have no distrust of the Nabob, and hope he will comply with them.

Governor

Governor General. I agree to the question. I object to the amendment. My reasons have been assigned in the preceding minutes; I will not therefore repeat them.

Resolved, In the terms of the Governor General's motion.

Copy of a Letter proposed by the Governor General to be written to the Nabob Mobareck ul Dowla.

“ A Letter having been received from the
 “ Honourable Court of Directors by the ship
 “ lately arrived from Europe, in which they
 “ have thought proper to signify their pleasure,
 “ that Mahomed Reza Khan be immediately
 “ restored to the office of Naib Subah, and to
 “ direct that he be again assured of the continu-
 “ ance of their favor, so long as a firm attach-
 “ ment to the interest of the Company, and a
 “ proper Discharge of the Duties of his station
 “ shall render him worthy of their protection;”
 it becomes my duty therefore, in compliance
 with their orders, to communicate the same to
 your Highness.

The same to Mahomed Reza Khan, *mutatis mutandis.*

24 November, 1779.

Mr. Francis.

Mr. Francis. I do not disapprove of the Letter to the Nabob Mobarek ul Dowla, as far as it goes, except that the whole of the last paragraph of the Company's Letter of the 4th of February should be recited in it. But I think that this recital should be followed by a formal requisition on the part of the Governor General and Council, demanding his compliance with the Company's pleasure. I have no personal distrust of the Nabob, but he is too young and inexperienced to judge for himself; nor am I sure that very dangerous advice may not be given him by some persons immediately interested in the arrangement of Mahomed Reza Cawn's offices and salary. The communication of the Company's pleasure, in its present form, appears to me irregular, and I believe it to be wholly unprecedented. The authority of the Court of Directors over the government of these provinces (which in effect is that of the nation over a dependent dominion) does not act directly and immediately on the things or persons subject to it in India, but always through the medium of their local representatives. The omission of the use of this medium, in a single and in so remarkable an instance, may possibly suggest to the Nabob or his advisers, that there is a reluctance in the Governor General and Council to execute the Company's orders, and furnish them with

with some formal pretence for not complying with them, which otherwise would not be attempted.

For these reasons I deem the proposed letter essentially defective and incomplete, and am therefore against it.

Translation of a Letter from the Nabob Mobarck ul Dowlah, inclosed in a Letter from the Resident at the Durbar, dated the 10th, and received the 12th of December, 1779.

I have been favoured with your friendly letter under date the 21st of Zecaide.

You write, “ that a letter has been lately received from the Court of Directors, expressing their pleasure that the Nabob Mahmud Reza Khan be restored to the office of Naib Subah.”

My Patron ! When the aforesaid Nabob was first appointed to the Naib Subahship, it was entirely on this account, that by reason of my tender age I could not transact my own affairs in person, but required the assistance of a Naib. When I became of age there was no further occasion for a Naib, and I accordingly wrote you on the subject, and informed you that I would
take

take on myself the management of my own affairs, and had no further use for a Naib; and as this was perfectly reasonable, you, in council, gave your sanction thereto, and favoured me with a letter, authorizing me to take the administration on myself, and to dismiss the said Nabob, which was accordingly done; and from that time to the present, the affairs of the Nizamut, Foujedaree, and Adaulet dependant on the Nizamut have been conducted on that plan by my authority. The letter lately received from the Court of Directors, signifying their pleasure that the said Nabob be restored to the Naib Subahship, fills me with the greatest astonishment, nor can I penetrate the motive of it. Perhaps the circumstance of my having arrived at years of maturity has not yet reached the ears of the Court of Directors in Europe; and notwithstanding the number of children and dependents which I have, they still reckon me an infant; otherwise would they have determined to place my family under the authority of another, and written you for that purpose? In a word, it was necessary that I should inform you of my situation, which I formerly did; and it depended on you to transmit such information to the Court of Directors.

It is notorious that the meanest of the people will not admit of the authority of a stranger in their families, how can it then be expected of
 I me?

me? In a word, I administer the affairs of the Nizamut, which are in fact the affairs of my own family, by my own authority, and shall do so; and I can never, on any account, agree to the appointment of the said Nabob to the Naib Subahship, which would bring the greatest dishonour, disgrace, and contempt on me. I will never, of my own consent, admit the said Nabob to any authority in the affairs of the Nizamut, Foujedaree, and Adawlet, dependant on the Nizamut; and from motives of justice I expect, that regarding the rights which my late father is allowed to have had on the Company, you will never consent that any compulsion be put in practice against me on account of this business, and that you will use every means for the preservation of my credit, honour, and dignity.

Council, 15th December 1779.

Read the letters from Mobareck ul Dowlah
and Mahomed Reza Khan.

Mr. Francis. I must request the attention of the Board to a short recapitulation of the principal steps taken, and declarations made by the Nabob and by this government, in relation to the removal of Mahomed Reza Khan, and to the succeeding distribution of the several offices held by him.

In a letter received from the Nabob on the 17th of November 1777, he desires, "That
 " Munny Begum may be allowed to take on
 " herself the administration of the affairs of the
 " Nizamut, without the interference of any other
 " person whatever;" and adds that, "by this
 " the Governor will give him compleat satisf-
 " faction."

In his next letter, he desires "that Mahomed
 " Reza Khan may be removed," and expresses his
 hopes that, "as he himself is now come to years
 " of maturity, and by the blessing of God is
 " not so devoid of understanding as to be in-
 " capable of conducting his own affairs, the
 " Governor will give him the management of
 " the affairs of the Nizamut, and of his own
 " household, together with the administration
 " of the Adawlet and Phouzdarry." As the
 Court of Directors themselves have fully discus-
 sed the claims and pretensions stated in this let-
 ter, I shall not attempt to add any thing to their
 observations thereupon.

On the 7th of March 1778, a letter from the
 Governor informs the Nabob, that "it had been
 " agreed, that his Excellency being now arrived
 " at years of maturity, the control of his own
 " household, and of the Courts dependent on
 " the Nizamut and Phouzdarry, should be placed
 " in his hands, and Mahomed Reza Khan was
 " directed at the same time to resign his autho-
 " rity to the Nabob."

In

In a letter received from the Nabob, on the 4th of May 1778, he says, " he has made choice of Sudder ul Hoc Khan to fill the station of Naib of his Adawlet and Phouzdarry, and of Raja Gourdots for the office of the Nizamut; and desires that Mahomed Reza Khan's salary may be divided between those two persons and the two Begums." On the requests contained in the letter, and immediately complied with, I have nothing to add to the remarks stated in my minutes of the 7th of May 1778, except that there could not be a grosser contradiction than first to remove Mahomed Reza Khan, on pretence of the Nabob's executing the several offices himself, and immediately afterwards to appoint other persons to execute those offices, and at the same time to give a considerable portion of the salary annexed to them to the two Begums.

Sudder ul Hoc Khan, in a letter received 1st September 1778, says, " His Highness himself is not deficient in regard for me, but certain bad men have gained an ascendancy over his temper, by whose instigation he acts." After complaining of the slights he receives from the Nabob, he adds, " Thus they cause the Nabob to treat me sometimes with indignity, at other times with kindness, just as they think proper to advise him; their view is, that by compelling me to displeasure at such unworthy treatment, they may force me either to relinquish my station,

“ station, or to join with them and act by their
 “ advice, and appoint creatures of their recom-
 “ mendation to the different offices, from which
 “ they might draw profit to themselves.”

In a subsequent letter to the Governor, Sud-
 der ul Hoc Khan says, “ The Begum’s ministers,
 “ before my arrival, with the advice of their
 “ counsellors caused the Nabob to sign a receipt,
 “ in consequence of which they received, at two
 “ different times, near 50,000 rupees in the
 “ name of the officers of the Adawlet, Phou-
 “ darry, &c. from the Company’s Sircar; and
 “ having drawn up an account current in the
 “ manner they wished, they got the Nabob to
 “ sign it, and then sent it to me.” In the same
 letter he asserts, that these people have the Na-
 bob intirely in their power.

On the 1st of September 1778, the Governor
 informs the Nabob, that it is highly expedient
 that Sudder ul Hoc Khan should have full con-
 trol in all matters relative to his office, and the
 sole appointment and dismissal of the Sudder
 and Mofussil officers, and that his seal and signa-
 ture should be authentic to all papers having re-
 lation to the business entrusted to him; I there-
 fore intimate to you that he should appoint and
 dismiss all the officers under him, and that your
 Excellency should not interfere in any one.

The Nabob, in a letter to the Governor re-
 ceived 3d September 1778, says, “ Agreeably
 “ to

“to your pleasure. I have relinquished all concern
 “with the affairs of the Phouzdarry and Adawlet,
 “leaving the intire management of them in Sud-
 “der ul Hoc Khan’s hands.”

Sudder ul Hoc Khan, in a letter received 30th September, says, “Yatibar Ally Cawn, Munny
 “Begum’s chief Eunuch, from the amount of the
 “salaries of the officers of the Adawlet and Phouz-
 “darry, which before my arrival he had received
 “for two months from the Sircar, made dis-
 “bursements according to his own pleasure. He
 “had before caused the sum of 7400 rupees, on
 “account of the price of mine and my Paisahere’s
 “Kellaats, to be carried to account, and now
 “continually sends a man to demand from me
 “four thousand three hundred and odd rupees,
 “as the balance of the price of Kellaats, and
 “constantly presses me to take it from the
 “amount of the salaries of the officers of the
 “Adawlet and Phouzdarry, and send it to him ;
 “and I shall be under the necessity of comply-
 “ing. I mention this for your information.”

The Governor General’s letter to the Nabob, dated the 10th of October 1778, contains a representation so pointed, and so very just, of the fatal effects which had attended the Nabob’s interfering in the administration of justice, that I shall insert it intire, but without any comment ; in fact it speaks too plainly to require one.

“ At

“ At your Excellency’s request, I sent Sud-der ul Hoc Khan to take on him the administration of the affairs of the Adawlet and Phouz-darry, and hoped by that means not only to have given satisfaction to your Excellency, but that, through his abilities and experience, these affairs would have been conducted in such a manner as to have secured the peace of the country, and the happiness of the people; and it is with the greatest concern I learn, that this measure is so far from being attended with the expected advantages, that the affairs both of the Phouz-darry and Adawlet are in the greatest confusion imaginable, and daily robberies and murders are perpetrated throughout the country.

This is evidently owing to the want of a proper authority in the person appointed to superintend them. I therefore addressed your Excellency on the importance and delicacy of the affairs in question, and of the necessity of lodging full power in the hands of the person chosen to administer them. In reply to which, your Excellency expressed sentiments coincident with mine; notwithstanding which, your dependents and people, actuated by selfish and avaritious views, have, by their interference, so impeded the business, as to throw the whole country into a state of confusion, from which nothing can retrieve it but an unlimited power lodged in the hands of the superintendant. I therefore request
that

that your Excellency will give the strictest injunctions to all your dependents not to interfere in any manner with any matter relative to the affairs of the Adawlet and Phouzdarry; and that you will yourself relinquish all interference therein, and leave them intirely to the management of Sudder ul Hoc Khan. This is absolutely necessary to restore the country to a state of tranquillity: and if your Excellency has any plan to propose for the management of the affairs in future, be pleased to communicate it to me, and every attention shall be paid to give your Excellency satisfaction. In the mean time; I have given directions to Sudder ul Hoc Khan to take the sole management of them into his own hands, and to apply assiduously to the restoration of tranquillity and good order in the country: and I must request that your Excellency will confirm them by similar orders to him, otherwise a measure which I adopted at your Excellency's request, and with a view to your satisfaction and the benefit of the country, will be attended with quite contrary effects, and bring discredit on me."

From the preceding correspondence, I think it appears beyond dispute, that the Nabob himself has hitherto been a mere cypher through the whole transaction, or rather an instrument, in the hands of Munny Begum and others, employed by them, and for their purposes only,

to

to accomplish the removal of Mahomed Reza Khan : That these people have made a most dangerous and iniquitous use of the Nabob's name and authority, while they had both at their disposal. And that the Governor General himself was convinced that the interference of the Nabob, or of those who acted for him in the affairs of the Nizamut, had been attended with the most ruinous consequences, which he accordingly endeavoured to obviate, by directing him not to concern himself in any shape in the conduct of the business intrusted to the Naib Subadar.

With respect to the Nabob, I shall only observe, that his letters involve him in a very disgraceful dilemma. If I could believe it possible that, freely, and of his own mere motion, he could recommend, “ *That Munny Begum should take on herself the management of the affairs of the Nizamut, without the interference of any other person* ; that he should in one letter desire to conduct the affairs of the Nizamut himself, and in the next, that a Naib should be appointed to conduct them for him, I should give little credit to the assertion with which these requests are accompanied, viz. “ *that he is not devoid of understanding.*” He may arrive at years of maturity ; but if, at the age of twenty-one, he does not perceive the folly and absurdity of such propositions, and such contradictions,

contradictions, I should despair of his ever arriving at years of discretion. On the other hand, if these letters are written for him, which I am thoroughly satisfied is the case; if he has no will of his own, and if the rights and authorities demanded in his name are in reality to devolve to Munny Begum, to her chief eunuch, and to the other persons of whose misconduct the late Naib Subadar made so many complaints to the Governor, what opinion are we to entertain of his Excellency's understanding and veracity; or on what ground can we commit the management of such important affairs to a young man so dependant on Munny Begum, and evidently so incapable of judging or acting for himself?

I now proceed to the last orders from the Court of Directors: they consider the whole subject in the same light that I do: they acknowledge no right of inheritance in the Nabob: they understand every ostensible accession to his power as a real one to that of Munny Begum: they deem it for the welfare of the country that the office of Naib Subadar should be continued; and they positively direct us forthwith to signify to the Nabob their pleasure, that Mahomed Reza Khan be immediately restored to it.

But notwithstanding they had a thorough knowledge of the facts, and were perfectly
G acquainted

acquainted with all the characters, they certainly were not aware of the possibility of such a case as now exists, or they would have provided against it. They did not foresee that their positive orders would not be enforced by this government, or that such orders would be disobeyed. When they read the Nabob's late letters, the false and frivolous pretences on which he ventures to counteract and defeat an arrangement which the Company have deemed necessary for the welfare of the country will astonish them no less than our acquiescence in such pretences.

First; He says, " that he had formerly written to the Governor that he had no farther occasion for a Naib, and would himself conduct his own affairs : " And he asserts, that since the dismissal of Mahomed Reza Khan to the present time, the business had been conducted under his own immediate direction. Is it possible he should forget, that in consequence of Sudder ul Hoc Khan's appointment, the Governor had expressly required him not to interfere, and that the Nabob had thereupon relinquished all concern with the affairs of the Fouzdarry and Adawlet, and left the entire management of them in the hands of the Naib. In his next letter he talks of the rights of his deceased father, as well as his own, as if the office of Nazim were hereditary. He talks of his claims

claims on the Company, as if he held by some other title than their friendship and protection; or, as if either he or his father had any right in the Subadary beyond what they derived from the voluntary acts of the Company, or of their representatives. He says, he never will admit Mahomed Reza Khan to possess any degree of authority in his family; and that as Sudder ul Hoc Khan is dead, he shall take on himself the management of the business. In his last letter he observes, that Mahomed Reza Khan was at first appointed on account of his, the Nabob's, tender age, which required the assistance of a Naib; forgetting not only that a Naib Subadar was appointed, and the office executed without objection during the government of his predecessors, but that he himself had submitted, about a year ago, to the appointment of Sudder ul Hoc Khan; and that the latter continued to execute his several offices till his death, with powers totally and avowedly independent of the Nabob: he forgets, or perhaps he does not know, that the treaty of March, 1770, by which alone his rights, whatever they may be, were created, provides for the appointment of a Naib of the provinces, to be invested with the management of affairs; and that this Naib was appointed at the instance of the Governor and Gentlemen of the Council. In the same letter the Nabob declares, that he administers the affairs of the Nizamut *by his own authority, and*

shall do so; and that he never can, on any account, agree to the appointment of Mahomed Reza Khan to the Naib Soubaship.

The Governor General's letter of the 10th of October, 1778, will shew the Company not only in what manner this important business is likely to be conducted, and what opinion the Governor General himself entertains of the Nabob's capacity, but that neither were his supposed rights and the maturity of his age attended to at that time, nor his personal inclinations consulted. Notwithstanding all his claims to the Phouzdarry and Adawlet, the Governor's pleasure divested him of both, and left him without an option. These, however, are not the first and immediate objects of consideration. A new and unexpected question is now before us. The Company's orders are disobeyed on pretended principles, which suppose the existence of an authority in these provinces independent of the authority of Great Britain over them. That of the Court of Directors is the only medium by which the subjection of Bengal to Great Britain is held and secured. In opposition to it the Nabob declares, that *he acts by his own authority, and shall continue to do so*. I do not know what name the law will give to disobedience of the Company's lawful orders by this Board; or whether such disobedience, directly avowed by ourselves, would not be less criminal,

criminal, and in its consequences less dangerous, than under the form which it now assumes : but every man must see which way the present example leads, and what use may be made of it. If some vigorous measure be not immediately taken by the Company to disarm the Nabob of all means of resistance, or at least to deter him from attempting it again, their dominion over Bengal is not secure. I am sorry this inexperienced young man should have been so unhappily advised. He does not know on what dangerous ground he treads. He forgets himself too grossly when he disobeys the Company's positive orders, and in the same breath tells the Governor General, " You are the master and my patron, and I can take no measure without first communicating it to you."

The Company will consider whether this avowed distinction between them and their local representative be not something more than disrespectful; or whether their injunctions would have been slighted if they had been accompanied by the usual and proper requisition on the part of the Governor General and Council, which I repeatedly recommended without success. Other and more alarming reflections will naturally succeed. The ostensible shadow of the Nabob's authority may in time find a substance to support it. If the spirit of party and faction, which prevails through every department

partment of government, and through every other rank of life, should reach to the Seapoys, it would be a painful, but not a difficult, task, to count the few remaining steps which lead inevitably from that state of things to final dissolution. At whatever distance that danger may appear to be, yet, if the course we are in points directly to it, I trust that the wisdom of the Company will not deem it unworthy of their instant consideration. The same measures by which a great and imminent mischief might have been prevented will not be sufficient to correct or retrieve it!

I now move that it may be resolved, That the preceding letter from the Nabob is highly dissatisfactory to the Board; and that the Governor General be requested to signify the same to him, and to demand in our name his immediate compliance with the orders of the Company.

Mr. Wheeler. I agree to the motion.

Mr. Barwell. If any advantage was stated to derive to the Company by controuling the will of the Nabob, it might be a question with me how far the occasion would vindicate the compulsion proposed; but when no national benefit can accrue, nor is stated, I cannot give my assent to a very exceptionable measure.

Governor General. I shall take another occasion to declare my sentiments at large on the subject

ject of this motion. For the present I shall content myself with declaring, that I have gone to the utmost lengths prescribed to me by the Company's orders, and by my sense of my duty, and that I will not go beyond them.

The motion resolved in the negative.

Mr. Francis. Since it is resolved that the Board will not insist on the Nabob's compliance with the Company's orders, nothing is left for me but to move, as I now do, that the salary allotted by the Company out of their revenue for the support of the office of Naib Souba, amounting to three lack of sicca rupees per annum, or so much of it as was divided between Munny Begum, Baboo Begum, Raja Gourdass, and Sudder ul Hoc Cawn may cease, and be made a saving in the Company's treasury from the day when Sudder ul Hoc Khan died.

It is the Company's property, and if it be not employed in the manner they direct, it should not at least be applied to any other purpose.

Mr. Wheeler. I agree to the motion.

Mr. Barwell. I must desire that the fund from which this payment is made to the ministers of the Nabob be stated by the Accomptant General before I give my opinion on the motion.

Governor General. I object to the question in the terms of it, but consent to wait for the information required by Mr. Barwell.

Minute

Minute of Council the 20th December, 1779.

Considered the motion made by Mr. Francis at the last consultation, viz.

“ That the salary allotted by the Company
 “ out of their revenues, for the support of the
 “ office of Naib Soubah, amounting to three
 “ lacks of sicca rupees per annum, or so much
 “ of it as was divided between Munny Begum,
 “ Baboo Begum, Raja Gourdaß, and Sudder
 “ ul Hoc Khan may cease, and be made a
 “ saving in the Company’s treasury from the
 “ day when Sudder ul Hoc Khan died.”

Mr. Barwell. By the letter received by Mr. Croftes, the charge of the Nizamut allowances appears to be defrayed by the Company. There was, I find, a certain fund, under the name of the Sinking Fund, established upon the orders of the Company, limiting the personal charges of the Nabob to the sum of sixteen lacks, and reserving sicca rupees 15,81,860 per annum; and to this fund was charged certain demands against the Mogul government, which have since been totally liquidated, as will appear more particularly by a state of the fund which I have just now received from Mr. Croftes. If it was incumbent on the Nabob to discharge, out of the allowances made to him by our government, the different claims which appear to be stated in this account, I do not see any reason why the
 Company

Company should continue burthened with certain expences, which arise solely on the score of his government, while those means which he has of providing for the whole from his established allowances remain unapplied. By the present method it appears to me that the savings stated in the Sinking Fund are made totally at the expence of the Company, because the charges of the Nizamut, or country government dependant on the Soubah, instead of being disbursed from the sum allotted for the Soubah's government, are disbursed from the Company's means, and the claim on the score of the allowances fixed for the charges of the Soubah's government suffered to accumulate to the exorbitant sum of rupees, 90,04,188,7,4, as a debt due from the Company. This being the case, there appears to me an absolute necessity to correct an error, which has led Mr. Francis into the idea that the disbursements which are made by the Company are made by them out of their revenues, for the support of the office of Naib Soubah, amounting to three lacks of rupees per annum. While the Company hold this fund of 15,81,860 rupees per annum, of the sum of 31,81,860, which by treaty they expressly stipulate to pay for the support of the Soubah's government, it is not just that they should be charged with any expence to be disbursed on that account. I therefore Move, " That all expences that have been incurred, or shall in future be incurred,

H

" on

“ on account of the Nizamut, or country government department, or the Soubah, be set off against the claims of the Soubah, for such part of the stipend or salary allotted for the support of his government as has been retained by government for this and other express purposes directed by the Company.”—

I understand the motion made by Mr. Francis to have for its object the compelling the Nabob to accept of Mahomed Reza Khan for his minister, or to reserve the sum which is allotted as the due of Mahomed Reza Khan, to be disposed of by the orders of the Company. This motion being made on the presumption that the Nizamut officers are the officers of the Company, and in the pay of the Company, can only be supported upon that principle, I am therefore against the motion.

Mr. Francis's motion carried in the negative.

Mr. Francis. If I understand the preceding minute, the savings from which the Sinking Fund therein mentioned was constituted, viz, 15,81,860 sicca rupees per annum (accruing since the time when the pension of the Nabob Mobareck ul Dowlah, as settled by a treaty highly disapproved of by the Company, was reduced to 16 lacks by their positive orders) do not belong to the Company, and that something will be gained by charging that fund with the amount of the salary allotted by the Company,

out

out of their own revenues, for the support of the Naib Subadar. It is indifferent to me, and I believe perfectly immaterial to the Company, in what way the account is stated. The charge, if disbursed, comes out of the Company's treasury; it is immediately paid out of the collections of the division of Moorshedabad, as the Company will see by referring to our Letter to Mr. Martin, of the 11th of May, 1778. Am I to understand that Mr. Barwell means to make the Company debtor to the Nabob Mobareck ul Dowlah for the amount of the above savings? if he does, I wish it to be declared so in plain terms: they would by this time amount, as I believe, to 112 lacks of sicca rupees: If he does not, I cannot possibly discover the meaning or application of his motion. As for myself, I deny the fact, and all consequences pretended to be derived from it. On the remainder of Mr. Barwell's minute there is but little to be said, supposing it true that a *real* effective country government now existed, and that the affairs of the Nizamut did of right fall under the immediate administration of Mobareck ul Dowlah (all which is so manifestly contrary to the fact, that it will not bear an argument) still it would not follow that my last motion ought to be rejected. The sum which I propose to be reserved is not divided among the officers of the Nizamut: Mr. Barwell surely did not consider in what manner it is actually distributed; neither do I admit that my last motion had for its object *the compelling*

ling the Nabob to accept of Mahomed Reza Khan for his minister. It could not possibly have that effect; the point was already decided by a preceding resolution; and if, as I conclude, the sole object of the Nabob be to keep the amount of Mahomed Reza Khan's salary, and to distribute it among his family and dependents, our taking the money from him will not tend to compel him to reinstate Mahomed Reza Khan, by which he would equally lose it. If that were the only alternative proposed to him, he would certainly prefer the measure which freed him from the check of Mahomed Reza Khan's authority, and left every thing in his own hands.

I have said the mode of stating the account proposed by Mr. Barwell is a matter of indifference in itself; but as it implies a conclusion in which I do not concur, I am against the motion.

F I N I S.

A U T H E N T I C
A B S T R A C T S

O F

M I N U T E S

I N T H E

S U P R E M E C O U N C I L

O F

B E N G A L,

the late Contracts for Draught and Carriage Bullocks, for
victualling the European Troops, and for victualling FORT
WILLIAM; the Augmentation of General SIR EYRE COOKE's
Appointment, and Continuation of Brigadier-General SIB-
BERG's Emoluments, though superseded in the Chief Com-
mand, and a remarkable TREATY, offensive and defensive,
with the RANAH of GOHUR, a Marratta.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. ALMON opposite Burlington-House, Piccadilly,
MDCCLXXX.

P R E F A C E.

AT a time that the British empire is overwhelmed with taxes and debt, that the ravages of war are depopulating the realm, that the colonies and settlements abroad (which were the sinews of its wealth and superiority) are dismembering from it, and that unnatural discontents and feuds at home, are sapping and disuniting its internal resources and power; it becomes the duty of individuals, by the exposure of authentic facts, to exhibit before the Ministers of Government, and the Public, the fatal errors which have led to some of those unhappy embarrassments; and to rouse them to a sense of what they owe to their stations, and to themselves, as the means of saving a remnant, upon which to raise a superstructure, superior even to what it has been.

The abuses committed in the Supreme Council of Bengal are so voluminous, that it would

be almost impossible (however interesting the subject) to exhibit them to the public, so as to secure due attention to them, in any other shape, than by piece-meal.

The *contracts* which Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell carried into execution, by Mr. Hastings's *casting vote*, as Governor-General, against the remonstrances and votes of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler in the latter end of 1779; the advance, salaries, and emoluments voted to General Sir Eyre Coote, as Commander in Chief; and the continuation of a Commander in Chief's appointment to Brigadier-General Stibbert *after* he was superseded, have been topics of conversation in Britain; but the partial display of misrepresentation *designedly*, hath imposed upon the credulity of many. As these compose a part of the evils which threaten the speedy extinction of the East-India Company, and subversion of the British commerce and possessions in India, they are made the subject of the following sheets, at a time that Ministers are again obliged to bring the affairs of the Company before Parliament. A Treaty of a curious nature and complexion with the distressed and reduced Ranah of Gohud is annexed, as well to shew the real principles of action,

P R E F A C E.

action, as the unaccountable infatuation which have guided the political faculties of men, cried up in this country, as prodigies for superior talents. Other facts are to follow forthwith, amongst which the origin and history of the present Marratta war, the late war whereby the Company's troops, *as mercenaries*, exterminated the Robilla nation, and the present actual situation and disposition of the several states and powers in Hindostan, combined and closely ligued into a strict confederacy against the English, on principles of self-preservation.

In March 1777, there were above £.1,500,000 sterling unappropriated in the treasuries of Bengal. In August 1778, Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell pledged themselves, that after making liberal allowances for all extra contingencies, there would remain unappropriated in the Treasury, on the 31st of March following, £.2,056,000; yet at the prefixed period, there was not £.10,000 unappropriated. And by a positive resolution which originated under Mr. Hastings's pen in the month of November 1778, the Company's investments were in future re-
duced

duced from 140 to 100 lacks of rupees. The last estimate of probable resources and actual disbursements, from March 1780 to April 1781, unanimously authenticated by every Member of the Council Board, and transmitted to the Court of Directors, discovered a real deficiency of near £.300,000, after accounting for, and appropriating the deposit of £.359,000, in Fort William. The Treasury of Oude, which paid a subsidy of about £.950,000 a year to the Company, was exhausted, and the Company's troops in the provinces dependent upon the Nabob, were in arrears, some six, and none less than three months. Native troops in India are like the Swiss troops in Europe; the stoppage of pay is the stoppage of service; mutiny and desertion are the certain consequence; and the troops regularly trained and disciplined by the Company, will augment the armies of their enemies. What the event will be, needs no prophetic faculty, unless measures, as well as men, are changed.

M I N U T E S

IN THE

S U P R E M E C O U N C I L

OF
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B E N G A L

O N T H E

B U L L O C K C O N T R A C T.

August 31st, 1779.

Minute from Mr. *Ficous* and Mr. *Wheeler*.

WE have great reason to complain of the uncommon hurry and precipitation, with which the proposed contract for supplying the army with draught and carriage bullocks for five years has been engrossed and brought before the board to be executed on Thursday the 26th instant. Considering the very extraordinary charge which the Company is to incur by this contract, and the number of new and intricate clauses and provisions of which it consists, it was the secretary's duty to have prepared a draft of the contract, and to have submitted it to the approbation of the board, before he gave directions to the attorney for having it engrossed. This necessary form not having been observed,

B

we

we have not a sufficient time allowed us to consider every article of the contract, with the attention it deserves; but this shall not prevent our laying before the board such remarks as immediately occur to us, in hopes that they may still be early enough to induce the other members to weigh the subject more deliberately, and not to put their names to an instrument, in which, as we think, the Company's interest is entirely sacrificed, and their orders flatly disobeyed. If, nevertheless, a majority of the board should persist in their intentions to execute the contract, we shall have done as much as depends upon us at present, by stating our objections to it, and shewing the consequences that must attend it, supposing the contract to take effect.

We have already referred to the Company's instructions relative to contracts in general; but as we find that in the year 1770, the court of directors had entered into a very minute enquiry, concerning the particular contract for furnishing draught and carriage bullocks, we beg leave to annex a copy of the order they gave at that time, from which we shall only quote the following words in this place, that the members of the board who have it in contemplation to give away the contract for five years, may know at the same time, that they are setting the Company's authority at defiance :

“ It is our express order, and we hereby positively direct, that you do not fail every year, to advertise for, and receive such proposals, as may be offered for supplying the troops with provisions, and for furnishing draught and carriage bullocks to be employed with our army. And that you do in all cases accept those proposals, which may appear the most reasonable in point of charge.”

The annexed paper No. 2, contains a comparison of the expence of the present establishment of bullocks, supposing

supposing it complete according to the contract now existing, with that which is to be created by the proposed contract. By this it appears that the former is Sicca rupees 13,786 : 3 anas per month, and the latter Sicca rupees 58,629 making the enormous difference or increase of Sicca rupees 44,842 : 13 anas per month. On this footing the bullock contract will cost the Company, no less than current rupees 8,16,120 per annum, for five years certain, or current rupees 40,80,600. (408,060l. sterling) And this excessive charge cannot, according to the terms of the contract, be reduced a single rupee during the five years; at the same time that openings are designedly left to increase it considerably.

We solemnly protest against every attempt to load the Company with such an immoderate expence, and particularly against the intention, to fix it irrevocably for any term of years. In the contract now existing, and in all the former bullock contracts, a clause has been invariably inserted, by which the Company or the Government here, or even the Colonels of the brigade, had a power reserved to them of discharging any number of superfluous, or unnecessary bullocks, giving one month's notice to the contractor; but no such clause is inserted in the intended contract, so that the Company must at all events, keep up the entire number of 6700 bullocks for five years, or at least pay for them, under every change of circumstances whatsoever, and even though they should find it necessary to reduce or new model their army in the mean time.

In the proposed contract no distinction is made between draught and carriage bullocks, or whether within or without the provinces. Every bullock is to be paid for at the rate of Sicca rupees, 8 : 12 anas, per month,

R. A. P.

or Sonat rupees, 9. 2. 3 $\frac{1}{2}$, including the divers.

B 2

By

By the present contract without the provinces, a draught bullock employed or unemployed R. A. P.
 is Sonat rupees — — 5 : 0 : 0
 Carriage ditto — — 3 : 10 : 0
 Draught and carriage unemployed within the provinces — — — 2 : 9 : 6
 And for this he feeds them, and finds them in divers, pads, ropes, &c.

The difference between the two rates is so extraordinary, that we imagine no member of the board, who gives his attention to the subject, will ever consent to it.

In the third article of the proposals, it is stated that condemned bullocks shall be thrown on the hands of the contractor, but without any penalty, which we think there ought to be, considering how much the service may suffer; and that he is allowed 12 Sicca rupees per annum, for every bullock in the army, to make good losses that may happen by the enemy, death, *rejection*, &c. besides a bounty of 10 Sicca rupees, for every extra bullock found, upon notice given.

He is to incur a penalty of, three times the actual Bazar price of the gram, if the bullocks are not victualled agreeably to the terms of the contract. The latter part, the commanding officer of the brigade, and commanding officer of the artillery may certify on the bills; but as the commissary-general is to be the check, how is he to know the *actual bazar price* of gram at the several stations? We think it would be much better to have the penalty fixed at a certain rate.

By the fifth article the contractor is to be paid by extra bills, for any increase of food given to the bullocks, by orders of the commanding officer. This we think highly unreasonable, as the terms of the contractor

ter are in themselves already much too liberal, and it is the interest of the contractor, that his bullocks should be properly fed.

The expence of drivers, firdars-drivers, bridles, picket ropes, pads, &c. was never before charged to the Company.

Losses by forced marches, or over loading, are to be made good to the contractor. He is allowed a Sicca rupee per month for each bullock, to make good losses by the enemy, death, rejection, &c. Every bullock that dies, will be drawn for, on either of those accounts. It is difficult to ascertain the fact, but if the clause is admitted, at what rate is the commissary-general to allow, within and without the provinces for draught, and for carriage bullocks which have died, owing to those two causes; and what proof or evidence is he to accept, that the death of the bullock was owing to one or other of the above causes?

Is it meant that the bullocks loaded with grain for feeding the other bullocks, are to be at the expence of the Company? If not there was no occasion for the fourteenth article, as they always have been, and must be allowed to attend the army.

The bounty of ten Sicca rupees for every extra bullock found in a certain time, as expressed in the fifteenth article, is unnecessary, at least the sum proposed is a great deal too much. By the present contract nothing is allowed for the purchase of bullocks, unless required within a month's notice; and if, on such emergency, the usual price of bullocks should be thereby enhanced, he is allowed for any extra price, that may have been ac-

R. A.

tually paid more than Sonat rupees, 12. 8. for each draught

draught bullock, and 8 Sonat rupees for each carriage bullock, but if he does not pay more than those prices, he is to be allowed nothing.

In the bounty there is no distinction made, betwixt extra draught, and extra carriage bullocks. The former ought surely to cost more than the latter, at least there has been always a difference, both in the price, and charges of feeding, hitherto. Considering the time allowed in the fifteenth article, no bounty should be given; the contractor is sufficiently rewarded by the increase, without any other emolument.

If the bills are not presented by the contractor's agent to the officers, whose duty it is to countersign them, within a certain number of days after the muster, the contractor should be liable to a deduction of 10 per cent. Many irregularities are produced, from bills being drawn sometimes ten and twelve months in arrears. After the words, "that the bills should not lay above eight days in the commissary-general's office," it should be added, "unless he has occasion to make reference to the officers who have countersigned the bills," as this will necessarily occasion some delay.

In order to enable the contractor to execute this most lucrative contract, he is to have the value of three-fourths of his flock, advanced to him out of the treasuries when he may require it: and by the following article, we are to provide him with a piece of ground for keeping his cattle. As we know not in what terms, to express our disapprobation of these extravagant conditions, we shall content ourselves with stating them for the Company's observation.

The penalty of 50 Sicca rupees for every bullock, hired from officers civil or military, seems to us a nugatory

tory clause, thrown out for no other purpose but to give the contract an air of rigour, which by no means belongs to it. Such a penalty can never be enforced.

To conclude, we suggest these cursory remarks to the board, as fatal to the proposed contract on its own principles, and exclusive of the legality of granting a contract on any conditions for the term in question. Many other objections we doubt not would occur to persons better versed in the subject than we are; but what has been said we trust will be sufficient to justify to the Company and to the public in general, the part we have taken, or may hereafter take in resisting so enormous and unprecedented a waste of the Company's property.

(Signed) P. FRANCIS.
E. WHEELER.

No. II.

COMPARISON between the expence of the present
and proposed BULLOCK CONTRACT.

Proposed Contract.

4000 Draught	Bullocks at 5. 12.	38,525
2700 Carriage		
A driver to every two bullocks is 3,350 at 5.		16,750
A firdar driver to every six pair of bullocks		
is 559. firdar driver at 6.		3,354
Total monthly expences of the proposed con-		
tract	<u> </u>	<u> </u> 58,629
		PRESENT

PRESENT CONTRACT TERMS and number of bullocks with the army, supposing the same number with the temporary as with the 1st brigade in the field, agreeable to the establishment.

640 draught bullocks with the 1st brig. in the field.

640 ditto ditto, with the temporary brigade.

	R.	A.
1280 draught bullocks, at 5 rupees	—	6,400 : —

1125 ditto with the two brigades at the
Presidency and Burrampore

36 ditto with the light infantry

R. A.

1161 draught bullocks, at 3. 7.	3,990 : 15
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306 carriage bullocks with the 1st brigade.

306 ditto ditto with the temporary brigade.

R. A.

612 carriage bullocks, at 3. 10.	2,218 : 8
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550 ditto with the two brigades at the
Presidency and Burrampore.

14 ditto with the light infantry.

R. A.

564 carriage bullocks, at 3. 3.	1,797 : 12
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Total monthly expence of the bullocks
for the army, by the present contract,
supposing the establishment complete.

Sonat Rupees. 14,407 : 3

Monthly expence of the bullocks for the army, by the proposed contract.	Sicca Rupees. 58,629 : —
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Monthly

Monthly expence of the bullocks for
the army, by the present contract.

Sonat Rupees 14,407. 3. or 13,786 : 3

Difference of expence betwixt the pre-
sent and proposed contract, monthly *Sicca Rupees.*
44,842 : 13

Total expence of the proposed con-
tract per annum, according to the fixed
establishment, and exclusive of all addi-
tional allowances provided for in the said
contract,

	R.	A.	P.	
Current rupees	8,16,115	: 10	: 11	
				Ct. Rs. A. P.
Ditto for five years				40,80,578 6 : 7

BOARD OF INSPECTION.

9th September, 1779.

Mr. FRANCIS,

IN addition to the remarks contained in Mr. Wheler's
minute and mine of the 31st of August on the pro-
posed bullock contract, I beg leave to lay the annexed
papers before the board, and to request the attention
of the members to the calculations contained therein,
before any farther steps are taken in this business. Cal-
culations of this nature ought to have accompanied the
plan in the first instance, that the board might know
what they were doing, and not be hurried blindly into
engagements, extent, consequences, and expence, of
which they could not possibly have formed an idea.

The annexed papers, number 1 and 2, shew the full amount of all the draught and carriage bullocks necessary for the compleat service of the three entire brigades, supposing them all in the field; by which it appears, that the number of bullocks, proposed to be kept up for five years, exceeds what the whole army, on a compleat war establishment, would require, by 2769. These supernumerary bullocks, therefore, if they are maintained, will have nothing to do. There are not guns or carriages for them to draw. There is literally nothing for them to carry. But before this time, who ever heard of keeping up a compleat war establishment of bullocks, without actual service in any part of the provinces. What are the bullocks to do at the presidency? What are they to do at the different cantonments? In truth I might with great reason ask (with the exception of a very moderate number) what occasion have we for an establishment of bullocks any where? When they are wanted, they may be hired, or press'd, as in fact they have been hitherto, notwithstanding the contract; but admitting that some establishment ought to be maintained, it will be difficult to assign a good reason why it should exceed the complement necessary for the troops in the field; supposing a third of the army to be maintained on a war establishment, the number of draught and carriage bullocks, taken together, ought not to exceed 1,310.

On this principle, which of itself would lead us into an exorbitant expence, the proposed contract is to maintain 5390 bullocks more than can be wanted, which, for five years, at the new contract rates, will be found to amount to the enormous sum of current rupees 32,82,510, absolutely given away out of the Company's treasury, or squandered without any necessity or service whatsoever.

(n)
No.

Contains a calculation of the difference of expence between the proposed establishment, and that which would be necessary for the whole army in the field, calculated at the new contract rates. Even on this extravagant principle, the expence would fall short of the proposed contract by seventeen lacks of current rupees in five years.

No. IV

Shews what the expence of a complete establishment for the whole army would amount to, if calculated at the *present* contract rates. The difference between this and the proposed rates and numbers, amounts in five years to no less than current rupees, 30,48,854, or very near three hundred and five thousand pounds sterling.

If a majority of the Board, with such glaring facts before them, can entertain a thought of proceeding farther in the proposed contract, I cannot hope that they will pay the least regard to any observations I can make upon it. To acquit myself, nevertheless, of the duty I owe to the Company on this important occasion, I think it right to state the following general observations. My present ill state of health will not allow me to go so deep into the subject, as I should do at another time.

Although no evil is more severely felt, yet there is not apparently any less attended to than the number of followers of the army: they consist of a multitude of predatory vagrants, and whatever tends to encrease their numbers, tends to embarrass and impede the service.

C 2.

Provisions

Provisions and forage are not only rendered *constantly* dearer than they need be, but frequent scarcities of both are occasioned by this rabble, which thereby bring into imminent danger the safety and existence of the troops.

In this view the number of bullock drivers proposed, appears to be highly detrimental to the good of the service. It would not be credited in Europe, that 12 bullocks should require seven keepers. But this is not the extent of the evil; some, at least, of those seven, will carry with them their families. Those have their attendants with bullocks, or *tattoes*, to carry their provisions; and those must have drivers, who also must have provisions. Thus the number of followers increases beyond calculation; measures tending to reduce their numbers would be useful indeed, and deserving of the highest applause. But what shall we say of schemes which manifestly tend to encrease them? What effect can they have, but to encrease the confusion of our camps, to enhance the difficulty of procuring forage and provisions, to extend and weaken the line of march, and, in the end, to make our army little better than a convoy for the baggage.

Having not had it in my power to enter into a particular consideration of the new victualling contract, I take this opportunity of declaring, that I entirely concur in Mr. Wheeler's remarks upon it. I find it is formed upon the same exorbitant principles with the bullock contract, and to be executed by the same persons; that is, a variety of concealed interests are to be provided for, under the name of Mr. Crofts. On this part of the subject I must observe, that the two contracts ought not, on any account, to be in the same hands; no one person is equal to the conduct of two such extensive concerns.

In

* Tattoes are small hardy horses.

In the second place, I must declare, that the present contractors, whoever they are, are the most improper persons that could be chosen for the like trust in future. The contracts were never so ill executed, as by the present contractors. Their bullocks have never been ready, or fit for service, when called upon ; and the provisions issued to the Europeans, particularly the beef, has been such as must have produced a mortality among them, if they had eaten it.

The contractor has never given an ounce of mutton to the Europeans in Fort William since February last ; in consequence of which, they have usually taken cow-ries in lieu of the carrion beef, with which he would have supplied them.

On the increase of the rates in both contracts, there is one general observation to be made, which, I think, must strike every man conversant in public business.

In engaging for the supply of any article whatsoever, the contractor proportions his rate of price to the quantity of the thing demanded. If he supplies a little, his rate, or price, must be proportionably higher. If he supplies a great deal, he can afford to reduce his terms, since the profit upon the whole compensates for the reduction on the rate of each specification. In the proposed bullock contract, this universal principle is manifestly reversed. The number of bullocks, on the pay of which the contractors profit is to arise, is increased in nearly the proportion of seventeen to nine ; and the period, during which the contract is to endure, is enlarged from one year to five. One would expect from this increase of the period, and the number, that the rates would have been proportionally diminished. On the contrary, however, the Company will find, that the rated pay of each individual

dual bullock, lumping the draught and carriage bullocks together, is double what it was.

Upon the whole, the terms, voluntarily contrived and given by Government, are such, as I presume, no man living would have presumed to have demanded, if the contract had been advertised in the manner prescribed by the Company's most peremptory and repeated orders.

(Signed)

P. FRANCIS.

No. I.

Proportion of Ordinance for one Brigade, consisting of one Regiment of Europeans, eleven battalions of Seapoys, and a detachment of the Corps of Artillery, shewing the number of draught bullocks necessary for dragging its train, and for that of the whole army.

4	twelve pounder brass guns, with carriage, ten bullocks to each	—	40
28	six ditto, with ditto, eight ditto	—	224
4	five and half inch howitzer, six ditto		24
29	tumbrils ammunition loaded, ten ditto		290
1	ditto treasure, ten ditto	—	10
2	carts, artificers, ten ditto	—	20
1	waggon for gin, sixteen ditto	—	16

Spare

Spare Carriage and Tumbrils.

1 for twelve pounders, eight bullocks	—	8
7 for six ditto, six ditto	—	42
1 for five and half-inch howitzer, six ditto		6
7 for tumbrils, six ditto	—	42
		<hr/>
		722
Allow one spare to every six bullocks		120
		<hr/>
Complement of draught bullocks for one brigade on service	}	842 3
		<hr/>
Ditto for three brigades	—	2526
Independant Chittagong battalion	—	30
Battalion of light infantry	—	30
		<hr/>
Total draught bullocks necessary for the field ordnance of the whole army, supposing it on actual service	—	2586

According to the establishment of 1777, the complement of ordnance for a brigade on service was 26 pieces. Since that period, 2 twelve pounders, and 2 howitzers, have been added, which, with the 6 guns of the three battalions of the temporary brigade that are to be incorporated into each of the other brigades, makes the present proportion 36 pieces.

No. 2.

Calculate of carriage bullocks necessary for carrying the musquet ammunition and military stores, attached to a brigade on service, supposing it to be of the strength

strength specified in No. 1. shewing the number necessary for the whole army, supposing it to be in motion.

196 Carriage bullocks will carry 329 barrels of musquet ball ammunition, each barrel containing 800 pounds, to — — 313,600

Supposing a brigade to consist of 9580 men, and that 8500 of them are fit for service, they will carry in their pouches, at 24 pounds per man 1,70,000

Total musquet cartridges for a brigade on service — — 4,83,600

50 Carriage bullocks will carry 160 lb. barrels of powder, being the usual proportion for service.

130 Carriage bullocks, and 20 haccaries, which are not provided by the contractor, it is believed, are sufficient for the carriage of the other stores in the magazine (No. 5.) exclusive of the above haccaries, the captains of battalion and quarter-masters are allowed 18, and the surgeon major 10 haccaries.

376

63 Spare bullocks in the proportion of one to six.

439 Total number of carriage bullocks necessary to be provided by the contractor for one brigade on service.

878 Add for two other brigades on service.

- 1317 Total carriage bullocks for three brigades.
 14 Allow for the Chittagong independent battalion;
 14 Allow for the battalion of light infantry.

1345 Grand total carriage of bullocks.

No. 3.

Calculate of the extra expence that would be incurred by the number of bullocks and drivers, supposing no excess in the rates proposed.

4000 Draught } Bullocks at 8. 12. or 923. $1\frac{1}{4}$ includ-
 1345 Carriage } ing drivers wages as proposed per month,
 Sicca Rupees 58629.

6700

2586 Draught } Bullocks necessary for the } R. A.
 1345 Carriage } train of the whole army, at }
 } the above rate per month, } 34,401 : 4
 } Sicca rupees }

Monthly difference Sic, Rup. 24227 : 12

Annual difference — — 290733 : —

Difference that would be occasioned in
 five years by mere excess of bullocks,
 at the rates proposed, Sicca Rupees R. A. P.
 14,53,665, or current rupees 16,86,251 : 6 : 5

(' 18)

No. 4.

Comparison between the expence of the proposed contract, and the necessary number of bullocks for the whole army at the present contract rates, supposing half the troops to be without, and the other half within the Provinces, and the whole on actual service.

Proposed contract establishment, as before stated, per month
Sicca rupees 58629

Necessary Establishment.

1293	Draught bullocks	}	6465
	without the provinces, at 5 rup.		
673	Carriage ditto,	R. A.	
	ditto, at	3 10	2439 10
1293	Draught	}	at 3 7 4414 11
672	Carriage.		
		Bullocks in provinces	
		at 3 3	2142

Sonat rupees 15491 5 or Sa. 14823 10

Monthly difference, Sicca rupees 43805 6

Annual difference 525664 8

Diff. in 5 yrs. Son. rups. 2628322 8
or current rupees — 30,48,854 1 7

Proof of the difference.

Annual expence of the proposed contract, Sic. Rups. 7,03,548,
or Cur. Rups. 8,16,115 10 11
which for 5 yrs is curt. rups 40,80,578 6 7

Annual

Annual expence of the necessary
 . establishment, according to the
 present contract rates, Sicca Ru-
 pee, 1,77,883 8, or Current
 Rups. 2,06,344 13 9 $\frac{1}{2}$. which
 for five years is Current Rups. 10,31,724 5
 Diff. as above, Current Rups. 30,48,854 1 7

Board of Inspection, September 1779.

Mr. *Wheler*. In addition to Mr. Francis's accounts, I beg leave to present the accompanying calculate, No. 5. in order to demonstrate, that even upon the extravagant supposition of the necessity of keeping up a constant establishment of 6700 bullocks, an excess of expence will arise, in 5 years from the exorbitant increase of the constant rates, of no less than Current Rupees 23,44,191 : 8 : 5. being above two hundred and thirty four thousand pounds sterling; and having established this fact, which, with what Mr. Francis has said, sufficiently exposes the complexion of this transaction, and cuts off every possible plea of justification. I have at present only to add, that I join Mr. Francis in reprobating the projected contract, as a measure big with the most ruinous consequences to the Company.

(Signed)

E. W.

Calculate of surplus expence that would arise from the increase of rates, supposing the whole number of Draught and Carriage Bullocks specified in the *proposed* contract to be necessary, and one half of that number to be without, and the other half within the Provinces.

4000 Draught	} Bullocks, being the	Sic, Rups.
2700 Carriage		
	proposed contract	
	establishment, as	
	specified in No. 3.	58629 : —

2000 Draught Bullocks out
of the provinces, at
the present contract
rate, 5 Sonat Rupees
each, Sont. Rups. 1000

2000 Ditto within the pro-
vinces, at the pre-
sent contract rate,
R. A.
at 3 : 7 each — 6875

4000 Total draught bul-
locks proposed per
month, at the pre-
sent contract rates,
Sonat Rupees 16,875

1350 Carriage bullocks,
without the pro-
vinces, at the pre-
sent contract rate, at
R. A. R. A.
3 : 10 each, 4893 : 12

1350 Ditto within the pro-
vinces, at the pre-
sent contract rate, at
R. A.
3 : 3 each, 4303 : 2

2700 Total carriage bullocks, proposed at the present contract rate, per month 9196 : 14

To monthly expence of the proposed contract establishment of draught & carriage bullocks, at the present contract rates; Snt. R. 26,071 : 14; or 24,948 : 1 : 4
98

Monthly difference between the proposed and present contract rates ——— Sic. Rups. 33,680 : 14 : 7 ³⁴/₁₀₀

Yearly difference Sic. Rups. 4,04,170 : 15 : 2 ⁴²/₁₀₀

all extraordinary expence that would be occasioned in 5 years, by the mere increase of rates, supposing no excess in the number of bullocks proposed, Sicca Rupees, 20,20,800 : 12 : 2, or present Rupees ——— 23,44,191 : 8 : 5

Minutes on the Army Victualling Contract.

and the following letter from the Executor of the late Army Contractor.

Inspection

Inspection Board, 19th August, 1779.

Honoured Sir, and Sirs,

I HAVE been honoured through your secretary *with your proffer of certain alterations in the army bullock contract*; I voluntarily accept them, and having, with a view to the liquidation of my brother's estate, transferred its concern in this, as well as the victualling contract, to Mr. Charles Croftes, who was before a partner in them, I humbly request the new contracts may both be made out in his name, and farther hope, that as these two contracts have always been kept in the same hands, that they will now be both granted for the same term.

Fort William, 16th August, 1779. I am, &c.
(Signed) RICH. JOHNSON.

Agreed that the new contract for supplying the draught and carriage cattle, and victualling the troops of this establishment, be drawn in the name of Mr. Charles Croftes, and that the latter contract be extended for the same term as the former.

Mr. Francis. I object to it, and protest against it.

Mr. Wheeler. I have already given my opinion against the recital of either of these contracts for a term not exceeding one year, and shall not sign them; nevertheless, so far as relates to the inserting of one name instead of the other, I acquiesce, believing the party to have had a share in the former contract.

The Secretary lays before the Board, the following letter from the Executor to the late Army Contractor.

Sir.

Sir,

I HAVE received your letter of this date, and accept the terms it contains.

The contract allows 10 Sonat Rupees full batta, and 5 rupees for half batta, for beef per month, or 5 Anas, 1 Pice each man per day, full batta, and 2 Anas 8 Pice. per each man per day half batta, for the period that mutton is required, I agree to deliver it for 7 Anas 6 Pice. each man per day half batta, for the period that mutton is required, I agree to deliver it for 7 Anas 6 Pice. each man per day, full batta, and 3 Anas 6 Pice. each man per day, half batta.

I am, Sir,

I am, &c.

Yours,

(Signed) R. JOHNSON.

The Board agree to allow the difference required for the manner of the contract, but in the new contract they only allow the difference of one Ana and one Pice per man full batta, and proportionally for half batta, as by the custom of the service, though not specified on the present contract, beef and mutton ought to be distributed to the soldiers in equal quantities.

Mr. *Frazer*. I cannot agree in this resolution, because I am no judge of the prices of provisions, or whether the terms proposed are reasonable or not; the way to ascertain the cheapest terms on which government can be served, is by advertising publicly for proposals.

Mr. *Wheler*.—I can form no judgment of the propriety of the present request, for want of the proper calculations, which should accompany a proposal of this sort from the contractor, and those from the regular department of government necessary to contract with

with them. I beg to be favoured with the amount what one Ana one Pice. per man, per day, intended to be given in the new contract amounts to by the year. I likewise wish to have it ascertained, at the same time, what proportion mutton, for the six months mentioned in the contractor's letter, bears to beef in the six following months, and whether the quantity of each is to be delivered out equally; that is, whether during the six months that mutton is delivered, the garrison is to receive the same number of pounds weight in mutton, as in beef the six following months.

Governor General.—I have no objection to the latter part of the question remaining for consideration, but for the short remainder of the present contract, I propose that the difference he requires be allowed.

Letter from the late Army Contractor's executor,
to Mr. Baugh.

Sir,

I have received the honor of your letter of the 19th instant.

Having considered the difference that will be occasioned, by supplying mutton instead of beef, I find it to be one Ana six Pice. sonat, per man per day. For the delivery of beef at the presidency, I now receive five Anas and four Pice. In lieu therefore of the alteration you propose, upon my claim for the delivery of mutton, I beg leave to offer as a medium for the whole term of the new contract, that the contractor deliver at the presidency, mutton for the six hot months, (April to September inclusive) and during the remaining six months, mutton and beef every other day alternately; for which he shall be permitted to draw, six
Anas

Anas and 10 Pice. sonat per day,* throughout the whole year. This proposal only to vary under the regulation of full and half Batta, which ever the troops at the presidency may be entitled to receive.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

R. JOHNSON,
Executor to the late Contractor.

Governor General.—The offer made by the contractor, approaches very nearly to the resolution of the board, the proposition being since considerably varied by my suggestion to the contractor, as it appears to me necessary that the allowance of beef and mutton to the soldiers in the winter months, ought to be in equal quantities. I understand the price of mutton in Calcutta to be just double the price of beef, and the rate now proposed will be found on examination, to make up the exact difference between the provision of beef alone at the former rate, and of beef and mutton in the proportion of three-fourths of the latter, and one-fourth of the former at the common rate proposed.

I therefore agree to it.

(Signed)

WARREN HASTINGS.

Mr. Wheeler.—Almost every argument used in Mr. Francis and my minute of the 31st of August, on the bullock contract, applies with equal force to the present proposal for victualling the troops. The Court of Directors in the 134th paragraph of their general letter by the Mansfield, dated the 23d of March 1770, say,

“ It is our express order, and we hereby positively direct, that you do not fail every year to advertise for, and receive such proposals as may be offered, for supplying the troops with provisions; and for furnishing draught and carriage bullocks, to be employed with

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our

our army, and that you do in all cases accept those proposals, which may appear the most reasonable in point of charge; and you are also to take care in all your advertisements, a sufficient time be allowed before the expiration of the contract, which may then subsist, or the time which you may limit for receiving proposals for such contract."

Unless such advertisements are made, and a fair competition allowed, I do not see how the board can judge whether the contractor's proposals are reasonable or not. It cannot be expected that the members of this board can be competent judges of the comparative prices, between beef and mutton in all parts of this country, within and without the province, where troops may serve, or at what rates the contractor may be able to procure them, allowing for the difference, between wholesale and retail purchasers.

Such a question is more fit to be decided by professional men, than by members of this council, if left to make their offers, according to the orders of the Court of Directors. Some of them would without doubt bring the most reasonable proposals before the board, of which the nature of the service was capable, and it would then belong to the board to judge which offer was most advantageous.

I must however observe, that the contractor states the difference that will arise by supplying mutton instead of beef, to be one ana six pice sonat per man per day, and in consequence of engaging to deliver mutton for the six hot months, and mutton and beef alternately for the remainder of the year; he, in opposition to his own principles, requires to be paid the difference between the two articles, throughout the whole year.

I do

I do not believe the price of mutton will exceed that of beef, supposing the quality to be equal, and each consumed in its proper season, but granting that the former should exceed the latter, even to the extent stated by the contractor; under what pretence does he claim the addition of one ana and six pice per man per day, for the whole year, where he contracts only to change or vary the diet for three quarters of a year.

In other respects, I must consider myself as left entirely without the necessary information on this subject, and can therefore only lay before the Council, for the information of the Court of Directors, an estimate, shewing the difference and excess of expence, between the late contract and the present proposal, for victualling the European soldiers stationed at the Presidency, together with the further excess, provided the contract be extended to the supply of the whole European establishment, both within and without the provinces, which will be considerably increased when the establishment is completed, according to the proposals of the Commander in Chief.

I have already objected to the term, and I now object to the conditions of this contract.

Comparative view of the expence of victualling the European soldiers, stationed at the Presidency, betwixt the present and the proposed contract.

Present Contract.	St.	R.	A.	P.
Each man for 12 months, at 5 rupees	60	0	0	

Proposed Contract.	
Each man for 365 days at 3 annas 5 pices	
per day	77 15 1

E 2

Difference

Difference being an yearly excess on
the present contract for each man,
stationed at the Presidency — 17 15

77 15 1 77 15 1

The medium number of Europeans returned at the Presidency for the last three months, including those attached to the third brigade, to the company of Artillery brigade at the Presidency, and at Budge-Budge; the Invalid body-guard, and the European women and children, is 1645, w^l ch^t, at 17 rupees 15 anas 1 pice, makes the yearly excess, on the present contract for victualling the Europeans attached to the Presidency, Sonat rupees 29515 12 1

753 Europeans returned upon the medium of three months, with the second brigade at Burrampore, (but no women or children are included as they are not returned) on half batta.

81 Europeans at Chunar and Baxar on ditto.

834 Men at 17 rupees 15 anas 1 pice, the yearly excess for victualling one man, Sonat rupees — — 14964 3 6

197 Men returned on an average of three months, with the temporary brigade on full batta.

871 Men returned on an average of three months, with the first brigade on full batta

1068 Men

1068 Men at 35 rupees 14 anas 2 pices,
the yearly exception on the present
contract for victualling one man,
when on full batta — 38325 10

Total excess on the present contract for
victualling the Europeans of the army, if
the proposed contract be extended to the
whole European establishment, Sonat ru-
pees, per annum — 82805 9 7

Mr. Barwell and *Sir Eyre Coote* subscribe to the opi-
nion of the Governor General.

Resolved, That the proposals of the executor of the
late army contractor, viz. to supply mutton instead of
beef, for the provision of the troops serving at the
Presidency, from April to September inclusive; and
during the remaining six months, mutton and beef
every other day, alternately, for which he shall be al-
lowed six anas ten pice sonat per man per day, through-
out the whole year, only to vary under the regulation
of full and half batta, which ever the troops at the
Presidency may be entitled to receive—be agreed to.

Minutes on the contract for victualling Fort William.

Extract proceedings Military Department 9th August,
1779.

Extract minute by the Commander in Chief on the
general establishment and regulations of the army,
under the Presidency of Fort William, dated 7th
July, 1779.

Sir Eyre Coote.

I approve of the department of provisions and regulations respecting its being kept up.

Governor General.

Having received frequent remonstrances from the agent for this deposit concerning the heavy losses and inconveniences, to which he is subjected by the present indefinite term of his agency, which obliges him to purchase the different articles of the stores at the current prices of the markets, and in such quantities as are specified in the prescribed lists, which, in times of scarcity, can neither be procured of equal qualities, as in seasons of plenty, nor without an increase in the price, sometimes even greatly exceeding the rates prescribed in the table formed by the board. *The Governor General recommends that the agency be converted into a contract, and be fixed for the term of five years.*—The Governor General desires his motion to be inserted in this place, but to prevent any delay in passing the resolutions required, by the subjects expressly submitted to the board by the Commander in Chief, he desires that the opinion of the Board may be received upon it in circulation.

15th August.

Sir Eyre Coote,

I entirely concur in the motion of the Governor-General, as I am clear that a contractor can act cheaper, and of course perform the service better, by having his contract for a series of years than for one only, when his profit must be immense even to bear him harmless and much more to secure him a profit, and this is better known than I do, by members of this board, to be the general practice of Europe.

However, had I not these fundamental principles to induce me to support the Governor General's motion, I should still most heartily join in it from the long knowledge I have of the

the merits of Mr. Belli, whose abilities, honour, and integrity I know to be equal to any charge that Government can confer upon him, and which I am confident he will execute with as much advantage to his employers, as credit to himself, and those who place him in it.

(Signed) E. COOTE.

Mr. Wheeler,

As I have upon a very recent occasion assigned my reasons for preferring annual contracts to engagements of a longer period, and as I have likewise endeavoured to prove that no other can be entered into without subjecting on the one hand, the contractor to an unreasonable degree of risque, or the Company, on the other, to an improvident bargain, it remains only for me to add, that in my opinion, if pains were taken to select from among the variety of contracts that already have, or probably very soon will, become the subject of public discussion, it might prove difficult to take from the mass, one where the fitness of an annual contract in preference to a longer period was more striking, and where the arguments in favour of a contrary opinion, can with less effect or reason be applied.

The advantage and utility of annual contracts, are so well known in England, that I do not recollect a single instance among the Company's engagements, whether for military or naval stores, for provisions, or for any article either for export or home consumption, where the contracts or engagements have not expired within the year; and although I seem called upon by the Commander in Chief to evince the contrary practice, I must here declare, that those which I had the honour to be engaged in with government, were for no longer a period.

I may likewise further add, that the public received no small advantage from the short duration of those contracts,

tracts, yet sufficient encouragement was given to the contractors.

If then the fundamental principles of contracts are as I have stated them in favour of annual ones, or if the precaution is necessary, and generally adopted, in a country where the value of each article can be ascertained with so much facility and ease, and where either a rise or fall of the markets rarely exceeds five per cent. how much more expedient must a similar regulation prove in Bengal, where there is frequently a fluctuation of thirty per cent.

To prove the utility of entering into engagements for so long a period as five years, it is necessary, in my opinion, to state very different arguments from those made use of in the Governor General's minute, viz. It ought to be clearly ascertained that the articles to be contracted for, are subject to little or no fluctuation, and that they will certainly be procured at or about the same price, which regulates the markets at the commencement of the contract; without some such rule the contracting parties will become equally exposed to the ill consequences of long engagements, which shorter ones are better calculated to relieve, if not entirely exempt them from.

In addition to the above arguments it may be necessary to observe that a deposit of provisions in Fort William can only be required in the case of a war, or the apprehension of a war, and that many circumstances may happen which might render it quite unnecessary and leave the contract if extended to the time proposed, an useless burden and expence on the Company.

For

For these reasons I am against entering into any contract for a term exceeding one year.

(Signed)

E. WHEELER.

Mr. Francis.

EVERY objection urged against disposing of the bullock contract for five years in the manner proposed, in my opinion lies with greater force against the proposition. Both of them stand in direct contradiction to the 36th article of the Company's instructions to the board, in which it is ordered, " that all contracts with the conditions, be publicly advertised, and sealed proposals received for the same."

The business of supplying the fort with stores, has hitherto been performed by agency, and this mode was expressly chosen by the Governor General himself, because " *an advertisement for a contract for such stores would be improper. It would be to tell the world what provision was made for the defence of the garrison.*"

The Governor General now represents, that " *he has received frequent remonstrances from the agent of this department, concerning the heavy losses and inconveniencies to which he is subjected, by the present indefinite term of his agency,*" and on this ground recommends, " *that it be converted into a contract, and be fixed for the term of five years.*"

It is natural enough that the agent, after enjoying the most profitable employment, that I believe ever existed under this government, since January 1777, without any public complaint of those heavy losses, and inconveniencies, against which he now remonstrates, should wish to have it secured to him for five years longer.— It is also very natural, that at the approaching expiration

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of

of the government, he should feel some apprehension for the fate of his agency under a new one, and that he should use his interest with a majority of the board; if possible to put it out of their successors power to reduce his immoderate profits, or to make any new arrangement for the public service, in this important department.— But when he affirms that he has suffered heavy losses and inconveniencies, by the indefinite term of his agency, so extraordinary a proposition ought to have been accompanied with something like a proof. Nothing less than its being brought before us by the principal member of the board, could induce me to give it a serious consideration.

In opposition to it, I shall state some facts, which I believe will set the matter in a clear light.

1st. The amount of the provisions supplied by the agent since the commencement of his agency, is current rupees 370,252 prime cost, as per account annexed.— This sum is advanced to him by government, as fast as his supplies are purchased; consequently he has not been subject to any distress or difficulty to raise money.

He loses nothing on the head of interest, and if he is not very careless, or unskilful in his management, he ought to have been a considerable gainer on the original purchase of the several articles, independent of the profits he may make, by the occasional conversion of the stores at favourable opportunities. He has the favour and protection of government, to support him in his purchases; which, in this country, is no small advantage. He buys great quantities at a time, at what season he pleases, and is paid at the average rate fixed, by the bazar price of small quantities, that is, he buys in gross, and in effect sells in retail, and lastly, he trades with a stock purchased for him, with the public money.

2d. To secure the agent, however, against all possible losses, to enable him to keep a constant stock, and to reward him for his trouble, it was originally agreed to take the opinion of three of the most reputable merchants in Calcutta, what might be a reasonable commission on the value of the supplies, to answer all the above purposes; and Mess. Robinson, Killican, and Crostes, who were consulted on the occasion, reported, that twenty per cent. per annum, would be a reasonable commission. It was resolved nevertheless by the Governor-general and Mr. Barwell, against General Clavering's opinion and mine, that thirty per cent. per annum, should be allowed.

3d. The commission already drawn by the agent, on a supply of current rupees, 370,252 amounts to current rupees 220,912, that is since the 10th of March 1777. His annual commission on the above sum, amounts to current rupees 111,075, yet he complains that he suffers heavy losses and inconveniencies, by the indefinite term of his agency.

Nothing more I imagine need be said, to demonstrate the unreasonableness and inexpediency of any measure tending to continue the agency on its present footing. But independent of all other objections, I object to the proposed contract, as to an act exceeding the limits of our lawful authority.

If it be in the power of a majority of this board, at the moment of their own dissolution, to bind their successors by engagements for any term they think proper, and to disable them from correcting any existing abuse, it will be in vain for the Company or Parliament to change the administration of the Company's affairs in the country, and to vest it in other hands. That question however, if I continue in the government, shall be tried

in behalf of the Company; and if it be in my power, the exorbitant profits of this agency, in whatever shape it may be continued, shall be reduced. In the mean time, I protest against the proposition, and will not sign the contract.

(Signed) P. FRANCIS.

Mr. Barwell,

I have read with attention, the dissent and protest of Mr. Francis to the measure for continuing the supply of victualling stores with Mr. Belli, the present agent, who furnishes these stores.

The principles on which this dissent is grounded, might require examination, if the warmth with which it is made, and the intimation given in the concluding words of it, would allow any one who reads it, to doubt the influence under which it is written.

That species of disposition, which is established and maintained by the operation of an unremitted dependence on the will of rulers, is, of all others, most pernicious to a community, because every member of a community so circumstanced, must, when it systematically prevails, either preserve his station by servile compliances, or risk it by venturing to act on principles of freedom. In short, unremitted dependence for pecuniary benefits, is a constant bribe given to an individual, by the rules of every state, who annex it as a condition to the benefit they confer. I cannot therefore acquiesce in the reasoning I have heard advanced by the members in opposition, nor subscribe to their opinion, which would make the present agent, who furnishes and keeps up the deposit of provisions for Fort William, hold his office during pleasure.

The objections which are made to the commission of
fifteen

fifteen per cent. for furnishing the stores, and to the fifteen per cent. allowed to indemnify the agent for replacing the decayed and damaged stores, and for renewing the whole deposit every year, are indeed ingeniously stated, and the inventive powers appear racked to the utmost to make this commission, and this allowance, amounting in the whole to thirty per cent. strike the superficial reader as an exorbitant premium; but I will adventure to affirm on my own knowledge, of the perishable nature of the stores supplied and kept up, that it is not possible for the agent to derive much or any benefit, if he does not suffer a loss, which I really think he must from this part of his engagement. Where is the garrison in which a deposit of provisions is kept at the public charge, that does not condemn more than fifteen per cent. of such stores in the course of one year; over and above the heavy loss arising to the public, by the yearly renovation of the deposit? I believe the depot of the garrison of Gibraltar is not, nor can be maintained by the English government at so small an expence, while the supplies are contracted for, and the loss on condemned stores borne by the nation, as well as of those which, though not condemned, are sold off at the end of every year as being of a perishable nature, and though fit for immediate use, are not in a state of preservation, or capable of it, for the course of another season. And if this is the case, and it certainly is the case, fifteen per cent. for the renovation of the deposit of provisions for Fort William, and the loss arising from condemned stores, is a very moderate premium, much more moderate, I affirm, than the expence would be to our government, was a contract entered into for an annual supply, and the old stores in preservation and those condemned, sold at the end of every year for Government. Why it should be advanced as an argument against the mode proposed for keeping up a deposit in high and perfect preservation, that the agent possibly may do it without loss to himself, I cannot comprehend

comprehend, unless it means to affirm, by implication, that Government can keep up such a deposit with equal facility, and without loss, or little loss. If this is the position laboured to be established, I deny it, and the experience of every man must contradict it.

In what office of our Government, or in any Government, are stores of a perishable nature kept up without loss, and a heavy loss to Government. I am sure in no office that has ever fallen under my observation, and I call upon the other members for information if any office has, under theirs.

In all the offices of supply under our Government, advances are made on the application of our officers, and a commission of fifteen per cent. allowed on the rates fixed by Government on the articles to be supplied. On many articles this commission is reduced to nothing; as their real price far exceeds the rates—while on others it is enhanced by being below the rates. I dare affirm the agent for keeping up the deposit of provision for Fort William, would esteem himself very happy to draw his commission clear for the supplies, and disengage himself from the further allowance of fifteen per cent. with the condition annexed to it, of renewing and keeping up the deposit. But as I am convinced it is not for the interest of Government to remit this condition, and contract at fifteen per cent. simply for an annual supply, I can never acquiesce to make his office a mere office of supply, and subject the Company to the burthen some loss of renewing yearly such perishable stores; the perplexed and intricate manner in which the account annexed to Mr. Francis's minute is drawn, obliges me to oppose to it a more simple and comprehensive one, shewing the periods; the amount of the supplies, and the commission, to the 1st of May, 1779, from the 1st of May, 1777, in which period the first purchase of 150,231r. 8s. 3p. mult

must have been renewed twice at the expence of the agent, and the subsequent ones to the thirtieth of April once.

I will not propose that the commission drawn of fifteen per cent. in the course of the same period should stand opposed—I am convinced none of the other offices of supply are so low, or in which the services of the agents have a meaner reward.

I agree to the proposition for keeping up a depot of provisions for the garrison of Fort William, on the terms of the existing agency on a contract for five years.

The Governor General desires the following Minute may be recorded on the proceedings in reply to Mr. Francis's of the 17th of August :

Mr. Barwell has already so fully answered every objection urged by Mr. Francis, against the propriety of continuing to Mr. Belli, the agency for supplying the garrison of Fort William in provisions for five years, that any further remarks from me appear to be unnecessary, but when I consider Mr. Belli's situation in my family, and the acrimony of stile displayed in Mr. Francis's protest, as well as the several insinuations contained in it, I cannot help deeming the violent opposition he has made to my motion, as personal; and viewing it in this light, I shall trouble the board with a few remarks upon the subject, after having thankfully acknowledged how much I think myself obliged to Mr. Barwell (*whatever were his motives*) both for the readiness and ability with which he has refuted the arguments offered by Mr. Francis against this measure.

Mr.

Mr. Francis begins by observing, that this contract is in direct opposition to the Company's orders, and that the business has hitherto been performed by agency, &c.

† To furnish a deposit of provisions for the garrison of Fort William, is not business for proclamation, nor to be disposed of to the lowest bidder, for the reasons which I before used, and which Mr. Francis, I know not why, has quoted against it.

An agency with a fixed rate, and a fixed commission, is to all intents and purposes a contract. All that I have now proposed is, to fix the term, and to bind the contract by penalties.

I can by no means agree with Mr. Francis, that the agent victuallet enjoys the most profitable employment that ever existed in this government.

Mr. Livius has an agency with 15 per cent. commission on articles rated by former charges of commissaries, of course greatly above the real cost. Mr. Livius is professedly patronized by Mr. Francis, who passes his bills.—Nine or ten lacks thus paid to him, are yet unaccounted for.

In an answer to Mr. Francis's insinuation, that it is natural enough for the agent to wish to secure himself, before the expiration of the present government, *I avow the fact as to myself, as well as to the agent.*

When I see a systematic opposition to every measure proposed by me for the service of the public, by which an individual may eventually benefit, I cannot hesitate a moment to declare it to be my firm belief, that

that should the government of this country be placed in the hands of the present minority, they would seek the ruin of every man connected with me. *It is therefore only an act of common justice in me, to wish to secure them, as far as I legally can, from the apprehension of future oppression.*

Mr. Francis has grossly mis-stated my minute, when he says, I affirm the contractor has sustained heavy losses, by the indefinite term of his agency. I am sorry to add this to the many instances upon record, during the course of our debates, of the inaccuracy of Mr. Francis's quotations, and his subsequent reasonings in consequence.

I said he was "*subjected to many heavy losses, and some he has actually sustained in the purchase of articles at 20 per cent. above the table of rates;*" on the capital article of grain, he has indeed been a gainer, his purchases having been luckily made at a time of plenty, and his sales, with the public apprehension of a scarcity. His success in this instance has alarmed him for the future, and with reason.

Suppose the reverse had happened, with his indefinite agency, which may expire to-morrow, he can only venture to purchase what is immediately wanted, and that he is obliged to provide. He cannot venture to invest a large capital in distant commissions. Of course his purchases, by being made at hand, are from the dearest, as well as the nearest markets. He may buy his rice at 20 seers for the rupee; he may be under the necessity of selling it at 40, and this one article proves his ruin.

With what propriety can the profits of this agency be stiled immoderate?

The rates were fixed by accurate and actual rates of the market, and the agent was allowed the customary commission of 15 per cent. on the purchases, he was obliged to change the stores, and allowed for damages (which in many would be the loss of the whole, and in all of something) 15 per cent. on the prime cost, so sold. This Mr. Francis calls 30 per cent. and rates it as a clear profit.—Besides this drawback, the agent, as will appear from an inspection of his books, if called for, has frequently been obliged to purchase stores at a price far exceeding the allowances made to him by the Company.

In the purchase of

Ghee, he lost	—	20	per cent.
Moong	—	25	ditto
Turmeric	—	17½	ditto
Oil	—	52	ditto
Salt beef	—	33	ditto

He is likewise liable to losses in the transportation of goods to Calcutta, and by an adventure from Purnea last season, sustained a loss of 10,000 rupees.

Mr. Francis, stating the sum of current rupees 2,29,912, as a clear gain to the agent, makes no deduction for the losses I have specified, nor has he considered the decay, wastage, servants wages, cooley hire, and other unavoidable expences, attending the agency for near three years; but in order to swell this sum as much as possible, he has included in it, about 70,000 rupees, as received by the agent, though the risk for which it was paid to him will not expire 'till May, 1780.

Mr. Francis once thought differently of my plan :
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the words of his minute delivered on the 4th November, 1776, when it was first read at the Board, were, "*If the service be necessary in any degree, it is a service of the first necessity, and should not be stinted for the sake of any inconsiderable saving, which in the event perhaps might only be apparent.*"

I am firmly of opinion, and am happy to be confirmed in it by the sentiments of the commander in chief, that the service must continue of the first necessity, while we continue in possession of Fort William.

I also most heartily concur with the commander in chief in opinion, that the Board could not confer a contract of this importance on a gentleman of more honor and integrity than Mr. Belli, or who could more conscientiously discharge the duties of it.

In reply to Mr. Francis's observation, *that Mr. Belli enjoys the favor and protection of government*, I do most solemnly declare that he has never applied to me for the most trifling interference or support in his agency.

I have one remark to make on the subject of this agency since Mr. Francis has thought proper to make so pointed an attack upon it. He must remember how strenuously it was opposed by the late General Clavering in its several stages. His protests and remarks were transmitted to the Court of Directors, and were received at a time when our proceedings were rigidly scrutinized, and when every measure proposed by me which could be deemed in the smallest degree objectionable, underwent the severest comment.

My plan for supplying Fort William with provisions, passed without a remark; and this is to me a
 G 2 convincing

convincing proof that the Directors esteemed it to be highly beneficial to the company*.

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

Houghly, 2d October, 1779.

Mr. Francis,

I HAVE not seen Mr. Barwell's minute in which the Governor General affirms, that *every objection* urged by me against the contract proposed to be given to Mr. Belli for five years, is fully answered. I did not know that such a minute existed; and unless facts can be altered, I cannot for my own part conceive it possible, that mine can be refuted. The Governor General's minute was transmitted to me this morning.

If recrimination does not imply an admission of the charge, it certainly is no defence against it; I cannot allow that one abuse is justified by another; nor am I bound to answer any objections, whether valid or not, to the agency for stores held by Mr. Livius.—The Governor General and Mr. Barwell had just as much concern in giving it to him as I had.—*If it be liable to abuse, why is it not corrected? if his profits are too great, why have they not been reduced?* Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell have had absolute power in their hands for above three years.

It is said "that Mr. Livius has an agency with fifteen per cent. commission on articles rated by former charges of commissaries; of course greatly above the real cost." If the

Yet the Directors have severely censured it, in their letter by the General Barker; but being slow in their proceedings, it encouraged Mr. Hastings to infer in his own favour, that they had approved it.

the assertion were true in terms, it remains to be explained, even on the principle of precedents, how the giving fifteen per cent. to one agent, justifies giving thirty per cent. to another.—Mess. Robinson, Killican, and Croftes reported that 20 per cent. per ann. would be a reasonable commission to Mr. Belli. *Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, nevertheless gave him thirty.*—With respect to the military storekeeper's book of rates, the fact is, *that it was formed by the late Colonel Dow, with the approbation of the Board of Ordnance, not by the former charge of the commissaries, but by an enquiry into the actual Bazar prices of that period;* whether Mr. Livius gains or loses by those rates, is unknown to me. I believe that occasionally he may do both.—I have no right to examine his mercantile books, nor does it concern the service in question.

It is said that “*Mr. Livius is professedly patronized by me,*” I recommended him to the office of military storekeeper, and I would maintain him in the just rights belonging to it, on the same principle, on which I would insist on his performing the duties of it; thus far my patronage of Mr. Livius has extended.

But it is said, “*that I pass his bills;*” the assertion, as it stands expressed, may be supposed to be a mistake.—The Governor well knows, that I resigned the employment of comptroller of the offices from the end of December, 1778; and that I have repeatedly urged to him the necessity of requesting some other member of the board to undertake it from that period. Places of influence and profit, are not seen so easily relinquished. If the accounts of the public offices have not since been examined, the Governor General, I presume, will assign his reasons for it to the company; neither is it true, that I ever passed Mr Livius's bill in the sense plainly implied by the Governor: they

they were constantly examined by Mr. Baugh and his assistant, with the utmost strictness, before they came to me for their final confirmation. My diary is before the Court of Directors, it was not possible therefore, that I could favour Mr. Livius, or any body else, unless Mr. Baugh and I acted in collusion. I desire that he may be examined at the board upon his oath, and in my absence, concerning the manner in which I executed my part of the examination; and I most earnestly request of Mr. Wheeler, to make a motion in my behalf to this effect, at the next Board of Inspection; I leave it to the Governor General and Mr. Barwell to put such questions to him as they think fit. It would be much beneath me to make any other reply to the conclusion evidently meant to be drawn from the supposed fact "*of my passing Mr. Livius's bills,*" but that I receive it as it deserves,

Again it is asserted, "*that nine or ten lacs thus paid to Mr. Livius, are yet unaccounted for.*" I do not know what the amount of the military store-keeper's disbursements may be since December last, having no concern in the examination of his accounts. The secretary has the monthly accounts before him, and I desire he will state the amount in this place, (current

R's. A. P.

rupees 4,13,965 : 13 : 6) the military store-keeper's accounts of his disbursements being given unto him every month, and a balance struck before he receives a farther advance for the ensuing month, it cannot truly be said, that the sums he has received since December last, are unaccounted for. If his accounts are not examined, it is not his fault.

Any person unacquainted with the transaction of business in the military store-keeper's office, and who saw only in what circumstances, and with what ap-

parent view it is asserted, " *that nine or ten lacks thus paid to Mr. Livius, since December last, are yet unaccounted for,*" would naturally conclude that this money was all on account of his agency for the provision of military stores. For if it were not so, the comparison between his supposed profits, and those of Mr. Belli (to shelter which, Mr. Livius's name and office are manifestly introduced) proves nothing, and falls to the ground. Now the fact is, that the greatest part of the monthly sums issued to Mr. Livius, are advanced to him as military store-keeper, not as agent. Out of these he pays his own office charges by a fixed establishment; the establishment of the commissary general's office, with the price of all the articles furnished by Lieutenant Colonel Green by contract; the price of all the powder furnished monthly by the powder contractor; and many other contingencies. In the management of all these disbursements, the military store-keeper pays as fast as he receives, and has no profit whatsoever, not even that of having a sum of public money for a short time in his hands. It is a fact, not unworthy of notice in this place, that all the other heads of officers, receive their monthly advances twenty days before he does, owing to some difficulty of adjustment between him and the Commissary, by which in this respect they both suffer.

The following statement which I have desired the secretary to fill up, will shew what proportion the foregoing disbursements, bear to the total amount of the military store-keeper's advances, since December last.

First, Total amount of advances, from January, 1779, inclusive	Current Rupees: 442105 : 7 : 6
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Second, Amount of office charges,
as per establishment for ditto — 6899 : 8 : 0

Third, Amount paid to Lieutenant
Colonel Green, for ditto — 16321 : 7 : 8

Fourth, Ditto to the powder con-
tractor — — — — 124605 : 14 : 9

Five, Ditto of all other contingent
expences — — — — 122116 : 2 : 10

Total Current Rupers

 2,69,943 : 1 : 3

Difference

 1,72,162 : 6 : 3

To that part of the Governor General's minute which immediately follows, I shall make no answer. He supposes his facts, and draws his conclusion from them. Perhaps we ought to deem it a proof of his moderation, that he has not endeavoured to secure his friends in the possession of all the lucrative contracts, as well as employments, for the next twenty years; and that he has confined the intended operation of his influence to so short a period as five years, after the expiration of his administration. He had full as good a right to do one as the other.

I have quoted the Governor General's own words at length; yet he says, "*that I have grossly mis-stated his minute.*" At the worst, I could only have been guilty of a misconstruction, of which every man, who reads my minute, would be able to judge, having the Governor's words literally quoted before him; I did really conceive that it was meant to be asserted, or understood at least, that Mr. Belli had suffered heavy losses and inconveniencies.

nencies. It did not occur to me, that he could have made "*frequent remonstrances concerning the heavy losses and inconveniences to which he was subjected by the present inefficient mode of his agency.*" It, in fact, and after an experience of near two years, he had suffered no such losses and inconveniences, we are therefore to attribute these frequent remonstrances of the agent, not to any losses and inconveniences he has actually sustained, but merely to the quickness of his apprehension. He finds himself subjected to losses, of which hitherto he had no experience, and nothing less than a contract for five years can secure him against them.

Here one would think we might be sure of our facts, and that the argument might be concluded. The Governor General, however, is pleased to take new ground; after charging me with having "*grossly misstated his minute,*" in the construction I gave to the words, "*subjected to many heavy losses,*" he himself now asserts, that "*some he has actually sustained.*" The word "*some,*" I presume, must refer to *heavy losses*; and, if that be true, my construction of his original words is no other than what he himself now gives them, and confirms; if not, he must be understood to have intended to weaken his own argument, by saying, that the agent was only liable to heavy losses, when he might have said, as he does now, that he had actually suffered them.

I have stated the whole commission as a clear gain to the agent, from a conviction, that it was, or might have been so, or within a mere trifle of it. In the supply of articles of provision, the bazar market retail rates of Calcutta are the highest that could be taken. A contractor, who purchases in gross quantities in the different parts of the country in which the articles are produced, ought to gain at least enough between the purchase and the Company's price, to defray all charges of merchandise and

and other expences whatsoever, considering always that he trades with the public money, and not with his own.

The plan to which I originally gave my assent, was proposed at a time when I thought that an invasion of these provinces was a probable event. That apprehension, whether well or ill-founded, was the ground of this and several other opinions delivered by me, tending to prove the expediency, if not necessity, of putting these provinces in a posture of defence. The Governor General constantly treated the idea of an invasion as chimerical; yet, in this instance, as well as in many others, in which our military and naval establishments have been, on his principles, very unnecessarily augmented, he acted as if he thought the apprehension of an invasion was not ill-founded; his opinion has been justified by the event, but they both condemn his conduct.

I never would flint a necessary service for the sake of any inconsiderable saving. I thought this a necessary service at the time when it was proposed, and I would not have flinted it: not that I disregard little savings, but because I know, by experience, that while they are attended to, the great ones are neglected. But admitting that the circumstances of public affairs were not changed, as I affirm they are, is this really the same plan to which I originally gave my consent? Did I ever consent to allow the agent a commission of thirty per cent. per annum against the opinion of the merchants to whom the reference was made, and whose opinion was to have decided the question? On the contrary, did I not remonstrate against it? Was the binding the India Company by contract to maintain a specific garrison in Fort William, and in one particular mode, and whether they approved of it or not, and under every possible change of the circumstances of the government, ever suggested to me at the time the agency was proposed? If these questions cannot

not be answered in the affirmative, it follows, that it is not I who think differently of the plan, but the Governor General, who has changed his plan for a purpose in which the public service has no concern.

On the remainder of the Governor's minute I shall make no remarks, though not for want of materials; I content myself with doing my own duty, and leave it to others to answer for themselves.

(Signed)

P. FRANCIS.

On the 6th of October, 1779.

SIR,

I desire you will send the inclosed minute in circulation. I remain, Sir, your's,

E. WHEELER.

In consequence of the most earnest request of Mr. Francis, I move, that Mr. Baugh may be examined at the board upon oath, concerning the manner in which Mr. Francis hath examined and passed the accounts of Mr. George Livius. And I must further desire, that his (Mr. Baugh's) examination may be taken in Mr. Francis's absence.

E. W.

Extract Consultation the 1st of November, 1779.

Mr. Baugh attending the board in consequence of the motion made by Mr. Wheeler, and entered in the last consultation, is admitted.

Read The motion of Mr. Wheeler.

Mr. Francis.—My intention was, to give the Governor General an opportunity of satisfying himself, and doing me justice, upon the points alluded to in the motion. I do not insist upon his oath, because I am perfectly satisfied that his testimony will be equally valid without it. As I was sick at Houghly at the time the motion was made, I did imagine it would be resolved upon in my absence, but I have no difficulty about its being determined now.

Governor General.—I shall put no questions to Mr. Baugh in the mode prescribed ; I think it very irregular. I have not even given Mr. Francis's minute an intimate perusal, although I have kept it by me for some time with the intention of examining it, and of replying to it, if I had found it necessary. Other business of more importance, a strong aversion to personal debate, and a conviction of its inutility for any purpose, either of decision here, or of reference at home, have hitherto concurred to make me postpone it. Mr. Baugh is now before the board at the requisition of Mr. Francis. I shall leave it to Mr. Francis to put what questions he may think proper to him, either upon oath, or otherwise.

Mr. Wheeler.—I am called upon by Mr. Francis to take a part in this disagreeable business, which is exceedingly irksome to myself, and becomes still more so by the Governor General's declining to put any questions to Mr. Baugh. If time had permitted a short answer to Mr. Francis's last minute, it might have answered the same purpose as the questions which I must now address to Mr. Baugh, and I doubt not but the answers will give the board every satisfaction they can require.

Mr.

Mr. Wheeler delivers the following questions to be put to *Mr. Baugh*.

1st. Whether it is not your duty, as assistant to the comptroller of the offices, to examine the monthly accounts of each office before they are seen by the comptroller, and to furnish him with whatever remarks may have occurred to you thereon?

Answer. Preparatory to the comptroller's examining the accounts of the offices, they have always been examined by my assistant, so far as respected their calculations and additions, after which they have been compared by me, with the vouchers delivered with them. I have then compared such charges as were established, with the fixed establishments also such charges for stores provided by contract, or by agency, with the terms of the contract engagements for those supplies. And if upon this examination I have discovered any deviation from either, I have pointed them out to the Comptroller, who has either immediately deducted the difference, or applied to the head of that department, whose accounts were under examination, for an explanation.

2nd. Whether you have not constantly done so?

Answer. Yes, I have.

3d. Whether you have ever observed, that *Mr. Francis*, in examining the accounts of the military store keeper, or of any other of the public offices, or in passing their bills, or in any other instance whatsoever, has favoured the military store keeper, or any other person, or has ever suffered an error or overcharge in his or their accounts, to pass without correction and censure?

Governor General.—I beg that Mr. Baugh may be dispensed from answering the third question; if there is a necessity for it; it is highly improper on many accounts, considering the wide distance between Mr. Baugh and Mr. Francis, that he should be obliged to answer to such a question. *I do not recollect what words of mine have given occasion for it; but if I have made use of any, which either directly lay such a charge to Mr. Francis's account, or imply it, I retract them, without accounting at this time for the manner in which any such expressions may have escaped me, as they are now entirely out of my memory. The object of the question therefore is removed.*

Mr. Francis.—I am satisfied, and desire the question may be waved.

4th. To what point of time have the military store keeper's accounts been examined and passed by the Comptroller?

Answ. To the end of December, 1778.

5th. What is the amount of the monthly sums issued to and from the treasury for the monthly disbursements of his office, including his agency since December 1778, to the end of September last?

Answ. The advances made to the military store keeper from the treasury, between the 1st of January and 30th of September, 1779, amount to current rupees 4,24,000; but in this sum is not included his advance on account of September, being 42,000 rupees, because it did not pass the board in time to be issued during that month. The order of the treasury was not signed till the 30th of September; and I observe, by the estimate of the store keeper's disbursements for October, that the amount was not received till the 6th of the last-mentioned month.

month. In Mr. Francis's minute of the 2nd of October, the amount of the advances issued to the military store keeper to the end of August, is stated by me at current rupees 4,42,105 : 7 : 6 ; but it is proper to remark, that in this sum is included the monthly payments made to him by Mr. Robert Stewart, on account of the new powder works, and his receipts for ready money sales.

6th. Has the military store keeper delivered in his monthly accounts regularly to the Comptroller's office since December last ?

Ans. Yes, to the end of September.

Governor General.—I desire to put the two following questions to Mr. Baugh.

1st. Have Mr. Livius's accounts ever appeared before the board ?

2d. What is the amount of Mr. Livius's receipts and disbursements, from the time he first had charge of his present office, to the date of my minute in September ? If Mr. Baugh cannot answer the last of these questions from his own official knowledge, I desire him to obtain proper official information to complete his answer ?

1st *Ans.* They never have appeared before the board. It was not the intent of the regulations constituting the Comptroller's office, that they should be laid before the board.

2d *Ans.* Not having the necessary materials in my possession for furnishing the accounts required by the Governor General, I applied for it to the military store keeper, and beg leave to lay before the board the following

lowing abstracts, which I have in consequence received from him, of his receipts and disbursements from April 1775 to September, 1779, inclusive, the former amounting to current rupces 23,16,074 . 13 : 3, the latter to 23,1678 : 1 . 3, which constituted a balance in favour of Mr. Livius, which he had actually advanced for the Company, instead of being nine or ten lacks in arrear. Mr. Livius was appointed to the office of military store keeper on the 20th of March, 1775, and the Governor's minute is dated in September, 1779.

I think it proper to acquaint the board, that my application for this account would have been made to the Accomptant General, and not to the military store keeper, could the former have furnished it complete. But the general books being balanced only to the 30th of April, 1778, it could not have been prepared from them to a period subsequent to that time. I believe also, that the entries in the general books are adapted from the abstracts of the receipts and disbursements supplied to the Accomptant General by the heads of the different offices.

Minutes on the Advance Salary and Appointment to Sir Eyre Coote. Extraét Board of Inspection the 12th of April, 1779.

Read the following propositions of Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote.

That the five half shares of the revenue do devolve upon Sir Eyre Coote, as Commander in Chief, from his arrival in Fort William on the 23d of March, and that General Stibbert do only share as oldest Colonel from that time.

That the 3000 rupees per month, lately granted to General Stibbert for contingent expences in the field, do devolve on General Coote, from the 31st of March, as Commander in Chief.

That the 16,000 rupees per annum, for secret intelligence, do devolve to General Sir Eyre Coote from the 31st of March.

Sir Eyre Coote delivers in the following minute.

The reference I made to the board on the subject of General Stibbert's allowances, which exceed mine by 82,750 rupees per annum, proceeded from an idea, that they were granted to him as Commander in Chief, under the presidency; and as, on my arrival at Fort William, he could be no longer considered in that capacity, whatever he drew under such a denomination must necessarily be discontinued to him.

An examination of the minutes of Council has rendered me master of the several reasons assigned for granting him those allowances; and my researches on

this occasion have led me also to a knowledge of the sentiments which have been expressed by the members of the board in general, respecting the insufficiency of the salary allowed by the Court of Directors to their Commander in Chief in India.

From a long experience of the service, I am thoroughly convinced of the justice of this opinion, and I am equally certain, that the Court of Directors never meant I should suffer in my private fortune by carrying on the public service.

You will please therefore, Gentlemen, to adopt such measures as may prevent any unnecessary expence from falling on the Company, and which will at the same time enable me to execute the duties incumbent upon me, as their Commander in Chief, to visit the several stations of the troops, or to take the field, if necessary, without involving myself in expences, which I should be unable to support.

(Signed)

E. COOTE.

Mr. Francis,

I have prepared my opinion on the Commander in Chief's propositions, and beg leave to lay it before the board.

My opinion on the account of General Stibbert's allowances is very fully stated in the consultation of the 14th of May, 1778, and I adhere to it in every particular. I think they should now be reduced to the establishment at which they stood during General Clavering's command. This establishment was formerly referred to the Company, and confirmed by them in their letter of the 24th of December, 1776, paragraph 49.—I cannot

cannot consent to any variation from the allowances fixed by, and enjoyed by General Clavering, without the Company's orders.—The very last which they have given, and which Sir Eyre Coote brought out with him, direct, that Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote do receive the same pay as Commander in Chief of their forces in India as was received by Lieutenant General Sir John Clavering. If all the allowances stated in the propositions are agreed to, the present Commander in Chief will receive eighty-two thousand two hundred current rupees per annum more than was received by his predecessor.

(Signed)

P. FRANCIS.

Mr. Barwell,

AS I expect in a short time the orders of the Company on the additional allowances drawn by Brigadier General Stibbert, there does not appear any urgent necessity to proceed on the regulation of such allowances until the arrival of the Company's instructions. The Court of Directors, in fixing the established salary for a commander of all their forces in India, have expressed it as a salary. They therefore certainly intend it to be drawn free, and disburthened from all disbursements to be incurred in the immediate execution of their military service; they certainly did not intend to put the Commander in Chief of all their military forces upon a meaner establishment than the provincial Commander in Chief at the other presidencies, or General Stibbert, whose allowance by the 49th paragraph of their letter of the 24th of December, 1776, is reckoned at 82,000 rupees. These facts are so very striking, that I cannot doubt of our having full authority to regulate an establishment for Sir Eyre Coote, while in the field, as may be suitable to his high rank, and bear some proportion

to the allowances made to the subordinate field officers of this government. I am for the question, that a field establishment be formed for Lieutenant General Coote, Commander in Chief of all the Company's forces while in the field.

Governor General,

THE allowance of five half shares of the commission on the revenues was not an establishment annexed to his station, but a bounty specially and personally granted to General Stibbert, by the order of the Court of Directors in the 31st paragraph of their general letter of the 16th of April, 1777. It cannot, therefore, be taken from him, but by the same authority.

The allowance of 3000 rupees per month for contingent expences in the field was granted to General Stibbert by a separate act of this board, though their resolutions upon this subject have been various, yet the opinions of the different members, respecting the necessity of such an allowance, have been generally the same, as may be seen by the proceedings of the board of the 29th of February, 1775, when this subject was first brought under the consideration of the board, and for other reasons rejected. For the truth of this, I appeal particularly to the opinions of General Clavering and Colonel Monson.

This was never meant as an allowance annexed to the station of Commander in Chief, for when it was first proposed, General Stibbert was not considered as invested with that character, but to defray the unavoidable expence attendant on the command in the field.

As the resolution of the board upon this subject has been long since referred to the Court of Directors, with
another

another relative circumstance, which must force their attention to it, and draw from them a clear decision upon it; and as that decision may be expected with the first dispatches of the season, I think it would be improper and irregular to make any alteration in it at this time.

I do not recollect any orders which authorises General Stibbert to draw a fixed sum for secret service. This is an expence in its nature variable, and the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 24th of December, 1776, have expressly directed that it shall not be fixed, but that Colonel Stibbert, (that is commander in the field) shall be paid such expences as shall appear to us to have been necessarily incurred by him, from time to time, on that account.

I apprehend, that this is a service which will properly and exclusively belong to the Commander in Chief, whenever his situation will enable him to assume the charge of it, and that General Stibbert should be accordingly directed to conform to his orders respecting it.

Respecting the incidental charges of the Commander in Chief, when he is in the field, or which in this point will be equivalent, when he is absent from the presidency, I shall premise the following observations :

1st. The present allowances drawn by General Stibbert is as follows :

Pays

Pays Brigadier General, 750l. per ann.	7,500
Table expences in the field	60,000
Contingent expences in the field —	36,000
Commission in the revenue, current rupees, 21,368, or — —	19,250
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Sonat Rupees	1,22,750

I do not reckon the allowance for secret service, because I regard it as a public charge, in which he has no interest, or other concern, than faithfully to disburse what he draws.

Of the above establishment the following sums have been allotted to General Subbert, by the express appointment of the Court of Directors:

Pay as Brigadier General — —	7,500
Table charges in the field —	60,000
Commission on the revenue at that time, as I find it computed in Mr. Francis's minute of the 14 th of May, 1778, current rupees 24,480, or —	22,059
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Sonat Rupees	89,559

The salary allowed to the Commander in Chief, by the fundamental regulations of this government, is 6000l. per annum, or rupees 60,000.

The sum is expressed to be in lieu of all charges and contingencies in the field; but the Court of Directors have since granted to their first Colonel on this establishment, as I have remarked above, an annual stipend of 89,559 rupees, a sum exceeding that of a Commander in Chief by nearly 50 per cent.

But

But it cannot be supposed, that the Court of Directors ever meant to invert the order of the service, and that in so great a degree, as to make a partial and unjust distinction between an officer placed, not by selection, but by casual succession, at the head of a single establishment, and the Commander in Chief of all the British forces in India; therefore, when they passed these grants to Colonel, now General, Stibbert, they *virtually* established a precedent for a proportionate augmentation of the allowances of the Commander in Chief of all the British forces in India; for it cannot be disputed, that his unavoidable expences in the discharge of all the various duties annexed to his station must greatly exceed those of General Stibbert in a limited command, and I will presume, that had it been at the same time proposed to ascertain the allowances of the Commander in Chief, they would have augmented them proportionably.

On the premised grounds, I move,

1st. That the Commander in ^{*}Chief be allowed to draw for the expences of his table, when he is in the field, 90,000 rupees per annum.

2. That the Commander in Chief be authorized to draw for the following establishment for himself and his staff, when he is in the field, in lieu of travelling, and all incidental charges whatever.

12 Budgerows	150	—	1800
30 Boats	40	—	1200
10 Elephants	75	—	750
200 Coolies	5	—	1000
28 Hircarahs	7	—	156
1 Head ditto	30	—	30
1 Naib	15	—	15
			<hr/>
			4990
			<hr/>
50 Lascars	8	—	400
1 Serang	20	—	20
2 Tindals	15	—	30
4 Hackeries	30	—	120
2 Gurry Men	7	—	15
2 Writers		—	150
Stationary		—	200
12 Horses		—	360
			<hr/>
			S. Rs. 6286

The sums which I have annexed to the establishment are added merely to shew the computed amount of it, but are not taken from any correct authority, nor meant to be a part of the proposition. If this motion shall be agreed to, it will be the province of the Commissary General to affix the rates of expence to each article, and I shall propose that they be referred to him for that purpose.

Mr. Francis,

On the principles on which the opinion I have already given was founded, I have much more reason to object to the establishment now proposed, than to the Commander in Chief's first propositions. All the allowances granted to General Stibbert, as Commander in

in Chief, or otherwise, and which I have constantly objected to as excessive, are to be continued to him; and, at the same time, a total new establishment created, amounting to the monthly charge of current

R. A. P. R. A.

rupees, 15,302 : 7 : 5. or 1,83,629 : 8 per annum.
I am against the motion*.

Mr. Bartoll,

I cannot concur in opinion with Mr. Francis, that the proposed establishment is a double one. I do not understand these allowances are to be drawn upon any other occasion, than that for which it was expressed, for the General's expences in the field. There is no immediate call, that I know of, upon the Commander in Chief to leave the presidency†; and, before a month is passed, we shall, in all probability, receive the orders of the Court of Directors, whether Brigadier General Stibbert is to draw the allowances which he is intitled to receive, or whether they are to cease.—In either case, the necessity of the establishment now proposed for the Commander in Chief of all the Company's forces is but a single establishment; nor is this a monthly establishment, or if it was, is it of the extent stated? It is an establishment only to be drawn when the public service calls the Commander in Chief from the presidency. That it will be drawn, I admit; but it is not probable it will be drawn through the whole year; besides, it is a charge limited to a specific sum, but does not necessarily include the expenditure of the whole amount.—I agree to the proposition.

Governor General.—I agree to the proposition.

* He left it, however, in a short time thereafter, and has taken care not to return in a hurry; it was originally understood to be so.

† He was afterwards allowed 1200 rupees per month in addition to the above allowance.

Resolved, that the Commander in Chief of the Company's forces in India, be allowed to draw for the expences of his table, when he is in the field, the monthly sum of seven thousand five hundred Sonat rupees, or ninety thousand current rupees per annum.

Resolved, That the Commander in Chief of the Company's forces in India, be allowed to draw for the following monthly establishment for himself and his staff when he is in the field, in lieu of travelling and all incidental charges whatever, when in the field.

- 12 Budgerows
- 30 Boats
- 10 Elephants
- 200 Coolies
- 28 Hircarahs
- 1 Head ditto
- 1 Naib
- 50 Lascars
- 1 Serang
- 2 Tindals
- 4 Hackeries
- 2 Gurrymen
- Stationary
- 12 Horses.

Ordered, That this establishment be referred to the Commissary-General, with directions to affix the rates of expence to each article, specified therein.

Mr. Wheeler having delivered the following minute, on the foregoing proceedings being shewn him by the secretary, it is entered in this place for the sake of connection.

Mr. Wheeler — The argument made use of by the Governor-General, to evince the necessity of an augmentation of allowances to the Commander in Chief when

when in the field, are by no means sufficient to obviate those objections, which from a perfect knowledge of the regulations alluded to, suggest themselves to my mind. •

In the first place, the allowances to the commander in chief by the fundamental regulations of this government, was not an act of the court of directors, but of the proprietary at large, convened together for that purpose; and by their orders, communicated to their servants in Bengal, by the executive part of their constitution, the court of directors. Thence it appears to me, neither optional in the court of directors, to encrease or diminish an allowance voted to their commander in chief by a general court of proprietors; for if it was, with the same degree of propriety that the court of directors could revoke the orders of their constituents by augmenting an allowance fixed as above to their commander in chief, they might revoke any and every act of the proprietors at large.

It naturally follows, that the court of directors do not in themselves possess the power of altering the allowance fixed to the office of commander in chief; and it is equally conclusive with me, that no such power can possibly be vested in our board.

But even admitting their power; it is plain from the 5th paragraph of their general letter, dated the 7th of May 1778, by the Stafford, that it was not their intention to deviate from the established allowance, granted to their late commander.

Without entering therefore into the detail of this business, or expressing my disapprobation of the enormity of each particular article of increase, I shall content myself with objecting to any further allowances being made to Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, that the

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court

Court of Directors have in the 60th paragraph of their letter, dated the 29th of March, 1774, directed to be paid to Lieutenant-General Sir John Clavering; an extract of which I shall here subjoin,

“ And that there be paid to him the sum of six thousand pounds sterling per annum, in full for his services as commander in chief, and in lieu of travelling charges, and of all other advantages and emoluments whatever, except his salary of ten thousand pounds per annum, established by law, and ordered to be paid him as one of the council at Fort William in Bengal.”

E. WHEELER.

Minutes in council, on the treaty with the Rana of Gohud.

Extract Secret Department Consultation.

November 12th, 1779.

The Governor General informs the board, that during their late recess, he has had several conferences with the Minister deputed by the Rana of Gohud; and invested with full powers on the subject of a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, proposed by the Rana, to be concluded between him and the Company. The Governor-General lays before the board a draft of conditions which he has formed on the basis of the Rana's propositions for such a treaty; and which, with the Rana's letters and propositions, he desires may be entered in this place, for the informations and opinions of the board.

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

Draft of Treaty.

Article 1st. A treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive.

fenfive, fhall be eftablifhed between the Englifh Company and Maha Raja Ranna Lohinder Bahadre.

2d. Whenever a war fhall actually take place between the contracting parties and the Marattas*, if the Rana fhall require the affiftance of an Englifh force for the purpofes hereinafter defcribed, *ſuch a force, proportioned to the exigency of the ſervice ſhall be immediately ſent, on his requiſition made in writing to the commanding officer at the neareſt ſtation of the Company's troops; ſhall remain with him as long as he ſhall require it, and return when he ſhall diſmiſs it* †, the expence thereof ſhall be defrayed by the Rana at the fixed rate of twenty thouſand Muchle dar rupees of the currency of Banares, or any other ſpecies of rupees of ſame intrinsic amount, for each battalion of the Seapoys, on their preſent eſtabliſhment, with their proportion of artillery §.— The payment to commence on the day when the ſaid force ſhall paſs the borders of the Company's dominions, or the dominions of the Nabob of Oude: and ceaſe on the period ſtipulated for its return to either; four coſs being allowed for each day's march.

3d. The force ſhall be employed for the defence of the Rana's dominions againſt all foreign or domeſtic enemies, and for the enlargement of his dominions by conqueſt on the Marattas.

4th. Whatever acquisition in purſuance of this treaty ſhall be made of countries being contiguous to the

* The Marattas were then at war with the Rana of Gohud, and his forts attacked.

† Theſe were the ſtrange powers to Sujah Dowla, to exterminate the Rohillas.

§ The Rana had not wherewith to pay his own troops.

the Rana's dominions, or formerly appertaining to them, whether effected by his or the English troops, separately or in conjunction, or obtained by treaty, shall be shared in the following proportions, viz. nine anas to the Company, and seven anas to the Rana: the mean amount of the gross revenue of the Company's share collected in time of peace in the ten years preceding, after deducting the charges of collection, which shall be ascertained by Auméens chosen by each party, shall be fixed and paid by the Rana as a perpetual tribute to the Company, and the lands and forts shall be ceded to the Rana.

5th. In case it shall be judged adviseable to employ the combined forces of the Company and the Rana in any distant operations against the common enemy beyond the borders and neighbourhood of the Rana's dominions, on requisition made in writing from this government, he shall furnish ten thousand horle for such service; and each party shall bear his own separate expence, which shall continue separate until the return of the combined army to the borders of the Rana's country, or until it shall be employed in the services mentioned in the third article of this treaty.

6th. Whenever the English forces are employed for the defence of the Rana's country, or for the acquisition of territory, the service to be performed shall be prescribed by himself; but the mode of executing it shall be left to the direction of the officer commanding the English troops.

7th. Whenever the combined troops of the Company and the Rana shall be employed in any remote operations, such as are described in the 5th article, the commanding officers of the English forces shall consult the Rana on the choice of the service

to be performed, but the ultimate decision, in case of a difference of opinion, and the mode of conducting such service, shall be left entirely to the commanding officer of the English troops, with a reservation of the Rana's complete authority over his own troops.

8th. Whenever peace shall be concluded between the English Company and the Maratta state, *the Rana shall be included as a party in the treaty which shall be made for that purpose; and his present possessions, together with such countries as he shall have acquired during the course of the war, and which it shall be then stipulated to leave in his possession, shall be guaranteed to him by such treaty**.

9th. No English factory shall be established in the dominions of the Rana. No persons of any denomination shall be sent into his dominions, on the part of the English Company, or with the licence of the Governor-General and Council, without his previous consent, nor any authority exercised over them but his own †.

Ordered, That these papers lie for consideration.

Extract Secret Consultation: *A. C. L. M.*

2d December, 1779.

Considered the Governor-General's minute, entered in consultation the 12th of November, with heads
proposed

* The Rana is a natural enemy, the Company but an occasional one: yet this treaty of alliance, modestly engages the Company to compel the ablest power in India, as the only condition of a peace with them, to be reconciled to an irreconcilable enemy. And that that enemy's possessions, though incapable of preserving them, shall be warranted by the Company, at all events.

† Of what benefit will the treaty be to a commercial Company on these conditions?

proposed for a treaty to be concluded with the Rana of Gohud.

Read the letter from the Rana, recorded in the books of the Persian correspondence, received the 7th of June last; also another letter dated the 5th of Shau-baun, and received the 3d of September.

Read the proposed heads for a treaty with the Rana of Gohud, entered in consultation the 12th of November.

The Governor General lays before the board the following amended draft of a treaty proposed to be executed with the Rana of Gohud, and desires that it may be substituted for the former, and entered in consultation the 12th ult. As it contains such alterations *proposed by the Minister of the Rana, as the Governor-General deems reasonable.* And to the treaty in this form, the Minister, who is now present, declares his entire concurrence.

Draft of a treaty proposed between the Company and
Maha Raja Leukinda Bahadre,

Articles of agreement, made and concluded at Fort William, in Bengal, between the honourable the Governor-General and Council for the affairs of the Honourable English East India Company on the one part, and Maha Raja Leukinda Bahadre, Rana of Gohud, for himself and his successors on the other part *.

Article 1st. Perpetual friendship shall take place between the English Company and Maha Raga Leukindar

* The remarks made in the preceding articles are sufficient for these; with this only difference, that the alterations in this are powerfully in favour of the Rana, and against the Company.

dar Bahadre and their successors, and an alliance be established between them for the prosecution of the objects herecin after mentioned.

2d. Whenever a war shall actually take place between the contracting parties and the Marattas, if Maha Raja Leukindar Bahadre shall require the assistance of an English force from the Company for the defence of his countries or for the acquisition of territory, such a force, proportioned to the exigency of the service shall be immediately sent, on his requisition made in writing to the commanding officer of the nearest station of the Company's troops, and shall remain with him as long as he shall require it, and return when he shall dismiss it, the expences thereof shall be defrayed by the Maha Raja at the fixed monthly rate of twenty thousand Muchle dar rupees of the currency of Benares, or any other species of rupees of the same intrinsic amount for each battalion of seapoys on its present establishment, with its proportion of artillery; the payment to commence on the day when the said force shall pass the borders of the Company's dominions, or the dominions of the Nabob of Oude, and cease on the period stipulated for the return to either; four co's being allowed for each day's march.

3d. This force shall be employed for the defence of the Maha Raja's dominions against all foreign or domestic enemies, and for the enlargement of his dominions, by conquest on the Marattas.

4th. Whatever countries shall be acquired from the Marattas in pursuance of this treaty by the troops of the Company, or of the Maha Raja, separately or in conjunction, whether by war or treaty, except the fifty-six mahls which constitute the Maha Raja's jaghire, and

which are not now in the possession of the Marattas, shall be shared in the following proportions, viz. nine annas to the Company, and seven annas to the Maha Raja. The mean amount of the gross revenue of the whole shall be ascertained by ameens chosen by each party, on the collections made in the ten preceding years, and the amount of the Company's share, as determined by the said ameens after deducting the charges of collection, which are customary in such countries, shall be fixed and paid by the Maha Raja, as a perpetual tribute to the company; and the lands and forts shall be ceded to the Maha Raja.

5th. In case it shall be judged advisable to employ the combined forces of the company and the Maha Raja in any hostile operations against the Marattas, beyond the borders of the Maha Raja's dominions, on requisition made to him in writing from this government, he shall furnish ten thousand horse for such service, and each shall bear his own separate expence, and if upon the return of the English forces, towards their own borders, the Maha Raja shall have occasion for their services, and shall make a requisition to retain them, from the instant of such requisition he shall pay their charge in the same manner as stipulated in the second article. But it shall not be required of the Maha Raja, nor be in the power of this government, to detach or employ his troops beyond the borders of Gegur and Indoor, without special consent.

6th. When the English forces are employed for the defence of the Maha Raja's country, or for the acquisition of territory, the service to be performed shall be prescribed by himself, but the mode of executing it shall be left to the decision of the commanding officer of the English troops.

7th. Whenever the combined troops of the company and the Maha Raja, shall be employed in any remote operations, the commanding officer of the English forces, shall consult the Raja upon all services to be performed, but the ultimate decision, in case of a difference of opinion, and the mode of conducting such services, shall be left entirely to the commanding officer of the English forces, with a reservation of the Maha Raja's compleat authority over his troops.

8th. Whenever peace shall be concluded between the company and the Maratta state, the Maha Raja, shall be included as a party in the treaty which shall be made for that purpose, and his present possessions, together with the fort of Cowallier, which of old belonged to the family of the Maha Raja, if it shall be then in his possession, and such countries as he shall have acquired in the course of war, and which it shall then be stipulated to leave in his hands, shall be guaranteed to him by such treaty.

9th. No English factory shall be established in the dominions of the Maha Raja; no person of any denomination shall be sent into his dominions on the part of an English company, or with the licence of the governor general and council without his previous consent, neither shall his ryots be pressed for any military service, nor any authority exercised over them but his own.

Signed, sealed, and concluded at Fort William,
 this day of in the year
 of our Lord one thousand seven hundred
 and seventy-nine, or the day of

Mr. Wheeler delivers in the following minute prepared
 in consequence of the governor general's former pro-
 positions,

positions, which he thinks equally applicable to the present.

Mr. Wheeler. I feel myself a great deal at a loss in giving my opinion on the subject of the treaty proposed by the governor general with the Rana of Gohud, as I think a matter of so much importance should not have been introduced without being accompanied with necessary information to enable the members of the board to judge of its expediency.

The Rana of Gohud, is, I believe, almost a new name on our records. I am intirely unacquainted with the situation even of his capital, except by consulting the map, the extent of his territory, his revenue, the force he is able to bring into the field, and his personal character, are points in which I am equally uninformed, nor do I believe any Englishman, whose authority can be depended upon, has ever been within the territories of Gohud, to ascertain them; yet these are points, on which the board ought to have the most accurate information, before they proceed to decide on the proposed treaty; otherwise they may engage in a war with the Marattas, either to support, or make conquest for a man who has neither means or capacity to enable him to bear any proportion in the risque or charges which may attend such a war.

Uninformed, therefore, as I am, I can only give my opinion on the general principle of the proposed alliance; which is, that having for its object, war, conquest, and increase of territory. I conceive it to be contrary to the true interest of the Company and British nation, and to the fundamental policy of the former, and, in fact, changes the condition of the company here, from a commercial to a military state, that it is likewise in direct opposition to all our instructions, and peculiarly inexpedient at this time, when our treasury is exhausted, these provinces

vinces drained of their specie, when the nation is engaged in a dangerous war in Europe, and the Company is threatened with a general combination of the Indian powers against all their settlements.

How, under such circumstances, the condition of the company is to be mended by hiring out their troops, and making conquest for a petty Raja, situated at so great a distance from their frontier, does not in anywise occur to me. I rather think that such alliance, and the measures proposed in consequence, are calculated to draw the neighbouring Marattas upon us, to expose our extensive and unguarded frontier to waste and ravage, and to involve the Company still more in danger and expence, without any adequate proposed advantage.

I am therefore against the treaty.

delivered in the following minute upon this subject.

The Rana of Gohud is a prince with whom the company have hitherto had no connection, and whose name, I believe, is unknown to them: I myself, I confess, have no other information concerning him, than what I have been able to collect within these few days. I see, by Major Rennell's map, that his capital is situated in latitude 26 deg. 20 min. long. west of Calcutta, 9 deg. 20 min. Gwallier, the place of which he wants to get possession, is a strong fortress in the hills, about eighty miles distant from Etawa, on the other side of the Jumna. From some officers who have been in that part of the country, I understand that the Rana is very poor, that his country is wild, rocky, and uncultivated; and that his army is little better than a rabble, ill armed and clothed, and without regular pay or discipline. The governor-general's motion gives us no information on any of these points: yet in the
con-

consideration of a question of such importance, as an immediate alliance, offensive and defensive, to be followed by a *future guarantee of future acquisitions*, it seems essential to us to know what are the strength and resources of the prince with whom we are going to engage; the situation and extent of his country, together with the circumstances and disposition of the powers who border upon it, and in whose differences with him, whatever there may be, we shall probably become parties, in consequence of our present engagements. Whether the conquest of Gwallier, is the Rana's sole and real object, or whether another expedition into Bundelcund, may not be in fact the consequence of our sending troops to act with him, is in my judgment very uncertain. Colonel Leslie set out under instructions, first to proceed to Bombay, and afterwards to Berar. Instead of doing either, he marched into Bundelcund, took possession of the capital, and remained there very quietly till he died. I think it not at all unlikely, that the officer who may command this expedition now projected, will follow the example of his immediate predecessor. There is nothing to be gained in the country of Gohud, or its neighbourhood, whereas the diamond country offers every temptation. It is the high road to fortune, and therefore the most likely to be pursued. Having no authentic information before me, on the state and condition of the Rana of Gohud, I must draw my conclusion from the best I have been able to obtain. Of course, they cannot be in favour of an alliance with a person so circumstanced as I believe the Rana of Gohud to be. At the same time I have no difficulty in declaring, that if all the facts were reversed, it would not incline me to assent to the measure. The event of these treaties in which we have hitherto engaged, or attempted to engage, does not furnish me with any encouragement to enter into new ones, formed on the same principles, or to follow that line of policy. I deem it unwise and dangerous

gerous in every sense. It is inconsistent with the welfare of Bengal to employ our forces in distant schemes of conquest, whether for ourselves or others. It is inconsistent with the safety of Bengal to send our troops across the Jumna, and much more to bind ourselves to let them remain there at the direction of any of the country powers. The distance is too great, and the strength of the Rana of Gohud too inconsiderable, to suffer me to suppose it possible, that the impressions of any efforts of *his*, or of ours in conjunction with him, can be felt on the Malabar coast, or create a diversion that can be of the smallest service to Brigadier-General Goddard.

• But this, in my judgment, is not the most material consideration: the extent of our present frontier, to speak moderately, and without the hazard of exaggeration, is full as great as we are able to defend; and if it were not so, a system of invasion and conquest is equally unnatural, to the condition of the East India company as a mercantile body, and to that of the territory we possess in India.

What sort of conclusions must arise in the minds of men at home, who are capable of judging of such questions, when they see that with all our present immense possessions, and with all the revenues which we ought to derive from them, it is necessary to their security that we should endeavour to enlarge them. On the same principle, and from the same causes on which such measures are deemed necessary now, the future necessity of them must increase with every new acquisition. We must continue to conquer, as long as we continue to acquire.

They who think such a system of policy essential to the safety of the Company's actual possessions, must admit, that our situation in India is not only very precarious,

rious, but incapable of being fixed, once for all, upon a limited and solid foundation: but I am far from admitting that our establishment here is of that nature, or that the measures in question have any tendency to strengthen or secure it. — Mr. Wheeler's minute to which I entirely subscribe, has anticipated a great deal of what I intended to have said. I shall therefore only add, that the system of which this measure makes a part, counteracts the fundamental principles of the Company's policy, and cannot be pursued without direct disobedience to their positive and repeated orders and instructions to this government, nor without oversetting a principle laid down by the governor-general himself, and in which I entirely concur, that " Notwithstanding
" the superiority of the British force in India, its general
" line of action must be purely defensive."

" The terms of the proposed treaty are liable to many difficulties and objections. I shall only mention one. Guarantees between princes and states are usually, I believe, always reciprocal. There is a manifest reason, I confess, for not calling upon the Rana of Gohud to guarantee, as regularly as he ought to do, the possession of future acquisitions to this government; but it is such a reason as reduces the Rana very low, and ought to deter us from entering into any alliance with him. It may involve us into the constant support of his quarrels with his neighbours; but it offers us no compensation or assistance in return, supposing the Company's possession in any other part of India were invaded, nor is it in his power to afford it.

Whether this be a just observation or not, I need not insist upon it, because my opposition to the proposed treaty, is founded on principles which do not oblige me to canvass the particular advantage, or disadvantage of every specific article contained in it. On that general ground

ground of argument, which Mr. Wheeler has taken, and to which I have only added a little, without improving it. I entirely disapprove of the proposition, and protest against it.

Mr. Barwell. The general object of the treaty appears to me pointed to the present circumstances of our government, and that of the Marattas. It strikes me to be well calculated to give strength, to both the offensive means we hold within ourselves, as to weaken those of our immediate enemies the Marattas. In a state of war with that power, every enemy that is raised up to their state, is an advantage to our own.—Plans of conquests, acquisition of territory, and a design to engage the forces of the Company in distant expeditions, to which the objections of Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Francis particularly point, are not meditated by the present treaty. It is the defence of these provinces and the distress of the common enemy, that appears to me to have led to this treaty. If acquisition of territory, or any advantage shall arise from such a policy, the Company and the nation will be benefited, without any of the risks that seem to be regarded with so much apprehension in the foregoing minutes. I agree to the proposed treaty.

Governor-General. I had no suspicion that the members of this government could be ignorant of the consequence, much less of the existence of the Rana of Gohud; it was therefore unnecessary for me to have instructed them on these points. *Nor was I forward to introduce a measure of self-apparent necessity, with arguments which I know would be contested,* and the measure of course opposed. We were upon the eve of a war with the Maratta state; a war which is no less the effect of the Company's decided orders, than of the measures of their servants, to which this government has given its sanction. From General Goddard's ad-

vices it may be almost positively concluded, that we are actually in a state of war with them, *and possibly with other powers combined with them.* Had this government remained in total inaction, had no measure of this kind been adopted, I should expect to be reproached with suffering the Company to be drawn into a war, with perhaps the first power in India, without any alliance to support it, or to obviate the predatory incursions of such an enemy. I am now reproached with forming such an alliance, and on grounds which will not apply to a state of perfect peace and domestic security. Were the acquisition of territory, or the increase of revenue the object, the operations of the treaty would not be limited to the seasons of war. If war has taken place, or shall take place with the Maratta state, the treaty secures the support and assistance of a powerful Prince, whose dominions adjoin to our own frontier, and lie in one of the principal roads through which the Marattas must pass to invade us, and the objects proposed by the alliance, are such as are most likely to weaken the Maratta state, by depriving it of its resources, and dividing its attention. At the same time, the principal in the treaty with us, is a man whose personal interests and enmity to the Maratta state, we may depend on for his faithful adherence to it. He succeeded to his present possessions by the death of his father, who lost his life, and the fortress of Gwalier at the same time, in an engagement with the Marattas, with whom the son has ever since been in a state of warfare. It is notorious, and will be probably known to many well-informed persons at home, that the Marattas have made various attempts to reduce the present Rana with numerous armies conducted by their most eminent leaders, and once by Raganaut Row in person; and have been as often repulsed with discredit to their government, and honour to the Rana. *That he was the protector of two of the most important and obnoxious characters in Hindostan-*
Gauzi,

Gauzi, Odien Cawn, and Cossim Ali Cawn, are facts so notorious, that I cannot yet suppose any member of this board to be ignorant of them; and there are not only presumptive, but very strong proofs of the power of the man, whose state could prove an asylum to such fugitives. His personal abilities are equally known. They are universally acknowledged, and proved by his actions.

I have said that the object of the treaty, and the operations dependent on it, are restricted to a state of war with the Marattas. A war, in which with respect to the immediate commencement of it, independent of former causes, *they must be the aggressors, by rejecting the offers of peace which we have made to them.*—If after all, my supposition should not be realized by the event, but a peace ensue, the treaty becomes in itself null, being reduced to the simple tie of friendship, which alters nothing of the relative state in which we are at present with the Rana; and all the consequences which Mr. Francis concludes that it will entail upon us, which suppose a war with the Marattas, are certainly more likely to happen from such a war, if we have no support, than with a provision to avert them.—I have had such frequent occasion to complain of the unfair manner in which Mr. Francis quotes my words and opinions, that I shall make no other reply to his assertion of the contradiction of the present measure to my own principles, than that the expression which he has quoted, appertains to a different occasion, and a different object, and bears no more relation to the present subject, than the dispatch of treasure to Bombay or Surat.

Mr. Francis. Neither Mr. Wheeler nor I, have professed to be ignorant of the existence of the Rana of Gohud; but when a treaty offensive and defensive is

proposed to be concluded with him, I presume it is not enough to know that he exists. I, for my own part, should have held myself indebted to the Governor-General, as I always am, for any information he might have thought proper to give me of the circumstances and situation of this Rajah. It is probable that I might have endeavoured to obtain it myself from other quarters, if at any period since my arrival in Bengal, I had thought it possible that an intimate connection of interells between the Company and him should ever have been proposed. When a similar treaty was in agitation with a much greater Prince, I mean Modajee Boolla, the Governor-General introduced the proposition with a very particular report of his situation, views, family, connections, resources, and interests. The lights which the Governor-General's last minute have furnished me, do not tend to establish a favourable opinion either of the Rana's character or strength. I do not wish to be connected with a man who is only known by the protection he afforded to persons so obnoxious to this government, and to India in general, as Cossim Ali Cawn, and Gauzi Odien Cawn; and as to the strength which enabled him to give them that protection, I believe it to be purely defensive. He is a hill Rajah. I conclude he has strong holds in the mountains, and that it is not easy to come at him. Admitting it to be true, that at this time, and to support a war, which it is said is the effect of the decided orders of the Company, alliances with some of the country powers might be useful and necessary. It does not follow that all and every alliance deserves that character. It is not at all unlikely, that we may find ourselves encumbered and embarrassed with the burthen of a useless ally. I mean to use the words applied by the Governor-General not long ago, to our connection with Ragoba, and I am sure I express the sense of them; an offensive union with Hyder Ally, or the Nizam, or even with the Raja
of

of Berar, if he could be separated from his countrymen, might indeed on the principles of the present war be of importance to its success. The Rana of Gohud is too inconsiderable to be of weight in either scale; but if his strength were greater than it is, it would not necessarily follow that we should gain any thing by uniting it to ours. Before such a junction can be effected, we must cross the Jumna, and relinquish all the security and other advantages which the intervention of that great barrier affords to all our possessions, and to those of our ally. By the said act we divide our force, and make it difficult, if not impracticable, for the different parts of it so separated, to assist each other. Every operation we undertake on either side of the river, so far from adding to our strength, or distressing the enemy, is only laying ourselves open to wounds in a quarter where, if we staid within our barrier, we might be invulnerable. We relinquish a situation of superior strength, to meet an enemy, if we do meet him on equal terms. I shall trouble the board but with one word more. The Governor-General, it is true, has often complained of unfair quotations; and this complaint I am informed, has been echoed in England, but I do not admit that it has ever been made with reason; let an instance of any moment be pointed out, and I am ready to join issue upon it.

Governor General. I have never made the complaint against Mr. Francis of an unfair quotation, but I have pointed out the instances and proved them to be unfair. The present instance is before us. I do remember that when we were first informed of a war between Great-Britain and France, I said that our part of the war must be purely defensive, because they had all to gain, and we to lose. I do not know that these were the words, but I am sure that this was the substance and sense of the maxim which is now quoted as a contradiction

tradition to the proposal which I make of withstanding a predatory enemy, already in possession of a great part of Hindostan, by distant and offensive operations. For the rest of Mr. Francis's minute, I do not think it necessary to reply to it, having, I think, in all our contests allowed him the last argument; and I think the subject was sufficiently discussed in the preceding minutes.

Mr. Francis. I admit that the maxim which I have attributed to the Governor-General, was introduced on the occasion he mentions; I nevertheless understood it to be a general one, at least, it certainly could not be confined to the case of a war with France, since at the same point of time we strongly recommended, and by our assistance promoted the siege of Pondicherry.

Governor-General. Let it be added, that I at the same time proposed a measure, which from its tendency led to the possibility at least of an offensive war with the Marattas. And this proposition was made in the same minute in which the maxim now attributed to me was introduced; and I will venture to say, will not be understood from these minutes; neither from those of Mr. Francis and my own.

Agreed to the amended draught of the treaty.

Ordered to be engrossed fair, and executed.

Extract Secret Department Consultations,

6th December, 1779.

The following minute from the Governor-General was sent in on Saturday last; and agreeable to his direction was circulated to the members of the the board.

Governor

Governor-General. Having in consequence of the treaty passed the board for an alliance with the Rana of Gohud, required his Vakeel to produce the powers with which he was invested for executing it on the part of his master, he delivered me a paper which I shall lay before the board at their next meeting, containing simply the Rajah's public seal, and which with his letters, declaring the Vakeel to be deputed for the purpose of concluding such a treaty, are deemed sufficient and ample authority according to the form and usage of Hindostan; but as the Rana has not set his name to the paper, and with us the signatures of the contracting parties are held indispensable to the validity of all the public engagements, I informed the Vakeel of this defect in his powers. He requested that they might, with the addition of his own seal and signature, be admitted for the present execution of the treaty, and to remove all doubt, and authenticate it according to our forms, he made me a proposal, which I now lay before the board, under his hand and seal, for sending a person on the part of this government to witness the Rana's final execution of it, and exchange the ratification; and I recommend it for their approbation.

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

Arzee from Muzhar Ally, Vakeel of the Rana of Gohud.

" As I understand from what you said, that the customs of your country require contracting parties should sign their names to the treaty, to give it credit and validity, I am therefore hopeful, and make it my request, that since the Rajah in his letters to you, has assured you of the validity of my powers, you will for the present accept of a furd with my signature, and the seal of the Maha Rajah; and that a gentleman of trust
may

may be sent to the Maha Rajah, that all the points which have been settled here, may be finally concluded there, in the presence of such gentleman; and that in like manner as I have represented many things on the part of the Maha Rajah, such gentleman may obtain satisfaction in all matters, and see the Maha Rajah set his signature to the treaty. This will be highly pleasing to the Maha Rajah, and gain me credit with you "

The following opinions were returned to the above minute and Arzee.

" I agree to the propositions.

(Signed)

R. BARWELL."

Mr. Francis. If the Vakcel be not invested with sufficient powers to execute the treaty on the part of his constituent, we ought not to have proceeded with him so far as we have done. The extent of his powers should regularly have been ascertained in the first instance. For my own part, I am perfectly satisfied with the Rajah's seal, and the contents of his letters. It is not likely that he should refuse to ratify a treaty by which he is entitled to, and impowered to require the assistance of our forces, *for the defence of his country, or for the acquisition of territory*, without any other limitation or description of the amount of such force to be sent, *immediately on his requisition*, except that it shall be proportioned to the exigency of the service: of which the Rana is to be the judge. The deputing a gentleman, on purpose to Gohud, to see the treaty ratified, is, in my opinion, a very useless, and I am sure it will be a very expensive measure. I am therefore entirely against it. I do not even know that the Rana's signature is wanted.

wanted. The public seal on both sides is the true authentication of their public acts respectively.

(Signed)

P. FRANCIS.

(Agreed to the above,)

E. WHEELER.

Resolved, That a person on the part of this government be deputed to the Rana of Gohud, *for the purpose of seeing the treaty executed by the Rana, and for the changing the ratification.*

The Governor-General now produces to the board the power and treaty above recorded, under the seal of the Rana of Gohud.

Vide, the Book of Persian Correspondence under date.

The Governor-General thinks it incumbent on him to lay before the board the following paper of intelligence, which was inclosed in a letter to him from the Commander in Chief.

Extract of a letter from Futty-gur, 20th Nov. 1779.

“ I have likewise just now received from Gohud, the disagreeable news of the Marattas having made themselves masters of the fort Arhaund, (which I had the honour to inform you some time ago was invested) and put the garrison to the sword. The same account informs me, that they are preparing to attack another fort, and that the Rajah is by no means in a condition to oppose them; his troops being not only inferior in point of number to the enemy, but also dispirited and ready to mutiny, on account of the long arrears due to them, which he is at present unable to pay. In this situation of his affairs, the speedy conquest of his whole
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country must be the consequence of the enemy's pursuing their advantage with that briskness which the defenceless state of it seems to invite."

Governor General. Having communicated this intelligence to Meer Muzzur Ally, the Rajah's Minister, he informed me, that he had received no letter from his master since his arrival, and therefore concluded that the danger stated as impending on his country from the Maratta invasion, had been much exaggerated; but thought it probable that the port of Arhaund, mentioned in the intelligence, had been taken by the Marattas; that it was situated in the southern extremity of his dominions, and not capable of much resistance. There can be no doubt that a Maratta force has entered the territories of the Rana of Gohud, though of itself not likely to be productive of any material consequence. It appears to me to be part of a plan, which I was lately informed by a channel which I have hitherto experienced to be of good authority, had been consulted by the ruling administration of Poona, for the general conduct of the war against the Company, namely, that Nana Furness and Hurry Punt Purkia were to conduct the war against General Goddard; and that Madagee Scindia and Tuccajee Holkar were to unite their forces, and proceed immediately against the Rana of Gohud, to reduce his country, and afterwards enter the Douab, and the dominions of the Nabob of Oude, or into the countries dependent on Bengal; as the circumstances of the times should direct them probably to either. I have since heard that this plan has been changed, and that all the chiefs above mentioned had united their forces, and were preparing to march directly against General Goddard. It appears however, equally necessary to guard against any attempts which may have been projected against the Rana of Gohud, and to strengthen his

his hands, to enable him the better to act in concert with us, if that design, from whatever cause, shall have been suspended. I therefore move, that a copy of the treaty which it has been agreed to conclude with the Rana of Gohud, be immediately transmitted to the Commander in Chief, with instructions to comply with any immediate requisition which the Rana may make for a detachment of our forces, proportioned to the exigency of the service required by it, of which he will of course be the judge.

Mr. Wheeler. I am against the motion.

Mr. Francis. If the Board were disposed to make a right use of the intelligence contained in the preceding letter, I should have thought it a fortunate circumstance that we had received it before any thing had been actually concluded with the Rana's Vakeel. The Rana of Gohud's situation appears, by this letter, to be considerably worse than it was represented to me. One of his forts was taken; the Marattas were preparing to take another, and the speedy conquest of the whole country was likely to be the consequence. If this be the case, we are going to execute a treaty with a Prince, who may have neither army nor any dominions left. His army is dispirited, and ready to mutiny for want of pay, which he is unable to give them. If he cannot pay his own troops, how will it be possible for him to discharge the subsidy which he engaged to pay for ours? Instead of enlarging his territories by conquest, which is the professed object of the treaty, our first labour will be to recover for him, what he has already lost; and this must be attempted by marching part of our army to a considerable distance on the other side of the Jumna. I do not consider the present invasion of his country by the Marattas, as belonging to,

or the effect of any particular plan of operations against the Company. He is at constant enmity, with the Marattas, and I look upon this attack as nothing more than the continuance of former hostilities against him. At all events we shall only distress ourselves, and abandon the protection of our frontier, by engaging in his defence. I am, therefore, against the motion.

Mr. Barwell. I agree to the motion. I cannot adopt the opinion, that to allow the Marattas to conquer a country, so near our frontier, and extend their possessions quite up to it, will be attended with any of those advantages which have been supposed as the probable result of our not opposing their progress. The intelligence that has been laid before the Board, rather determines me to engage our government in the support of the Rana of Gohud, than to leave the country an easy conquest to the only enemy from whom we have reason to apprehend any mischief.

Agreed to the Governor-General's motion. And ordered that a copy of the treaty with the Rana of Gohud, be immediately transmitted to the Commander in Chief.

Secret Department Consultation, Dec. 13, 1779.

The *Governor-General* proposes that Captain Palmer be permitted to draw the same allowances during his deputation to Gohud, as were assigned to Mr. Elliot, on his deputation to Berar. And that Mr. Tho. Short be appointed assistant to Captain Palmer, with the same allowances as were granted to Mr. Farquhar, assistant to Mr. Elliot.

Mr. Wheeler. I have not yet considered the business which

which Captain Palmer is going to undertake, in the light, or of the same importance with that which was entrusted to the charge of Mr. Elliot. At this distance of time, I do not properly recollect, whether the allowances given to that gentlemen, were not objected to by me. However, I do not mean to revert to a former opinion, upon a subject so personal as the present; though I would wish the allowances had been such on this occasion, as I should have judged safe to have acceded to, which, as they are now stated, I must beg leave to decline.

Mr. Francis. Mr. Elliott's allowances amounted to 3318 cur. rup. per month, those of his assistants to 555. in all 3873. I think they are much too high for the present occasion; and as Captain Palmer is only deputed to see the treaty with the Rana executed, he cannot have any use or employment for an assistant.

Mr. Barwell. I think the allowances for Mr. Elliot, were regulated by those allotted to Colonel Upton, on his embassy to Poona; and however large they may have appeared to the Court of Directors, I have reason to think that neither Colonel Upton nor Mr. Elliott were enabled to make any considerable saving from their allowances. The circumstances in which Captain Palmer is placed, is nearly the same, and the appearance he must make, must be regulated upon the same principle. The difference of rank between Colonel Upton and Captain Palmer can be no rule to direct the judgment, on this occasion. He is the servant of Government, in the same line as Colonel Upton was, and he must support the same character. I therefore assent to the motion.

Agreed. That Captain Palmer be permitted to draw the
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the same allowances as Mr. Elliott, viz. Lieutenant Colonel's pay, and double batta 1488 sonat rupees per month, fixed salary 1000; and contingencies, including mouchies, servants, &c. 500. That Mr. Short, as assistant to Captain Palmer, be allowed the same as Mr. Farquar, viz. pay and batta of a Captain, 512 sonat rupees per month.

F I N I S.

THE
O R I G I N
AND
AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE
OF THE PRESENT
M A R R A T T A W A R
AND ALSO,
THE LATE ROHILLA WAR,
IN
1773 AND 1774;

Whereby the EAST-INDIA COMPANY'S Troops (as Mercenaries)
exterminated that brave Nation, and openly drove them for
Asylum and Existence into the Dominions of their former most
inveterate Enemies.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,
THE UNACCOUNTABLE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE
MILITARY STORE-KEEPER'S OFFICE, in BENGAL.

L O N D O N
PRINTED FOR J. ALMON and J. DEBRET, opposite
BURLINGTON HOUSE, PICCADILLY.
MDCCLXXIII.

P R E F A C E.

THE title of this small performance, will suffice to announce its contents; the sole purpose of publishing it being, to remove the unjust impression and prejudice which false representations of facts and circumstances have left upon the minds of many persons interested in the event.

H I S T O R Y

OF THE

M A R R A T T A W A R.

THE Marhatta States in the Deccan, are the only people of Hindostan who were not effectually subdued, or who did not unanimously submit to the government, and acknowledge allegiance as fiefs, to the throne of Delhi. They are, consequently, the only nation of note now existing under the dominion of the Hindoo princes. The provinces, or kingdoms of Hindostan, were originally governed by princes, who were distinguished according to eminence and family, under the titles of *Sou*, or *Ram-rajah*, *Ranah*, and *Rajah*.* The bold and brave efforts of resistance and perseverance of these people, within natural fastnesses and inaccessible mountains, which, in a manner preserved them from bearing the Mogul yoke, may also be assigned, with a degree of justice and propriety, as the true cause of their marvellous disposition since, a continued neglect of industry and agriculture, and an invincible love of arms. Still, at the same time, they continue to preserve many of those elevated customs, and observe with sacred and superstitious scruples, the laws of hospitality in the most expanded sense, towards strangers and each other, which, in former times, so eminently characterized the civilization, address, police, elegance, and virtue of Eastern nations.

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* Lesser characters were known by the names of *Paishwa*, *Sardar*, *Zemindar*, *Polygar*, &c. by the Hindoos. The titles of *Visier*, *Soubah*, *Nizam*, *Nabob*, *Omrah*, &c. accompanied the Mogul government, and continue in the occupation of Mahomedans only.

It is with them, as in all other countries, that by breaking a principal link of the chain, which united a number of distinct bodies, the mass is thrown into anarchy and confusion, the union is dissolved, the compact (which rendered them, as one body, great and powerful) is annihilated, and each of the component parts assumes the prerogatives of an independent sovereignty. Hence jealousies, envy, discords, usurpations, and petty states arise, without form, power, or influence.

Amidst these foreign and intestine struggles, the Mar rattas continued to yield a tacit kind of allegiance to a supreme head, as *Sou*, or *Ram rajah*, whose throne was established at Setterah. The united power of the chief, and his nominal dependants, were extremely great, and often alarming to the Emperors of Hindostan. In the time of Aliverdi-Cawn's usurped Soubahship of Bengal, they over-ran those provinces, having, through mere dread, obtained the consent of the pusillanimous, indolent, and effeminate Mahomed Scha, to establish a chout* or tribute to be paid annually from the Nabobship of Bengal, and indeed from the whole empire; in the same manner as the great Aurangzebe found it prudent, by composition, to invest them in the Deccan. They marked the terror of their arms and depredations into the heart of Delhi, and carried off vast treasures; until, by the cession of Catac, in the kingdom of Orissa, and a chout of twelve lacks of rupees annually, a peace and treaty were concluded between Aliverdi-Cawn and them, in 1750.

The Marratta revenues, taken disjunctively, were originally enormous. Before the usurpation and rapid success of that soldier of fortune, Hyder-Alli-Cawn, in
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* *Chout* implies a quarter part of the territorial revenue.

the kingdom of Myfore, and around it, the whole might have bordered upon seventeen crores of rupees, or seventeen millions of British pounds. It is computed, that, now, they enjoy an annual revenue, equal to about twelve millions sterling. Their military establishment, which is composed of cavalry, may yet be equal to 300,000; but these are not to be regarded as regulars, or permanent troops, but as an established militia. The Sou, or Ram-rajah, by virtue of the treaty with Aurengezebe, and by the Hindoo tenures, has power to order out the troops of his tributaries, as often as the state requires their service. It is a circumstance material to be understood, in judging of the Marratta force, that it is an invâriable custom among them, when an expedition is concluded, for the troops to retire with what plunder they may have seized, to their respective abodes, leaving only the household forces with the chiefs. And when their services are again wanted, they are summoned by letters, directed to the chief officer of each village, or district, so that they are re-assembled in a week or ten days. The Marratta territory may properly be said to extend, sea-ward, from Travancore near Cape Comorin, at the southern extremity of the peninsula, to the river Paldar, which discharges itself in the Gulf of Scindy, and which divides Guzzerat from the Persian dominions, except the Marratta territory lately usurped by Hyder-Alli-Cawn. They are bounded by the Carnatic, the Company's northern Circars, and the dominions of the Nizam-ul-Muluck,* to the East, except the province of Catac, which carries their possessions, irregularly, to the Bay of Bengal; and the river Jumna, with the provinces of the Mogul empire, terminate their boundary to the North.

The Sou, or Rapp-rajah, exists now but in name. Nana-row, father of the late Mada-row and Narain-row, and brother to the present Roganaut row, (commonly known by the name of *Ragoba*) seized the reins of government, and the person of the Ram-rajah, at the same instant. The revolution was favoured by the religious Brahmin cast of the usurper. The government he administered under the title of *Paisbwa*, or Prime Minister, and the prince he confined in a fortress near Setterah, the metropolis. In this position, the present young Ram-rajah, and the government of the Murratta state, continue to this day. Jonogee Boosla, or Buncello, the father, or immediate predecessor,* of Moodajee Boosla, Rajah of Berar was a pretender to the sovereignty, as one of the nearest of kin to the confined Ram rajah. And Roganaut-row was a pretender to the Paisbwa-ship, even during the life-time of his nephew Mada-row, for which Mada-row kept him under confinement, until, foreseeing his own approaching dissolution, and dreading the crafty intriguing disposition of the uncle, even in confinement, to the prejudice of the lineal successor Narain-row, whose youth and inexperience might expose him to snares and plots, thought it most advisable to release Roganaut-row, and effect a reconciliation. Accordingly, having, to all appearances, settled measures, and removed uneasinesses, he placed the hands of the youth into those of the uncle, and shedding tears of joy and satisfaction, said, That he intrusted and recommended the young man, and earnestly besought the uncle's tender care, protection, and advice to him, in the administration of government. A promise which Roganaut-row observed no longer than, by his wiles, he could procure assassins, who cut the nephew to pieces, in the false arms of an uncle,

* The right of Moodajee Boosla, in his own person, to the Rajaship of Berar, has lately been challenged by his best friend, Mr. Hastings.

uncle, who thus had no competitor remaining in his own family to the Paishwa-ship. Mada-row died in November, 1772 ; and Narain-row was allowed to live until the September following, and the 23d year of his age.

The death of Narain-row being lamented, and the unnatural manner execrated by the generality of people, Roganaut-row's succession was opposed powerfully. Divisions became formidable. At last the opposition prevailed, and the barbarous parricide, Roganaut-row, was obliged to fly. Unhappily, he directed his course to the island of Bombay, where protection was granted him, in consideration of a promise of flattering concessions, which he had neither the power nor right to perform.

The asylum thus accorded to Roganaut-row, very justly incensed the Marrattas on the one hand, while, on the other, it amused with a prospect of valuable concessions of territory, together with the usual spoils and superb acknowledgments which Indian revolutions presented to the ambitious views of successful allies, instigated both sides to commence hostilities, apparently with mutual good-will, and stimulated appetites.

The marine of Bombay bravely sustained the troops in reducing the island of Salsette, after considerable loss to the assailants ; while the reduction of Baroach cost the life of one of the best and bravest officers that belonged to either the British army or the Company's service, in the death of General Wedderburne. The Company felt the loss soon thereafter, by the defeat of the Bombay army under Colonel Keating. Happily, however, by means of the established enmity between the Marrattas and Hyder-Alli-Cawn, several jealousies and heart-burnings between the principal and lesser states, and divisions in the Poonah Council, the Marratta government

vernment was, at this time, so divided, that they shewed a serious disposition to preserve the friendship and alliance of the Company, in preference to all other connections; provided the murderer, Roganaut-row, was not supported by them, in an unjust claim, to fully and contaminate the Company's reputation and fame, by a conduct diametrically opposite to the generally received opinion, which, until of late, had been uniformly entertained of the British nation in India.

Had the government of the Company in India the discernment common even to inferior politicians, they would rather have encouraged those animities, jealousies, and intestine divisions, than by a series of ambitious and mercenary plans and usurpations, and a support of bad characters in iniquitous pretensions, to compel the contending powers, and jarring parties, to unite in the general defence of each other, and their rights, as a common cause.

In this plight were the Company involved with the Marratta state, when the new government, composed of Mr. Hastings, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis, commenced, in October, 1774. The newly-arrived members (General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis) entered upon the duty assigned to them by their country and the Company with alacrity, with sentiments strongly impregnated with true patriotism and justice, and with views solely directed to the recovery of the Company's affairs from the state of embarrassed confusion, debt, and discredit, into which the preceding mal-administration of their principal servants had undutifully plunged them. After selecting the most intelligent and meritorious servants, to administer in the subordinate stations of government, they severely reprehended the Rohilla war, as barbarous, unjust, and impolitic; reprobated,
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in plain and direct terms, the treaty with Sujah-ul-dowla, and improved upon it with princely advantages in the line of finance and military establishment, in favour of the Company. The spirit of humanity, justice, and œconomy, breathing in every articulation and action, which this uncorrupted majority uttered and performed; they availed themselves of the extended superiority which the act of parliament gave them in certain cases over the other Presidencies, and sent Colonel Upton upon an embassy, to negotiate an honourable peace with the Marratta court; which was at length concluded and ratified, upon the first of March, 1776 under the title of the Poorunder, and sometimes the Poonah, treaty.

By this treaty, Salsette, Baroach, and other districts in the Guzzerat provinces, were ceded to the Company; they were to be paid twelve lacks of rupees in three fixed terms, to defray the charges of the war, to secure which several pergunnahs were delivered up in mortgage possession; and an extent of territory, of the annual value of three lacks, adjoining, or near to Baroach. And, on the other hand, Roganaut-row was to be provided for, according to his rank and pretensions, in a private line, and to withdraw from Bombay; and that no protection or assistance was to be given to him, or any other subject or servant of the Marratta state, who may cause any disturbance or rebellion in the country.

Whether the conditions in this treaty were observed by the contracting parties, whether the proper methods were used for carrying them into execution, or for avoiding a war, or whether the laws of good faith, justice, and policy, were observed in the supreme British Council of India, and the Presidency of Bombay, will appear in the following ingenuous and authentic state
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of facts, abstracted from uncontested records. Certain, however, it is, that the evil originated in the non-performance of that treaty, and the extraordinary proceedings thereon; that the Marratta government shewed every possible disposition to preserve the friendship, and to maintain an alliance with the English; that a breach of public faith, and an insatiable thirst for power and unbounded monarchy, so apparent in every measure of the Company's servants, united the discordant Marratta states, and jarring members of the administration in Poonah, Hyder-Alli-Cawn, the Soubah of the Deccan, the Rajah of Berar, Nudjiff-Cawn, and all the lesser powers of India, into a combined, determined compact, and close association, to resist, oppose, and reduce the extravagant views and pretensions of the Company's leading administration in Asia; that, urged by the same dread, the native powers, in desperation, discovered inclinations to hearken to the overtures of France, looking wishfully and anxiously with impatience, for the day of deliverance from the scourge of tyranny, and the iron hand of oppression; that these facts have, it is said, been known to the Court of Directors, and to the King's ministers, by the possession of authentic materials; that, by this rash, dishonourable, and unwarrantable war, the Company have had their treasures wasted, their credit ruined, and their reputation for arms almost irretrievably lost; that the Marrattas distinguished more temper, moderation, and good faith, throughout this unlucky business, particularly when victory gave them a *carte-blanche*, than could have been expected from a people of a more pacific disposition, and to whom the opposite qualities are ascribed characteristically. And that it is too evident, from appearances, however artfully disguised, that a train of disgraceful and distressing events, were original objects of the acting administration from the beginning, influenced by sinister views, founded upon ambition,

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by unabating keen resentment for imaginary preferences, and by an implacable, unremitting opposition to every measure of the majority in the life-time of General Clavering and Colonel Monson, particularly the treaty of Poonah, which they were bent upon overturning, at all hazards. There are reasons to imagine, that it was proposed to derive some oblique justification of the Rohilla war, from the unfavourable effects of an ill-conducted Marratta war:

Roganaut-row, under the protection of the Bombay government, entered into intrigues, and fomented parties and dissensions in the administration of Poonah; until at length, he procured an infatuated deception upon the simple credulity of the unsuspecting Resident, Mr. Mostyn, who in consequence of his own easy faith, as easily misled the willing minds of the Presidency of Bombay into a belief of what they so eagerly wished.

The Governor General, Mr. Hastings, introduced the subject at the supreme board, upon the 28th day of January 1778, in a very long minute, wherein, among a variety of other matters, he complained bitterly of the silence and remissness of the Presidency of Bombay, although Mr. Mostyn had had several conferences with the Poonah ministers, who continued to complain that Roganaut-row was still entertained at Bombay, in violation of orders from the supreme board. He added, that new sources of uneasiness had arisen, in the extraordinary countenance afforded to the Chevalier St. Lubin and Mr. Bolts, by the court of Poonah; one as agent to the crown of France, the other as representative of the House of Austria. That if reports could be believed, written engagements had passed between them and Monsieur St. Lubin, "*the object of*
"*which, whatever it be, must if attained, prove destruc-*
B "*live*

*“ live to the trade of the English Company, and to the British influence in India.” **

These being the ideas which Mr. Hastings laboured to impress on the minds of his fellow-counsellors, as an evil which threatened destruction, by the alarming power of the Marrattas—As a wise and faithful servant and subject, would it not have been more consistent, and infinitely more just and political, to have accommodated the breach, and applied a healing balsam to the sore, by an observance of the late treaty, and good faith, than wantonly to urge a dangerous, expensive, and unjust war?

At the same moment, Mr. Hastings acknowledged,
*“ that although he believed the Marratta power, unallied
 “ with other states, unable to cope with the Company’s
 “ power at Bombay, yet sustained by the French, they are
 “ qualified to refuse acquiescence to our demands ; which de-
 “ mands, the possession of the island of Bassen offers, as the
 “ only prospect of a security ; that no obligation precludes us
 “ from demanding it, nor can any blame be justly imputed to
 “ us, if as the Superior Power, we prescribe the terms,
 “ were they even more unequal than these are, on which we
 “ are willing to release both parties, from that dangerous
 “ point on which they fluctuated, between war and peace,
 “ during a long interval of two years, and are likely to con-
 “ tinue there, unless one side assumes the right of decision.”*

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* Hyder-Alli having resented the proffers of St. Lubin to the Marrattas, and the Marrattas unwilling to irritate the English, no concession or treaty whatsoever was entered into with Mr. St. Lubin, and he was expressly desired to withdraw from Poonah. He had had partizans there who wished to promote his views. He went to Hyder-Alli, and the refusal of the Marratta government contributed to facilitate the treaty, and the cession of the port of Mangalore. This was, and is the fact.

In this passage of his minute, Mr. Hastings unguardedly avows facts, which in direct terms condemn his own deliberate measures. The extensive advantages which a French alliance would yield to the Marrattas, should have induced him to treat upon more liberal, equal, and just principles, as the most likely means of oversetting the suspected treaty with St. Lubin. He avows, "*danger to both sides*," and a confession tantamount to its having been a studied impending manoeuvre in his political system, "*for a long interval of two years*," which comprehends the intire time that the Poonah treaty had existence. According to his professed maxima, "*the sword and not justice, should decide the point of right*," in an issue in which the Company had, *bona fide*, no concern, and became unnecessarily and imprudently, officious medlers. The great and acknowledged abilities of Mr. Hastings, and particularly the singular talent which he has acquired in writing, are circumstances which, upon a critical review and examination of his minutes and general conduct, since his return with power to India, will, upon many occasions, condemn himself, even more than the masterly pens of his opponents. The art of evasion, and equivocation, for the purposes of veiling or disguising the real measures taken, or meant to be taken, are too conspicuous not to create suspicions of the matters thus meant to be supported or defended. Plain, unequivocal facts, carry conviction where the ground is really sound, and the measures themselves directed to wise and salutary purposes; but when the mind is conscious of having betrayed trust, or is perversely bent upon, and determined, to guide and enforce measures, whether right or wrong, by the exercise of power abused and misapplied, the faculties of evasion, equivocation, and consequently of perversion, are employed with dangerous and alarming advantages in the supreme magistrate of a remote government, vested with civil, military,

litary, political, and commercial powers. The arguments and reasonings expressed in the minutes of Mr. Hastings, upon this and other important subjects, since the treaty of Benaras, contain such palpable contradictions to each other, and duplicity of sentiment, as are sufficient, without the able opposition they have had to encounter, to condemn the whole. And the inattention of the Directors to these subjects, regularly transmitted to them, nearly establishes an unpleasant truth, that although charged with a trust of magnitude and dignity, they scarcely ever read the proceedings of their servants, on the most important concerns of the Company and nation, in India.

The Governor proposed a plan, composed of ten articles, as the terms to be asked and insisted upon from the Marrattas, and being opposed by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, the consideration was put off till the day following.

1778, January 29th. On which day, the Governor laid before the Board, a letter from the Presidency of Bombay, concerning the subject of yesterday's complaint. In this letter, dated the 12th December, 1777, they give notice of an offer made by some members of the ministerial party at Poonah, to reinstate Roganaut-row, and of their own determination to accept such offer, whenever it should be authenticated by a direct engagement from the ministers, and to march with Roganaut-row, to establish him in the Paishwa-ship of Poonah by force of arms. They condemn the countenance given to Mr. Bolts, as well as to Mr. St. Lubin, and amuse themselves with the greater assurance of success in favour of Roganaut-row, as they expect assistance from Hyder-Alli-Cawn, who professes a friendship for that party; *an advantage which, however, they neglected to improve.* And the Governor reduced the propositions of yesterday

day from ten to five articles, without any material variation in point of matter, to the following purport, *viz.*

I. That such reasonable and practicable security be obtained for the personal safety of Roganaut-row, as *Roganaut-row himself shall require.*

II. That a specific sum be demanded to reimburse the company for the military charge, which may be incurred by that interposition.

III. That the fort and district of Basseen be ceded in perpetuity to the Company.

IV. That an additional grant of territory be made adjacent to Basseen and Bombay, in exchange for Baroach, and the lands ceded by Futta-Sing-Guiacawar, and from the pergunnahs of Hanfood, Aumood, and Desborah.

V. That no European settlement be allowed on any of the maritime coasts of the Marratta dominions, *without the consent of the supreme council previously obtained.*

These demands were sufficiently imperious and dictatorial, to a powerful independant state; but the 9th of the propositions of yesterday, contained a more imperious tone, in these terms: "*That these proposals be conveyed by letter to the present Paishwa; that his answer be required, without condition or reserve, to each article; and that this government shall take its final resolution, to abide by the treaty, as it shall stand confirmed by his answer, or to consider it as annulled and invalidated by them.*"

It is worthy of observation, that at a juncture so confessedly critical, notwithstanding the objectionable part of Mr. Bolt's political conduct, recorded on the proceedings

ceedings in Bombay, and the positive injunctions of the Company concerning his object in India, the very leading members of that government, afforded him the most essential assistance in his undertakings, of which the ship *Louisa*, and her cargoes to and from China, furnished the clearest evidence. And it is somewhat extraordinary, that however impolitic it might prove, to establish the avowed friend and partizan of Hyder-Alli-Cawn, at the head of the Marratta government, yet, as they had determined upon the measure, they should certainly have formed some plan of accommodation, to which Hyder should engage, as a party; although, upon every possible principle of good policy, the Marratta alliance was a more natural and beneficial connection to the Company, and more to be depended upon, than an aspiring, ambitious usurper, whose enmity to the English, and their allies, was as firmly rooted as that which he entertained for the Marrattas. It would therefore have been the essence of good policy, in the Company's servants, to have made use of their influence in preserving the division, and countenancing the jealousies, of two states, whose junction of power, should it ever happen, would effectually crush and destroy all the future prospects of the British nation in Hindostan.

Mr. Francis entered a formal protest against the Bombay proceedings; doubted the sincerity of the conference between Mr. Lewis (the assistant resident at Poona) and Amunt-row, for the restoration of Roganaut-row; urged the propriety of a steady adherence to the Company's general instructions, and particularly to their reprehensive letter of 12th April, 1775, addressed to the Presidency of Bombay: He wished, he said, to obtain the right and possession of Bassen for the Company, "*by an amicable negociation of exchange, or purchase;*" but declared, "*that even his views were cooled, by the little utility in point of revenue, arising from the conquest of* Sal-

“ *Salsette*.” * His reasons throughout are clear, judicious, and predictory of what followed. Mr. Wheler manifested the warmth of zeal and duty, in opposition to the proceedings in Bombay, as having an immediate tendency to consume the Company’s revenues, and to involve their means and reputation in distress and ruin. †

Upon the 2d February, 1778, Mr. Hastings’s proposals were re-considered; opposed, as before, by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, and carried by the Governor’s *casting vote*, to support Roganaut-row, in direct violation of the Poorunder treaty; and, with three additional articles, were ordered to be dispatched to the Presidency of Bombay, for their government.

The Governor then proposed, to take the opinion of General Stibbert on the sending a reinforcement, over the continent to Bombay, and the consequent necessity of augmenting the Sepoy corps: He also proposed a letter to Madras, to induce that Presidency to reinforce the Bombay army from thence; and at the same instant, that he continued with confidence, to assert, “ *that the Presidency of Bengal is, and will be, in a condition to assist Bombay abundantly, with men and money, to carry on the Marratta war,*” he stated the Bombay army thus:

Artillery, rank and file	-	261
European infantry	-	783
Sepoy infantry	-	5621
Irregulars	-	1231

A force which he thought able to carry all their hostile purposes into execution, without any assistance from
Bengal

* It is confidently alledged, that the present clear revenue of Salsette, is far short of the real advantages it yielded in the line of commerce, when it was in the possession of the Marrattas.

† Vide the Company’s records, for these minutes.

Bengal or Madras; an opinion which he struggled to enforce, by comparing it with the force of Bengal at the battle of Plassey, and against the Scha Zadda; with Colonel Forde's expedition against Masulipatnam; and considerably greater, than when unsupported by country powers, the troops of Bengal wrested the provinces and Soubaship from Cossim-Alli-Cawn. And thus, he affected to draw the same successful conclusions in the present affair, without considering, that the Marrattas are professionally and constitutionally, a warlike nation; whereas the Bengalee's are the most timid, irresolute, and indolent part of the human species. He might also, have considered that Fortune has proved herself as fickle and inconstant, in the decision of arms, as in the dispensation of other fortuitous events, which affect empires, states, societies, and individuals. He computed the distance from Bombay to Poonah at only four days march; that the friends of Roganaut-row were encamped in the neighbourhood of Poonah with 20,000 horse, and that his opponents, together with the main Marratta army, were engaged hostilely against Hyder-Alli-Cawn on the banks of the Kistna, therefore could not assist against the friends and measures of Roganaut-row.

How unfortunate was Mr. Hastings, as well in his secret intelligence, as in his conjectures, *if they were such as he expressed!* The Bombay army were not within two days march of Poonah, after having been about fifty days in their progress,* without any hostile obstruction, before they were totally defeated, and forced to a disgraceful humiliation, and a *carte-blanche*. There was not a man in the civil or military admini-

* The expedition moved from Bombay on the 22d of November, and after three or four days skirmishing, they capitulated at War-gaum on the 16th of January, distance about twenty-five or thirty miles from Poonah.

administration of the Marhatta government, either in thought or action, ready to espouse the cause of Roga-naut-row; but, on the contrary, the whole body of the people, in every station, seemed unanimous to oppose him, and the plan and measure he had adopted; and when it came to the test, the Bombay army found so numerous a force to oppose their approaches, that they were surrounded, and hemmed in at all quarters, by such a body of troops, that it proved the Marhatta main army were not on the banks of the Kistna. By this rule of judging, are not the following queries directly applicable? Is not the Governor General, by the countenance which he gave, and tallacious representations made by him, by which the Presidency of Bombay were not only encouraged, but justified, and enspirited on, culpable in a greater degree than as an accessory? And is he not immediately and directly answerable, with his fortune and person, to the Company and British nation, for all the treasure and troops which have been lost unnecessarily, and the disrepute and discredit brought on the Company and the nation, by the unwarrantable and wanton manner in which he forced the Company into the Marhatta war? — The mode of approbation by the Supreme Council, and the conditions which accompanied it, as requisitions inadmissible by the Marhattas, are material justifications of the Bombay gentlemen, against censures which otherwise should have irretrievably crushed them. Mr. Hastings's inconsistency, or whatever other definition it may admit of, appears in a reply to the eighth paragraph of Mr. Francis's minute. He proposed, *"to enter into a war with the most powerful state in Hindostan, who he conjectured were in alliance with France, as the means of defeating the views of France and Spain."* Instead of endeavouring to make that *"most powerful state,"* forsake the alliance of France, and become the faithful friends and allies of the British nation,

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and thus render the Company's possessions so secure, that the whole power and force of Britain might be directed elsewhere, with effect, against its enemies.—The Marrattas offered to settle a jaghire of five lacks of rupees annually on Roganaut-row, provided he would withdraw to Benaras, under the English protection. This Mr. Hastings opposed, and by that means, refused peace and security, together with the reception of about £.60,000 sterling annually, in specie, from a country with which the Company have no mercantile intercourse from Bengal or Bahar.

The 9th of February, Mr. Hastings informed the Board, that by private intelligence, he had received assurance of Governor Bellecombe's departure from Pondichery to the Malabar Coast, with a design to receive solemn possession of the port of Choul, on the part of France, in consequence of a cession thereof by the Marrattas. The truth was, that Monf. Bellecombe made a tour to Mahe in the *Brillante* man of war, and doubtless had in view, to assist Mr. St. Lubin, in forming and concluding treaties with the Marrattas and Hyder-Alli-Cawn. But the port of Choul never had been, either the object of his expedition, nor the probable concession on the part of a state, already too jealous and suspicious of European influence and intrigues in their vicinity.

On the 23d of February, Mr. Hastings presented a letter from Bombay of the 20th January, on which, it would seem, that he founded his motion for marching a detachment over land to re-inforce the Bombay army. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler persisted to oppose it, and protested in the strongest terms against the resolves of the majority.* The Governor's double
vote

* Vide the minutes upon record.

vote, and the single one of Mr. Barwell, having overruled the two single votes of their opponents, a detachment under the command of Colonel Matthew Leslie was resolved upon, to consist of

Officers	- - - -	103
Troops	- - - -	6,624
Servants	- - - -	19,729
Bazar people	- -	12,000

38,456

Here was an army of 6727 troops only, and a suite of 31,729 servants and sutlers, ordered to encounter an unexplored country, * inhabited by a warlike people, inimical to the Company, occupying fastnesses and defiles, and intersected by large navigable rivers, which would continually expose the army to be cut off by the sword, reduced by famine, or perish in the hospitals.

A letter from the Court of Directors, dated the 4th July, 1777, to the Presidency of Bombay, having arrived in Calcutta on the 12th March, 1778, "*particularly and positively confirming the treaty made by Colonel Upton with the Murrattas, and ordering a strict adherence to it; recommending special vigilance, whilst Ragoba was at Bombay, that he formed no plans, against what is called the ministerial party at Poona; and positively commanding, that no intervention or scheme in his favour, shall be entered into, without the previous consent of the Supreme Council, or Court of Directors.*" At the same time, saying, "*that common humanity warranted the protection of Ragoba's person from violence.*" No council being then sitting, or to sit in the rotation of business until the Monday following, and the detachment

tachment under Colonel Leslie being under orders to march, Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler addressed the Governor General by letter on the same day, urging the Board to countermand the march, but without effect.

On the 18th March, a letter to the Presidency of Bombay, drawn up by Mr. Hastings, was laid before the Board, consisting of orders and instructions for the guidance of that Presidency. This letter is enveloped with so much art and subtilty, that though the writer's judgment must be condemned upon the face of every fact, yet a person unacquainted with the history, his views, and abilities in that way, would be apt to acquit him of having had intentions directly foreign to the language expressed. It is like ~~the~~ horizontal plan or base of a rugged or hilly country, laid down by outlines upon a fair sheet of paper, which deceives the eye into a belief, that the country is as flat and level as it appears represented on the paper.—It sets out with an abstract of the Company's last recited letter, which in the 65th paragraph strongly desires the observance of the treaty; and in the same breath, he charges the Marattas with an absolute violation of every article in the treaty, with forming French connections; and insinuates a firm hope, that the spirit of the measures conveyed in the present letter of instruction, shall have been anticipated before it reaches, by a great event against the Maratta administration in favour of Roga-naut-row. But, he says, as the reverse is yet probable, they (the Supreme Council) shall furnish such instructions and authority for their guidance, as are necessary on a supposition that no revolution hath taken place at Ponnah, consisting of seven articles, to the following effect, viz.

The 1st requires a peremptory demand of a country of three complete lacks of rupees annual revenue, near Baroaeh; and in case of non-conformity, *to declare it a violation of treaty.*

The 2d requires a peremptory demand of the immediate payment of twelve lacks of rupees; and in case of non-compliance, *to declare it a violation of treaty.*

The 3d orders them to keep possession of the several villages, and pergunnahs ceded to the Company by Futta-Sing-Guicawar, *as the Marrattas have neglected to produce proof of Futta-Sing's incapacity to make such cession.*

The 4th directs them, to remonstrate against the countenance afforded to Mr. St. Lubin; the engagements entered into with him; the grant of the port of Choul; and to demand a clear and satisfactory explanation of their intentions in regard to France.—And to declare, that the English Company shall take such measures as prudence shall dictate for the future safety of their interests and possessions. The Governor condescended to acknowledge on this subject,—“ *That he regarded the Marrattas as the only native, and the French as the only foreign power in India, capable of affecting the influence which the British nation had acquired in it.* The former having been rendered incapable by internal distraction,† and the inequality of their numbers to European discipline; and the latter, by the want of territorial property, or any to supply it.—That therefore an alliance between them would at once relieve all their mutual wants, and afford them all the requisites to dispute with us on equal* ”
“ *terms* ”

* Yet he laboured to unite these two powers, which were severally capable of affecting the British influence.

† Which distractions, his measures have healed, and effectually composed.

*“ terms, the dominion of India, which at present we possess
 “ without a rival, and may be attended with calamities more
 “ dreadful by the superior magnitude of the contest, than that
 “ which we formerly experienced in the Carnatic.”**

The 5th directs them to demand a safe passage for, and assistance to Colonel Leslie's detachment, through the Marratta dominions; and to assure them, that no act of hostility shall be committed by the army on their march; and to repeat the strongest assurances of a pacific disposition and adherence to the treaty in every point.

The 6th requires the observance of the Company's orders in their last recited letter, whether the administration of Saccaram Baboo, and Nana-furnese continues, or a revolution should have taken place. But if either administration shall *directly* or *indirectly*, infringe the treaty, in such case, the Supreme Council, in virtue of their authority, *doth authorise the Bombay Council to form a new alliance with Roganaut-row, and engage with him in any expedient scheme for retrieving his affairs. And the like authority is extended, at all events, if they are invited to accomplish the propositions transmitted to them on the 2d of February last.*

The 7th is a general recommendation, having a clear tendency to delude and circumvent the people of Bombay, and to make them ostensible for any unfortunate event that may arise; but it artfully recommends *“ such
 “ a policy, as circumstances will warrant, independent of any
 “ particular interest of Roganaut-row, whom they must re-
 “ gard in the great political object of our government, as sim-
 “ ply*

* What fatal confessions were these, and how inconsistent were his uniform measures, to these dreaded consequences, and to sound policy!

“ply meriting our consideration, and not necessarily connected or blended with them.”

Instructions and orders, thus carrying in every expression, violence and hostility, tantamount to a declaration of war, produced deliberate protests from Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, with such strong and solid reasons, as obviate the propriety of any other comment.

Mr. Francis concurred in two general principles *professed* in the intended letter. First, to make the Directors last letter, *“the ground work.”* And, secondly, to make the establishment of a lasting peace, the sole general object. On the preamble of the Governor’s letter, Mr. Francis observed, *“that we continued in the peaceable possession of Salsette, and of the Marratta share of the city and pergunnah of Baroach as stipulated by treaty.”*

I. As to the first article instructive, he alledged, that its execution appeared to have been retarded, only by a dispute about the literal meaning of a word,* differently construed by each party; and that the admission by the Supreme Board, on the 18th August last, of *gross* instead of *net* revenue, decided the dispute in favour of the Marrattas. But that having several other places in possession, and enjoying their revenues, as pledges, until the grants of the whole country required were made out, our security was not affected by any delay, occasioned chiefly by that dispute.

II. That by the acceptance and possession of Jamboosfer in mortgage, to be held until the revenues collected from thence, shall have liquidated the debt of
twelve

twelve lacks, which the Marrattas had consented to pay us towards the charge of the late war, demanded in the second instruction, it must be construed as a mutual performance of the treaty.

III. That the third instruction, deciding arbitrarily, and *ex parte*, the right of Futta Sing to make the cession therein specified, which appeared to him (Mr. Francis) very disputable; if decided after this imperious manner in our own favour, would make the establishment of a *lasting peace* impossible.

IV. That the fourth instruction, supposed the port of Choul to have been ceded to the French, an assertion which had already been acknowledged, upon enquiry, to want proof; and that the menaces uttered, if answers consonant to the desires of the Presidency of Bombay, or of Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, were not returned, amounted to a declaration of war: Mr. Francis observed, "*That the Marrattas having thus con-*
formed to the conditions of the treaty, it seemed just and
reasonable, that some satisfaction should be given them on
our side; particularly, that Roganaut-row should be re-
moved from Bombay, with a proper provision for his es-
tablishment in a private station; that if any negotiations
were formed with the French, we may trace them to their
source, in the protection given to Roganaut-row, his re-
sidence at Bombay, and the continued intrigues between him
and that Presidency; that the true way to defeat the views
of France, was to give the Marrattas a solid proof of
our good faith; that while Roganaut-row, a pretender
to their government, was supported by us, we give them
too much cause for looking to France for assistance; and
that the present measures will leave them without a
choice."

V. As to the fifth instruction, after stating the contradiction, and motives, which on different occasions have been assigned for sending an army to Bombay, he asked, "*If permission for a safe passage and assistance is refused, shall the detachment, nevertheless, be ordered to march through the Murratta territory, against their declared inclinations? And if that is meant, whether that act alone does not constitute a declaration of war, which cannot be qualified by any assurances of our pacific intentions? That such language, united with such measures, is an insult to common sense, and much too plain to deceive, either the Murrattas or the Court of Directors.*"

VI. On the sixth instruction, leaving an option in the Bombay Presidency, whether to declare the treaty infringed, by the Murrattas, or by themselves, and in consequence of such decision, empowering them to enter into new engagements with Roganaut-row, for retrieving his affairs with effect, he said, "*That, in the present temper and disposition of that Presidency, there cannot be a doubt of the use they will make of this extraordinary power, or that they will not be forward to avail themselves of it, before it can be recalled.*"

VII. On the seventh instruction, which leaves the Presidency of Bombay in possession of deciding as they shall please, and recommends the interest of Roganaut-row to be regarded only as unconnected with the grand political system,* he said, "*It is a manifest contradiction to the foregoing, and to former instructions; that not to pursue some one determinate system may be hazardous and disgraceful: That he conceived the Supreme Board not warranted to convey such unlimited powers to the Presidency of Bombay: That that Presidency should continue*"

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"subor-

* Mr. Hastings never communicated this "grand political system" to the Presidency of Bombay.

“subordinate, and be successively directed by the Supreme Council; and that the peace of India, perhaps the fate of the British empire in this part of the world, is involved in the questions, which are thus left to their future decisions.” He asked, “Are we justified in relinquishing our jurisdiction, even for a moment, over such questions?” And he concluded thus: “Upon the whole, it appears to me, that the real tendency of this letter, notwithstanding any qualifying expressions interspersed through it, is to provoke a war with the Marrattas; that it seeks for causes of offence, where none exist; that the language it holds to the Marrattas is peremptory and hostile, and never used but when a rupture is pre-determined; that the causes of complaint on which it urges a quarrel, are trifling and exaggerated; that the facts it refers to, are either clearly disproved, or taken for granted, without evidence; and that the terms of the instructions are in some places ambiguous, and in others contradictory.—Whether they are or are not consistent with the pacific resolutions, so clearly and positively expressed by the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 4th July, must be left to their judgment.”

Mr. Wheeler having repeated his dissent and protestation against any interference between the contending powers of the Marratta government, and the armament then under orders for Bombay, as well as the purpose to which it was to be employed, declared, “That he should not think it necessary in future to enter into discussions on these matters, as the Governor General and Mr. Barwell had taken the whole responsibility on themselves; must be answerable for the consequences of the measures already resolved on, and such as may, of necessity, follow” * He agreed with the Governor, that the 65th paragraph of

* In justice, and in good policy, should not the private estates of persons taking responsibility upon themselves, in such strong instances, which, in the letter of law, may amount to an assumption of debt, be held accountable, in terms thereof, for the consequences?

of the Company's letter to Bombay should be the ground of the instructions to that Presidency, but he dissented from every other part of them, on the same principles as those urged by Mr. Francis.

Mr. *Barwell* having joined in the Governor's measures, the letter was prepared, and agreed to, for signature and dispatch.

Colonel Goddard's regiment of cavalry were ordered, on the 30th March, to join Colonel Leslie's detachment, and to proceed to Bombay.

Advices from Bombay, received the 6th April, represented every thing in a state of perfect tranquility; that no motion had been made in favour of Roganautrow, nor measure arisen from the pretended overtures of his partizans in Poonah, mentioned in their letter of 12th December. Yet Colonel Leslie's detachment was ordered to march; instructions were passed; from all of which Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler dissented. Several minutes by Mr. Hastings, in reply to Mr. Francis, with rejoinders and sur-rejoinders, explanatory of former minutes, and quibbling upon words, were committed to record, in the course of this month, but so immaterial as not to merit quotation.

The object of this narrative being restrained to such facts and circumstances, as shall remove false impressions from misrepresentations, and to shew the unwearied, unremitted, and faithful resistance made by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, through each and every stage of the ruinous business. So alarming were these gentlemen's apprehensions, and such their prescience of the declining state of the Company's finances, as well as those of their *dependent* allies in India, the probable wants of the nation in Europe, and the demand which the nation must make, in some shape or other, on the

Company, for a renewal of their charter, to answer the call of a general war, so much threatened in Europe that the records exhibit indefatigable labour and assiduity in both, and marks of nervous, clear, and irresistible abilities in Mr. Francis, to oppose expences, and to introduce principles of œconomy, on every occasion ; and that it was with these views, and those of justice, together with a fixed intention to good-faith, and the preservation of national fame, that he uniformly and steadily pressed, without intermission, against the Marratta war, and every other avoidable hostility in India ; as most consistent with the instructions of the Company, with good policy, and with honour. Lest it should be alledged, that this detachment was not attended with an extraordinary military charge of magnitude, it is proper to assert, as a truth, that an equal number of troops were immediately recruited, by additional battalions, and an augmentation of each existing battalion, at an immense expence in advance, cloathing, arms, and discipline ; and that an extra staff, extra stores, extra train of artillery, and other unforeseen extra expences, incident to such an occasion, besides the charges and actual losses upon the exchange of remittances, together also with the distressing irretrievable inconvenience of transporting the current coins wanted in circulation at home, into parts from whence it cannot return. Even the distresses of the Nabob of Oude were heightened ; and the Rajah Cheyt Sing, the identical tributary of the Company, had a new contribution levied upon him, under this pretext, in addition to his established tribute. Demands equally unjust and impolitic, as they were compulsory, at a time, when prudence should have dictated the propriety, perhaps the necessity, of conciliating the minds, attaching the affections, and securing the loyalty and fidelity of the principal natives, instead of creating dissensions and resentments, by claims which were not founded on pre-contracts, or conditional treaties, but upon the capri-

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cious movements of imperious and oppressive minds, having, in remote as well as immediate contemplation, ends very opposite to those which were professed.

May 11, 1778. Advices from Bombay of the 5th April, having communicated the accounts of a revolution at Poonah, in favour of Roganaut-row, * Mr. Francis, upon a principle that any assistance from Bengal would not now be wanted on the Malabar coast, either against the Marrattas, or to oppose France, as the supposed connection between Nana-furnese and Monsieur St. Lubin could no longer exist with effect, resumed the subject of suspending the march of Colonel Leslie's detachment, as no longer necessary. But the Governor persisted as before, and over-ruled the motion.

May 16. The detachment having marched, and the rainy season approaching, Mr. Francis urged the recall of the detachment. Mr. Hastings, with constant perseverance, against his own knowledge and certain conviction, maintained, "*That no season could be more happily chosen than the beginning of May; that the violent heats would soon be over; and that the succeeding rains would be a relief to the troops, and facilitate the march*"—To those who have experienced the rains of India, the idea will appear new and extraordinary. Colonel Leslie's letters, *particularly his private ones to the Governor*, prove that nothing could have been so ill founded. He uniformly attributes the delay of his march to the torrents of rain which had overflowed the country, destroying the roads, and making even the small rivers and guts impassable. Light troops, without incumbrance, may perhaps move in any season, but it is not so easy to convey a train of artillery, with stores, ammunition, camp-equipage, and provisions,

provisions, for a body of people not less than 38,000 in number, in a tempestuous season, and through an enemy's country, intersected with numberless streams, generally overflowed. The effect of the heat was fatally experienced on the first day's march from Calpee; by the ignorance of the conductors, or the obstinacy of the commander, they moved out of the right course, and for want of water, and through fatigue, between 300 and 400 persons, belonging to the army, or to its followers, died raving mad. Captain Crawford, one of the best and bravest characters in India, died in that state, of two hours illness. Colonel Parker, Major Fullarton, Captain Ash, Captain Showers, and about ten subalterns, happily recovered from dangerous illnesses, occasioned by the march. And when Colonel Goddard, after the death of Colonel Leslie, took charge of the army, although very little progress had been made in the route, he found above a thousand Sepoys in the hospital.

June 8. By letters from Colonel Leslie, it is discovered, that the Marratta states adjoining to the Jumna, had opposed the passing of the army, and continued a resistance through the Bundelcund country; that Moodajee Boosla, Rajah of Berar, had expressed an unwillingness to admit the detachment near his capital; the evident effect of distrust; that he disclaimed all political interests and objects for himself; that he refused to join his troops with the Company's; and that he recommended, in the strongest terms, an accommodation with the Marrattas, offering himself as a mediator. Mr. Francis renewed his motion for the recall of the detachment, on account of the opposition and obstruction it had already received, and the further difficulties it would meet with. — The Governor's reply merits particular attention; he described the route of the army with so minute a direction, and with so positive a security,

curity, through Bundelcund and Bapaul; he asserted so confidently, the invitation and pressing solicitations of Moodajee Boosla to send the army through his country; and declared so pointedly the political objects and interests of that prince, that one would forbear even to doubt the moral possibility of the facts alledged. He insinuated that the Marratta tribes were not under subjection to the Paishwa; in order to impress an idea of their unimportance, as a state capable of annoying the march of the detachment.—What must Mr. Hastings's warmest adherents and advocates now think of his political judgement and asseverations, against proofs so incontrovertibly positive, if they pretend to vindicate his intentions?

Mr. Francis rejoined, in an able and spirited minute, to all Mr. Hastings's equivocations, sophistry, and ill-founded assertions. — He observed, That whether the Marrattas, as distinct tribes, are under immediate subjection to the Paishwa or not, was very immaterial, when a general alliance, and a common enemy, operated on their interests and mutual security.

Mr. Hastings sur-rejoined, in terms that must have struck the Directors with astonishment, if they attended to the expressions, and their unequivocal tendency, by which he declared “ *his unalterable determination to prosecute the measure to the utmost of his power to the conclusion.*” — He said, “ *That the disgrace of those who planned the expedition, the irreparable loss of the credit of this government, and a perpetual distrust of all its future acts, exclusive of the forfeiture of the advantages for which it was originally concerted, would be the infallible consequence of stopping the expedition.*” Do not these words mark, in strong terms, and distinguished characters, the obstinate and imperious disposition of the man, which is not to be withheld from its purposes,
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by self-evident consequences, or immediate danger? But "*a thirst for plunder, and an avidity for power, have ever been motives of hostility and injustice, to avaricious men,*" is the sentiment of a very sensible, intelligent person,* one of Hastings's principal agents, in a late publication, "*Of the History and Management of the East-India Company,*" which is peculiarly applicable to the author's own friend.

By letters received the 11th June, from Bombay, dated the 2d May, they advise, that they had countermanded the advance of Colonel Leslie's detachment, until further orders. — That this step was founded on the opinion they had formed of the present state of affairs, and their desire to rescue the Company from the heavy expence, and their troops from the dangers and difficulties of a march from Bengal to Bombay.

By letters of the 9th May, received the 21st June, they advise of having reversed the last-mentioned resolution, within two days after the measure was adopted; and that they had ordered Colonel Leslie to proceed. But they assigned no reason for the alteration.

June 22. Considering this extraordinary fluctuation and unsteadiness in the Council of Bombay, and that no motives whatsoever were assigned for it, Mr. Francis represented to the Board, the hazard and discredit of leaving a detachment at the discretion of such Council; and, on that ground, urged again, but in vain, the necessity of recalling it.

June 29. Another letter from Bombay advised the receipt of Instructions from the Supreme Council, and that, in consequence thereof, they had directed Mr.
Mostyn

* Mr. John Macpherson.

Mostyn to demand, from the Regency of Poonah, the several matters ordered by the Governor-general and Council. — That, conceiving the passage of Colonel Leslie's detachment to be attended with almost insuperable dangers and difficulties, they recommended, that in future, any reinforcement to them might proceed directly from Madras, as the best and easiest mode. — Thus, it is evident to demonstration, that the safety of the detachment was more the effect of chance than conduct.

July 6. The detachment having crossed the Jumna, and proceeded into the heart of a hostile country, from whence its recall might be construed into a disgraceful defeat and retreat, the Governor thought it no longer necessary to disguise his real purposes; on the 6th of July, he dropt the mask, by the first direct move towards the object which he since appears to have had originally at heart, of an alliance with the Rajah of Berar, and which will appear to have been, (notwithstanding the reasons ostensibly held out) the real object of the expedition. The mystery once unfolded, all further concealments were either useless or impracticable. — The great difficulty with Mr. Hastings appears to have been, to find pretences for so extraordinary and questionable a step, as that of sending the Company's troops out of the provinces, over land to the opposite extremity of India, against the very letter of repeated and positive orders, and to account for the enormous expenses that must attend it. To remove those difficulties, no assertions were spared, no artifice omitted, and no sophistry unemployed. That point once carried, and the army out of the probable reach of being recalled, — new facts are asserted, new principles established, and new objects proposed. — The same army, which originally was to have reinstated Roga-naut-row, and to support that interest alone, is now
E destined

destined to place Moodajee Boosla at the head of the Marratta empire, as well in opposition to Roganautrow as to his adversaries; and the Company to join with that prince in invading the dominions of their own ally, the Nizam of the Deccan. And yet Mr. Hastings, in the month of December following, declared, that this Moodajee Boosla, who was then dangerously ill, and expected to die, and who was to have been exalted to the Marratta Imperial throne, was not the real Rajah of Berar, nor the pretender to the Ramrajah-ship, but the Naib, or Depury Rajah of Berar, during the minority of the real prince. In consequence of this change in the destination of the expedition, Colonel Leslie was ordered to take his route through Berar, instead of pursuing the direct easy road through Malva; and, for the first time, Madajee Scindia, the chief of that district, was declared by Mr. Hastings, to have had no friendly intercourse or connection with the Company; and that he was always represented as a partizan with Nana-furnese, against them, and in favour of the French.

July 7. Advice arrived from Mr. Baldwin, the Company's agent at Cairo, on the 7th July, which, however, proved premature, that war had been declared between France and Britain.—Mr. Francis recurred to his original motion, and urged the necessity, in consequence of that event, of recalling the detachment for the defence and protection of the Company's principal object. The Governor and Mr. Barwell persisted as before, and ordered it to halt in Berar; while the Presidency of Bombay were, by order of these very persons who compose the majority, declaring war, and committing hostilities, on the faith of receiving assistance from this very detachment, which, for that sole purpose, *ostensibly*, was put under their absolute authority.

July

July 9. At a time when, in consequence of the advices from Cairo, it was expected that the defence of the Company's possessions would occupy the deliberations of the Supreme Council, to secure their dominion and trade against French invasions, Mr. Hastings produced a laboured history of the Ram-rajah, the constitution of the Marratta empire, and some remote pretensions of Moodajee Boosla, by consanguinity, to the Marratta sovereignty. And concluded with a proposal to enter into a treaty with Moodajee Boosla, who (he alledged) was at *perpetual and inveterate warfare* with the Regency of Poonah, and with the Soubah of the Deccan, with whom the Company were yet in terms of friendship, by alliance and solemn treaties. And that a Company's servant should be immediately dispatched to him, with plenipotentiary powers to that purpose.

A system of policy so contrary to common sense, common justice, and common faith, is difficult to be justified. If the Marrattas with a French alliance, were acknowledged by Mr. Hastings, "*to be capable of refusing acquiescence to,*" and "*obstruſſing upon an equality of power, the British views in Hindostan,*" what must the same power, in conjunction with the Soubah, who is the richest prince in India, and the probable junction of the Soubah's most particular friend and inseparable ally Hyder-Alli-Cawn, produce to the Company's disadvantage, toward the total subversion of the British empire in Asia? Must not such measures render the Marrattas, not only irreconcilable and inveterate, but desperate? Would not the union of these three powerful states, easily overrun the Carnatic, and restore to the Soubah the five northern Circars, which the Company now enjoy? And after the reduction of all the Company's forts and garrisons on each side of the peninsula, would not that united power confine the remaining influence of the

Company to the Bengal provinces, and perhaps render *them* insecure? Such an event, considering the shackles which the Company have impolitically held upon their allies in the interior countries, and the pinioned princes of the Carnatic, would, without a deviation from good faith and honour, rejoice their hearts, in the prospect which a native superiority would offer to their emancipation and enfranchisement.

July 10. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, on the 10th July, argued against the proposals of Mr. Hastings on the preceding day, and urged the necessity of putting Bengal in a state of defence, recalling the detachment, and sending a reinforcement from Madras to Bombay, *to act solely on a defensive plan.*

July 11. The next day, the subject was revived and canvassed, with a motion for recalling the detachment. Mr. Wheler desired time to consider the nature and extent of the intended treaty, before he positively determined; in which he was joined by Mr. Francis. The majority resolved on a treaty, and that Mr. Elliot be appointed to negotiate it. The plan was not produced.

July 18. Mr. Hastings having prepared powers and instructions for Mr. Elliot's embassy to Berar, produced them at the Board the 18th July, and were voted by himself and Mr. Barwell against a strenuous opposition by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler. * It appeared upon these documents, that the treaty was to extend generally, to offence and defence; that Roganaut-row was to be set aside; that Moodajee Boolla was to be placed at the head of the Marratta empire, and to be supported in his pretensions against the Company's ally, the Sou-
bah

* Mr. Wheler's minute is strong, pathetic, and sensible, against the treaty and the expedition.

bah of the Deccan. This plan of new, hostile, and extensive operations, which instantly tended to involve all India, was proposed and urged by Mr. Hastings, at the beginning of a French war, and at a time that all India beheld the Company's growing power and usurpations with fearful, jealous eyes, without any availing and direct measure taken or proposed, for the effectual security of Bengal, or any other of the Company's possessions † During all this time, the detachment halted at Chatterpore, a few days march from the Jumna. It appeared from Col. Leslie's letters, that Mr. Hastings must have been perfectly acquainted with all the transactions of the army; particularly in his letter of 30th June, where he says, "*That he will critically observe the Governor's private instructions, in communicating with him, one post before he does with the Board; in order that he may have time to observe upon it, before it reaches the Board, &c.*" Yet at the Board, the Governor constantly defended him, and recommended to the Board to approve Colonel Leslie's violent and hostile attack upon the town and fortress of Mow, under the protection of the Marrattas, although the Governor could not but be acquainted with the true motives of that barbarous depredatory measure.

August 17. A letter from Bombay, dated 25th July, was received in Calcutta the 17th Aug. saying, "*That they had declared the treaty of Poonah annulled, and no longer binding on the Company; that they had determined to accept the offers of Moraba and other Chiefs, who had declared in favour of Rozanaut-*"
" rose, &c."

† To save appearances at home, and to gloss over his own measures, Mr. Hastings proposed several unavailing and ineffectual modes preparatory to defence; while, at the same time, he continued at dismantling the grand arsenal of the actual arms. A narrative of transactions in the ordnance department will appear in support of this allegation.

"row; and accordingly had determined to accompany him with an army to Poonah, the beginning of September." Notwithstanding Mr. Hastings's projected treaty with Moodajee Boolla, he warmly approved the plan for reinstating Roganaut-row; yet he represented Roganaut-row's cause as desperate, and the measures of the Presidency of Bombay, "as equivalent to a resolution to do nothing." The meaning of which is, that he supported measures which he knew would not take effect. But, probably, he trusted that they might save his projected detachment, at the hazard of the Bombay army, Bombay itself, and all the Company's factories on that side of India. By letters from Colonel Leslie it appeared, that the gentlemen of Bombay had directed him to proceed in a direct course to Poonah, instead of the route through Guzzerat to Baroach, or Surat, as had been pre-determined.

In Council, on the 31st August, some reflections having been made by Mr. Francis on Colonel Leslie's extraordinary delay at Chatterpore, the Board agreed with him, that the causes deserved to be enquired into.

And on the 2d September, in the course of a warm debate on the stay of the detachment at Chatterpore, Mr. Hastings uniformly defended and supported Colonel Leslie, and with much apparent confidence in his conduct, referred to the event to justify it. It afterwards appeared from the letters of Colonel Leslie, that all these defences were fallacious and deceitful. In a letter dated at Chatterpore, the 30th July, Colonel Leslie tells Mr. Hastings, bluntly, "*That he had the Governor's own private and public approbation of all the measures, which he had since condemned and execrated bitterly.*" He added, "*that he hopes for the Governor's own reputation, that he believes the assertions of ignorance, presumption, and rapacity, imputed to him (the Colonel)*"

" in.

“ in Captain Palmer’s letter, to be true, for the following
 “ lines in the same letter from Capt. Palmer to Capt. Cocke-
 “ rell, say, That my disgrace is determined on, either by the
 “ recall of the detachment, or by my supercession in the com-
 “ mand; and that the efforts of friendship alone, not a
 “ possibility of my being innocent of these charges, protracts
 “ the measure, and suspends your resolution.” This quo-
 tation from Captain Palmer’s letter must have been
 very early in July, or the latter end of June. It ma-
 nifestly proves, that the most sacred trusts were sacri-
 ficed to private views, and private friendships, as the
 declarations by the Governor’s most confidential secre-
 tary, must have had his authority.

From the 22d September to the 5th October, no
 material advices from Colonel Leslie had transpired.
 He had altered the position of his camp, but without
 any apparent intention to pursue the march. The hos-
 tility committed by him in the province of Bundel-
 cund (*the Country of Diamonds*) being as reprehensible
 as the delay, and other circumstances, Mr. Francis
 urged again, that his conduct should be enquired into;
 but at the particular request of Mr. Hastings, *to defer*
it, that influence predominated. Having received ac-
 counts of the death of Mr. Elliot, in his way to nego-
 ciate the treaty with the Rajah of Berar, Mr. Hastings
 moved in council, that the commission be continued,
 and another person appointed to carry it into execu-
 tion.

It is a justice due to superior merit, to digress in
 this place, in order to lament the too early fate of one
 of the most promising characters, and elevated genius,
 which dignify humanity; and to sympathize with his
 relations and acquaintances; for all who knew him were
 his friends, as well as strangers, to whom report only
 yielded an opportunity of admiring his virtues and ca-
 pacity

capacity, for the death of Alexander Elliot, Esq. * He fell a martyr to patriotism, and fidelity to his employers.—Afflicted with a disorder peculiar to the East, which originates in bilious obstructions, and in the cure requires too copious an application of mercury; his duty (as he thought) prevailed over reason, in undertaking a long and harrassing journey, in the deluged season, without the possibility of accommodations suited to his state. After leaving the Company's territories, he discovered that Governor Chevalier, who had secretly escaped from Chandernagore, was pursuing the same route, before him. Knowing the ambitious designs of that man, and the accurate knowledge he had acquired in the politics of India, the suggestions instigated Mr. Elliot to endeavour, at all events, to seize his person, dreading that his liberty and arrival in France might be attended with the worst consequences to the Company's affairs, and the views of Britain, in India. He moved on by forced and fatiguing journeys, still tracing and approaching Mr. Chevalier.—Unfortunately, when he had the chace in view, one of the large rivers of Catac, obstructed his progress, by a sudden overflow of its waters. Zeal and resolution actuated him, regardless of the state of his body, and the medicines which he had used, and the exertion of strength and activity which the stemming of a rapid stream required, he undertook and succeeded, in swimming over the river, with a few of his attendants and sepoy's.—He found Mr. Chevalier at the metropolis of Catac; and although escorted only by a company of sepoy's, he claimed the person of Governor Chevalier from the Rajah, with such sensible and manly arguments in support thereof, that the Rajah yielded to Mr. Elliot's eloquence, as superior to that of Mr. Chevalier, and surrendered him up. As Mr. Elliot had but a
small

* Son to the late Sir Gilbert Elliot.

small escort, and the longest and most dangerous part of his journey yet to encounter, he could not, without sacrificing the object of his commission, return a guard to conduct Mr. Chevalier and his companion Mr. Moneron to Calcutta; therefore he engaged their paroles in writing, to surrender themselves as prisoners of war within a limited time, to the Governor-general. — Mr. Chevalier and Mr. Moneron performed their engagements; Mr. Elliot pursued his route for Berar, and died a few days thereafter. Thus, by an exertion worthy of Mr. Elliot, did he lose his own life, the Company a most able and faithful servant, and his country a loyal subject. And Mr. Hastings, with opposite sentiments, accommodated his friend Mr. Chevalier, with a safe and speedy passage to Versailles. A mode of conveyance which Mr. Chevalier could not have achieved in thrice the time, if at all, had he been suffered to wander through the interior of India in disguise.

On the 7th October, Mr. Hastings withdrew his motion for continuing the commission, and sending another person to execute it; but he persisted, notwithstanding, in forming the alliance with Moodajee Boosla. Although he had discovered, and, in consequence thereof, declared, “*That it was always more advantageous to wait for solicitations, than to make advances.*”

The new instructions now proposed for the march of the detachment, will be found to deserve particular attention. * The tendency of them was, that the detachment should be left under the orders of the Presidency of Bombay, for the express purposes of supporting any plan or design for the restoration of Rogaun-row, and to provide for the immediate safety

of Bombay, against a French invasion. Upon this occasion, Mr. Hastings, for the first time, avowed a distrust of Colonel Leslie, with an indirect profession of an intention to remove him.

October 12. However important the subject, considering the charge and power with which Colonel Leslie was intrusted, no resolution was taken to remove him from the command, until the 12th October.—Mr. Hastings, upon that occasion, informed the Board, “*That it had been the will of God to blast his designs by means which no human prudence could have foreseen, and against which he had therefore provided no resource.*” Yet he affirmed, “*That the effects of the detachment will still answer his most sanguine hopes, and that the measure itself is as adviseable now, and n^o so, than when it was first adopted.*” Mr. Francis, with his wonted zeal, by a most able minute, urged against meddling, directly or indirectly, in the differences and pretensions of the Maratta chiefs and ministers amongst themselves. * “*He briefly recapitulated his continued and invariable opposition to a cause, and measures, so inconsistent with sound policy, and the real interests and security of the Company’s possessions and trade, through every*

* The Company’s positive injunctions in the general letter to Madras, dated 27th June, 1770, against offensive and officious alliances, are peculiarly adapted to the sentiments expressed by Mr. Francis, viz. “*We have only here to enjoin you, to avoid, as much as in you lies, becoming parties in any dispute between the powers in India; and to pay the most strict obedience to our orders, for confining our views to our present possessions; the peace and security of which are the utmost scope of our wishes, as they will necessarily tend to advance the commercial and vital interests of the Company.*”

Mr. Hastings was second in Council at Madras, upon the 18th April, 1771, when this letter was quoted in clear and satisfactory justification of the sentiments and conduct of that Board, and, for that purpose, entered upon their proceedings.

every successive stage thereof. He stated the disappointment and failure in the pretended support of Bhangaut-row and his partizans, their dispersion, and the imprisonment of his principal adherents in Poonah.—That, by advice from Colonel Leslie, the detachment, in four months, had only marched 120 miles, at the expence of 12 lacks of rupees, or 3 lacks per month; that they were opposed by a numerous body of Marhattas and natives; and that they had yet above a thousand miles to march over.” Mr. Francis then desired information on several interesting points—How money was to be supplied?—how provisions were to be conveyed?—what probability there was, that the Rajah of Berar would receive and entertain them as friends and allies, or give them a passage through his country? or even, admitting these facts to be resolved favourably, “Whether Mr. Hastings believes confidently, that if the army shall meet with no interruption in its march, it will get to Bombay, in time to afford relief to that place, if it shall be attacked, or that an attack had been preconcerted by the allied forces of the French and the Marhattas?” It is a truth well known, that it is with violence to themselves, and difficulty to their officers, that seapoys will embark upon the sea, if at all. If the army had marched, as was originally intended, to Baroach or Surat, which are in the Guzzerat country, their distance from Bombay would not only be very great, but more difficult, by reason of almost inaccessible defiles and passes between hills, and the entire space inhabited by a numerous martial people, in that degree that they could not yield more speedy succours to Bombay, than if they were cantoned in the Bengal provinces.

October 19. Chatterpore, which is the capital of Bundelcund, is situate near the western confine of that province. Its distance from Calcutta may be computed at twenty days ordinary journey for a native courier.

Here the detachment had long lain. Col. Leslie's last letter was laid before the Board upon the 19th October, wherein he stated the causes which retarded his march, and accounts for his not having being heretofore more explicit in his communication to the Board, saying, "*That he had furnished Mr. Hastings, at his own special desire, a particular journal of occurrences, and therefore had trusted to him for such explanations as the Board might desire to know.*" The Colonel expressed no apprehension of Mr. Hastings's resentment, or of any effects it could produce; but, on the contrary, sets him at open defiance in plain terms, and refused to hold private correspondence with him any longer.

October 22. The Governor having received information of the death of Colonel Leslie at Chatterpore, on the 3d October, laid that information, and the Colonel's private letters, before the Board, on the 22d; although the event had been known in the native circle of Calcutta, and therefore to the Governor, most probably, several days before; and it is a general conclusion, that the impossibility of his recovery was effectually established as an inevitable consequence, in the Governor's mind, at the time he consented to his dismissal from the command of the army, on the 14th October.

November 2. Colonel Goddard, as second, having succeeded to the chief command of the detachment, upon the death of Colonel Leslie, he advised that he found the military treasure-chest empty; that he was obliged to draw bills for the subsistence of his troops; that there were upwards of 1000 sepoy in the hospital; and that, under these inconveniences, he had, notwithstanding, proceeded on his march to Sagur.

On the 12th November, the Governor proposed an arrangement for supplying the detachment with money by remittances to Nagpore, the capital of Berar.—If it was not intended that the army shall halt in that country, the measure was absurd, because if the detachment was to march without interruption to Bombay, it would be arrived there before remittances from Calcutta could reach Berar. The proposition expressed an immediate want of money, and to receive it in two months from this date, at a place considerably more than a thousand miles from the place of destination. One would almost suppose, that this proposition argued deliberate purposes to waste the Company's treasures, in the same manner as the original expedition seemed calculated to consume their army.

November 6. A private letter from Colonel Goddard, of the 22d October, with others from Moodajee Boosla and his ministers, to the Governor, were laid before the Board. The Governor proposed to renew the negotiation with Moodajee Boosla, on the principles of Mr. Ellior's instructions; although it was but upon the 7th of last month, that he had declared, "*It would be more advantageous to wait for solicitations than to make advances.*" And he proposed, that Colonel Goddard have charge of the negotiation, with full powers to conclude.

Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler opposed the motion, but it was carried against them.—They then objected to the private correspondence carried on between the Governor and the commanding officers of the Company's troops, thus detached out of the provinces, without any fixed destination, or principle of action.—The private mode of correspondence, so universally existed and practised by Mr. Hastings, with the commanding officer of the detachment, ought to be as much an object

ject of consideration, as it certainly was of suspicion. One of the objecting members observed with great justice, "That it was very difficult and distressing to those members of council, who disapprove of such a proceeding, to express their disapprobation of it, in terms that do not imply personal distrust of their President. There was no language (he said) in which a total want of confidence in his personal honour and veracity can be conveyed, without a direct affront to him." Mr. Francis, in his minute of this day, objected to the continuance of this correspondence, in the most guarded and moderate terms, and more with a view to exculpate himself, than from any hope of influencing Mr. Hastings's conduct.—The practice is so evidently wrong, and so capable of being dangerous, and also open to many obvious ill consequences, that it needs no illustration.—By the private letters which Mr. Hastings produced on the 22d October, (which may have been selected, as his private letters to Colonel Leslie were not laid before the Board) it appeared that he possessed material information in many instances, which ought to have had direct and immediate communication to the Governor-general and Council. The letter of 30th July in particular, establishes two very interesting facts. 1st, That, whereas Mr. Francis appears on the face of the consultations, to observe Colonel Leslie's conduct with attention, and to censure it with some degree of severity, while Mr. Hastings constantly supported and defended him; it is nevertheless true, that at least so early as the end of June, Mr. Hastings must have thought infinitely worse of Colonel Leslie's conduct, than even Mr. Francis, who had no light to guide him, but the public letters. 2dly, That whereas Mr. Hastings, about the end of June, if not sooner, must have conceived the very worst opinion possible of Colonel Leslie, he took no step to remove him from the command till the 12th October, when, in all probability,

lity, he was thoroughly assured that there was no possibility of his recovery, if his intelligence did not amount to a certainty that he was then dead.* So that, in his own principles, he must have left the conduct of this most important enterprise in the hands of a man, whom he does not scruple to accuse of *ignorance, presumption, and rapacity.*

A motion was sent in circulation by the Governor, on the 23d November, to revoke the power delegated on the 15th October, to the Presidency of Bombay, of commanding the march and route of the detachment. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler protested against it, as not only inconsistent with all the principles hitherto avowed, and with the ostensible objects heretofore proposed to be accomplished by the expedition, but as not corresponding with, or capable of being justified, by the reasons assigned for it. Let the direction of this motion, and the reasons in support of it, be compared with the language held by Mr. Hastings, on the 12th October last, when he violently censured the Presidency of Bombay, for not pushing matters to extremity against the Maratta regency in favour of Roganaut-row, and how much pains he took to fix responsibility upon them for past and future miscarriages in the operations of the detachment: He said, "*They have done nothing. They have attempted nothing. They have neither avail-*

ed.

* This circumstance will admit a severe suspicion, and imply a dangerous connivance. It strongly implies a confidence of Colonel Leslie's death, before the accounts of his dismissal from the command could reach Chatterpore. A violent man, impressed with resentment, and wounded by his disgrace, would be too apt to bias dangerous truths. And these suspicions are heightened by the menace and defiance which are pretty plainly couched in his late letters, particularly that of the 20th of July, where, confident of holding fast by a *strut*, on which he could rely, he took off all restraint.

"ad themselves, nor wished to avail themselves of
 "events. They have no instrument left, nor any incli-
 "nation to seek for one. In short, we are abandoned
 "by them, after all that we have done for their re-
 "lief."—And the indignation with which he pretend-
 ed on the same day to resent a suspicion expressed by
 Mr. Francis, that the detachment was really never meant
 to proceed to Bombay; which Mr. Hastings replied to,
 in these lofty words: "If there are men in England so
 "devoid of common sense, as to suppose it possible for
 "me to have formed a plan ostensibly professed for the as-
 "sistance of Raganout-row, but really meant as a cover
 "for other designs, let them. Who yet they be, or in
 "whatever relation they may stand to this government,
 "such opinions will give me no kind of concern." If
 these expressions were not meant as a mask upon trea-
 chery of the deepest shade, they arose from a con-
 sciousness of guilt, and premeditated abuse, which
 therefore nothing but the most insulting effrontery could
 have. Indeed, they are only a specimen of his uni-
 form conduct since the death of Sir John Clavering.

By a letter received the 30th November from Mr.
 Lewis, the acting resident at Poonah, dated the 27th
 October, the following information is conveyed:
 "By orders from Governor Hornby, I have sent away all
 "the sepoy who came with Mr. Moseyn, and am in
 "hourly expectation of being recalled myself, as the Go-
 "vernor writes me, that the Secret Committee have de-
 "termined on acting against this government." Thus,
 in virtue of the discretionary powers, and the vio-
 lent and positive instructions accompanying it, which
 were sent to the Presidency of Bombay on the 18th
 March, according to the prediction of Mr. Francis, in his
 remark on the 6th article of the instructions, that Pre-
 sidency declared war deliberately against the Maratta
 empire.

From

From the 15th November to the 21st December, the Board received but one letter from Colonel Goddard, dated the 5th November, by which it only appears, that he was engaged in hostilities with Palagee Pundit, who harraided his march with 5000 Marratta horse; and, on the same day, Mr. Hastings produced a private letter of the 16th November, from Colonel Goddard to him. The detachment was then at Beersea, 25 coss, or 50 miles from the Narbudda; his march still interrupted, and his supplies cut off by Palagee Pundit. He says, that he had received friendly letters from Moodajee Boosla, but that it was plain he would rather some agreement was entered into for his security, before the army marched into his territory. An evident mark of distrust.

On the same day, Mr. Hastings produced the copy of a letter from Moodajee Boosla to Colonel Goddard, dated the 23d November, which had been forwarded direct from Nagpore to Calcutta. He lays before Colonel Goddard, in the strongest colours, a detail of the preparations making by the Poonah Government, to oppose his march, and of the dangers and difficulties which he must expect to meet with.* He declines joining him with a body of his troops; observing that it would produce no good effect, but would remove the veil from the business, and leave their designs exposed; that it would destroy the friendship established between him and the Paishwa, and the Nizam-ul-Muluck, Soubah of the Deccan, and expose his dominions to the ravages of the armies of the Deccan and the Paishwa, in Berar and at the Gauts: Finally, he advises Colonel Goddard to write all these particulars to Calcutta, and

G

wait

* These designs and preparations were directed by the approach of the Bombay expedition. Otherwise it is beyond a doubt, that Colonel Goddard's expedition must have failed.

wait for orders from thence, and until their arrival, to continue on the banks of the Narbudda. In the mean time, he recommends to Colonel Goddard to write an amicable letter to the Paishwa, to desire a safe passage through his dominions to Bombay, with assurances that the march of the detachment had no other object than to strengthen the place against the designs of the French. After this explicit explanation, by the Rajah of Berar, is it questionable, whether Mr. Hastings did not, in every stage of this business, urge and stimulate the people in Bombay, to force on a Marratta war at all events, and to undertake the wild and rash expedition from thence to Poonah, let the event be ever so fatal, for the express purpose of drawing the main force and attention of the Marrattas to that object only, and by that means to secure the march of his own projected detachment in safety, and without molestation. An effect which the defeat of the Bombay army, and the reduction of Pondicherry and Mahé, actually produced. This allegation involves a heavy charge. In the defeat of the Bombay army, the disgraceful condition to which they were reduced, and in the violation of public faith, the Company and the British nation have submitted to an indelible stain on their fame, in every honourable sense, which time will, with difficulty, be scarcely able to obliterate. *

After

* To shew, as well the dreadful opinion conceived of English faith, as the just and amicable disposition of the Poonah Government, an abstract from two letters, written by the Paishwa to Governor Hastings, received in Calcutta on the 7th and 12th December current, referred to in the Appendix, A, No. 4. and 5, will apply also in this place as notes.

F I R S T L E T T E R.

" I call God to witness, that, out of regard to the friendship and alliance of the Company, and the English Chiefs, I dismissed the French Envoy, without negotiating; or even conversing with him.

After producing this copy of a letter from Moodajee Boosla to Colonel Goddard, Mr. Hastings informed the Board, that Moodajee Boosla, notwithstanding all his former assertions, and declarations in his praise and favour;

him — I have lately heard, that some of your people (Colonel Leslie) have hostilely possessed themselves of the fort of Cadpoor, which belongs to this government. This measure is widely removed from the faith of the solemn treaty executed by the English. When the Governor of Bombay, in former times, put on the mask of friendship, for the purposes of deceit, and aided the enemy of this government, regarding you, Sir, as superior to all the other chiefs, I made peace and friendship with you, and these are the fruits produced by this friendship."

"You write, that the maintaining of friendship and strict union between our states, is your resolve. — Is it, in effect, for the preservation of friendship, that you trouble the dominions of this government? — Such a mode of conduct is inconsistent with the maxims and usages of high and illustrious Chiefs. It is mutually incumbent on us, to preserve inviolate the terms of the treaty. Should any deviation arise therein, they are the effects of the will and dispensation of God."

SECOND LETTER.

"It is universally allowed, that there is nothing in the world more excellent than friendship and harmony, which are blessings to mankind in general. The maintenance of every article of the treaty, is equally incumbent on both parties. It is not stipulated in any article of the treaty, that either party may send forces through the dominions of the other, without consulting him before hand; and cause trouble and distress to the people. To what rule of friendship can be attributed the stationing garrisons in the country of the other party? What has happened, is then agreeable to English faith? — In proof of this assertion, he observed, that Colonel Leslie has kept with him Roganautow's vakeel, and, in conjunction with him, collects money from the dominions of this government, by intimidating its subjects. This being the case, what becomes of your assurances before recited?" — After recapitulating many abuses and circumstances, with just reproaches on the mode of administering the Company's government in Calcutta and Bombay, he concludes thus; — "It is the dictate of sound policy, that you withdraw your troops into your own territory. This will be a convincing proof of the sincerity

farour, was not the real Rajah of Berar, but only the Naib rajah, or deputy, during a minority; and that he was then at the point of death.

Mr. Francis finding that all this important intelligence was not followed by any motion from the Governor, proposed two questions to the Board. "First, That it appeared that Moodajee Boosla was not inclined to join Colonel Goddard — Secondly, That it was Moodajee Boosla's opinion, that the continuance of Colonel Goddard's march would be attended with the greatest difficulties and dangers." The object of these questions appears evident, if they had not been resolved in the negative, by Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, to have been to establish the affirmative, as a ground for recalling the detachment, or sending it along the Narbydda to Baroach.

By Moodajee Boosla's letter of the 23d November, it is singularly manifest, that, on that day, or any day before, he had not entertained even a remote idea of breaking with the Poona Government; that he was alarmed for the safety of his own country and very determined not to join Colonel Goddard, and unwilling to allow the detachment to enter his country under any pretext. He speaks the language of a man of sense, and he advises and represents facts and apparent circumstances like a candid friend, and a lover of humanity and justice. But his letters discover no appearance of that intrepid firm character, which Mr. Hastings,

"city of your friendship, and will spread the fame of your good name throughout the universe. From the commencement of the government of the Peshwa, they have entered into treaties with many of the Chiefs of the East and West, and have never before experienced such a want of faith, from any one, — Nor ever, to the present time, deviated from their engagements, or been wanting to the duties of friendship and alliance. The blame rests with you."

ings, (with delusive enthusiasm, supposedly) ascribed to him, in his letter to Divjee Poonjee, the Rajah's minister, on the 23d November, "as a person of approved spirit and bravery," on which he (Mr. Hastings) professed to rest his hopes, "that he would entirely catch up the objects presented to his view." And though it may be strictly true, as Mr. Hastings said in the same letter, "That, in the whole of his own conduct, he had departed from the common line of policy, in making advances, which others in his situation would have waited for situations;" it does not appear that all his advances, and the flattering object presented to his ambition, have produced either an ardour, or a favourable impression on the mind of Moodajee Boofla.

But if, after all, Moodajee Boofla be not the real Rajah of Berar, it remained to be considered, whether the state of Berar could be bound by any act of his; or whether the alliance, offensive and defensive, which Colonel Goddard was directed to form with him in the terms of Mr. Elthor's commission, could be concluded with honour and safety to the Company, when it was previously admitted, that one of the parties had no right in his own person, and the character in which he appeared, to conclude such alliance.

On the 28th December, the Governor moved in council, that two battalions be ordered from the barracks in Calcutta,† under the command of Major Osmac, to reinforce Colonel Goddard, in order to supply all losses which the detachment had suffered by Colonel

Letitia

* Vide the letter in Appendix, A, No. 1.

† The most distant station of all the Company's garrisons, from the country where Colonel Goddard's army lay. Besides that, the motion had an immediate tendency to weaken and expose the principal fortress and capital, by which the British empire in India was suspended.

Little's delays, and by the length of their march. That they should proceed to the western frontier of Pallamora, and there wait the directions of Colonel Goddard, either for a junction with him, *for the protection of Woodajee Boosla's capital*, or to preserve the communication with the Company's provinces. Before the question was put, Mr. Francis desired to see the return of the detachment, that the Board might know what loss it had really suffered, and on what grounds the reinforcement was proposed. But, no return; no letters; no explanations of any kind, were produced. Mr. Barwell declared, "*That there was no indispensable necessity to influence the propositions; and that if he was to form his opinion, simply on the necessity of the thing, he should certainly vote against the march of the troops.*" Mr. Hastings, under colour of an objection urged by Mr. Francis, to the private correspondence carried on between him and the commanding officer, said, "*That he had been thereby discouraged from affording the Board, in their collective capacity, those lights, which upon many points were necessary for their information.*" Let the world judge of a declaration, so daring and bold, from the chief servant of a company of merchants, acting in immediate concert with a council, whose opinions had power to over-rule his own. It will not admit of animadversion, the language being too plain and explicit, as it was expressed.

Other remarks of serious consequences occur upon the proceedings of this day. A reinforcement is ordered, upon a simple presumption that the detachment has suffered a considerable loss. No return, or letters are produced to prove it, and all lights avowedly withheld from the Board. Mr. Barwell, at the same time, "*denies the necessity of the measure.*" And Mr. Hastings himself, in the course of the debate, observes, "*That loss bears no degree of proportion to the reinforcement,*"
" and

"and has, in effect, been inconsiderable." The purpose of this reinforcement must therefore be, to provide for the protection of Nagpore, the capital of Berar; or, as Mr. Barwell expressed it, *"to give that security to the possessions of the Berar Chief, as to dispel every apprehension he may entertain of the hostilities with which he may be threatened."* From these explanations, it is to be understood, that the Rajah of Berar, who with the assistance of the detachment, was to overset the Marhatta state, and to invade the dominions of the Deccan Soubah, wants, now, two battalions of the Company's sepoys for the protection of his own capital, and the security of his dominions.

December 31, 1778. In consequence of the resolution of reinforcing Colonel Goddard's detachment, the Governor moved, upon the 31st December, in council, that although two battalions of sepoys were more than equal to the losses sustained by the detachment, yet as it may be advisable to guard against *all possible* contingencies, which it may not be so easy to provide for in future, he therefore proposed that 700 rank and file, sepoys, *without officers or arms*, be added to Major Camac's two battalions; and that in this *unarmed and unofficered* state, unaccompanied by any escort, through a long and hazardous country, to join Major Camac at Bissnepore, from the Presidency, Midapore, and Barrampore.*

Mr. Francis opposed the measure, by a nervous, pithy minute, in which he was supported by Mr. Wheeler. He censured as well the unmilitary and dangerous expedient, as the addition altogether. The majority, at length,

* The first advance to Major Camac, to defray the charge of this reinforcement, was 436,793 current rupees, equal to 43,680l. sterling.

length, yielded to the reasons urged against the unarmed and unofficered march, and consented, that they march *with arms*.

On the 4th January, 1779, Mr. Hastings informed the Board, that by a letter from Colonel Goddard, dated the 30th November, the detachment was arrived on the banks of the Narbudda, after a fatiguing march through difficult passes in the mountains, and that he then saw no impediment to his crossing the river.

By letters of the 2d and 5th December, communicated by Mr. Hastings on the 4th January, Colonel Goddard informs the Board, that he had crossed the Narbudda, and was encamped on the southern banks of that river, within the territory of Berar, where he waited to be informed of the Rajah's final resolution. He says, "*that all the artillery and gun carriages were much shattered, and in want of repair; but that the number of sick was reduced from 1000 to about 400.*"

The Governor presented to the Board, a long and interesting letter from Moodajee Boosla, under date the 5th December, which was received in Calcutta the 2d instant. Instead of joining Colonel Goddard, the Rajah gives Mr. Hastings a great deal of good advice, both moral and political, concerning the preservation of peace, fidelity of engagements, justice, clemency, &c. but in particular, "*he recommends it to him to act with deliberation, and to proportion his means to his ends;*" observing, "*that it is a proverb, that whatever is deliberately done, is done well.*" The letter breathes so much good sense, humanity, justice, and sound doctrine, that in justice to its author, it will obtain a place in the appendix; to which an attentive perusal is recommended, for the satisfaction of the reader.*

On

Vide Appendix, A. No. 2.

On the whole, it appears clearly, by these letters, that the Rajah of Berar, never had an idea of the nature and extent of Mr. Hastings's views, much less of waging war against the Marratta regency, and the Soubah of the Deccan, or of entering into any engagements with the Company; that could lead him into a rupture with either of these states, his neighbours. Indeed, Mr. Hastings, in his recited letter of 23d November, avows, "*that the suggestion originated solely in himself; that he laid it as a bait to the Rajah's ambition; that without observing the common and necessary rules of policy, he had advanced, unsolicited; and that he had trusted to the Rajah's approved bravery and spirit, to catch ardently at the object, which the Governor's ingenuity and personal friendship had generously designed for his aggrandisement.*" The Rajah, wisely preferring peace in mediocrity, to the flattering but uncertain bait thus offered to his ambition, undertook to vindicate the Pashwa from the designs imputed to him by the Company's servants, of a secret connection with the French, and earnestly offers his own mediation to effect a perfect reconciliation, an offer which should immediately have been accepted of. These sentiments in the Rajah, should have been considered as a step towards taking a direct part with his countrymen, if the Company declined to acquiesce in his mediation, which strongly implied a distrust in their faith and honour, as acting under the same insatiable influence.* At all events, he disclaims every thought of joining the Company against the Marrattas. After enumerating the several chiefs, and their forces, who were prepared to oppose Colonel Goddard, he expressly says, "*The junction of a body of my forces with Colonel Goddard's, would*"

H

"avail

* The Rajah, accordingly, joined in the confederacy against the Company, when his offers of mediation were rejected, and he found that the views of Mr. Hastings were apparently hostile to all the native states of Hindostan.

“avail nothing in the face of such large armies, but would only involve me in the greatest losses; yet neither was it adviseable for Colonel Goddard to return, which would diminish the awe and respect in which he was held.” In the end, he tells, “that the times require, that a conciliation take place with the Poonah ministers.” Thus all India beheld the critical situation to which Mr. Hastings’s politics had precipitated the power, which, when he entered upon the administration thereof, was venerated and courted by all, except Hyder-Alli-Cawn, who dreaded it.

* Supposing it possible, that every objection to the measure, on the score of prudence or expediency, could be answered or removed, or that any degree of success should hereafter furnish an unexpected argument in its defence, there is still another important point of view, in which it becomes the Company’s dignity and wisdom to consider it. When Mr. Hastings engaged the Company’s arms in offensive wars, without necessity or provocation, when he implicated their government in treaties and alliances with the Indian powers, of which war, acquisition, and conquest, are the sole objects; when he sent their troops far away from the defence of their own territories, when he disturbed the peace of India, and when he avowed a vain, ambitious purpose, so far as to declare, “If the British arms and influence have suffered a severe check in the western world, it is the more incumbent on those who are charged with the interests of Great Britain in the East, to exert themselves for the retrieval of the national loss. That we have the means in our power; and that with such superior advantages as we possess over every power which can oppose us, we

* This paragraph is the just idea of a person who knew the spirit and effect of the whole projects of the Company’s leading servants in India. It is borrowed, literally.

"we should not act merely on the defensive." Did not Mr. Hastings, by this declaration, subvert the fundamental principles of the Company's policy? Did he not disobey their repeated and most peremptory commands, and transgress every line of limitation which they had prescribed for the administration of their affairs in India? If the affirmative should appear true, the Court of Directors will undoubtedly recall to their remembrance, the principles on which the Rohilla war was unanimously condemned by them, and how grossly their condemnation of that measure has been slighted. They will reflect on the nature and extent of the trust reposed in them by the Company, and by the nation; and seriously consider, on how precarious a foundation, the British empire in India stands, when one daring individual can, at his pleasure, subvert every principle of their government, violate their most positive orders and solemn instructions, contemn their authority, and set their power at defiance. It will not, it is to be hoped, be too late for them to weigh the disgraceful and dangerous consequences of uniting constant condemnation with constant impunity, and of continuing men in stations of the highest trust and dignity, whom, if we may rely on the opinion they have repeatedly expressed of their conduct and character, they ought not to think worthy of the lowest.

January 11, 1779. Mr. Francis, at a Board held the 11th January, delivered a minute to be recorded, in which his sentiments are stated at large, respecting Moodajee Boosla's conduct, and the critical position of the detachment, as well as that clearness of perspicuity and ability, which have distinguished his opposition and general conduct.* In this minute, the contents of the Rajah's letter are strictly canvassed, and a conclusion drawn from them, that recalling the detachment would be

* Vide the minute in Appendix, A. No. 3.

be the most advisable step in a situation which admits of no one eligible resolution. To this measure, the Governor, as the strongest proof he could exhibit of the unanswerable sentiments and arguments, composedly replied thus : *" I have seen Mr. Francis's minute, and do not think necessary or proper to reply to it."*

In a day or two after, the Board received the first intelligence, by way of Madras, of the motion of an army from Bombay, to reinstate Roganaut-row in the Regency of Poonah.

January 25. Letters of the 30th December, from Moodajee Boosla, were produced in Council on the 25th January, confirming in the most explicit terms, the declarations he had made some weeks before in his letters to Colonel Goddard and the Governor; still urging the necessity of an accommodation with the Regency of Poonah, and refusing to join the Company against them. On this day, the Governor, notwithstanding his professed resolution, not to answer Mr. Francis's minute of the 11th instant, quoted and reprobated the opinion contained in it, in terms full of passion and contempt. Yet with so many new and material facts before him, with the certain knowledge of Moodajee Boosla's final resolutions, and of the measures taken at Bombay in favour of Roganaut-row, he himself proposed nothing, but left Colonel Goddard without orders or instructions of any kind.

Letters from Bombay of the 12th December, received about the 28th January, advised that their forces, amounting to 3910, officers included, had actually taken the field, to conduct Roganaut-row to Poonah. That they had come to that resolution on the 12th October. That they had concluded a new treaty with Roganaut-

ganaut-ron. That their latest intelligence from Europe, gave them not the smallest apprehension of danger to Bombay in the absence of their troops. That the whole conduct of the expedition, was entrusted to a committee consisting of Mess. Carnac, Egerton, and Mostyn. That whatever turn affairs might take at Poonah, they should certainly require a considerable augmentation of their force to defend their new acquisitions, and garrison Bombay. That Mr. Draper dissented from the whole of the measure. And that Hyder-Alli-Cawn continued to shew a disposition very favourable to the French. They concluded with requesting the government of Bengal, immediately to send them the annual supply. Mr. Hastings declared his intention of laying some propositions before the Board, in a few days, in consequence of the preceding advices from Bombay.

February 1, 1779. By letters from Colonel Goddard, dated the 6th January, communicated on the 1st February, it appeared that he was still in the same position at Hussanabad, on the banks of the Narbudda, but that he proposed moving, in a few days, towards Poonah. From an accurate map of the route, the distance from Hussanabad to Poonah, appears to be 270 English miles. As the Presidency of Bombay had resolved on the expedition, so early as the 12th October, and the power of commanding the detachment having then, not been countermanded, they were culpable in not ordering matters so, that the two armies should appear before Poonah at the same time; when, by a division of the Marratta forces, it is highly probable, that success would have attended the Company's arms. But this does not appear to have been any part of Mr. Hastings's plan; and the Presidency of Bombay were so confident of success, that they were unwilling to suffer any others to participate, either in the emoluments or the credit of it.

It appeared also, by Colonel Goddard's letter, that soon after crossing the Narbudda, he had deputed Lieutenant Weatherstone to Nagpore, in order to press Moodajee Boosla to conclude the treaty, and immediately to enter upon the execution of it; but without the smallest success. That the Rajah declined entering into any treaty, or taking any active part whatever, till further accounts should arrive from Calcutta. That, to colour this refusal, the Rajah pleaded the part taken by the Council of Bombay, in favour of Roganaut-row; and that he solicited as well as recommended the relinquishing of Roganaut-row, and accepting of terms from the present ministerial party in Poonah. Assuredly the Rajah was justified in relenting the measures pursued in favour of Roganaut-row, so very different from the repeated solemn declarations and assurances by Mr. Hastings to himself, to his Vakeel, and to the Marhatta ministers, which is particularly mentioned in a passage of the Rajah's letter of the 5th December to Mr. Hastings himself, in these words, "*That his Vakeel in Calcutta had it from Mr. Hastings's own mouth, that it never was, nor is, designed by the English chiefs, to support Roganaut-row;*" and that on the faith of these reiterated declarations, he had ventured to impress the Regency of Poonah with the same assurances. It is proper, however, to observe that the Rajah had been fixed in a pacific resolution long before it was possible for him to have heard of the movements at Bombay, which was evident by his using the same language on the 23d November to Colonel Goddard, with that on the 30th December to Mr. Hastings, and the army did not move from Bombay until the 22d November. It must, nevertheless, be admitted, that the support thus given to Roganaut-row would naturally confirm the Rajah in his first resolution. It is very evident, that Mr. Hastings amused the people of Bombay by instigating them to support the cause of Roganaut-row,

row, and kept them in total ignorance, as to his views in favour of the Rajah of Berar, and the real destination of the expedition from Bengal under Colonels Leslie and Goddard, whose orders were in consequence as inconstant as a shuttle-cock, alternately placed under the authority of the gentlemen in Bombay, or resumed by the Supreme Board, or countermanded from Bombay to Surat, from Surat to Poonah, from Poonah to Berar, &c. in a confused rotation, evidently calculated to perplex, confound, disappoint, and amuse.—It is not the want of candour alone, but the want of mature deliberation and consequent firmness, which constitute some of the errors so conspicuous in Mr. Hastings's political faculties. Colonel Goddard says, *"That the schemes of the gentlemen at Bombay, and the active part they have taken in support of Roganaut-row, have destroyed all hopes of concluding the proposed alliance with the Court of Nagpore, until it shall be judged expedient by the Supreme Council to direct the former to be relinquished, in order to leave room for the entire and free adoption of the latter."*

Whether this was a mere pretence in the Rajah, or not, to excuse his refusal to accede to the proposed alliance, or whether he ever really formed the project attributed to him by Mr. Hastings, of asserting a claim to the Marratta state, is much to be questioned.—Colonel Goddard himself took notice *"of the inconsistency of his labouring so strenuously for the interest of the Paishwa, with whom he meant soon to engage in hostilities"* And considered his answer to this question, *"as a refinement upon policy, that might almost lead to suspect, but he was not altogether serious, and determined upon the Setterab * expedition."*

By

* *Setterab* expedition means the Rajah's accession to the supreme sovereignty of the Marratta state, it being the ancient capital and seat of government.

By Mr. Weatherstone's letters from Nagpore to Colonel Goddard, it appears, "*That the Government of Berar were determined not to take any active part whatever with the Company's armies; that they had a thousand arguments to oppose to those he urged in favour of the plan for assuming the dignity of Rauge (or Ram-rajah) of Setterah, particularly the faith pledged, and the alliance of friendship they had sworn to, with the present Paishwa; that their asserting their pretensions to the sovereignty would meet with numberless oppositions; and that a victory could not be obtained without shedding much blood, and at the expence of their violating the sacred engagements before entered into with them.*" What a lesson of sound justice and morality, public and private faith, and exemplary virtue, is here set, by men distinguished in Europe under the name of *infidels*, to the representatives of a great *Christian* nation!—How little must the English East India Company feel their own real importance, when their principal servants expose their reputation and credit, to such humiliating reproaches, as every expression thus uttered by the Marhatta princes, thrusts a keen dagger into their very vitals. When the force and effect of these declarations are considered, it will rest with Mr. Hastings to satisfy the Company, that his plan, stated in the instructions to Mr. Elliot, and in which he had embarked so deeply, was not built without a foundation. Mr. Weatherstone says, "*That it seemed now to be the first wish of the Court of Berar, to set aside our connection with Ranganaut-row; the supporting of whom,*" the Dewan said, "*he was convinced was highly impolitical, and would, in the end, be fully proved so. That, that Chief (Ranganaut-row) was held in universal abhorrence; and that the prejudices in the Deccan against him would not easily, if ever, be removed.*" The remainder of Mr. Weatherstone's letter contained many particulars that deserve the attention of the Company; especially a clear explanation

nation of the views, principles, and policy of the Court of Nagpore; of all which the Governor-general does not appear to have had any precise information, or any accurate idea. To think otherwise would be to think him guilty of the blackest treachery.

February 1, 1779. All the preceding letters having been again read in Council, upon the first of February, the Governor said, that he had not had time to prepare the propositions which he intended to lay before the Board. His intentions, whatever they may have been, had not yet transpired, but no orders from the Presidency, could now reach Colonel Goddard in time, to affect the motions of the detachment; because, if he had marched on the twelfth of January, and met with no material obstruction, he ought to be at Poonah, before any letter written at this time could overtake him. The Board had no other knowledge of the difficulties and opposition, which he might, in all likelihood encounter, than what was to be collected from the Rajah's letters. The Board were equally uninformed of the actual strength and condition of the detachment. On these points, the Governor continued to observe a profound silence. It may be concluded, however, from the resolution to send two battalions, with a draught of 700 additional recruits, to reinforce the detachment, that it must have suffered considerably by sickness or desertion. It was known, that Captain Wray's regiment of cavalry, was totally ruined; and that he and several other officers had obtained leave, under one pretence or other, to return to Bengal.— Colonel Goddard's public orders of the first of November, accidentally produced at the Board of Ordnance by Colonel Pearce, begins with declaring, "*that the unmilitary and unexampled spirit of disaffection to the service, which had so manifestly displayed itself in the frequent desertions from the corps of Cavalry*" and

“ and Infantry within a few days, was become a matter of the most serious and important consideration.”
 There can be no doubt, but that his numbers were greatly reduced, nor was there a chance of his being joined by the re-inforcement under Major Camac.

On the fourth of February, Mr. Hastings laid before the Council, the draughts of letters by way of *new* instructions to Colonel Goddard, and *new* resolutions, founded on the late advices from Bombay.—The form in which these voluminous papers were drawn up, seemed more than commonly loose, confused, and intricate.—Whether they were intended to be so, or whether they were hastily thrown together, without any sort of consideration or advice, may be equally doubted.—Mr. Hastings's first general object was to heap as much censure as possible on the Presidency of Bombay, as well for what they have themselves done, as for the obstacles they have thrown in the way of his negotiations with Moodajee Boosla.—His second object plainly appeared to be, to break the treaty they had concluded with Roganaut-row, although certainly warranted by the several letters of the eighteenth of March and eighteenth of August last, which he confessed; and to revert, if possible, to his favourite alliance with Moodajee Boosla.—The introduction, or preamble to the draught intended for the Presidency of Bombay, was the first, although an indirect communication of Mr. Hastings's plan in favour of Moodajee Boosla, to that Presidency, and the language is truly original, but very consistent with its author.—He says, *“ It had formerly been a matter of great concern to us, that you had suffered so many opportunities to escape, since the conclusion of the plan which you had formed in December 1777, without taking any effectual means to carry it into execution. It now affords us equal concern and mortification, that you have precipitately undertaken*

“ taken it, after having given us every reason to conclude,
 “ that you had abandoned it altogether, and compelled us
 “ to adopt other measures, which in consequence of your op-
 “ rations, have been abruptly broken off, without intima-
 “ ting your design to us, and affording us time to suspend
 “ the course of our measures, or to accommodate them to
 “ yours.”—Let these assertions, thus boldly committed
 on the Company’s records, be compared with the au-
 thentic facts already stated; and the injustice offered
 to the Gentlemen of Bombay, will appear too con-
 spicuous to be refuted. By the uniform tenor of
 Mr. Hastings’s minutes, and the letters from and
 to the Rajah of Berar, it is unquestionably evident,
 that an alliance with the Rajah, and an embassy to
 solicit him to become a candidate for the Sovereignty
 of the Marratta Empire, were the real objects of that
 expedition, from the beginning, although he injudi-
 ciously concealed them, and countenanced another, in
 direct opposition to it.—How cruel and unjust, there-
 fore, were these contradictory charges and censures,
 and the absurd reasons assigned for a change of mea-
 sures.

To accomplish his designs, Mr. Hastings proposed
 that Colonel Goddard, (whose march to Poonah he
 now approved, although not strictly justifiable under
 the last orders of the 23d of November) should con-
 tinue to hold his command, independent of the Go-
 vernment of Bombay.*—That Colonel Goddard may
 demand *reinforcements* from that Presidency, which he
 was sent originally to *reinforce*; but these not to be
 com.


* To judge from appearances, it is doubtful whether the Gover-
 nor’s *private* orders, did not, by the same messenger, always super-
 sede the *public* ones of the board. Colonel Leslie’s letters do more
 than justify this suspicion.

commanded by any officer superior in rank to his own,* that Colonel Goddard shall be appointed, the Minister of the Supreme Government at the Court of Poonah, independent of the Presidency of Bombay; that he shall in his ministerial capacity, demand of Roganautrow, a re-imbursement of the expences of the expedition, at two lacks of rupees each month from the first of June 1778, in addition to the two and half lacks, stipulated in the Bombay treaty, in full for the expences of the army. — That in case of refusal, he shall either return to Berar, or retire to the lands ceded to the Company, which were (it would seem) to be kept, notwithstanding the treaty whereby they were ceded was to be annulled; that the Presidency of Bombay shall be peremptorily required and commanded, in such case, to recall their troops from Poonah, and from the Maratta dominions. That the instructions already given to Colonel Goddard, do remain in full force And that he be directed to resume the negotiations with the Government of Berar, and to treat with it, on the grounds of these instructions, whenever an occasion shall offer to execute them, consistently with the foregoing resolutions.

The chapter of this day, may with propriety be closed with an abstract from the preamble of the letter proposed to be written to Colonel Goddard, and a short stricture upon it.

*“ We are much concerned that Moodajee Boosla should
 “ so much distrust you, as to suppose, that any engagement
 “ formed by the President and Council of Bombay could ope-
 “ rate*

* This passage accounts in explicit terms for the *secret* correspondence, the resentment expressed at the reprobation thereof, and also for the destination of the detachment at last to Surat, instead of Bombay.



“ rate to those made by our authority with him, and there-
 “ fore decline to enter into the proposed negociation: For, if,
 “ you had concluded a treaty with him, it would have been
 “ our duty to support it, in preference to any made at Bom-
 “ bay, that might oppose it.”

As the expedition over land was planned and resolved on the 23d of February 1778, and by the 6th article of the instructions to the Presidency of Bombay, to treat *conclusively and effectually* with Roganaut-row, which have never been revoked, bearing date the 18th of the ensuing month of March, the Supreme Council were solemnly bound and implicated to perform every condition, which any such treaty might contain, unless violation of faith, and premeditated deception were intended from the beginning.—Why were not the Government of Bombay, in so long an interval of time, and after such a series of warm discussion on the measures in agitation, commanded to forbear entering into any treaty with Roganaut-row, the moment that the negociation with Moodajee Boosla was resolved; and to forbear the commission of overt hostilities against the Marrattas, unless in defence, until expressly authorised by the Supreme Council, or Court of Directors? or, why were they not confidentially intrusted with the design in favour of Moodajee Boosla, and directed to contribute to its success, when it was in an advanced stage for action.

At a consultation held the 8th of February, Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler delivered their opinions at large, on the Governor's propositions of the 4th instant—Their minutes will not admit of being abstracted, without deviating from the justice and commendation, which strength of judgment and reason claim; therefore, with a reference to the minutes themselves, which leaves neither fact nor argument in Mr.
 Hastings's

Hastings's propositions unrefuted, let it suffice, in the mean time, to state the general principles on which they were opposed.*

1st. It is taken as a point granted in the Governor's own terms, that the treaty with Roganaut-row is warranted by instructions from the Supreme Council. That it has received the firmest and fullest ratification that could be given to it, by the contracting parties, and

* Some of Mr. Francis's sentiments are conceived in a language so exquisitely just and honourable, that they command particular observation. He said: —

“ The line of conduct which I have invariably pursued, with respect to the late political measures of this Government, and of the Presidency of Bombay, not only exempt me from all responsibility for the consequences of them, but from any obligation of deciding upon the respective merits of their proceedings and ours. That question lies strictly between the present majority of this Board and the Presidency of Bombay. I shall enter into it no farther than I am compelled to do by the propositions before us, and not by the existing state of facts. —

“ In the consideration of every measure which I have recommended or opposed, my original and constant object was “ *to preserve the peace of India; to adhere faithfully to our treaty with the Pajbwa; and not to suffer the Company's arms to be engaged either on this side of India, by the Presidency of India, or by the Presidency of Bombay, in such schemes of conquest and ambition.*” In adhering to these principles, I believe I have been guided by the dictates of sound policy and right reason, as I assuredly have been by the Company's fundamental maxims, and by their positive and repeated commands. I have it too from an authority which, in the scale of any argument of mine, must be deemed particularly weighty; *That in the Company's concerns with their neighbours and allies, the most scrupulous observance of their public engagements, and of the rights of others, ought to be their first and ruling object; for every prince and state, whose possessions may stand within sight of the Company's ambition, is naturally led to apply to their own interest, the treatment which they see others receive from the Company and their dependents.*”

Towards the conclusion of this judicious, and indeed unanswerable minute, he observed, “ That the expence of Colonel Goddard's

and that it therefore, cannot admit, either of amendment or addition—

2d It is contended that the additional demand to be made by Colonel Goddard is unjust, and can never be admitted by Roganaut-row; and that even, were it granted, it would not amount to a reimbursement of our actual expence.

3d. That the conditional orders prescribed to Colonel Goddard, and to the Presidency of Bombay, in case of a refusal, are equivalent to a formal renunciation of the treaty.

4th. That the independent command, pretended to be vested in Colonel Goddard, while he co-operates with the Presidency at Bombay, and acts on the same ground with their army, is highly dangerous in itself, and cannot take effect without subverting the fundamental principles of military discipline and subordination.

5th. That a junction of the two detachments, which the instructions positively preclude, may, in some cases, be essential to their mutual safety; and in many cases, necessary to the success of their operations.

6th. That the vesting Colonel Goddard with separate powers from the Supreme Board, to treat with
the

“ Goddard’s detachment commenced (in effect) in March 1778,
“ and the whole was accumulating in April, as a fixed expence of
“ two lacs and 60,000 rupees *per* month, besides *extra* and contingent charges, besides the Nabob of Oude’s cavalry, and besides
“ Major Camac’s detachment of 64,600 rupees *per* month.”

His observation on the 8th article of the Governor’s propositions, concerning the breach of public faith, and the character which these transactions is likely to affix on the British name in India, call forth the attention of the Company and the Nation.

the court of Poonah, independent of the Presidency of Bombay, tends to reduce the credit and influence of that Presidency, for no adequate or avowed object; and that it stands in direct contradiction to the Company's express orders given on occasion of the separate powers delegated to Colonel Upton, in the general letter of 7th February 1777, paragraphs 21 to 24.

7th. That an attempt to renew the negotiation with Moodajee Boosla, besides all former objections to the measure, is not warranted by the experience the board has had of his disposition and character, or by the treatment already received from him nor can it be reconciled to the late treaty with Rogunaut-low.

In the face of these, ^{and} many other arguments, the Governor's propositions were voted by himself and Mr. Barwell, *without deigning a reply.*

The Governor guided by secret motives, pursues the same line of inconsistency, in a letter laid before the Board, on the 9th of February, prepared by himself, for Moodajee Boosla, containing some remarkable passages. He *laments* rather than *complains*, of the *distrust* entertained by the Rajah; and declares, that had he accepted of the terms *offered* to him by Colonel Goddard, and concluded a treaty with the Government of Bengal, he (Mr. H.) should have held the obligation of it, superior to that of any engagement formed by the Government of Bombay; and should have thought it his duty to have maintained it, &c. "*against every consideration, even of the most valuable interests and safety of the English possessions intrusted to his charge.*"* At the same

* This is a truth of which Mr. Hastings frequently exhibited manifest proofs. It surpasses, however, the bitterest accusations of his adversaries, and exposes views and purposes totally inconsistent with duty and fidelity.

same time, however, he reminds him, that the original intention of sending an English army from the east to the western side of India, was to assist the Government of Bombay in the accomplishment of a plan concerted with the actual rulers of the Marratta state. * He might with greater propriety have added, "*and to excite dread and jealousy in the minds of all the Princes of Hindostan*" He concluded, with professing, that his disposition and wishes remain the same, that nothing is yet lost, and that he desired to be yet guided by the Rajah's inclinations.†

In consultation on the 11th of February, the Governor replied to Mr. Francis's minute of the 8th, although the propositions to which it alluded, were then voted by himself, and Mr. Birwell, without designing a reply.

The only subject in the proceedings of this and the following day in council, consisted in the discussion of former points, and cavilling upon words. Whether Mr. Francis's assertion in his minute of the 8th, that Mr. Elliot's embassy to negotiate with Moodajee Boosla, "*became the main and sole object of the expedition under Colonel Leslie*" With his usual address, Mr. Hastings laboured to contradict himself, and maintain that the expedition had other objects more immediately in view. But his opponent, by recurring only to recorded facts, issuing from the pen of Mr. Hastings himself, without a breach of good manners, or betraying any personality or resentment, supported his original allegation, and stripped his adversary of the flimsy mask in which he again meant to impose upon the understanding of mankind, as he seems to have successfully done on the credulous minds of his employers.

* This was the first time he intimated the Bombay plan to the Rajah. On the contrary, he cautiously laboured to conceal it from his knowledge, and repeatedly denied every purpose in favour of Roganaut-row.

† It would be improper in this place, not to insert as a note, a most curious passage in the Governor's letter to Moodajee Boosla,

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" To

One quotation on each side will serve as a specimen of the whole controversy, there having been nothing new argued, except such illustrations by Mr. Hastings, as the heat of argument extracted unguardedly from him in his own disfavour; and therefore the specimen now selected shall be the most favourable to him.

The Governor's quotation is thus introduced. *'To so pointed a denial of the Governor's assertions, the best argument which he can propose will be a reference to Mr. Elliot's instructions, in which he is directed to suspend his negotiations with Moodajee Boosla, on the information of any engagement actually concluded at the Presidency of Bombay, and to conform to it.'**

Which

"To you, I had unreservedly committed all my views, partly and indistinctly by letters, but very fully in repeated conversations with your valued Beneram Pundit, as it would have been very improper to have affairs of such delicacy and importance committed to letters, and to the hazards to which these would have been exposed in a long and doubtful journey. Your caution was still greater, and perhaps more commendable, although I may regret the necessity which prescribed it, for neither your letters, nor the letters of Beneram I undid, afforded me the least clue, to judge of your sentiments or inclination respecting the particular points of action, which were to form the substance of our projected engagements; and although from your general professions, and the warmth and sincerity with which these were manifestly dictated, I had every reason to conclude that you approved of them. Yet, without some assurances, common prudence required, that I should not precipitately abandon every other resource, and irrevocably commit the honor and interests of this government in a doubtful measure. Precautions were taken, that nothing should be undertaken by any of the governments dependent on this, which might eventually interfere with those actually concluded with you."

A general reference to the preceding state of authentic facts, is the severest and justest comment that can possibly be made on the above extraordinary style and asseverations, as well the unwarrantable confessions contained in it. The rest of the letter runs in the same inconsistent strain.

* How palpably is this quotation contradicted in the letter of the 9th current, recited in the foregoing page, and in the above note.

Which Mr Francis's minutes refute by many quotations, and first by a reference to the very passage in Mr. Elliot's instructions, quoted by Mr. Hastings, thus :

*' Even the passage quoted by the Governor-general proves, that the junction with Moodajee Boosla was not considered by us as little more than an eventual resource, * but that it was then our main and principal object. On a supposition that the Presidency of Bombay might have entered into engagements with Roganaut-row ;' the instructions referred to by the Governor say, " You will so conduct yourself as to conform to their measures, if you can consistently with the prior intention, which you will give to our views ; remembering that a defensive alliance with Moodajee Boosla being the permanent object of your commission, you are to suffer no consideration whatever to direct you from that object."*

Mr. Francis, after a multitude of replications and rejoinders, closes the debate by a sur rejoinder, in the following cool, judicious terms :

' When fundamental maxims of policy are avowedly set aside, a change of circumstances should not only be clear and incontrovertible, but it should be such a one as warrants the adoption of new and opposite principles of action. I am not sufficiently master of the revolutions which have happened in the Murratta empire since April 1771, and which in so short a period are supposed to have produced a total alteration in its circumstances, to enter into that part of the question. Taking the facts as they are stated by the Governor, it seems to me an obvious conclusion, that if it were dangerous to us to unite with the Marrattas, when their empire was entire, and in its full vigor, it

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must

* The Governor in his justifying minute, uses these words, " That the junction with the Rajah of Berar was considered as little more than an eventual resource."

‘ must be useless to commit ourselves, by taking any part in
 ‘ their divisions, when their empire is falling to pieces of it-
 ‘ self. Either way, our engaging the Company’s arms in
 ‘ offensive wars, whether in conjunction with a part, or
 ‘ the whole of the Mahratta empire, is indefensible, since
 ‘ it is equally contrary to the Company’s solemn and repeated
 ‘ commands.’

At a consultation held the 25th February, the Governor laid before the Board, a paper received the day before from Madras, containing intelligence of the defeat of the Bombay army near Poonah, which he said, he believed to be but too true, but that he did not think proper to propose any immediate measures to be taken in consequence.

The paper which conveyed this mortifying intelligence, was a literal translation from a letter to the Nabob of Arcot from his Vakeel at the court of Poonah —
 * It represents the disgrace of the army, and the Company’s arms in such humiliating terms, that the probable, or perhaps the possible chance of retrieving the national fame and reputation in India, must be the effect of time, let their successes be ever so quick and great.

The fourth paragraph represents the first conference of the Mahratta Chiefs, after the approach of the Bombay army, thus: ‘ All the Chiefs having met to consult
 ‘ what was to be done in the present state of affairs, they
 ‘ all with one voice agreed, that if Roganaut-row came
 ‘ with his own forces alone, they should receive him, and
 ‘ give him a share of the power as formerly. But since he
 ‘ came with an army of English, who were of a different
 ‘ nation from them, and whose conduct in Sujab-ul-Dowla’s
 ‘ country, the Rohilla country, Bengal, and the Carnatic,
 ‘ they

* See the translation in Appendix, A. No. 4.

‘ they were well acquainted with, they unanimously determined not to receive Roganaut-row, as otherwise, in the end, they would be obliged to forsake their religion and become the slaves of Europeans; upon this they exchanged oaths.’

After relating journally, the proceedings of both armies on the field of Tulicanoon, the Nabob’s Vakeel says, *‘ On the 15th January, the Marratta Sardars (Generals or Chiefs) went to the trenches, and began firing again, but it was not answered from the English camp; soon after, Mr. Farmer, (a Gentleman who was some time ago at your Highness’s court) came from the English camp, and the fire of the Marrattas immediately ceased. The Marrattas sent for him into the presence,’ and Mr. Farmer said to them—***WE ARE ONLY MERCHANTS.—***‘ WHEN DISPUTES PREVAILED WITH YOU, ROGANAUT-ROW CAME TO US, AND DEMANDED OUR PROTECTION.—WE THOUGHT HE HAD A RIGHT TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND GAVE HIM OUR ASSISTANCE.—NOTHING BUT ILL FORTUNE ATTENDS HIM, AND WE HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THIS MISERABLE STATE BY KEEPING HIM WITH US —YOU ARE MASTERS TO TAKE HIM FROM US.—WE SHALL HENCEFORTH ADHERE TO THE TREATIES THAT HAVE FORMERLY TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN US. BE PLEASED TO FORGIVE WHAT HAS HAPPENED.’*

*“ The Marratta Ministers answered—***ROGANAUT-ROW IS ONE OF US. WHAT RIGHT COULD YOU HAVE TO INTERFERE IN OUR CONCERNS WITH HIM? WE NOW DESIRE OF YOU TO GIVE UP SALSETTE AND BASSEEN, AND WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES YOU HAVE POSSESSED YOURSELVES OF, AS ALSO THE CIRCARS, THOSE OF THE PERGUNNAHS OF BAROACH, &c.***“ WHICH*

The Eastern term for an audience.

“ WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN IN GUZZERAT. ADHERE
 “ TO THE TREATY MADE IN THE TIME OF BALAGEE-
 “ ROW, * AND ASK NOTHING ELSE.”

“ Mr. Farmer heard this answer, and returned to his
 “ camp. On the 16th, at noon, Mr. Farmer returned,
 “ and told Scindia, *That he had brought a blank paper,*
 “ *signed and sealed, which the Marratta Chiefs might fill*
 “ *up as they pleased.* Scindia told the Ministers, *That al-*
 “ *though they had it in their power to make any demands*
 “ *they pleased, it would not be adviseable to do it at this*
 “ *time; for our making large demands would only sow re-*
 “ *sentment in their hearts, and we had better demand*
 “ *only what is necessary.* Let Roganau row be with us,
 “ and the treaty between us and the English will be ad-
 “ hered to. Let Salfette, and the Pergunnabs in Guzzerat,
 “ be given back to us. Let the Bengal army return back.
 “ For the rest, let us act with them, as is stipulated in
 “ the treaty with Balagee-row, the jewels mortgaged by
 “ Roganaut-row be restored, and nothing demanded for them.
 “ Let all these articles be wrote out on the paper they have
 “ sent; which was accordingly done. Mr. Farmer,
 “ and Lieutenant Stewart, were left as hostages for
 “ the ratification and punctual performance of the con-
 “ ditions stipulated in the capitulation and treaty.—
 “ On the 17th, the treaty was returned to the Mar-
 “ ratta camp, written in Persian, Marratta, and Eng-
 “ lish, *sealed with the Company's seal,* and signed by
 “ Mr. Carnac, and four officers. After this, the Mar-
 “ ratta sirdars sent them victuals, which they needed
 “ much. The English marched out, *escorted by 2000*
 “ *Marratta horse,* but Roganaut-row, not finding a
 “ lucky hour, did not go to the Marratta camp, but
 “ will go after twelve o'clock to-morrow.”

“ Alas ! alas ! how fallen ! how sullied !”

After

* This treaty was made in September, 1761.

After exhibiting such distinguished marks of the moderation of the Marratta Regency, on an occasion so remarkably favourable to their views and gratifications, it would be unjust not to transfix to honourable and equitable an impression, by a reference to two letters from Siccaram Sundit, Minister of the Marratta Sovereignty, to Mr. Hallings, in his highest capacity of Governor General, received in Calcutta the 7th and 12th December, 1778; together with an extract to the same effect, from Mo-dajef Boodla, the Rajah of Berar. These communications, which are impregnated with the noblest qualities which the human mind is capable of entertaining, are placed in the Appendix under A. No. 5, 6, and 7.

On this day, Mr. Francis, finding no proposition made by the Governor, moved, that orders be sent to General Stibbert, to put him on his guard, and to hold the troops stationed in Rohilkund, and in Oude, in readiness to march. The motion was opposed by the Governor and Mr. Barwell, as unnecessary and unreasonable. The Governor said, "*he wished it had not been made.*" Yet in the end it was agreed to, with an amendment proposed by Mr. Barwell, which carried the principle of the motion much farther than Mr. Francis intended: *i. e.* "*That the two brigades should be immediately assembled and encamped.*" Mr. Francis stated the evident contradiction contained in the arguments used by the majority, and therefore opposed the motion.

March 1. Letters of the 7th of February, from Madras, and of the 26th of January, from Colonel Goddard, were laid before the Council. That from Madras had the signature of Sir Eyre Coote, with those of the established Presidency, which stated, in strong terms, the fatal consequences likely to attend the disasters at Poonah, particularly to the Government of Madras. They

They say, ' *That by one ill-timed and unfortunate enterprise, the reputation of our arms is sullied; and the friendship of the principal Indian States, hazarded, or lost for ever; and that too, at a period when we are engaged in a war, which calls for the exertion of all our force, and the good will of every state in alliance with us.*' In the conclusion they recommended, ' *to direct the retreat of Colonel Goddard through Berar, towards the coast of Orissa, and the northern Circars.*'

By Colonel Goddard's letter it appeared, that he was uninformed of the event at Poonah; he inclosed a letter of the 11th January, from General Carnac and Colonel Egerton, in which they advise him to proceed either to Baroach or Surat, or to remain on the borders of Berar; but do not advise him to advance towards Poonah.

This advice discovers, that these Gentlemen found out their mistake before the first action with the Marratta army.—And concluded, that if Colonel Goddard continued his march towards Poonah, his army would be cut off or forced to surrender at discretion. He wisely and happily followed the very seasonable advice thus given to him. Himself was of opinion, that a prospect of being able to effect the revolution in favour of Roganautrow, themselves, was the motive for expressing so little anxiety about the arrival of his detachment. The Governor, without proposing any instructions for Colonel Goddard, moved, ' *That General Stibbert should be ordered to send the first brigade across the Jumna, and to encamp it on the other side.*' Mr Francis expressed at once, his sense of the measure, but desired that the further consideration of it might be put off till the next morning. This was consented to by the Governor, on condition that he might be allowed an opportunity of considering Mr. Francis's objections to the motion, before

fore they were brought into debate at the Board. Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis concurring in opinion, drew up their reasons in the form of a joint protest, which they sent next morning to the Governor, before the meeting of Council.

March 2. The next day Mr. Hastings began with declaring, '*That he had not read the joint protest;*' and delivered in a minute retracting that of yesterday.*—When this business was over, and no propositions made by the Governor, Mr. Francis moved, '*That orders be sent to Colonel Goddard, to retire to Berar, and from thence toward the coast of Orissa, and the Chicacole Circar, supposing always that these orders were to reach him before he quitted his station on the Narbudda.*' The motion was ordered to lie for consideration.

In a debate on the 4th March, upon Mr. Francis's motion of the 2d, it was rejected by the usual majority. The discussed subjects will throw additional lights upon the political views and principles of Mr. Hastings. He objected to the motion for two reasons. 1st '*Because he thought it probable that Colonel Goddard had resumed the negotiation with Moodajee Boosla.* 2d. '*Because the proposed route lay through the dominions of the Nizam, who, it is not to be expected, would consent to their passage, nor was this a time to furnish him with a pretext for open hostilities against us.*' Yet the negotiation, which Colonel Goddard is supposed to have resumed, and which Mr. Hastings thinks it unsafe to interrupt, has the invasion of the Nizam's dominions for one of its principal objects. Did not the same reasons apply more strongly and directly, to the march of the same detachment through the Marratta dominions?—It will appear from the Governor's minute, that conquest and
L extent

* The minutes on both sides deserve the attention of the Court of Directors.

extent of dominion, were held out as his professed and avowed objects, and that Mr. Francis's endeavouring to confine the Company's arms within their own actual possessions, is construed as prescribing narrow limits to their Government.

On the 8th of March, Mr. Francis recorded a comprehensive and judicious minute, in reply to the objections made to his motion, and in refutation of the general doctrine advanced and maintained by Mr. Hastings — the 4th paragraph of which is to the following purpose:

*' That the limits he would prescribe to the British Empire in India, is wide enough to answer every wise and profitable purpose. That their arms should be employed in securing what they had acquired. That all their acquisitions may be lost, by endeavouring to extend them. That if opposite maxims are recommended as a wiser policy, they are not supported by the example of Great Britain. That the distant dependencies of Great Britain originated in a spirit of Commerce and Colonization. And, that though their fleets acted with honour in the most distant quarters of the globe, the success of naval enterprizes proved nothing in favour of expeditions by land into the hearts of countries hostile and unknown.' **

Mr. Francis conceiving from indirect expressions, which the Governor had uttered, that the weight of his objection lay to the movement of the detachment into the Chicacole province, proposed again, that it might be ordered into Berar. But he was mistaken; it met the same fate. But whether the arguments used against the second motion can be reconciled to those which were employed against the first, may deserve the consideration of

* The latter part concerning Britain, alludes to Observations and Comparisons in Mr. Hastings's minute.

of the Court of Directors, who have them at large upon their records. In this place, however, it may be material to observe, that supposing any future turn of events, should, in the eyes of those who judge only by events, render it a fortunate circumstance, that Colonel Goddard should have proceeded to Surat, Mr. Hastings will have no merit from that measure, or from any advantageous consequence which may attend it, since it has been demonstrated beyond the power of doubt, that its object was diametrically opposite to such an idea. And in this day's debate Mr. Hastings expressly said, "*That he wish'd equally with Mr. Francis, for the return of the detachment to Berar, and equally dreaded to hear of its proceeding to the other coast.*" In the same debate he observed, "*that the plan for restoring Roganaut-row having failed, Colonel Goddard was under express orders, * on receiving advice of such conclusion to recur to his negotiations with Moodajee Boosla, which necessarily and unavoidably implied his return to Berar.*" Are these dark mysterious transactions consistent with Mr. Hastings's public duty? Or, are they either honourable or political?

It will hereafter appear, that Colonel Goddard received thanks and rewards for taking that very step, which, according to Mr. Hastings's present declaration, must be contrary to his *express orders*; admitting that he was justified by the necessity of his situation, in proceeding, by forced marches, to Surat, as soon as he had heard of the defeat near Poonah, Mr. Hastings has clearly no share in the merit of that resolution, or in any good consequences that might have attended it, since, "*according to his express orders, Colonel Goddard ought to have returned to Berar.*"

L 2

March

* These were private orders, without the knowledge or concurrence of the Board.

March 10. A letter from Colonel Goddard, dated the 5th of February, from Brahm-pore, announcing his purpose of marching the next day towards Surat, *in consequence of orders* he had received from the Select Committee of Bombay, was laid before the Board. By the letter of the Bombay Committee, dated 22d January, he is informed that they are not at liberty to give him any precise information as to the reasons of the return of their army, or the probable consequences of it. In pursuance of his resolution Colonel Goddard moved on with his detachment, and arrived at Surat about the 26th of February, having not seen an enemy, nor met with any opposition whatsoever in the march from Brahm-pore. — Had the army been commanded by a man of less bravery and activity, the chances were a hundred to one against the success of the expedition. The Mar-rattas called in all their troops to oppose the Bombay army; and the treaty made with Mr. Carnac lulled them into a security, until it was disavowed in Bombay; and in the mean time, Colonel Goddard pressed his march, and escaped.

The Remarker having, in the preceding detail, endeavoured to shew the origin, principle, and progress of the Marratta war, which cannot fail to lead the mind to understand its probable consequences on the dispositions of the native powers in India against the British name, he thinks it less necessary to pursue the same precision in the few observations that are to follow, in relation to dates and trivial discussions, while he adheres with confidence to real facts, in narrating the leading principles of action.

Mr. Francis, by minute on the 15th March, expressed a concern and surprise, at not having heard from the Presidency of Bombay, concerning the defeat of their army, the nature of the terms stipulated with the re-
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gency of Poonah, and their further determination. He insinuated an apprehension, that reduced to an extremity approaching to despair, and having nothing more to lose, they may be impelled by a fertility, which necessity is too ready to engender, to renew the war at all hazards. That past experience had afforded too much reason to justify that suspicion, and therefore, in order to prevent the probability of such injudicious and dangerous measures, he moved,

" That a letter be immediately written to the Presidency of Bombay, to express the concern and surprise of the Board at the profound silence they have observed to the supreme administration, on the late operations and defeat of their army, and to prohibit them in the most precise and positive terms, and as they will answer the contrary at their peril, from commencing or renewing hostilities against the Marrattas, or any other Indian princes or powers, except in their own immediate defence, without our consent and approbation, first had and obtained."

This motion was negatived by Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell. And certain it is, that nothing can shew the spirit of opposition, and its fatal influence over every principle of reason, policy, and concern for the Company's interest in general, than the very loose and frivolous reasons opposed to this motion, without disavowing the expediency, and even acknowledging the propriety of it.

On the 17th of March a letter was received from the Presidency of Bombay, dated the 3d February, intimating the failure of the expedition against Poonah, by the defeat of their army, and that they did not think themselves obligated by the conditions of the treaty; but that they had intentions to enter into another treaty with the Marrattas, and had, therefore, ordered Colonel Goddard's

Goddard's detachment to march to Surat, instead of coming to Bombay.

Mr. Wheeler made a long and sensible minute, exposing, without exaggeration, the critical, but above all, the ruinous and expensive state and position of the Company's affairs in India, and earnestly recommended the means of procuring peace, at any rate, in *some* of the quarters, where they are threatened with hostility.

April 5, Sir Eyre Coote having this day taken his seat at the Supreme Board. In consequence of a reconciliation, and a proper understanding, which had been effected between him and the Governor, the latter introduced an elaborate minute, complimentary of the former. And then, after stating the disgrace of the Bombay army, and the nature of the treaty, made on the field of battle, by persons unauthorised to subscribe to such conditions, and without a knowledge of the want of that authority in those who exacted it, he proposed the following conjectures to the consideration of the Board, as a ground to raise real propositions upon.

1st, " That the Marrattas ought to be satisfied with the possession of Roganaut-row, and to relinquish the other terms of the capitulation." *

2d, " That if the Marrattas have insisted on the conditions, that it is probable the Select Committee have refused compliance, and called upon Colonel Goddard to aid them in continuing the war."

3d, " That

* This favors more of the style of a conqueror, than the conqueror; consequently it may be thought somewhat indelicate and unreasonable, considering the extreme moderation of the *real conquerors*, on the 15th and 16th January,

3d, " That the Marrattas, knowing the invalidity of the act, had evasion in contemplation, in order to renew the war when they should be able to prosecute it with surer effect, with the assistance of the French from Mauritius.

4th, " That the divisions of the Marrattas have been but superficially covered, and not healed. That the return of Roganaut-row may excite fresh commotions amongst them. That he sees no chance of recovering Roganaut-row; but, on the contrary, *that he is lost to us for ever*, although it may be no great loss to us, except by regretting the wound which the British cre-
dit has received in the manner of his *separation* from us." *

5th, " That the conduct of Moodajee Boosla, since his knowledge of this event, manifests the impression which it hath generally made on the minds of the people of Hindoostan. And they believe that any force which we could send against them would prove unequal to their superiority of numbers, and the rapid movements of their cavalry." †

Upon these conjectured principles he offered the following propositions, viz.

1st. " That Colonel Goddard be invested with powers, as minister, to represent this government at the court of Poonah, for the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of Poorunder, to relinquish the late convention, and not to admit French forces into their dominions,

* This conjecture was calculated entirely for renewing the negotiation with Moodajee Boosla.

† Artful motives to stimulate a dangerous exertion in the war against the Marrattas, even at the hazard of leaving the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, destitute and defenceless.

“missions, or to make establishments on their coasts,
 “And that the alternative shall amount to a declara-
 “tion of war. (With a draught, No. 1.)

2d. “That the first brigade, already ordered to a
 “convenient station for crossing the Jumna, be sup-
 “plied with ordnance, ammunition, and stores fit for
 “the service.

3d. “That Major Camac be ordered back to Co-
 “lumba, or to some other convenient station, within,
 “or near to our borders, and supplied with ammuni-
 “tion, &c.

4th. “That Sir Eyre Coote be requested to issue
 “the necessary orders for carrying the preceding reso-
 “lutions into execution.

5th. “That a letter be written to the Paishwa and
 “his Ministers, on the subject of Colonel Goddard’s
 “commission. (With a draught, No. 2.)

6th. “That a letter be written to Moodajee Boosla;
 “(With a draught, No. 3.)

7th. “That a letter be written to the Presidency of
 “Bombay, advising of Colonel Goddard’s commission,
 “requiring conformity from them, and to prepare for
 “service, whether offensive or defensive, in virtue of
 “explicit and positive orders from hence.

8th. “That a letter be sent to the Presidency of
 “Madras, informing them of our designs. And in
 “case of success against Mahè, the forces to remain
 “there and at Tellicherry, in order to be ready to
 “move, on application, to join the forces at Bombay.”

Although

Although the conjectures which lead to these propositions, are liable to animadversion, as well as the propositions themselves; yet as the generality of them, have also an apparent tendency to bring forth an accommodation with the Marrattas, it will be treated with the same degree of indulgence which it received from Mr. Hastings's constant opponents on that subject, referring to the evident spirit disguised in the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 5th conjectures, and in the 1st and 6th propositions. Letters and authorities founded in general upon these propositions, were resolved.

Letters from the Presidency of Bombay, and from Colonel Egerton, having thrown new lights on many transactions, before, at, and after the expedition from thence to Poonah, it appeared, that the majority of the Select Committee are reprehensible in the highest degree, in undertaking so important a measure without previously adjusting terms with Roganaut-row's adherents; in not availing themselves of the power they had vested in them over the Bengal detachment, to co-operate with their own army; in not arriving at a clearer knowledge of the true state of the Poonah Durbar, before they finally resolved upon actual action; in the wilful violation of the Company's positive orders; by the appointment of civil deputies to conduct military operations in the field; in investing civilians with powers incompatible with military service, and subversive of that degree of subordination, which alone can secure a prospect of success; in the enormous quantity of baggage and cattle, so preposterously inconsistent with the distance, and number of troops; in the violation of a convention and capitulation, having, by their own act and investiture in the Field Committee, given the most solemn ratification which the whole board of the Select Committee, and the Company's public and corporate seal, could give; regardless, also, of the critical situa-

tion of two gentlemen, who freely yielded themselves as hostages, confiding in the sacred faith of the Company; and the ungenerous manner in which Colonel Egerton and Colonel Cockburn were circumvented, under specious and false pretences, to resign the command of the Bombay army in garrison.

The proceedings on these subjects are voluminous, and therefore would be tedious. However, as nothing can lead to a clearer knowledge of the facts, and the original, as well as the existing principles and views of the ruling parties, than some of these proceedings at both Boards, they shall be selected for that purpose, and the narrative continued by extracts from them, during the discussion of these points, with only occasional remarks.

Extract from a letter from the Select Committee of Bombay, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 27th March, 1779.

Par. 17. ' From the very general information the
' Governor General and Council gave in of their pro-
' jected alliance with Moodajee Boolla, we could not
' form any judgment in what manner this Presidency
' might be affected thereby, *nor did it strike us*, that we
' could receive either injury or benefit from the Rajah
' of Berar, unless he should assert his claim to the Ra-
' jaship of the Marratta empire, to which he had some
' pretensions, and restore the antient form of the Mar-
' ratta government. We did not pretend to judge,
' what advantage a connection with him might afford
' to your Bengal province, to which his country is con-
' tiguous; but so far as we might venture an opinion,
' we conceived them so little liable to danger, that an
' alliance with Moodajee Boolla merely for their secu-
' rity, so far as he could contribute to it, which ap-
' peared

appeared by their letter to be the object of Mr. Elliot's deputation, did not seem to be a consideration equivalent to the injury your general interest would sustain, were we to forego the plan resolved on the 21st July.

Had we been apprized in time that the negotiation with Moodajee Boosla, was to affect the operations of the Bengal detachment, or that in the intended alliance with him, was comprehended a plan, to supply the place of the one originally recommended by us, and to answer the same purpose, we certainly would not have prosecuted our plan for the restoration of Ragoba; * and thereby have avoided the confusion inseparable from a complicated scheme, when so great a distance lay between the parties. But we appeal to you, whether from the letters from Bengal of the 17th August and 15th of October, we had any reason to entertain such an idea of the negotiation with Moodajee Boosla. On the contrary, in the last of these letters, the Governor General, and Council, after they knew of the restraint laid on Moraba, and the members of his party, (adherents of Roganaut-row) gave us reason to conclude, *that they still depended upon us for the accomplishment of those grand objects we both had in view,*† by their giving up the controul over Colonel Goddard's detachment, whether the plan formed in July existed, or whether we had formed any other for the same ends, consistently with the terms they had presented for their assent.

The preceding paragraph was accompanied by the minutes of Council, of which the following are selected, as peculiarly adapted to the present occasion :

M 2

Minute

* Ragoba and Roganaut-row, is one and the same person.

† The words of the Bengal letter.

Minute of Governor Hornby, 19th Feb. 1779.

' The schemes of the Governor General and Council,
 ' with regard to the Rajah of Berar, being yet unknown
 ' to us, it is impossible to found any measure on them.
 ' Yet, I cannot help now observing, that if, as has been
 ' conjectured, the gentlemen at that Presidency have
 ' entertained thoughts of restoring in his person, the
 ' ancient Rajah government, the attempt seems likely
 ' to be attended with no small difficulty. The powers
 ' who are now in possession of the Paishwa domains,
 ' together with all the Jaghire-dars, however divided
 ' among themselves, would probably concur in oppos-
 ' ing Moodajee Boosla; who, from every thing I have
 ' been able to learn, has for some time past taken no
 ' part in the Western broils, nor appears to have any
 ' party among the leading men in this part of the em-
 ' pire.* And I would wish to submit to the Governor
 ' General and Council, whether it might not better
 ' answer our views, by supporting a formidable Chief,
 ' like Moodajee Scindia, who has already acquired the
 ' actual possession of the Paishwa domains, which are
 ' the authority of the office, who is backed with the
 ' resources of his own Jaghire, and has the person of
 ' Roganaut row at his disposal, to give a colour of law-
 ' ful

* If Moodajee Boosla had actually succeeded. He is a very old
 and infirm man, tottering upon the verge of eternity — Can, or
 could Mr. Hastings insure the future continuety of alliance and cor-
 respondence of a series of successors, when wallowing in power and
 wealth, to the Company? Are there not recent instances to the
 contrary in every part of India? Might it not, as himself said on
 a late occasion, prove dangerous to the security of the Company, to
 unite such great possessions, and of course such wealth and power,
 in any one neighbouring state; and would it not be highly impoli-
 tic, to bring so very powerful a neighbour on the borders of the
 Company's principal territories in Bengal, as the dominion of Be-
 rar would then be in the full possession of the Maratta power and
 empire.

‘ful authority to that he has assumed, than by attempt-
 ‘ing to model the whole state a-new, and to place the
 ‘rule of it in hands of our own chusing; a labour, that
 ‘is perhaps too arduous, and the success certainly du-
 ‘bious.’

The Governor of Bombay subjoined to his declaration the following state of arrangements at Poonah :

‘Moodajee Scindia in every change has appeared supreme.

1st. ‘Madarow Narrain, Paishwa:

2d. ‘Savagee-row (Ragoba’s Son) Naib.

3d. ‘Scindia and Holker, to act for Savagee-row.

4th. ‘Ragoba, to relinquish the government, have a Jaghire, and reside at Jassi.

5th. ‘Nana Furnese and Sacaram, to conduct the government as Ministers, and to derive their authority from Scindia and Holker.’

This settlement was passed in writing.—All the Mar-
 ratta officers were assembled, and told, that this must
 be looked upon and regarded as a conclusive settle-
 ment, and any attempt to oppose it, would be consider-
 ed as treachery against the state. The usual rejoicings
 on such occasions were observed;

Governor Hornby, by minute of 30 March, 1779,
 urges the same language as in the Letter to the Court
 of Directors of the 27th inst. and his last recited minute
 of 19th February, with respect to the proceedings of
 the Supreme Council.—And that Mr. Elliot would have
 had

had to encounter very great difficulties and obstacles in the negotiation with which he was entrusted, in order to reconcile the measures already adopted at Bombay, with the hearty approbation and concurrence of the Supreme Council, to the other opposite measures of the Supreme Council, at one and the same time.

Mr. Draper, the 3d in the Bombay Councils, upon more wise and accurate principles, declared, “ that he
“ had no opinion of succeeding in any *permanent* alli-
“ ance with Moodajee Scindia, from the *temporary* na-
“ ture of his present power. And he recommended,
“ in preference to all others, a direct and proper ar-
“ rangement with the Marratta Sta’ .” *

Mr. Hornby observed further, “ that the Governor-
“ General and Council probably thought, that the com-
“ munication of another scheme, while that in favour
“ of Roganaut-row was under consideration, might serve
“ only to embarrass and produce a diffidence in the Bom-
“ bay Councils, which might impede the prosecution of
“ their own measures with the necessary degree of con-
“ fidence and vigour.” †

On the same day, Mr. Hornby recorded another minute, which claims singular attention for the general propriety of the sentiments which it enforces.—Indeed, it proves, that in consenting to the disgraceful expedition under field-deputies, he erred only in judgment. The following passages are literal extracts from it :

“ The

* This minute merits the attention of the Court of Directors.

† These conjectures are surely not serious :—They carry a strong appearance of irony, however consistent with the conduct of Mr. Hastings, in not communicating his views in favour of Moodajee BOOLE, to the Presidency of Bombay, the servants of the same Company, co-operating in the same cause.

“ The Bengal detachment must already have cost an
 “ immense sum, and its expences, while it remains here,
 “ is more than equal to the full amount of all our pre-
 “ sent revenues; Colonel Goddard has hitherto sup-
 “ plied himself with the sums necessary for the payment
 “ of the troops, by drafts on Bengal; but this is a re-
 “ source that cannot be depended on for longer than
 “ eight or ten lacks more at farthest.—The Colonel has
 “ likewise already expressed his anxiety, with regard to
 “ the burthen his expences may prove to the Bengal
 “ treasury; and indeed, if we consider the increased
 “ military and naval establishments of that Presidency,
 “ on account of the war with France, and the demands
 “ which probably have been already made on the Go-
 “ vernor General and Council by the Gentlemen of Ma-
 “ drass, whose distress for money has, as we have un-
 “ derstood, been the cause of their delaying so long, to
 “ carry into execution the projected expedition against
 “ Mahé. We must consider it as highly probable, that
 “ our hopes of supplies of cash from Bengal may fail
 “ us.—In 1776, when the Governor General and Coun-
 “ cil proposed supporting us in a war with the Marratta
 “ Ministers, on a prospect of Colonel Upton’s negoti-
 “ ations proving ineffectual, they advised us, that they
 “ had resolved to supply us with ten lacks, which sum
 “ seemed all they could allow us to depend upon.—
 “ For they insisted that it should be reserved for the
 “ purposes of the war only, * and even ordered a sepa-
 “ rate account of it, that they might be satisfied it was
 “ applied to no other.—If this was the case at that time,
 “ how much lower must our expectations be at this,
 “ when their own occasions, as well as the expences of
 “ the

* This prudent economical system, subsisted only during the mi-
 nority of Mr. Hastings. The application of Mr. Hornby was cri-
 tically seasonable, had not Mr. Hastings acted and thought from
 principles diametrically opposite. The reproach was severe and just,
 and confers honour on the author.

“ the Presidency of Madras, must be encreased much
 “ beyond what we can venture even to guess at. By
 “ the most exact estimate I have been able to make, I
 “ judge that between this time and the 21st of October
 “ next (*seven months*) we shall have occasion for about
 “ fifty lacks, and all our resources together do not af-
 “ ford us a prospect of more than 20 lacks; great part
 “ of the last depending on the clearing of purchasers
 “ goods from our warehouse, and on revenues, a con-
 “ siderable part of which is to be received in kind, will
 “ be apt to fall short of the estimate, while our expen-
 “ ces are likely to exceed, rather than prove less than
 “ they are rated at.—We might, indeed, by putting a
 “ total stop to our investments, apply about four lacks
 “ appropriated for the purchase of pepper, and the com-
 “ pletion of the China ships cargo, to defray our ordi-
 “ nary expences; but besides the inadequate proportion
 “ of this supply to our wants, the remainder will, I be-
 “ lieve, be thought very desperate.”

“ Another very alarming circumstance calls for our
 “ consideration. Colonel Goddard informs us, that one
 “ half of his Sepoys have refused to receive their pay
 “ for the month of January, unless that for the month
 “ of February is at the same time discharged; and
 “ he seems to think that this has proceeded from a dis-
 “ position among the men to return home, if they could
 “ furnish themselves with money enough to bear their
 “ charges to their own country. — It is true, Colonel
 “ Goddard is of opinion, that he shall be able to put a
 “ stop to this spirit, on his return to the camp; but
 “ we have every reason to fear the increase of it, should
 “ the troops remain longer unengaged in service, which
 “ might divert them from such thoughts.”

“ Whatever our difficulties may be from the increase
 “ of our expences, and the necessity of providing for the
 “ punctual

" punctual payment of our troops; yet the defence of
 " the settlement absolutely requires, that we should find
 " means of keeping up our present force, while things
 " remain in the state they now are with the Marrattas,
 " and while the war with France continues. The only
 " way in which this can be effected is, by securing such
 " a revenue under our own collection, as may be nearly
 " answerable to our expences; * and it is absolutely ne-
 " cessary to think of taking such measures for this pur-
 " pose, before the distress we foresee arrives at such a
 " height, as to render our efforts ineffectual. — By the
 " month of October our finances will be utterly ex-
 " hausted; the full amount procured from Bengal ta-
 " ken up, and a large sum still due. In this state,
 " should we have to support an united attack from the
 " French and Marrattas, in what condition shall we then
 " be to oppose them? — Our bond-debt is already in-
 " creased near eight lacks. None of the money ex-
 " pected from Bengal to pay off that before contracted,
 " is yet arrived; and to most people here it seems in-
 " credible; that the subscription opened at Bengal for
 " raising the sum necessary, cannot be filled, or depen-
 " dence had upon it for supplies." †

" Let any one carry his view forward to the month of
 " October next, and imagine what our situation must
 " then be, if we continue inactive until that time; and
 " let him tell me, whether the most unsuccessful war
 N " could

* This insatiable or ambitious idea; it is to be suspected, spurred
 Mr. Hornby and his colleagues in council, to the unwarrantable
 support of Roganaut-row, without weighing the state of affairs and
 probable consequences, with that wise deliberation which became
 their stations.

† Here is an honest confession of the decline of the Company's
 credit in India, by one of the eldest and most sensible members of
 their administration; yet Mr. Hastings urged and stimulated the
 Presidency of Bombay, and the Supreme Council, to involve his
 employers in this labyrinth of distress and threatened destruction.

“ could be attended with more ruinous consequences
 “ than we are then to expect, without the loss of a sin-
 “ gle battle, and in possession still of every foot of land
 “ we at present hold. It will then be in vain to talk of
 “ waiting for orders, or assistance of any sort from a-
 “ broad, when all our hopes at home fail us, and the
 “ moment of providing for our necessities is past. The
 “ Poonah Durbar will soon find the terms of the con-
 “ vention, which they still insist on, will be every day
 “ less in our power to refuse. And we may depend that
 “ with such a claim on us, which they still keep up, they
 “ mean to enforce it, whenever the opportunity may
 “ seem favourable. After allowing for ten lacks more
 “ on Bengal, between this and next October, which is
 “ to the full as much as we shall find bills for, and I
 “ fear may be more than that government can conve-
 “ niently spare us, we must expect to be at least 20 lacks
 “ more in debt, which is so large a sum, that I have
 “ doubts whether we may be even able to borrow it.
 “ But granting that money is ever so plentiful, yet we
 “ have no funds to pay the interest. And if once it is
 “ seen that the dreams of inexhaustible wealth from
 “ Bengal are at an end, that our supplies from thence
 “ are stopped, and our expences more than double our
 “ annual revenue, our credit must fail, and we must
 “ fix a short day for the period of our ability to raise
 “ money by loans. * The Bengal troops which may
 “ now give vigour to our operations, by the time I
 “ allude to, may be quite useless for want of money to
 “ pay them. Or, if they were to have no cause of dis-
 “ satisfaction on this account, there is reason to fear
 “ their numbers will every day diminish, by their go-
 “ ing off to their own country; for which they will
 “ naturally be growing more impatient the longer they
 “ are kept without employment.”

The

*. However dreadful the impending aspect, reason confirms it as a natural one.

The foregoing abstract breathes so much candour in plain, unaffected terms, and exhibits a portrait of the Company's affairs, under such high, distinguishing colours, that the mind cannot possibly err in drawing just conclusions, as well from the predetermined measures which led to it, as the imminent evils which the all-powerful hand of Providence can alone avert.

Colonel Egerton, after fruitless endeavours and expostulations in Bombay, appealed by letter dated the 8th March, accompanying a circumstantial state of his case, to the Supreme Council; the nature of Colonel Egerton's complaint will appear in the minutes of Mr. Francis so clearly, that it would be a work of supererogation to abstract them here; but a striking passage concerning the character of Roganaut-row, demands an indispensable place, viz.

“ For this reason, and because I thought it conformable to your directions in most respects, I contented to continue granting support to Ragoba, though much against my own inclination, from a conviction that a man blackened with the commission of the most atrocious crimes, would not prove an advantageous or honourable ally; and that no faith could be expected from his most solemn engagements. However, notwithstanding these my rooted principles, the assistance of the Company's forces for conducting him to Poonah, could not at this time be withheld, without a total subversion of the political system, we had so long ago embarked in.”

It appears from these abstracts that Mr. Hastings persevered with unpardonable and inexcusable obstinacy in pursuing the plan of alliance with Moodajee Boolla, against every reasonable principle of sound policy, and the force of clear conviction, in four material points.—

First, had the negotiation at Berar succeeded, and been carried into effect at Setterah, the measure of restoring the antient Marratta government would by not only impolitic, but madness, threatening the subversion of the Company; and, in a general view, the subversion also of all the native powers of India. — Secondly, the Governor General having had a knowledge of the confinement of Moraba, and the other Marratta chiefs who adhered to Roganaut-row, before the consultation of 12th October 1778, and the instructions transmitted to Bombay, in consequence thereof, the cause of Roganaut-row ceased to wear any longer a propitious aspect, and should, in prudence, have been abandoned upon terms of personal security to him. — Thirdly, having had a perfect knowledge of the infamy and perfidioulness of Roganaut-row, it was highly dishonourable to the Company, dangerous to any confidence which might in future be reposed in him, and productive of disgust and diffidence in the minds of all the states of Hindostan, that the Company's protection, friendship and arms, should be prostituted to the service and exaltation of a man whose vices, dyed in the blood of his own kindred, and indelibly stamped with the foulest treachery, had rendered peculiarly obnoxious and detested throughout Asia. — And fourthly, having had a fixed object in his own head, and concealing it under false and specious pretences from Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler at the Supreme Board, and from the Select Committee in Bombay, he misled and amused the latter, and excited them to proceed to extremities upon a false ground, and erroneous principles, which candour, ingenuity, and fidelity to his trust, must have inevitably prevented, and by that means have preserved the honour of the Company's arms unsullied, their reputation unimpeached, and their treasures unexhausted.

May 24.

May 24. The possession of Bombay letters and documents necessarily commanded the interposition, and should have commanded the decisive judgments in certain cases, of the Supreme Council of India.—Mr. Hastings is possessed of abilities and perspicuity which are too distinguished not to discover the miserable situation into which his own measures had plunged the Company, and it became therefore a political principle in him to endeavour, by an appearance of temper, moderation, and condescension, to sooth and lull the quick discerning faculties of those who had steadily opposed his destructive plans from retorting the chief blame upon himself; and by a similar management and address, after loading the Presidency of Bombay with bitter reproaches and censures on the Bengal minutes, to impose silence on them for fear of more serious discoveries to his own dishonor, by writing to themselves in a style and language expressive only of confidence, hopes, concern, and sympathy. Having, to all appearances these objects in contemplation, on the 24th May he presented a minute of enormous extension, with an elaborate preamble of affected candour, exemplary moderation, and unusual condescension; but, now and then tinged with factious and insidious insinuations, with respect to other members of the board. He proposed various matters to the consideration of the board, arranged under twenty-two heads. On this occasion also, Mr. Hastings reckoned without his host. The addition of Sir Eyre Coote to his forces, did not intimidate, or even slacken, the determined persevering exertions of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler.

After thus arranging systematically the catalogue of matter submitted in the Bombay dispatches, Mr. Hastings, desirous of avoiding any scrutiny which might again bring his own conduct more openly into discussion, and probably draw the whole blame upon himself,
 attacked

attacked, with indecent violence, the council of Bombay, without producing any specific or direct charge. The unwillingness with which he entered upon this important part of his public duty, will appear evident in the following, among many other similar passages in his minute :

‘ If the Board shall judge it incumbent on them to enter into so laborious a discussion, I shall submit, though reluctantly, to bear my part in it.—Reluctantly, because it will occupy more of our time, than we can spare from other more substantial objects ; and because I foresee that it will lead to altercations among ourselves, it being impossible that we who have but just begun to agree in opinion, as to public measures, should all become of one mind on twenty-two distinct and interesting propositions, and because it would be unavailing and inconclusive.’

It is observable now, that the presence of Sir Eyre Coote had softened Mr. Hastings, from that imperious dictatorial stile, and silent contempt, which marked his former minutes, while his own casting voice decided all points in controversy. In the above specimen there appears a strange inconsistency of argument.—What ‘ *other more substantial objects*,’ could come before the Board, than a measure which confessedly threatened ruin to the Company’s concerns in Asia ? and yet in the fourth line thereafter he declares, that the unsubstantial objects are become very ‘ *interesting*,’ which nevertheless, would be ‘ *unavailing and inconclusive*,’ if made the subjects of ‘ *laborious discussion* ;’ thus conscious guilt foresaw, and seemed to anticipate the consequences of the enquiry ; it was therefore natural for him to wish to evade it.

Again,

Again, he says—‘ That to censure or to command,
 ‘ is all that we can do, except in one instance ; * for
 ‘ our censures cannot impress restraint, nor our com-
 ‘ mendations avert the effects of past misfortunes, or
 ‘ preclude the judgment, which awaits the instruments
 ‘ of them from higher authority. † Our effectual au-
 ‘ thority is limited to political engagements and military
 ‘ operations “ *undertaken without our previous licence.* ” ‡
 ‘ The treaty, or convention, or whatever name it may
 ‘ bear, which was concluded at Wargaum, certainly
 ‘ falls within this description, *and it is in our power if*
 ‘ *we please, to punish the authors of it by a temporary sus-*
 ‘ *pension.* But is it necessary ? An act so fatal to the
 ‘ interests of the Company, and so disgraceful to the
 ‘ reputation of the British nation, cannot fail to excite
 ‘ the most rigid scrutiny into the conduct of every
 ‘ one concerned in it, and the causes which produced
 ‘ it, § by those who have the power both to judge and
 ‘ to

* A Jesuitical evasion indeed ! Command should precede censure, and disobedience authorized dismissal.—What more can the Court of Directors inflict ? unless the premeditated effect will judicially entitle the injured party to damages.

† Is not the power of suspension deemed an effectual authority, in the mean time ? But Mr. Hastings trusted, that if the matter was immediately, and without local investigation, referred home, the superior influence of his own friends, would slur over the enquiry without scrupulous scrutiny, and rest the whole blame upon the Bombay Council ; whereas, if the enquiry was investigated in India, he dreaded, that the minutes of those who opposed his measures, and those of the Bombay Council, would trace the subject to its source, and distribute the stigmas among the culprits, according to their respective degrees of criminality.

‡ Here Mr. Hastings has carried affected moderation beyond his purposes, because the Bombay Council having had ‘ *previous licence,* ’ he, unguardedly, criminales himself, as the sole author of the licence.

§ By this bravado, he expected to impress the public with an idea of innocence in himself, and to avoid the censure of a direct participation, if not that of appearing the ostensible criminal.

to punish ; which, perhaps, in this case, *we have not in effect.*”

‘ The charge preferred by Governor Hornby against Colonel Egerton, and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and referred expressly to us for our judgment upon it, “ is but a small portion of a long series of long apparent misconduct, every part of which has an equal claim, and many greater, to our consideration of them.” There was no need of this reference to us, “ nor are we competent to receive it.” †

‘ Mr. Hastings, after bestowing a profusion of reproach, invective and abuse, on the B. n. bay government, for the whole of their conduct, all at once sweetened his tone into a tender melodious accent, and he urged temper in the form of conveying the opinions and resolutions of the Board to men who were not exempt from the common infirmities of humanity, in order to give encouragement and confidence to their future proceedings, instead of adding to their depression, which, by inflaming their passions, might prove the surest means of converting the power still left in their hands into instruments of opposition, and even of the defeat of the very measures which required their agency, and could not be accomplished without it.’

This is the most severe and cruel part of Mr. Hastings’s censures, because it ceases to attack their incapacity and want of judgment, but is pointedly directed to their hearts, and which, in fact, becomes a charge of

* Here he contradicts what he averred but a few lines before, that the Council possessed the power of suspension.

† Knowing, as Mr. Hastings avows, ‘ those great and repeated misconducts of a long standing,’ how criminal was himself, in not restraining them, having the power, and considerably more criminal, in extending their power beyond the reach of correction ?

of high, immediate criminality against himself, whether he really entertained those sentiments of the Bombay government or not.—He declares, in explicit terms, ‘*That under the influence of passion, he believes them capable of betraying the most sacred trust*’; and although he avows that the Supreme Board have legal power to suspend men of that dangerous disposition from their stations, he prefers the mild and temperate expedient of suppressing every idea of reproach, under pretence of preventing the abuse of an authority, which he, notwithstanding, continues to cloath them with, at the avowed hazard of subverting the whole British power, together with the property and possessions of the English East-India Company in Hindostan.—The artifice and device practised upon this occasion, were too thinly shaded to conceal the design. The Governor of Bombay erred principally in conveying the power of the whole Board to a committee which accompanied the expedition, and in being too credulous to the assertions of Mr. Mostyn and Mr. Lewis;—but above all, in being too obedient to the dark, mysterious dictates of Mr. Hastings. Mr. Draper, with a penetrating judgment, qualified by experience, opposed the whole measures, in every stage, and was of course blameless;—Mr. Mostyn, whose opinion first misled the rest, was dead;—Colonel Egerton continued under suspension.—And Mr. Carnac alone, remaining as the dreaded and exceptionable character, against whose voice was opposed that of Colonel Goddard, invested with the plenipotentiary and controuling power of the Supreme Council of India;—the Governor concluded with a proposal of a draught of a letter, to be written to the Select Committee of Bombay, agreeably to the mild sympathizing style which he thought most consistent with prudence, than the dangerous consequences of exasperating desperate spirits, by just reproaches.

Sir Eyre Coote, having prepared a minute, which while it discovered the animated remains of a veteran, expressed (in its primitive garb)*, uninfluenced sentiments, and promised honor to himself, and a happy issue to the trust committed to him, in a two-fold capacity; this performance, whether prompted by vanity, for it contained good things, or want of thought, for Sir Eyre is often absent in company, he presented at the board, notwithstanding that he had some time before, become a convert to the superior eloquence and influence of the Governor, and second in council. Vanity may be ascribed as a prevailing principle, because the paper was transmitted to all parts, as an admirable specimen of distinguished abilities, to excite the future expectations of mankind.

The language thus published will enflame the passions of men against the author, if by an actual apottery from the very spirit which it breathed, it is discovered, *that it was but a voice, an artificial sound emitted by the mouth, without the concurrence of the heart.*

He entered with judgment into an accurate detail of the whole proceedings, from the adoption of the measures in July 1778, and investigated circumstances and facts deducible from them, to the return of the vanquished army, and the suspension of the military commanders in Bombay. He criminated the conduct of the select committee, in taking away from the military commander the authority and influence which alone could ensure success and victory, and vesting it in a committee of two civilians, occupying three voices against a single voice of the nominal military commander.—And with just propriety, he enumerated
against

* He altered parts of it several days thereafter.

against Mr. Carnac (who, after the death of Mr. Mel-
tyn, possessed absolute and uncontrouled power over
the army) a catalogue of crimes and errors, on which
he makes the following very expressive interrogations
and suggestions.

‘ Is there any thing,’ said Sir Eyre, ‘ that we, the
‘ Supreme Council can do, adequate to such case ?
‘ The eyes of the nation are upon us.—Our feelings
‘ for our country’s honour, will be the measure of our
‘ own.—Our powers extend to a removal from their
‘ stations.—Removal from station, setting loss of cha-
‘ racter out of the question, amounts only to a cessa-
‘ tion of salary.—And shall a mere cessation of salary
‘ be a requital for the facts here stated, if they should
‘ prove true ? No ! let the acquittal or punishment,
‘ such an investigation may bring on, become a na-
‘ tional object. I propose, that a public trial be
‘ ordered home. Our martial law must decide upon
‘ the merits of the two commanders of the army, or
‘ such other officers, whose conduct upon the expe-
‘ dition may require elucidating. But nothing less
‘ than our national tribunals can acquit or punish the
‘ civil gentlemen engaged in it, who by the excessive
‘ powers they took, preserved the whole responsibility
‘ to themselves.”

What a pity that these sentiments possessed his mind,
but for a few days only ; it will appear by the minutes,
that on the 7th and 10th of June he adopted others,
directly opposite ; and on the 14th June subscribed to
a letter, which sacrificed the military Commanders of
Bombay to the decision of the Civilians, who were their
accusers, and whom he declared so late as the 24th of
May to have ‘ *preserved the whole responsibility to them-
‘ selves.*’ In the same short space, by a strange infatua-
tion, (for who can account for human infatuation)

he departed from all the patriotic, just, and elevated maxims, urged with so much energy and military fire, in this minute.

After complimenting Colonel Goddard on his great merit as an officer, Sir Eyre Coote proposed, that the rank of a Brigadier General by brevet commission be conferred on him, but adds,

‘ That it is not in the power of the Governor general and Council, or the Presidency of Bombay, to appoint him commander in chief of the forces there, or to give him an effective voice in the Select Committee; as Colonel Egerton cannot be looked upon in any other light than Commander in Chief, (tho’ prevented from acting as such) until the sentence of a Court Martial, or the Court of Directors, decide upon the charges laid against him. Under these circumstances, I have only to recommend, that the Government of Bombay shall give Colonel Goddard a deliberative voice in their committee, and consult him upon all military and political points; and that we continue to him those powers which he already possesses from this government, and further invest him with such others as may be found necessary for carrying on our views.’—In continuation he observed, ‘ That Moodajee Boosla was proposed, because his elevation will restore the old Marratta Government, and thereby strengthen, aggrandize, and unite the Marratta Empire; which very reason seeming so strong with the Council of Bombay,* if no better can be given, will prevent my ever concurring in it. Our real interests are to keep theirs divided; always preventing over-growth of power in any of their parties; thus

* He erred through inattention. The Council of Bombay thought exactly as he did himself. And the mistake led him to oppose his new friend Mr. Hastings, whose favourite measure it was.

' thus endeavouring to hold the scales in our own
 ' hands, we remain ourselves in a great degree the
 ' umpire. This is the truest road to the support of
 ' our dignity and profit, as well as to the surest means
 ' of retaining undisturbed, what we now possess.—I
 ' therefore think, that at present we should not look
 ' to renew a war, but negotiate with the various Mar-
 ' ratta interests, an honourable peace, conformably
 ' to the directions already given Colonel Goldard
 ' upon that head.

' But if by refusing this they force us to continue
 ' hostilities, then our utmost vigour should be exerted
 ' to support our military reputation in this country,
 ' and by one united effort, put a glorious and speedy
 ' end to the war. As to the various plans proposed of
 ' seeking war for plunder, the honor of the nation and
 ' the Company, inseparable from my own, will never
 ' permit me to subscribe to it.' *

Mr. Francis's minute upon the same occasion, will
 bespeak attention without either commendation or pre-
 face.—The most striking parts will be presented in his
 own words, as follow :

' I ought to apprise the Board, that in the following
 minute I have not offered my opinions on the mea-
 sures, which it may be proper for us to adopt here-
 after, for effecting a solid peace on the Marratta coast,
 because I looked on that part of the general subject
 as already provided for, or, at least, disposed of for
 the present, by the powers and instructions which we
 ' have

* He after several days fashioned and qualified the two last para-
 graphs to the mind and views of Mr. Hastings. Both continue
 upon record, as a monument of his good nature, and pliant conde-
 scension.

‘ have given to Colonel Goddard.—My reflections apply only to the facts already past, and which I understand to be referred generally to us, for our judgment upon them.’

The Minute of Mr. Francis, viz.

‘ It is needless at this time to enter into a consideration of the justice of our quarrel with the Marhatta Government, or of the extent and quality of the powers under which the Presidency of Bombay have acted, in violating the treaty of Poonah. Those questions have been sufficiently discussed in the Governor-General’s minutes and mine, before Sir Eyre Coote’s arrival.’

‘ The following observations are confined to the policy of the measure within itself, and on its own principles, and to the propriety of the means made use of, to carry it into execution.’

1st. ‘ It appears by the Bombay consultations of the 10th December 1777, and by their letter to us of the 20th January 1778, that they were unanimously determined, not to engage in any active enterprize in favour of Roganaut-row, unless they were solicited thereto, by Saccaram-Moraba, Bucheoba, and Tukojee Holker, by a joint application, under their hand-writing and sicca’s (seals) and that this was a condition *sine qua non*.

‘ Yet on the 1st July following, they resolve to march to Poonah, with Roganaut-row, without having received any application from the persons above-mentioned, or entered into any specific engagements whatsoever, with any of the Marhatta Chiefs.’ After the expedition had failed, Mr. Hornby says, ‘ *It was evident;*

* evident, there was not one Chief in the Empire who
 ' would draw a sword for Roganaut-row.'—(Minute
 19th February 1779) ' It follows therefore that in un-
 dertaking, to act, without having previously settled
 terms of co-operation with some of the Marratta
 Chiefs, they departed from their own fundamental
 principles, and as far as success depended on such
 co-operations, they had no right to expect it.

2d. ' It further appears by their proceedings of 12th
 October 1778, that when they took their resolution
 in July, they reckoned upon the hopes of assistance
 from Moraba, Bucheoba, and Holker, with 30,000
 horse. Yet in October they determined to carry their
 plan into execution, when every expectation of such
 assistance must have failed them, considering the two
 first of the above Chiefs were then under restraint,
 and the latter greatly suspected.

3d. ' In July, they appear to have relied on the as-
 sistance of Colonel Leslie's detachment, and to have
 considered the securing a junction with him, as essen-
 tial to the success of their plan, for which purpose they
 then sent him orders to march to Zonir.—Yet on the
 12th October, while our detachment was still in Bun-
 dlecond (the same station which it occupied in July)
 that is, at so great a distance, that a junction could
 not possibly have been effected before the February
 following; they determine to carry their plan forth-
 with into execution.

4th. ' With these facts before me, I have a right to
 conclude, that the Select Committee in attempting to
 march to Poonah, have acted in opposition to their
 own professed principles. I mean, that whereas at first,
 and up to the 12th October, they appear to have
 thought certain conditions necessary, as well to justify
 their

‘ their engaging in the measure in question, as to insure
 ‘ the success of it ; they at last plunged themselves into
 ‘ the execution of their plan, when every one of these
 ‘ conditions had failed them.

5th. ‘ Their ignorance of the real state of the Poonah
 ‘ Durbar, and of the respective powers and influence
 ‘ of the persons who composed it, is a remarkable cir-
 ‘ cumstance, and should serve as a future caution to
 ‘ the Company, and to this Government, against trust-
 ‘ ing implicitly to any intelligence we may receive from
 ‘ that quarter.—While the plan was in agitation, it
 ‘ suited their purpose to represent Sadra, as the most
 ‘ powerful, and to us, the most formidable of all the
 ‘ Marratta Chiefs ; that he was devoted to the French,
 ‘ and had engaged to put them into possession of
 ‘ Choul. Whatever his inclinations might be, of
 ‘ which we have no better evidence than of the rest ; it
 ‘ is clear that they were mistaken in their opinion
 ‘ of his power.’ Mr. Hornby says, in his minute of
 19th February 1779, ‘ The lead that Scindia has taken
 ‘ in the administration, and the condition to which he
 ‘ has reduced Nana, to be no more than a creature of
 ‘ his, were never thoroughly known, till the facts dis-
 ‘ covered themselves on this occasion ; yet they are to
 ‘ be traced in Mr. Mostyn’s and Mr. Lewis’s advices,
 ‘ ever since the revolution effected by Madajee Scin-
 ‘ dia’s means in June last, when Nana fled to him.’
 On which Mr. Draper observes—‘ That he cannot
 ‘ enough lament, that we have so lately become ac-
 ‘ quainted with Scindia’s being the principal person in
 ‘ power, notwithstanding the residence of Messrs. Mo-
 ‘ styn and Lewis at Poonah.’

‘ In the execution of the measure, the Board, I think,
 ‘ will see such errors at the outset, as might have been
 ‘ alone sufficient to defeat it.

1st. ‘ Their

1st. ' Their appointment of Field-deputies, under the title of a Committee for concerting and conducting all military operations. The success of military operations depends upon a unity of command, without which there can be neither decision or dispatch. Debate and execution cannot move together —Constant experience has shewn the bad effects of Field-deputations.—The Company in a former instance severely condemned the appointment at Madras on a similar service, and no one argument is suggested to shew, that such an appointment was necessary on the present occasion. If the Select Committee deemed their commanding officer unequal to the conduct of an expedition of three score miles, they ought not to have employed him. To place a civil authority over the immediate execution of military operations, might create many mischiefs, and could correct none. Mr. Hornby himself seems to have entertained the same opinion of the measure that I do.—The commission given to the Committee required the obedience of all the Company's servants, civil and military, yet Mr. Hornby in his letter of 23d December, to Mr. Carnac, says, that in his opinion, there can be no necessity for publishing it, and that the promulgation of such a commission might bear the appearance of setting up an authority in the very camp, to supersede that of the commanding officer, and give ideas among the troops, as well as to Colonel Egerton, very different from those of the Select Committee.'—He confesses, that the words, '*To concert and conduct all military operations*, are too comprehensive, that they escaped himself at the time the commission passed, and he thinks they must have Mr. Carnac also.'

' Considering that the body of the commission itself does not exceed a few lines, it seems extraordinary, that the essential parts of it should pass unobserved by
P those

* those who drew it up. But, whether it escaped those
 * gentlemen or not, Colonel Egerton has sufficiently
 * cleared himself from any concern in the measure. Be-
 * fore it is printed, he protested (on the 7th of No-
 * vember) against its being accompanied by Field-
 * * * * * His protest was framed after his de-
 * * * * * against its being published
 * * * * *, as soon as he saw it on the 20th De-
 * cember.

2d. * The immoderate quantity of baggage, and train
 * of cattle which attended the army, and which is said
 * to have amounted to nineteen thousand, seem to have
 * been unnecessary for so short a march, and wholly in-
 * consistent with the plan of an expedition, which could
 * only have succeeded by rapidity and surprize.

3d. * The allowing Roganaut-row to move with a
 * separate camp, instead of keeping him constantly un-
 * der the eyes of the Commander in Chief, seems to me
 * a capital mistake, in consequence of which the motions
 * of our army were made to depend on those of Rog-
 * naut-row, who kept aloof when he thought fit, and
 * was left at liberty to negotiate with the enemy for
 * himself, and in case of a misfortune, betray us to
 * them. *

* For these defects in the executive part of the plan,
 * I deem the President and Select Committee entirely
 * answerable.

1779, June 7th and 10th, Mr. Francis minuted se-
 * veral paragraphs more, on the subject of the military
 * opera-

* An event which he attempted to execute. See the Arcot Va-
 * keel's letter to the Nabob, the 9th paragraph, thus * Roganaut-
 * row sent privately to the Maratta Chief Scindia, telling him that
 * if he would attack the English, he would join them with his army.

operations, to the effect of the latter part of the draft of a letter which he proposed in Council, on the 7th June, and debated upon the 10th—therefore to carry on the conformity, the concluding paragraphs of the proposed draft shall be first introduced. He proposed, that in the letter to Bombay, the Board should communicate their disapprobation of the steps taken against the military commanders, thus :

1st. ‘ That we highly disapprove of the reference made to us, to decide on the conduct of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, over whom we have no jurisdiction; and that if we were otherwise competent to try the charge, the want of *viva voce* evidence, to be examined upon oath concerning many facts necessary to establish the truth of it, would be an immediate bar to our proceeding.

2d. ‘ That the formal charge exhibited by the President against Messrs. Egerton and Cockburn, for having refused to take charge of conducting the army back to Bombay, * ought to have been followed by an immediate arrest and trial. It is a question of fact, which could only be determined on the spot.

3d. ‘ That to prefer a charge and refuse a trial, is, in our opinion, a proceeding wholly inconsistent with justice, and liable to many dangerous consequences. A precedent of this nature, if once permitted to pass without condemnation, tends in the first instance to leave the characters and safety of individuals, at the mercy of men in power, and ultimately to weaken the hands of Government itself, by destroying that

P 2

‘ confi-

* Although Colonel Cockburn refused to take the charge of conducting the army over tracts and passes, back to Bombay, yet he offered to conduct them forward to Poonah.

‘ confidence which individuals have been taught to repose in the justice and good faith of Government, and which alone can engage them to act with spirit and vigour in the public service.

4th. ‘ That the menace held out by the President to the officers, against whom he himself had delivered a formal charge of disobedience of orders, viz. *That if they would not decline all military duty and submit their cause to our determination, he would move to suspend them the service*, is, in our opinion, a high and arbitrary proceeding, and calls for the most public and solemn condemnation from this Board. That the claim of Messrs. Egerton and Cockburn to be tried by a court-martial, was a claim of right, and accrued to them the moment a specific charge was exhibited against them. That any attempt to induce men under a public charge, to waive their right to a public trial, is equally inconsistent with the justice and dignity of Government. But that the intention of passing by all trial whatsoever, and of proceeding instantly from accusation to punishment, as plainly expressed in the minute held out by the President, is, in our opinion, highly criminal; and that as such we shall think it our duty to represent it to our superiors.

5th. ‘ That admitting that Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, whether surprized by the menaces of the President, or induced by any other motive whatsoever, had at first submitted to the conditions imposed on them, yet having disavowed or retracted such supposed assent, long before the reference to this Board was actually made, the advantage taken thereof was unjust in itself, and not to be reconciled to the fair and open purposes of public justice. That they were in full time to revert to their original
‘ right,

‘ right, and that their claim to it ought not to have
‘ been denied.

6th. ‘ That we are much concerned that so much
‘ time should have been lost, by a useless and dilatory
‘ reference to us, of a question which ought to have been
‘ tried upon the spot, where all the parties and wit-
‘ nes were present, and while the recollection of every
‘ particular was fresh in their minds. That, however,
‘ the right of Messrs Egerton and Cockburn to a court-
‘ martial, is not weakened by this delay ; and for this
‘ reason, as well as because we think that many circum-
‘ stances relative to the late transactions at Bombay, and
‘ necessary for the Company’s information, can only be
‘ brought to light by a public trial, we are of opinion,
‘ that a court-martial should be immediately ordered
‘ for the trial of Messrs. Egerton and Cockburn, on the
‘ formal charge preferred against them by the President,
‘ or such other charges as the President and Committee
‘ may think proper to prefer against them, for their
‘ conduct in the course of the expedition.’

But to revert to the proceedings in a regular order—
The consideration of the Governor-general’s minute of
the 24th May, being revived, Mr. Francis continued
his observations by a minute, in the following terms :

‘ It is not possible that any member of this Board can
‘ be more weary of controversy than I am, or more de-
‘ sirous to avoid it. When the Board agreed to revert
‘ to the treaty of Poonah, we, in effect, endeavoured to
‘ reinstate ourselves in a position from which we never
‘ should have departed. Without looking back to the
‘ steps by which that ground was lost, I willingly join-
‘ ed in the attempt to renew it. * I have no doubt that
‘ peace

* Meaning his acquiescence with the Governor’s propositions of
5th April last.

' peace may be obtained on the terms of Colonel God-
 ' dard's present instructions, provided he enters heartily
 ' into our views; *provided this Government itself be in*
 ' *earnest in pursuit of its present object*; and provided we
 ' do not suffer ourselves to be entangled in the despe-
 ' rate schemes of those who now constitute the Go-
 ' vernment of Bombay, or thwarted by their opposition.
 ' I deem, the re-establishment of peace on the Malabar coast
 ' to be essential, not merely to the prosperity of the India
 ' Company, but to their existence. The sum total of the
 ' British interest in India is involved in the question. Let
 ' a war upon that coast be conducted how it may, the dif-
 ' ference between conquest and defeat, in my judgment, is
 ' little more than the delay or acceleration of the ruin of all
 ' our resources; nor is it clear to my apprehension, which
 ' of these two events will soonest produce the effect I expect
 ' equally from both.*

' Taking the truth of their own representations for
 ' granted, it is not easy to describe a situation more com-
 ' pletely destitute of all means of supporting a war than
 ' that of the Presidency of Bombay; the annexed ac-
 ' count shews, that during the last five years they have
 ' received little less than one hundred and sixteen lacks
 ' of current rupees,* directly out of the revenues of
 ' Bengal; yet their bond debt accumulated daily, and
 ' now amounts to 38 lacks. By the month of October
 ' (Mr. Hornby says) their finances will be utterly ex-
 ' hausted. In the interval they will want a supply of
 ' 30 lacks

* From 30th April 1774 to 1st May 75	19,13,341,
30th April 1775 to 1st May 76	37,74,615,
30th April 1776 to 1st May 77	19,50,726,
30th April 1777 to 1st May 78	19,36,764,
30th April 1778 to 1st May 79	29,01,233,

Rupees 115,76,680.

30 lacs. Of this sum the President proposes to borrow 20 lacs, but doubts the possibility of raising so large a sum; and if it could be borrowed, he says, they have no funds to pay even interest.

Colonel Goddard in his last letter of the 25th of April, tells us, that it is impossible in that country, and he fears in its neighbourhood, to find men fit to recruit the vacancies which happened in his battalions, since leaving the Jumna. But Mr. Hornby himself tells us, and we have reason to believe it true, that the Bengal Sepoys will not stay at so great a distance from their native country.—He says, that if they were to have no cause of dissatisfaction on account of their pay, there is reason to fear their numbers will every day diminish, by their going of to their own country.

Even before the late rupture with the Marrattas, and long before the disaster which attended it, the Presidency of Bombay told us in their letter of the 7th December 1777, that since their late acquisitions it was become very necessary, and they had accordingly recommended it to the Company, to augment the European corps; that notwithstanding they gave every encouragement, it was very difficult to raise good Sepoys on that coast; that it would require so much time to raise and discipline a further number of Sepoys, so as in the least degree to be considered as effective troops, that it would be much better in every respect to send them a reinforcement of disciplined Sepoys, if European troops could not be spared.

*" We should do well to consider how long we can maintain a war on such a footing, before we engage in it. —
 " I will not suppose the case of new miscarriages. Let it be
 " admitted that success and conquest are as certain as the
 " most sanguine expectations can imagine; it does not follow,
 " that*

“ that the objects proposed to be obtained by them, are such
 “ as we ought to aim at in our present circumstances, or that
 “ victory will pay its own expences. — By extending our
 “ territorial possessions, we create irreconcilable enmity in
 “ the minds of those powers, whom we immediately rob of
 “ their property. We fill every other Indian state with jea-
 “ lousy and alarm, and the territory we acquire, comes wast-
 “ ed and depopulated into our hands.”

‘ To defend a new line of frontiers, new military es-
 ‘ tablishments must be formed, and those establishments
 ‘ must not only be paid for out of the revenues of Ben-
 ‘ gal, but the very men who compose them, raised and
 ‘ nourished here to supply a service, which we know
 ‘ they will take the first opportunity of deserting.

‘ Such, in my conception, is the situation in which a
 ‘ successful war against the Marrattas alone, will place
 us. But if our success, or the apparent prospect of
 it, should compel them to call in the French to their
 assistance, if rather than relinquish their country to us,
 they should resolve to make it the seat of war, let us
 consider in what manner the contest is then to be
 maintained, and to what issue it may lead us. No-
 thing less than the extreme and instant necessity of self-
 preservation, can ever reduce the Marrattas to so des-
 perate a resolution, as that of inviting a European
 army into their country. If once they are intro-
 duced, it may be a difficult task to remove them.
 The events of war in that case will not be so clearly at our
 command, as they are thought to be at present; and let it
 be remembered, that on these events, if they are forwarded
 by our acts, we shall want only to stake the fate of our
 Empire.’

“ The question does not end here: In the present state of
 “ things, much more than the interest of India may depend
 “ on

“ on the care and economy with which we conduct the Company's affairs. — A regular return of wealth from the revenues of these provinces is undoubtedly expected at home. The nation, now perhaps looks to Bengal, as its last and greatest external resource. But if this demand upon us from home were not so pressing, and so likely to increase, as I think it is, it is time for us to consider, whether there be in Great Britain a fundamental force equal to the tenure of unbounded acquisition, at this distance from the seat of Empire; or whether we are not arrived at a point, at which common prudence dictates to us to fix, once for all, the limits of our dominion. If my judgment were to prevail, it should be our object to contract them.”

‘ These general considerations belong properly to the opinion which I mean to give on the principal questions before us, and will be found applicable to the subject.’

‘ To avoid a useless debate at the Board, I think the first question should be put generally, and decided by a majority of votes,—viz.—Whether we shall or shall not enter into a discussion and censure of the late transactions at Bombay? If it be determined in the affirmative, the commander in chief's minute and mine, will furnish what I deem sufficient materials for that part of our letter. — To these, however, the other members of the Board may propose such additions or alterations as they shall think proper.’

‘ The second question, I should think, to be decided in the same manner, is, Whether we should declare our opinion to the Presidency at Bombay, that Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn should be tried by a court-martial, for the reasons assigned in the paragraphs I submitted to the Board on Monday last.’

Q

‘ The

‘ The remaining questions brought before us by the Governor General’s minute, require more care and deliberation than need be given to the condemnation of any thing that is past.’

‘ I think we ought, in the first place, to decide generally, whether we shall or shall not send any new instructions to Colonel Goddard, before we hear the result of those we have already sent.—My opinion is, that we should wait for advices from him, in reply to our letters of the 5th of April.’

‘ With respect to the proposed instructions, I am against our engaging in, or giving our sanction to, the plan of military operations proposed by Mr. Hornby.’

First. ‘ For the reason assigned by the commander in chief, in which I intirely concur, and which I beg leave to recite in his own words, viz. “ As to the various plans proposed of seeking war for plunder, the honour of the nation and of the Company, inseparable from his own, would never permit him to subscribe to it.”

Secondly. Because, if I thought a war on this or any other plan might at a future day be unavoidable, still I would not, at the present point of time, hold out to the Presidency of Bombay the most distant idea of encouragement and eventual support in the prosecution of such measures, being thoroughly convinced from my knowledge and experience of the temper that predominates there, it would furnish them with means, of which I fear they might avail themselves, to embarrass Colonel Goddard’s negotiations with the Poonah Durbar, and to prevent a peace. By plunging the Company into a war, it is possible that a hope may be entertained of recovering personal credit.

‘ That

That instant difficulty may withdraw the Company's attention from things already done; and that, in the course of events, new questions may arise, in which the consideration of former miscarriages and former misconduct may be lost.—But these are motives of action which have no relation to the public service, and which neither can, nor ought to have any influence over our deliberations.

‘ Thirdly. Because the motive assigned for not censuring the late transactions with the leniency they deserve, viz. *That it would be improper to add to the depression of men, by whose agency we must support and defend the rights of the Company, and the honor of the British nation,*’ amounts to a declaration or admission, that the same agency which has already produced so much dishonor and distress, must still be trusted and employed in the direction and conduct of the proposed operations. But to this I can never assent. I see no wisdom, nor firmness, nor union, in their councils. And I have no reason to believe that their disposition is pacific.”

‘ Fourthly. Because I see no ground for apprehension, that the Marattas will renew hostilities with us, even for the recovery of the territory ceded to them by the convention; provided we are contented to stand upon the defensive. They have no general principle of union among themselves, but that of self-defence. Neither party, however, can now act against the other, with effect, before October. In that interval a peace may be obtained, *if we, on our parts, are heartily inclined to it.* At all events, we lose nothing by waiting for the result of Colonel Goddard's negotiations — If in addition to his present instructions, it be thought adviseable to empower him to gain the friendship of Madajee Scindia, by an

Q. 2

‘ equitable

‘ equitable compromise, in lieu of the private engagements already settled with him, I shall readily agree to it, because I think, that with prudent management it may be the means of forwarding a general peace, without which I would not make any concession.’

‘ I have heretofore stated my reasons at large for objecting to the alliance proposed to be accomplished with Moodajee Boosla, by the deputation of Mr. Elliot, and Colonel Goddard’s subsequent appointment to the same commission.—The plan having failed, I should be sorry to see it resumed.—*I dread the idea of involving our government, which is now too great to act on any but simple principles, in a labyrinth of Asiatic politics.—Let us be contented with what we have. Let us keep the peace; let us leave our neighbours to settle their differences among themselves without our interposition, and I am thoroughly satisfied, that no Indian power will ever molest us.*

‘ To these general reasons I cannot add a stronger argument than that which the military commander in chief’s minute has furnished me; he observes, *That Moodajee Boosla is proposed, because his elevation will restore the old Marhatta government, and thereby strengthen, aggrandize, and unite the Marhatta empire, which very reason, if no better can be given, will prevent my concurring in it.* Even the Governor-General’s opinion comes strongly in support of Sir Eyre Coote’s sentiments and mine on this subject. He thinks, *that Moodajee Boosla will wait for proofs of our superiority, before he will hazard the consequences of a decided connection with us.* When that superiority is obtained, we shall stand in no need of the connection; and if our scheme of military operations be not practicable with our own force, I agree entirely with the Governor-General in thinking, *that we*
‘ *shall*

‘ *shall gain nothing by incumbering ourselves with the weight of a timid ally.*’

‘ Before we determine, whether we shall send any farther supply of money to Bombay, at this time, and to what amount, I desire that the Accomptant-General may lay before us, an account of the sums already remitted to that Presidency, for their exclusive service, since April, 1778, distinguishing the *annual* from the *extra* supply. Also, a state of the sums remitted to Colonel Goddard, or drawn for by him, since he succeeded to the command of the detachment. From these accounts, we may be able to judge, how far we are bound to comply with any new demands from Bombay; how long Colonel Goddard’s present funds will last; and at what time it may be necessary to make him further remittances for the pay of his army. At present, I will not consent to send a rupee to Bombay, for the purpose of carrying on war, and making conquests; nor will I consent to it at any time, but under the condition insisted on by the (military) commander in chief, *that means are taken to prevent the money falling into hands, which experience has proved will make so ill a use of it.* A considerable part of the money which we sent them last year, to defray their necessary expences, has been given to Roganaut-row and Scindia, nearly to the amount of 50,000 l. * — The truth is, they have dreamed too long of inexhaustible wealth from Bengal. Under the influence of this dream, they have embarked in schemes of the most dangerous nature, and wasted the Company’s property with unexampled profusion. It is high time that they should be awakened from it.’

The

To Roganaut-row	— 4 lacks rupees	} Bombay currency.
To his officers, at twice	30,000 rupees	
To Scindia’s officers	41,000 ditto.	
	4,71,000	

The Governor-general replied to Mr. Francis's minute, in the following laconic terms :

' I am equally anxious with Mr. Francis, to avoid controversy. This sentiment I not only profess, but I will evince it, by refusing to bear my part in it. — This must serve for an excuse, if an excuse is necessary for declining a reply to Mr. Francis's minute, at the same time that I must declare my disagreement, not only with its general tenor, but with many parts of it ; which appear to me, not so necessary to arise out of the subjects immediately before the Board, as to the continuation of former debates.'

' The sentiments which have been expressed by the several members of this Board, have led us into a wide field of debate ; from which, it is effectually incumbent upon me to endeavour to withdraw our attention to such precise points, as may bring this business to a conclusion.' †

' In my first minute, I enumerated all the points of consideration which were brought before us, by the dispatches lately received from Bombay ; leaving it to the choice of the Board which of these we shall reject, and which we should select for the subjects of our instructions to the Presidency of Bombay, and to Colonel Goddard ; and I concluded with the proposal of the draft of a letter, to be written to the President and Committee of Bombay ; to which, I have since made some very material alterations.'

' I now beg leave to recall the attention of the Board, to the motion which is thus regularly brought before them, and to request that they will be pleased to decide upon it. The letters involve many distinct questions,

† The causes for this arbitrary mode of shutting out debates are too obvious for animadversion.

tions, which may be determined by an approbation, or disapprobation, or an amendment of each paragraph taken as a separate question. Perhaps it may be deemed more expedient to the dispatch of business, to propose distinct questions; and from the sense of the Board collected, upon these to form the letter to Bombay, and such other instructions as may depend upon them. *I submit to this Board, if the other members of this Board shall prefer it.* *

It was resolved that a copy of the Governor-general's draft be delivered to each member, for their opinions on each paragraph.

At a consultation on the 10th of June, Mr. Francis proposed a draft of a letter, as amendments upon that which was proposed by the Governor, and a copy delivered to each member at the last meeting.

The Governor's draught.

1. " We have received your letter of the 4th April, with its inclosures, by the hands of Mr. Horsley."

2. " We do not think it necessary to enter on the review of your proceedings, but shall confine our present enquiries to the choice of such means as may best conduce to retrieve their unhappy consequences; leaving the past to the scrutiny of a higher

Mr. Francis's draught.

1. Approved—literally.

2. " After perusing these papers, with the strictest and most deliberate attention, we have determined, not to enter into a particular discussion, or censure of the measures which have involved you in your present distresses. You must answer to a higher and

* This kind of submission from Mr. Hastings's mouth, or pen, was so novel, that it commands to be distinguished in Italics.

and more effectual authority."

more effectual authority, for the difficulties to which you have reduced the government intrusted to your care, and for the unexampled dishonour you have brought upon the Company's arms. We leave your conduct in the course of these transactions to be examined at home; as we doubt not, it will be with the utmost severity. If, on our side, it had been possible for us to select any part of your proceedings, either in the plan or execution of the measures, on which we could have bestowed our approbation, we should readily have done it."

3. " We must desire to decline the reference made to us of the charge made by your President against Col. Egerton, and Lieut. Col. Cockburn, as a point on which we have no jurisdiction, and which is cognizable only by your authority; either with the power of suspension immediately, vested in your body by the Court of Di-

3. In Mr. Francis's draft, on the subject of the Governor's third paragraph, was a literal abstract of the propositions made by him on the 7th June.

Sir Eyre Coote proposed some small amendment on the Governor's paragraph.

4. Approved

rectors, or through the regular trial of a court-martial; to which we recommend their being immediately brought, not upon the limited charge given in by the President, which solely points to one part of their conduct, but upon a general charge for misconduct, upon an expedition that has failed."

4. "Having given full powers to Col. Goddard, to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace with the Marratta government, and having no cause to alter the terms which we have prescribed in our instructions for that purpose, we have only to repeat, that we look to the issue of that commission as our primary object, and the termination of all our political views on your side of India, if it shall prove successful."

5. "But if the ministers shall reject the proposals which we have ordered to be made to them, and shall reduce us to the necessity of defending the rights and interests of the Company

4. Approved—literally!

"... Until we shall be advised by Col. Goddard of the result of his negotiations in consequence of the present order, we do not think it expedient to take any further steps."

by an open war, we leave a latitude of action to Col. Goddard, under your instructions, to avail himself of the situation which fortune may present to him; and if a war should be indispensably continued, it must also rest with him, who is responsible to us for his conduct, to adopt any part, or the whole of Mr. Hornby's plan, laid down in his minute of 30th March, or not at all, as he may think most advisable for promoting the distress of the enemy."

Sir Eyre Coote proposed a trifling amendment on this paragraph.

6. "Should this plan be carried into execution, we require your strictest attention to the following cautions:—That your engagements shall be offensive, only for the objects of your immediate operations; and in all other re-

conditional determination, to prosecute the war on the plan proposed by Mr. Hornby, or on any other. Supposing that our views and wishes, which are all directed to an honourable peace, should be defeated, it is not from a partial effort on your side of India alone, that we can form any reasonable expectation of a decisive success against the united power of the Marattas; for in the case of war, we must suppose their strength to be united against us. We will not therefore, precipitate a resolution, in the consequence of which, all India may be involved. We shall wait for advices from Col. Goddard, and be determined by the lights and informations with which he may furnish us."

6. Comprehended in the last paragraph, No. 5, upon the general principle of his minute, of observing a silent reservation until fresh advices were received from Col. Goddard, in consequence of his instructions of 31st April.

spects,

spects, purely defensive. That your engagements with the Guicawar's family, shall be made with the chief of it, and with him exclusively. That you shall not assume a mediation between the brothers, or take any part whatever in their domestic disputes, further than to support the party in alliance with the Company, and his possessions against foreign invasion ; and that you do not commit the dignity of the Company, or pledge the national faith, in formal treaties with persons of a rank or power, unsuitable to such a distinction."

7. "We are sensible of the attention which you have shewn to our views with the government of Berar, in joining the overtures lately made to Moodajee Boosla, by Colonel Goddard, and in your resolution, to avoid whatever might again interfere with this negotiation. We confess, we at this time entertain little hope of his concurring with our designs: We will wait for proofs of

7. Observed the same silence as in the preceding, on this paragraph also—which of course implied a disapprobation.

our superiority, before he will hazard the consequences of a decided connection with us; and every offer made to him, while he is under the influence of such a policy, will but serve to increase his reserve, as he will naturally construe it, to proceed from the consciousness of our own inability to support ourselves without a foreign assistance; and this is an additional motive for our preferring a scheme of military operations, practicable by our own force, unincumbered with the weight of a timid ally. If, notwithstanding, Moodajee Boosla shall have answered the letters which have been written to him, by a willingness to accept of the proposed alliance, we shall leave it to be concluded under the instructions already given in charge to Colonel Goddard. If, on the contrary, as we expect, he shall directly refuse, or hesitate, or make new references to us, we have, in such case, ordered Colonel Goddard to break off the negotiation."

8. " We think ourselves strictly justifiable in refusing to ratify, even the smallest tittle of the treaty, or convention of Worgaum, and we have already intimated our sentiments on this head to Colonel Goddard, and given him our final instructions upon it; but as we had not at that time before us, the separate secret engagement entered into with Madajee Scindia, we could not take it into our consideration, nor judge of the obligation we were under to express our sense of his services, at the instant we disclaimed the acts of the committee; and will not admit of any pretensions founded on those acts, yet they cannot cancel any rights which have their basis in essential and intrinsic benefits reaped by our nation. This right we must acknowledge to be possessed by Madajee Scindia, and must therefore declare, that unless he should have forfeited it by any subsequent act, he is intitled to a full compensation for any disappointment he may suffer by our

8. The same marks of disapprobation, as in the three last paragraphs.

denial of the acts of the committee."

9. "We have therefore instructed Col. Goddard to express the sense in which this government is pleased to regard the services of Madajee Scindia, at War-gaum, by offering him such a gratification as may be afforded him by your government, or for some means which he may possess from the operations of war, in case peace is not concluded, upon the instructions he is already furnished with."

9. As above.

10. If in the event of war, Madajee Scindia shall be disposed to take part with us, we have authorized Colonel Goddard to enter into such engagements with him, as shall not be contrary to any before concluded, and which he may judge most advisable; making our future security, peace, and an adequate revenue, his chief and indispensable objects, and the grounds of our engagements with him."

10. As above.

11. "To

11. ' To sum up what we have written, our first desire is to obtain peace on the terms proposed by our instructions to Col. Goddard of 5th April, and it is only in the event of the failure in this design, that we have formed the subsequent instructions, or will allow of their operations'.

11. As above.

12. ' The execution of the proposed treaty of peace with the Poonah Ministry, we leave to the sole charge of Colonel Goddard, according to the instructions which we have already given him.

12. Approved, literally.

13. " The separate negotiation with Madajee Scindia, bears such a connection with the foregoing, that we have therefore thought it necessary to leave this also to his charge. The negotiation and treaty of alliance with Moodajee Boonla, we also leave to the sole management of Col. Goddard, in the authority of his instructions of the 16th November, until the period of their suspension by

13. Disapproved upon the principles expressed in his draft opposite to the fifth paragraph.

the refusal, or such hesitation of Moodajee Boosla, as he shall deem sufficient, to warrant his declaring the negotiation suspended. The future renewal of this negotiation we reserve to be determined by our express orders, but without revoking the credentials and instructions already granted to Col. Goddard respecting it. In all other negotiations, treaties, and plans of military operations, it is our wish so to blend the powers of your government with our own in the direction of them, and in every formal or occasional instrument which they may require for their ratification, as to preserve the credit and distinct responsibility of both, and to make both the pledges for the faithful observance of them. For this purpose we need not recommend that Col. Goddard be consulted and

of the

have already been placed

voice in your councils; and we are happy to find that you are so well satisfied with his conduct, and his ready disposition to assist in the execution of your designs, as to leave us little occasion to lay down a clearer line for the employment of the forces under his command, than that we have already described.

14. "We have directed Colonel Goddard to execute whatever service you shall think it proper to require, which he shall think practicable, and which shall not be contrary to any instructions, or to any existing engagements; a caution which we hope will be unnecessary, but with which we do not think ourselves at liberty to dispense, while the principal responsibility rests with us. And for the

14. As the foregoing.

same reason, we require that all treaties which may be concluded by any of our agents, shall be subject to the review of the Government, and that no such treaty shall be binding on the United States, until it has been approved by the President.

inferred

inserted in every treaty so concluded, to that effect.

15. "We shall heartily join with you in recommending Colonel Goddard to the Court of Directors, for the appointment of commander in chief, at your Presidency, on the first vacancy; and in the intermediate time we think it absolutely necessary in the present distressed situation that the military upon your establishment are reduced to, that he should have the rank given him of Brigadier General, in order to enable him to carry on the public service with more weight and dignity, for which purpose we have granted him a Brevet Commission for the service, in which he is now employed.

15. Silent.

In conclusion, Mr. Francis observed, "That with regard to the form and extent of the charge against Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, I have no objection to the terms recommended by Sir Eyre Coote."

We are, &c."

It is impossible, without deviating from the common rules of consistency, to pass over the Governor-general's draft without animadversion. It is a perfect masterpiece of artful confusion, containing throughout, a string of ambiguities, contradictions, and unintelligible tautologies, which, if they are not immediately calculated to confound and embarrass the negociator, are certainly meant, in case of error or failure in the execution, to screen the real author from censure, by casting it on Colonel Goddard, and heaping a portion also upon the ponderous mountain already suspended over the Presidency of Bombay. A review and critical comparison of the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th paragraphs, will clearly evince the truth of this assertion. But the 13th and 14th beggar description, and may, without offending the ablest productions of the late *Holy Society*, be adjudged to a conspicuous station among *Jesuitical* performances.—As the unconstitutional and impolitic authorities and instructions which are contained in it, were clearly demonstrated at the Board, by a refutation which did honour to the author,* as well as by another protest by Mr. Francis; it will only be necessary now, to say, that the plenipotentiary powers to Colonel Goddard, independent of, and as an absolute check and controul upon the Governor and Council of Bombay, within the express precincts of their commission and establishment, amount to a total suspension of that government, or that the whole act is, *prima facie*, illegal; that even allowing to Colonel

instructions conveyed in the Governor's
letter on the Company's records.

exposed to the temptations which are peculiar to the chief command of a military expedition in India, joined with an uncontrolled political authority, to separate ambitious objects from the immediate, important duties of his high commission.

The Governor-general in a minute, on the 10th June, canvassed the sentiments avowed by Mr. Francis, and expressed in the draft proposed as an amendment on the Governor's. He entered into a long harangue on peace or war with the Murrattas, as an alternative in which there was no latitude; and that the orders to Colonel Goddard prescribe clear and simple conditions. That if a peace follows, matters will continue in, and revert to the same state as they were by the treaty of Poorunder, without the interference of the Supreme Board. But that in case of war, the Company's safety must depend on *instant action*, by seizing particular posts, during the season in which (in his opinion) the Marratta troops could not act, and thus bring distress upon them before they could resist. † That he had *certain* intelligence, ‡ that Madajee Scindia, and his colleague Tuckajee Holkar, and Roganaut-row, have left the capital, and arrived at Barham-pore, with a design to invade the Nabob of Oude's dominion. That therefore, whether the Board chuse to credit the report or not, they ought to be guarded against it, and even to prevent it.

That, *for these reasons*, he was against Mr. Francis's draft; because, in case of war, it will bind our hands, while the Marrattas are free, and will leave the Presidency

* Extravagant, wild, and chimerical.

† It proved to be *false* intelligence, if there ever was any such. But it was calculated to intimidate the Council into an acquiescence with his hostile views.

dency of Bombay incumbered and oppressed with the weight of that force, on which we depend for success. He said, ' That he never would suffer the object to be lost, for which the detachment, now commanded by Colonel Goddard, was first appointed. That it was not to assist the designs of the Presidency of Bombay in their execution, but to support them in the consequences of it, though the detachment was for a while diverted from its destination, on the supposition, that the designs of that Presidency had either totally failed, or were relinquished. Yet it has since reverted to it, and is now precisely in the situation, in which it was originally meant to place it. I will not say, what would have been the fate of Bombay, had not Colonel Goddard most seasonably arrived for its relief.'

Perhaps human confidence has not produced another more daring instance, to impose on the understanding of men, by dint of mere sophistry and bold assertions, than what is contained in the last recital. The answer, regarding the safety of Bombay was simple. Bombay would continue as it is. Colonel Goddard's detachment was on the banks of the Narbudda, long after the defeat of the Bombay army. He continued for some time, after he had heard the event, to negotiate with Moodajee Boosla. Had the Marrattas had hostile intentions, equal to the repeated provocations which they received, they had it in their power, easily and effectually, to have cut him off, or force his army to surrender prisoners at discretion, either by the sword or by famine. And it is no less a truth, that a detachment of Sepoys at Surat, could yield no immediate succours or relief to Bombay, if it had been attacked.

They then proceeded to decide upon the course to be taken here before the Board, upon the

the two drafts of a letter to the Presidency of Bombay, which he predetermined thus, viz.

" He agreed to the 1st, 2d, 4th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, and 15th paragraphs.

" He agreed to the 3d and 5th, with the amendments proposed by Sir Eyre Coote.

" He *never will depart* from the opinions which he expressed in the 7th and 8th.

" He thinks the 12th a paragraph of no consequence, and may be omitted.

It was resolved by Mr. Hastings, Mr. Barwell, and Sir Eyre Coote's votes, against those of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, in favour of the Governor's draft. A letter was, accordingly, ordered to be engrossed, and that it be referred to Mr. Horsley (who was delegated upon the present occasion to represent the Presidency of Bombay) before it is transmitted. Mr. Horsley desired leave to take the letter with him, as the length of it, and the variety of subject it treated, necessarily rendered him cautious of offering any thing suddenly for the consideration of the Board; and the more so, "*as there are several parts of it, which he fears will appear to him more detrimental to the public service, the longer he considers them.*"

At a consultation held the 14th of June, at which the Board was complete. The amended draft of the letter to Bombay was read, and after a dissent the question was put, and carried for the Governor's amended draft as follows :

Warren Hastings,	} Approved.
Richard Barwell,	
+ Eyre Coose,	
Philip Francis,	} Disapproved.
Edward Wheler,	

And immediately Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler entered their protests, and Mr. Francis delivered the following minute to be recorded.

“ I dissent from, and protest against the preceding letter, for the following reasons, in addition to those on which I opposed the measures now adopted, at the time they were debated.”

1st. “ Because I deem it unbecoming the dignity of the Governor-general and Council, and a most unmerited demonstration of tenderness and partiality to the majority of the Select Committee of Bombay, with such evidences of their misconduct as we have before us, to pass by the whole of their late proceedings, without the slightest expression of disapprobation or concern, as if nothing were in question, but some common and trifling occurrence, by which, neither the interests of the Company, nor the credit of our arms, had been essentially wounded. When the separate opinions of the members of this Board shall appear before our superiors, I doubt not, they will think it an extraordinary circumstance, that no part of the spirit which breathes through those opinions, should be preserved in the Collective Act of Council.”

2. “ Be-

* Let this name to the letter in question be compared with the articulated sounds, which are supposed to have emitted from his mouth, on the 24th of May, and draw an inference.

Humanum est errare --- is a tender apology.

2. ' Because, considering the claim of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn to be tried by a Court Martial, *as a claim of right*, I think we sh^d not have confined our interposition on this point to a *cold and languid recommendation of such trial, but shou'd have insisted on its being granted, in terms that would admit of no evasion; much less shou'd we have weakened even that recommendation by referring to an alternative, of which the Select Committee may now avail themselves, under colour of our authority.*— This, I conceive, is no time to remind them that they have other powers vested in them; that they are at liberty to waive all trial, if they think proper, and to punish the parties, by an immediate and direct act of power.'

3. ' Because, admitting it to be true, that Messieurs Egerton and Cockburn, consented, at first, to relinquish their claim to a public trial, and that they had no right to retract such consent, once given, still, I think we should not have passed over in silence the unwarrantable acts and declarations of the President, by which it was extorted from them. They who think least favourably of the conduct of these gentlemen, should consider how far the precedent may be extended, and what security it leaves to the military service in general, against the arbitrary acts of a party, occasionally prevailing in the Council.'

4. ' Because the several plans of alliance or co-operations proposed to be executed with the Guicawars, or with Madajee Scindia, or with Moodajee Boodh, must be offered and negotiated, after we ourselves are, actually committed, by a declaration, and engaged in the prosecution of it. In such circumstances, I conceive, we shall treat with all, or any of the above-mentioned Chiefs for their assistance, under great disadvantages. When once they see us engaged in

in a war, which at all events we must carry on, they will either stand aloof, until they see the success of our operations, or tell us their assistance on terms which we should not yield to in any other situation.

5. ' Because no consideration whatever is given to the case of the two gentlemen who remain as hostages in the hands of the Marrattas, and whose lives may be hazarded by an abrupt declaration of war.

6. ' Because, exclusive of all other reasons already urged, against our precipitating the Company into a war with the Marrattas, if that extremity can be avoided, by any honourable means, I deem it inconsistent with the principles of Colonel Goddard's instructions of 5th April, in which the re-establishment of peace is professed to be an object, to send him orders, which leave no room for accommodation, and which ought to have accompanied the instructions, *if the Board had been originally determined* not to wait for the result of his negotiations, nor even for an answer to our letter. I deem it useless, even in view to a prosecution of the war, since, in all probability, the advices we expect from Colonel Goddard may arrive in 15 or 20 days, and though a rupture in that interval may be forwarded, and all means of reconciliation precluded, in consequence of the present orders, our troops cannot take the field before September. No possible advantages can therefore be taken in consequence of this precipitation; unless it be thought an advantage to denounce war, before we are able to act, and to give the enemy the earliest notice of our intention to invade their country, as soon as the season will permit.'

Lastly, ' I am unable to reconcile it with the opinion of every member of the Board, *except the Governor-*
T ' general,

' general, of Mr. Wheler's sentiments and mine, I pre-
 ' sume no doubt can be formed. Mr. Barwell says,
 ' *He thinks we should wait for the effect of Colonel Goddard's*
 ' *negotiation for peace.* But, if we now decide the main
 ' question of peace or war, the information which Mr.
 ' Barwell thinks we ought to wait for, can be of no
 ' use to us.'

' The Commander in Chief, in whose sentiments I
 ' have entirely concurred, declares it to be his opinion,
 ' *that we should not seek to renew a war, but negotiate with*
 ' *the various Marhatta interests an honourable peace. That*
 ' *Colonel Goddard's detachment, considering the state it is now*
 ' *in, together with the Bombay troops, are not equal to in-*
 ' *sure success in a contest with the united Marhatta power.*
 ' Yet it is with this force, and with this force alone,
 ' that under the present orders we are to commence a
 ' war, which will assuredly unite the whole power of the
 ' Marhattas against us. No measures previous to a de-
 ' claration of war, are taken to divide them, no alliance
 ' formed, no general plan of operations proposed. In
 ' short every thing that belongs to deliberation, and
 ' which ought to prepare, and lead to decision, is left
 ' to follow it. But if in the outset of the contest, and
 ' before any measures can be taken to support or co-
 ' operate with Colonel Goddard, the army under his
 ' command should be defeated; and if the consequences
 ' of the defeat should endanger the whole of the Company's
 ' possessions, as the Commander in Chief very justly thinks they
 ' would, on what principle can we justify a resolution, ca-
 ' pable of producing such hazardous consequences, from which,
 ' at the present point of time, no immediate advantage can
 ' be derived, and to be carried into execution by a force
 ' which the Commander in Chief thinks is not equal to insure
 ' success. The terms on which we are to engage in this war
 ' are very unequal, when the utmost we can expect from a
 ' victory, is some accession of territory on the Malabar coast,
 ' and

and when a defeat may endanger the whole of the Company's possessions.

The letter having been referred to Mr. Horsley, that gentleman, though a junior servant, yet acting as the representative, by delegation, of the Presidency of Bombay, did equal justice to his truth, and to clear abilities, in representing to the Supreme Board the plain improprieties and illegalities contained in the letters of instructions, &c. to the Presidency of Bombay. The paper will speak more forcibly and honourably for itself, than by abstracting its substance, which will be found on the Company's records in the India House.

By a letter from Colonel Goddard, dated at Surat, the 26th October, 1779, he informed, that the Paishwa's minister had in plain and direct terms declared to him, in the name of his master, that he would not accede to the proposals made by Colonel Goddard, or conclude peace with the English, unless Roganaut-row (who had escaped) was delivered up to him, and Salsette surrendered to the Marratta government. That in consequence of this declaration Colonel Goddard had broke off the negociation, and prepared for war. The Bombay Select Committee, by their letter of 31st October, informed the Board that they had strongly recommended to Colonel Goddard, not to precipitate matters, but to endeavour to gain time, and to deter any declaration until they were in a better condition for an active war.

As was predicted, the whole Marratta race, including the Rajah of Berar, and the Gujacawar Chief, together with Hyder Ali Cawn, and it is credibly suspected the Soubah of the Deccan, and Nudjiff Cawn, had entered into a close combination, and confederacy, to reduce the British empire in India, and that they are carrying on

a very deep and dangerous correspondence with the French Island of Mauritius.

1780, January. Some time in July, 1779, the majority in council resolved against the most pointed efforts to dissuade, on the parts of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, to send another detachment, to consist of 2,500 effectives, under the command of Captain Popham, across the continent, to reinforce Colonel Goddard's army at Surat; and that the detachment be draughted from the Sepoy battalions up the country. The latter end of August, Captain Popham took leave, and received his last dispatches, particularly an order on the Resident at Oude for 278,832 current rupees, a part of the subsistence and contingencies of the expedition. The universal opinion throughout Hindostan prognosticated, that it was a direct sacrifice of so weak a body of troops, not having the most distant prospect of similar successful casualties, to favour their escape and passage, as the first detachment had, consisting of three times the number of experienced troops, connected battalions, and the completest train of artillery in Asia under the command of Major Baillie, who has long been considered as the ablest artillery officer in the service. It was confidently alleged, that the very officers, who are seldom backward to go upon enterprizing service, did not shew any eagerness to go upon this; and the desertion of many, and almost a total refusal of the rank and file, to cross the Jumna, yielded too convincing a proof of the sense the natives had entertained of the improbability of succeeding. This avowed disaffection prevented the march of the detachment, until a laughable, preposterous treaty with the poor reduced Rana, of the hilly country of Gohud, was solemnized in January or February, 1780, and the impracticability of the expedition being then acknowledged; to save appearances, Captain Popham's detachment were ordered to join the visionary veterans

of our great and powerful new ally, to reduce the fortress of "Gucaliar," belonging to the Marrattas, in the neighbourhood of Gohud. The history of this famous treaty, and the embassy of state sent to witness the execution of a paper, having had already all the solemnity and authenticity usual and essential in India, is of a piece with many others, and worthy of perusal.*

It is a moral truth, that success against the Marratta Chief, Futta Sing Gujacawar, the Jaghire-dar of Guzzerat, does not immediately affect or injure the Regency of Poonah; nor will it ever be in the power of Colonel Goddard to attack them in their own country, or to bring them to a pitch or decisive battle in the field. They will pay no regard to any treaty or capitulation with Futta Sing, who, as a tenant for life, or in actual possession to his own sole use, has no right of alienation. They have always shown an aversion to the payment of money by treaty, as much as they have plainly discovered a solicitous inclination to preserve an uninterrupted harmony and alliance with the English. The trade of Guzzerat is of more importance to the English trade to Bengal and China, than any revenue that can arise from the territorial possession thereof, under an English system of government. It would therefore have been more advantageous to the East India Company, and the British nation, to have submitted to a second total defeat, as the means of any tolerable accommodation, than to continue a war, the expence of which is altogether insupportable by the Company's funds, and which can have no other tendency than to exasperate the Marrattas, and to excite additional jealousy, dread, and combinations in all the other native powers. If the

WAR

* The minutes are published in a late pamphlet, containing abstracts of minutes on Contracts, &c. in 1779.

war has held out to the year 1781, it must inevitably have cost the Company above three millions of pounds sterling.

The fidelity of the Company's native troops hath been preserved, and their military successes have arisen solely from a punctuality which no other power in India was able to observe in the payment of military establishments, and from the regular discipline which, in consequence of that punctuality, British officers were enabled to maintain in the armies. If the Company are rendered incapable of pursuing the same line of exactitude, mutiny and desertion however dangerous, will have less fatal consequences, than the occasion which it will furnish to their avowed enemies, of augmenting their armies with veteran troops, regularly formed and disciplined by the Company themselves. Such a spirit discovered itself in 1779, upon several occasions, even in the brigade stationed in and near Fort William, and it became remarkably serious in General Goddard's army at Baroach. The Company's allies (if that appellation can be said to belong to the state of dependence in which they are held) are reduced to a state of misery and distress, and by mere oppression rendered not only disaffected, but both unable and unwilling to pay their subsidiary engagements. The Company's own provinces are depopulated, the Zemindars utterly unable to discharge the heavy load of arrears which is suspended over them; their treasures at each Presidency are empty; their credit, faith, and power, are equally suspected; their investments, by solemn resolutions, as an act of necessity, not of choice, reduced 40 per cent. in Bengal; the quality of the remaining investment so debased, and its cost so advanced, that the sales in Europe create a certain large deficiency; their military and civil establishments, in the very midst of these dreadful symptoms, have been impolitically and madly augmented.

without bounds or measure; the estimate of probable resources for the year 1780 hath been acknowledged to fall grievously short of their absolute engagements; * and they are involved in a general war with all the independent states of Hindostan, and in the disaffection of their dependent allies, who are all encouraged and excited, by assurances of support from the only European powers who are conditioned to do it with effect. It is much to be dreaded, that the fatal blow is already struck, which may have blasted the glorious prospect of a vast accession of territory and trade in the British empire.

* Near 380,000 l. sterling, after consuming the deposit 359,600 l. sterling, to answer the calls of any emergency.

London, 15th March, 1781.

POST.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE ungenerous and uncandid attempt by the "partizans of the Governor General, to saddle the late incursions of Hyder-Alli-Cawn into the Carnatic, and the disaster to the Madras army, on the Presidency of Fort St. George, in order to draw the reproach which justly belong to them, from the measures of the Governor General, and the iniquitous Marratta war, into which he deliberately forced the Company, may bring forth some more documents, to place the saddle upon the right horse. In the mean time, it is thought proper to subjoin to this narrative, an extract from a minute which Mr. Whitehill, the late President of Fort St. George, committed upon record in Council, before he was suspended by the Governor General and Council in November 1780, to shew that the Marratta war *alone*, excited Hyder-Alli-Cawn to commence hostilities against the Company, in confederacy with the Marrattas, and the rest of the native powers, and even in alliance with Scha-Allum, and his Vizier Nudjiff-Cawn, whose abilities as a General and Politician, are distinguished in Hindostan. In speaking of the Governor General and Council, Mr. Whitehill uses the following convictive language, every word of which being founded on facts, corroborate the predictions and censures conveyed in the preceding narrative.

"Plunged into almost inextricable difficulties, it is
 "not an unwise stretch of policy, to screen themselves
 "if

“ if in their power; and to load others with the opprobrium of those acts, which are now overpowering us, with the pernicious consequence of their effects.”

“ Possessed of a sufficiency of territory, more even than we were adequate to the management of, your Presidency of Bengal might surely have been content with paying a strict obedience to your orders, which have been uniform and strict on that head; but unfortunately for your affairs, the offensive line of conduct which they adopted against the Marhattas, threw them into a scene of action so extensive, and so full of difficulty, that neither their forces, nor their revenues, were capable of bearing them through with any possibility of success. Had the experience of former times been called in a little to their aid, they would have seen that Aurengzebe, one of the most formidable monarchs that ever sat upon the throne of Delhi, was, after a twenty years struggle with all the power and riches of Hindostan, obliged to abandon a similar attempt.”

“ It was not, however, in the line alone of hostility, that the Governor General and Council of Bengal, lost sight of the national interests which have been entrusted to their care.”

“ They unaccountably forgot them in their negotiations and alliances with the Marhatta Chiefs. The infant Paishwa was first to be protected; next, Roganaut-row was to be assisted; again, Moodajee Boolla was to be supported in some distant pretensions; and all to the same object, the supreme government of the Marhatta state.”

“ When a contradiction of this nature appears in the public acts of a great power; when a more than a suspicion of the professions it may make, becomes the ruling complexion of the minds of those it is engaged with, the surest prop of political security is taken, and every evil may be justly expected as the consequence.”

" The measures that have been pursued in the pro-
 " secution of this fatal Marratta contest, may indeed
 " be supposed to be unconnected with the principle of
 " this address, but the truth is, the Marratta war has
 " been the real source of all the mischief that hath be-
 " fallen the Carnatic; and of all the injury that hath
 " been levelled at me by the Governor General and
 " Council of Bengal. Had peace existed in that quar-
 " ter with the English, Hyder-Alli-Cawn would never
 " have ventured from his own dominions. He saw,
 " however, the extremity to which we were reduced,
 " (a considerable part of our troops having been de-
 " tached to Bombay, at the requisition of the govern-
 " ment of Bengal, for the support of this very war)
 " and very prudently seized hold of the occasion to dis-
 " tress us, where he knew we were most vulnerable."
 " The Governor General and Council of Bengal,
 " may, in exculpation of themselves, endeavour to
 " brand this Presidency with the guilt of having ex-
 " cited the troubles which at present exist in the Car-
 " natic, by protracting the restitution of the Guntoor
 " Circar, and of having driven the Nabob Nizam-
 " Alli-Cawn, to avow himself the adviser of the con-
 " federacy. But the original cause of almost the loss
 " of all our consequence in Hindostan, will be found
 " to arise from the rash and ruinous conduct that they
 " themselves have held with respect to the Marrattas.
 " In the South, it has enabled Hyder to carry fire and
 " delolation before him; and in the North, (as the
 " latest accounts inform us) it hath afforded a favour-
 " able opportunity to the Mogul and Nudjiff-Cawn,
 " to take the field with a considerable army, decla-
 " redly with the intent of wresting from the English
 " the country which they took from the Rohillas, and
 " the dominions of Assoph-ul-Dowla, the Nabob of
 " Oude."

A P P E N D I X.

No. 200417

Copy of a Letter from Governor HASTINGS to
DEWAGUR BOOSLA, Prime Minister to the
Rajah of Benar, dated at Calcutta, 24th November,
1778.

"It is the object of my Letter, I have observed from the
common sense of your own mind, and from the example of
others, to set forth the great advantages, and the
difficulties, of the present situation, in which I am, and
cannot in their nature equal them to which the peo-
perious influence of our measures, and the state of the
Maha Rajah's government. But I know the character
to which I address myself. I trust in the goodness, bravery
and spirit of your Chief, that he will greatly enter into the
subjects proposed to his wisdom, and to your wisdom; of
which, if time reports truly, no minister ever
possessed a larger portion, that you will view their im-
portance in too clear a light to hazard the loss of them
by attempting to take an advantage of the desire which
I have expressed for their accomplishment. This intention
is not so much intended for a reason to you, as for an ex-
planation of my conduct to those who may be led into
retreat into the grounds of it."

A. No. H.

Copy of a letter from MOODAGEE BOOSLA to
Governor HASTINGS, dated the 5th December,
1778, and received the 2d January, 1779.

"Your friendly letter of the 10th Instant, (11th
October) informing me of your having received ad-
vice of the death of Mr. Elliot, in his way to Nag-
pore; your concern at that event, and at the unavoid-

able suspensions of the negotiations which that gentleman was to have conducted with me on the part of your government, and the delay in the establishment of a strict and perpetual friendship between the Company, State and mine (concerning which you had expressed yourself so warmly) by reason that the present situation of affairs would not admit of the delay which must attend the deputation of another person from thence without injuring the designs in hand; but that in your conviction of my favorable disposition, from the knowledge that my interests and the Company are inseparably connected, and in the case of Benjamin Pundit, whom, during the late period he resided with you, you found to be deserving of your confidence, &c. &c. *That is the plan proposed*, and what you have chosen, is to promote our common advantage, not for the interest of one party only, being convinced that no public alliance or *private friendship*, can be firmly established without reciprocal advantages. *That is on these principles you had long ago planned an alliance with me*; the time for the accomplishment of which is now come: for you conceive it to be equally for my interest as for yours; our countries bordering on each other, and our natural enemies being the same. That in a word, you required nothing but the junction of my forces with yours, by which, though each is singly very powerful, they will acquire a ten-fold proportion of strength. *That the delay of the progress in the detachment intended for Bombay, had not arisen from the apprehension of an enemy, but from other causes improper to mention*; but that it will now shortly arrive, being unopposed, and its operation be determined by my advice. *That you have given directions to Colonel Leslie, to co-operate with the forces which I shall send with his*: That as you offer me the forces of your Circar to promote my views, you in return require the assistance of mine to effect your purposes;

1793 with other particulars which I fully understand
 reached me on the 20th instant (10th November) af-
 forded me great pleasure. — I also received duplicates
 and triplicates of the same. In the same parts of it you
 express, that as you are much acquainted with
 your views, it is necessary that I also communicate to
 you, without reserve, the ends which I have in view for my
 advantage in this union. — That the good sense of
 the English to every thing which they contract to do, as
 it is observed by Cicero, is universal. Knowing, then,
 that it has been the intention of your country to
 support this character in all its operations on your side,
 never to relinquish any design of importance formed in
 good and judicious counsel; but to persevere steadily
 to its completion. *And having this resolution, it is
 necessary and proper, that you should be able to
 the knowledge of these you shall form your ultimate re-
 solution.*

It is equally a maxim of sincere friendship and good
 government, Readiness, magnanimity, and forbearance,
 that a plan formed on good and judicious grounds,
 should be conducted in such a manner, as to end hap-
 pily: *You desire to learn my sentiments and views, and
 deferring to form your ultimate resolutions, I will not
 beard further from me, in the same thing, and you will be
 fully satisfied in your first design.*

Since, after the strictest scrutiny and researches into
 the dispositions and views of the multitude, it has
 been determined, on proofs of universal sincerity and
 good faith, that a perfect friendship and union be
 established, it will, like the wall of Alexander, for
 the happiness of mankind, continue unshaken until
 the end of time.

The having caused a translation to be made into English of the Hindoo books, called the Shaster and Poran, and of the history of the former Kings, the studying these books, and keeping the pictures of the former Kings and present rulers of Hind, Decan, &c. always before your eyes, and from their lifeless similitude to discover which of them were, or are worthy of rule, and possessed of good faith, from which to determine with whom to contract engagements, and what conduct to observe to them respectively.——Also the endeavour to preserve the blessing of peace, 'till forced to relinquish it.——The supporting every one in his hereditary right,—and revenging the breach of faith and engagements: but on the submission of the offenders, the exercise of the virtues of clemency and generosity by pardoning, and receiving him again into favor, and restoring him to his possessions—*the not suffering the intoxication of power to reduce you into a breach of faith, and the giving support to each illustrious house in proportion to its respective merits*; —— And in matters which required a long course of years to bring to perfection, the forming your conduct on mature deliberation, and the advice of the Company and Council, are the sure means of exalting your greatness and prosperity to the highest pitch.——The intention of all this is to recommend universal peace and friendship in the manner following. The almighty disposes of kingdoms, and places whomsoever he chuses on the seats of power and rule; but makes their stability to depend on their peaceable, just, and friendly conduct to others.——It is not every one who is equal to the task of government, on the plan designed by the almighty ruler, and of ensuring his stability, by a wise and just conduct.——Hind and Decan possess, at present, very few enlightened, but a great multitude of weak and ignorant men. The English Chiefs, and you in a superior degree, pos-

sels

less all the virtues above recited, who coming from distant islands by a six month's voyage on the great ocean, by their magnanimity and fortitude, gained the admiration of many Soubahs on this continent. It is easy to acquire a kingdom; but to become a King over Kings, and Chief of Chiefs, is a very difficult matter.

—The attainment of this is only to be effected by the means of friendship, by which the universe may be subjected. My conduct is framed on these principles.

—The residence of Beneram Pundit at Calcutta, was solely to effect the establishment of the most intimate friendship, and by the blessing of God it has taken such deep root that, through your means, it has reached the ears of the Company and King of England; and our connection and correspondence carried on under the veil of the vicinity of our dominions, has been discovered by the Poonah Ministers, and by the Nabob Nizum-ul-Dowla; yet, though they form various conjectures and doubts, and have sent a trusty Vakeel, and written repeated letters, to endeavour to find out the motives of our union, yet they remain a mystery; as I make the plea of our ancient ties, and the junction of our territories.

I was impatiently expecting the arrival of Mr. Elliot, who being endowed with an enlightened understanding, and invested with full powers from you to conduct the negotiations, and determine on the measures to be pursued, would have established the ties of a perpetual friendship, and have settled every matter on the firmest basis. It pleased God that he should die on the journey, and the grief I felt at his unfortunate loss, who would have been the means of settling all points between us, to our mutual content, and by his negotiation with me, giving satisfaction to the Paishwa and Nabob Nizam ul-Dowla; all which have been by his death

death thrown back many months; my grief is not to be described, and only serves to add to your affliction. I have not yet recovered the shock which the event gave me, as you will learn more fully from Beneram Pundit. There is no remedy for such misfortunes, and it is in vain to strive against the decrees of providence; had Mr. Elliot arrived, such strokes of policy would have been employed, that the Poonah Ministers would have adhered more scrupulously than before to their engagements; and the French, who are the natural enemies of the English, would have been theirs likewise, and their suspicions from apprehensions of support being given to Raganaut-Row, which never was, nor is designed by the English Chiefs, as I learn from Beneram, who had it from your own mouth, and which has caused them great uneasiness, would have been entirely removed by Mr. Elliot and my joint security.

The Nubob Nizam ul-Dowla, who wrote you repeatedly on this subject, and received for answer, that you had no idea of aiding or supporting Raganaut-Row, that your enmity was solely pointed against the French, and that whoever assisted the French were your enemies, would likewise by these means have been thoroughly satisfied, and your detachment would have reached Bombay, without meeting the smallest interruption; and had the Poonah Ministers then acted a contrary part, I should have withdrawn myself from their friendship. But by the death of Mr. Elliot, all these designs have fallen to the ground, and must be suspended 'till another opportunity, and the knowledge of your sentiments. It is a proverb, that whatever is deliberately done, is well done. In reply to what you write respecting your framing your ultimate resolutions, I have communicated to Beneram Pundit whatever I judge proper and eligible, and which may promote them in such a manner as may not be subject to any change from the vicissi-

vicissitudes of fortune; for those points which I fixed on, after minute deliberation, as the most eligible that can be adopted, I refer you to the letters of Beneram Pundit. If, notwithstanding, you have any plan to propose for the reciprocal benefit of our states, be pleased to communicate to me.

Postscript.

To your letter, respecting sending an army to overawe the French, and to reinforce the Government of Bombay, and setting forth that the Poona Ministers having broken the treaty with the English, and in opposition to the rights of friendship received an Envoy of the French King, and granted the port of Choul to that nation, thereby enabling them to form an arsenal, and collect military stores, and of their having written to their officers, to permit the French ships to enter their ports, and that it being therefore incumbent on you to take measures to counteract their designs, you had determined to send a strong detachment for the reinforcement of Bombay, by the route of Berar; and that in consideration of our ancient friendship, and the vicinity of our dominions, you requested that on its arrival in my neighbourhood, I would cause it to be instructed in the route, and providing it with provisions and necessaries, have it conducted in safety through my territories, and join a body of my forces with it, which would increase and cement our friendship; and that you have, at the assurance of Beneram, fixed on this route for its march in preference to any other.—In reply to this letter, actuated by its dictates of the sincerest friendship, I waited not to take the advice of any one, but without hesitation wrote you.—That where a sincere friendship existed, the passage of troops through my country was a matter of no moment, that

that they should proceed immediately through my country.—I likewise informed Colonel Leslie of the difficulties and dangers he would meet with in the way, from dangerous mountains, extensive rivers, &c. And also dispatched Lalla Jadda Roy, with a Chief of note, to the banks of the Narbudda, to supply the detachment with provisions, as long as they were in my territory, and to treat them with all the duties of hospitality; where he waited in expectation of their arrival for six months to no purpose. *They loitered away their time in the Bundle Cund countries, contrary to every rule of policy.*—At that time all the Poonah Ministers were separately employed in their own private affairs, or in the war with Hyder Naig, insomuch that they had no time to turn their attention to the concerns of other parts, and the march to Bombay might have been effected with the greatest ease. The time is now past. The arrow is shot, and cannot be recalled. As I have repeatedly written to the Poonah Ministers, with whom I keep up a correspondence on the subject of their encouraging a French Envoy, and breaking their faith with the English Chiefs, acts highly inconsistent with honour and policy. The answer I have received from them, I have communicated to you. The substance of what they say in their own justification is this. That the French Vakeel came for the purpose of traffic; not to negotiate; yet, for the satisfaction of the English, they gave him his dismissal. That the account of the grant of the port of Choul, and an arsenal, is entirely without foundation; and that they have not the least indisposition towards the English; that I will therefore write to Calcutta, that you may be perfectly satisfied respecting their disposition. My letters did not produce the effect or satisfying you on the subject of the Pashwa, but your doubts still remained. And, actuated by wisdom

wisdom and prudence, you determined to send Mr. Elliot to me, and wrote to me, that on his arrival at Naigpore, after he had an interview with me, and learned my sentiments and views, he would, in conjunction with me, form a plan for our mutual honour and benefit, and give directions to Cononel Leslie in consequence, who would be guided thereby.—*The event of this gentleman's deputation is too well known, and Cononel Leslie likewise, after engaging in hostilities with the Paisbwa's officers, and Zimendars of these parts, and collecting large sums of money, died.* Colonel Goddard succeeded to the command, and pursued the same line of conduct, with respect to the Talookdars as his predecessor. And arriving at Garawale and Garasur in the territory of the Afghans, whither he was obliged to march with the utmost caution, being surrounded with a Marratta army, who constantly seized every opportunity to attack him, wrote me from thence, that he should shortly reach the Narbudda, where I would be pleased to cause grain and other necessaries to be prepared, and a party of my forces to be ready to join him.—I wrote him in answer, that Lalla Jada Roy, and Shao Baal Hazail were waiting on that side the Narbudda, which is within my territories, and that the gaut where the troops should cross was two cois from hence under Hasingabad; that Janojee Boosla forded it with his army at that place, on his expedition to Malawa, and that I did not doubt it was now fordable; that he should Therefore cross his army there, and repair to Hasingabad; that Lalla Jada Roy would exert his utmost assiduity in supplying him with grain and other provisions, and treat them with every degree of hospitality; but that, as the road forward was very difficult and dangerous, and thousands of the Balha Castes, were concealed in the holes in the mountains; who though not able to oppose him openly, yet

would do it by ambuscade and stratagems, and cut off his supplies of provisions: and that, beyond that he would enter the Soubaship of Barhampore, dependant on the Paishwa; that near 4000 of Scindia's cavalry were waiting at the fort of Assur, for the arrival of the English on the banks of the Ganges; 10,000 more were under the command of Bagarut Sundiab; Scindiah himself with the chiefs in readiness at Poona, waiting to hear of the approach of the English. And moreover in Berar, in which the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowla, possesses a share with me; all the Jaghirdars were in readiness with powerful armies; and although the English possessed the greatest magnanimity in battle, yet as every step they took would be just into the mouth of danger, and all the above-mentioned chiefs would set themselves to cut off and destroy his provisions, and take every opportunity of attacking him when they saw an advantage, and of harrassing him night and day; constantly surrounding his army with their numerous forces, the junction of a body of my forces with his, would avail nothing in the face of such large armies; but would only involve me in the greatest losses. That it neither was adviseable for him to return, which would diminish the awe and respect in which he was held: That I would therefore write the particulars explicitly to Calcutta, and that whatever you should think proper to intimate to him and me in reply, it would be adviseable to abide by, and act accordingly. All which time, I would recommend that he continued at Hollingur—That I have received letters from Calcutta, filled with the warmest friendship and confidence to the following purport: "That the detachment should come into my neighbourhood, and be guided in its operations by my advice:" that it is incumbent on every Chief who enjoys the confidence of another, to give such advice as may be

be most advantageous to the party reposing trust, and
 most consistent with the faith of engagements; and
 that with such conduct the Almighty is well pleased.
 That I had also written to the Poonah Ministers my
 advice on the situation of affairs to this purport.
 " That Mr. Elliot was deputed hither to negotiate
 " with me; but dying in the journey, all the nego-
 " ciations intrusted to him were suspended: that had he
 " arrived at Naigpore, I had determined, from princi-
 " ples of attachment, to have removed from the
 " minds of the English the doubts and apprehensions
 " which had arisen, by reason of the supposed, en-
 " couragement of the French Envoy at Poonah, and
 " the agreement to support that nation, who were
 " the inveterate enemies of the English, which had
 " given rise to the quarrel between the two states, by
 " proving to them under the sanction of solemn oaths,
 " and becoming myself guarantee, that all those
 " reports were groundless, and that the Poonah Mi-
 " nisters were steady and zealous in their engagements
 " with the English; and on several accounts highly
 " obliged to them: and I would have taken, from
 " Mr. Elliot, engagements that the English had no
 " idea of affording support to Raganaut-Row, but
 " were resolved to maintain their treaty inviolate;
 " and that their apprehensions related to the French,
 " and that when I gave the English satisfaction, rela-
 " ting to the French, and become guarantee, all his
 " doubts would be removed; and that if it was re-
 " quisite a fresh engagement should be executed, to
 " which he would be a guarantee; that in brief each
 " party entertained a reasonable doubt; the English,
 " that the Poonah Ministers would join with the
 " French; and the Poonah Ministers, that the English
 " support Raganaut-Row; that when these suspicions
 " no longer remained, all causes of displeasure would
 " of course cease, and that they could have no objection

“ to a detachment of English forces sent for the reinforcement of Bombay, and to overawe the French, not for the support of Roganaut-Row, repairing thither, and to oppose them, would in such case have been highly improper.” &c. &c. &c.

Second Postscript.

Baboo-Row, the Paishwa's Vakeel, has observed to me in the course of conversation, that his master has not the slightest idea of failing in his engagements with the English, or of contracting any friendship with the French, but that the treaty forbids the march of English forces through the Paishwa's dominions; that therefore the appearance of the detachment now on its march, is an infringement of the treaty.

Third Postscript.

Although it may appear improper to repeat the same thing over again, yet the importance of the subject may plead in my excuse. On either part a doubt subsists. The Poonah Ministers suspect that the English forces on their march to Bombay, though ostensibly for the purpose of opposing the French, are in reality intended for the support of Roganaut-Row; and that the English at Bombay, who were not included in the treaty with the Paishwa, which was concluded through the Government of Bengal, with the advice of the Chief at Calcutta, are desirous of breaking with the Paishwa, and supporting Roganaut-Row, and that the detachment had been sent at their requisition. They alledge, that the Chief of Calcutta, writes to them, that he is firmly resolved to adhere to the treaty with the Paishwa, and that the detachment he has sent to Bombay is solely to awe the French, without the least

least design to assist Roganaut-Row; and that since it is forbidden in the treaty to dispatch troops over land, the march of the troops is a breach of it. That if it is necessary to send troops to Bombay, to awe the French, they ought to be sent by sea.

The English on their part suspect the Poonah Ministers of joining the French, in consequence of having received a French Vakeel. As the Paishwa formerly wrote me, that he had no idea of failing in his engagements with the English, and that he had given no encouragement to the French Vakeel, who came for the purpose of traffic, and that he had dismissed him, therefore requested that I would satisfy you in that respect. I, in consequence, formerly wrote you all these particulars. As I have a voucher in my hand from the Paishwa, that he has no connection with the French, and is steady to his engagements with the English, I am able, by this voucher, to give you complete satisfaction on this head. But I have no voucher, or intimation from you, by which I may be able to give satisfaction to him.

As he pleads a prohibition in the treaty, to the march of forces over land, and likewise complains respecting the money collected by Colonel Leslie in his territories. What answer can be made thereto?

As the time requires, that a reconciliation take place with the Poonah Ministers, you will consider and determine what reply shall be given to these two points of which they complain, and by what means they may be satisfied, and communicate your resolution to me, that I may write conformable thereto, and remove all doubts.

*Mr. Francis's minute on the letter from Moodajee Boosla,
dated 5th December, 1778.*

January 11, 1779.

I have nothing to object to the pious precepts, and excellent moral instructions contained in these letters. Whether they come seasonably or not, at a time when deep plans of policy, and decided acts of vigour might have been expected from our intended ally, instead of a general discourse upon the duties of a statesman. Or how far such a discourse may with propriety be addressed to the chief member of this government, are questions very little necessary to be considered at present. It is of no sort of moment to us now, to enquire into the moral character, or religious creed of this Marratta, though it might have been prudent in us to have been somewhat better acquainted with both, before we trusted him so far. From other parts of his letter we may collect information of a more interesting nature. If we really mean the public service, if we mean to save Colonel Goddard's army, and to provide for the security of the Company's possessions, let us not obstinately shut our eyes to the evidence before us. After examining the facts without prejudice or passion, let us draw the natural and obvious conclusions from these facts, and endeavour to act firmly and consistently upon both.

For my own part, the declarations contained in Moodajee Boosla's letter to Colonel Goddard, received on the 21st of December, appeared to me sufficiently explicit. A majority of the Board, however, still thought it necessary to wait for some further explanation.

But

But now I presume that not the shadow of a doubt can remain with any of us concerning his real sentiments and resolutions. The most material points of fact ascertained by the present letters, and by which our measures must be immediately directed, are

1st. That so late as the 5th of December, Moudajee Boosla does not appear to have had the least idea of the extent or nature of the Governor-General's views, in the proposed alliance, though we have been informed that his Vakeel, Beneram Pundit, was perfectly possessed of the project of that alliance, from several conversations which he has had with the Governor-General in Calcutta, and was authorized to communicate the same to his master.

2dly. That whatever degree of information the Rajah might possess on this subject, and admitting his ignorance of the Governor's plan to be merely affected, he appears plainly to have had no sort of disposition to catch at the objects presented to his ambition, or to run the risk of a rupture either with the Paishwa or the Nizam, much less with both at the same instant, for any offers that we can make him. On this point his declarations are clear and decided.

3dly. That so far from shewing a disposition to join us against his countrymen, he says expressly, "that the junction of a body of his forces with Colonel Goddard's would avail nothing in the face of such large armies, but would only involve himself in the greatest losses."

4thly. That it is his opinion, founded on reason, which, if he does not deceive us, are sufficiently solid, that the detachment cannot proceed towards Bombay, without

without the greatest difficulty and danger, nor return without disgrace.

5thly.—That so far from entering into an offensive alliance with us against the Poona government, he insists on the necessity of our coming to an immediate conciliation with them, and of our previously giving them satisfaction for the march of our army through their country, and for the large sums collected from their dominions, first by Colonel Leslie, and afterwards by Colonel Goddard, “who (he says) has pursued the same line of conduct, with respect to the “Talookdars, as his predecessors.”—The perusal of these voluminous letters, will suggest many other interesting reflections to our superiors. One circumstance in particular, I think deserves their notice, notwithstanding the detachment was for some months under the orders of the Presidency of Bombay, whose designs were very explicitly communicated to us, and although the commanding officer was intreated to co-operate with them in the plan they had formed for the support of Ragoba, and notwithstanding all the measures taken here, professedly originated from the communications which were received in January last, of certain overtures supposed to have been made by the Ministers for reinstating Ragoba. Moodajee Boosla now affirms, that his Vakeel *had it from Mr. Hastings's own mouth, that it never was, nor is designed by the English Chiefs to support Ragoba.*

The good advice contained in these letters is, in effect, the severest reflections on the levity and precipitancy of our councils; and probably has no other meaning, than to shew the Governor-General in what respect Moodajee Boosla holds a statesman, who professes “to have departed from the common line of policy

“ licy in the whole of his conduct.”—If we were not become the objects of his scorn, would our boasted ally take such a time as this to tell us, “ that it is a proverb, that whatever is deliberately done is well done ; “ that it will be proper maturely to *deliberate* on the “ probable event before the commencement of any undertaking, and that it is the part of wisdom and sound judgment, before any further steps are taken, to determine by what means they are to be supported, “ that no unsteadiness may hereafter arise.”

What must this Maratta think of the prudence of a government that sends an army a thousand miles forward into an enemy's country, in the presumption of receiving assistance on the spot, without any treaty previously concluded ; without a single condition agreed on ; without one stipulation formed for the operations, for the proceeding, or for the retreat of that army ; and even without knowing the general sentiments, views, or dispositions of the prince on whose future support we placed our dependance ? I do not wonder that Moodajee Boosla should feel no inclination to unite his fortune with such a government.—But let us now at least profit by his advice, as far as the circumstances we are reduced to will admit. In the natural order of things, deliberation should go before measures, with us it must follow them.

Colonel Goddard's army is now near eleven degrees west of Calcutta. We have no other way of tracing his progress, or ascertaining his distance from us, but by observing, as accurately as we can, the latitude and longitude of his position, on a general map of India. If he attempts to proceed, it must be *in the mouth of danger*. If he retreats, *it will reflect dishonour on our arms*. If he advances into Berar, it is against the advice

of the Rajah, who insists on his remaining where he is ; and who, I presume, will never suffer an English army to march into the heart of the country ; especially when he hears that another detachment is preparing to enter it from the eastward. This measure, so far from giving him encouragement to join us, must naturally fill him with jealousy and distrust. Without insisting on the faithless character uniformly attributed to the Marattas, these motives alone are sufficient to put him on his guard against us ; while others, equally powerful, may induce him to take advantage of the critical situation of our army, and to compromise his own differences with the Paishwa and the Nizam at our expence. At all events, I presume, it cannot be disputed, that the safety of the detachment depends greatly on the good faith of Moodajee Boosla. In this situation we have a choice of difficulties before us ; whatever resolution we adopt will, I fear, be liable to such objections as will admit of no better answer, than that still greater objections may be urged against any other. We may order Colonel Goddard, at all events, to proceed to Bombay ; or to move towards our western frontiers through Berar, or to return as expeditiously as he can, by the way he went. I am against the first, because I am convinced it cannot be attempted without the greatest hazard to the detachment, or with the smallest probability of success. I consider it as one common and equally essential interest of all the powers of India to oppose the march of an English army across the continent ; and, by defeating the attempt in the first instance, to deter us from ever forming such an enterprise again. Moodajee Boosla himself states the danger to us in terms which sufficiently express his opinion of the impossibility of surmounting it.

With

With respect to Bombay, notwithstanding all that has been said of the deep designs of the French, that place is actually in no danger ; if it were, this is not the way of providing for its defence. I am against the second, because it appears that the Rajah himself is very averse to letting Colonel Goddard come into his country, and insists on his staying where he is. If the army should move into Berar without his consent, and without some stipulations previously determined with him, it will be always in his power to sacrifice them to the Poonah Government, or to the Nizam, if they can make it their interest so to do. For my own part, I am very much inclined to think, that all his late delays and uncertainties are affected, for no other purpose but to give his countrymen time to complete their preparations, and to surround Colonel Goddard. No choice then is left, but to order Colonel Goddard to return as he went. I do not say, that this measure shall not lessen the opinion which the powers of India may hitherto have entertained of the councils of this government. It may also be thought in some degree disgraceful to our arms. But neither is this of weight against other superior considerations ; nor do I apprehend that if no direct impression be made upon our army, its bare retreat will prove any thing, but the extreme imprudence of those measures which have left us no other option. At the same time, I think that proper letters should be written to the Paishwa, to inform him of this alteration, to desire that the army may return without molestation, and to assure him that we are sincerely disposed to come to a conciliation with him, and to adjust whatever differences may unfortunately have arisen between his government and ours, in an amicable manner, agreeable to the terms and principles of the treaty of Poonah.

The time which has elapsed since the receipt of Moodajee Boosla's letters, and the critical situation of the detachment, make it indispensibly necessary that some clear and decisive orders be immediately dispatched to Colonel Goddard. I shall be ready to correct and alter my opinion, if I see just and solid reasons urged against it.

P. Francis.

Governor General. I have seen Mr. Francis's minute, and do not think it necessary or proper to apply to it.

W. Hastings.

Intelligence from Poona, contained in a Letter from Row Gee, dated 18th of January, 1779, to the Nabob of Arcot.

1. I have addressed your Highness several letters of late, some of which I hope are arrived. I have accounts of others having been intercepted in the road, and shall therefore recapitulate some of the most important transactions here.

2. The English Sardars, as I have already wrote to your Highness, marched from Bombay to the passes, and fortified that of Kodtichully. Raganaut-Row took possession of two forts which were in the road, and joined the English army, which I hear consisted of 700 Europeans, 8 batalions of Seapoys, 40 pieces of cannon, mortars, and a quantity of powder and military stores; they had besides 4 lacks of rupees in money.

3. Siccaram Pundit, and Nana Furnese, two Maitra Sardars, joined their forces, and satisfied the discontented

contented chiefs Schindiah and Holkar, by giving them money, jaghires, and other presents.

4. All the chiefs having met to consult what was to be done in the present state of affairs, they all with one voice agreed, that if Roganaut-Row came with his own forces alone, they should receive him, and give him a share of the power as formerly; but since he came with an army of English, who were of a different nation from them, and whose conduct in Sujah Dowla's country, the Rohilla country, Bengal, and the Carnatic, they were well acquainted with; they unanimously determined not to receive Roganaut-Row; as otherwise, in the end, they would be obliged to forsake their religion, and become the slaves of Europeans. Upon this they exchanged oaths; and Nehum-Row, Apagee Pundit, and Scindiah, were sent with an army of 15,000 horse, besides foot, to the Gaut of Telicanoon, and were followed immediately after by Siccaram Pundit and Nana Furneze, with 40,000 horse.

5. It has been for some time the fixed determination of the English Surdars to give their assistance to Roganaut-Row, in replacing him at the head of the government; an army was sent from Calcutta, who made an alliance with Boosla, (Rajah of Berar) and they were greatly encouraged by the news of the surrender of Pondicherry.

6. Mr. Mostyn, who went from Poonah, made them believe, that many of the Marratta Surdars were in their interest, and that as soon as their army should arrive at the Gaut, Holkar would join them with all his forces.

7. The English, trusting to this, marched their army to the Gaut, and waited impatiently for a whole month, but no one appeared to join their standard. The English army marched forward from the Gaut, and were so much harrassed by the Marattas as not to be able to proceed more than two coss a day, during which time they lost a great many of their men by the fire kept upon them by the Marattas. When they came to Chockly, which is about 14 coss from the pass, they were obliged to halt; Captain Stewart, one of their Surdars, was killed at this place.

8. On the 21st January the European army arrived at Tulicanoon (17 coss from the pass); Mr. Carnac, Second of Bombay, was with them. Siccaram sent a body of horse to Tulicanoon, to harrass them; 25 Europeans, amongst whom was an officer, and 100 sepoy, were killed on the first day; the Marattas had 200 men killed.

9. On the 2d day, the English were surrounded on all sides by the Marattas, and all supplies of provisions cut off from them. Seeing themselves in this situation, they determined, if possible, to return back by the Gaut, and consulted upon the means to effect it. Roganaut-Row hearing this, sent privately to the Marattas Chief, Sindiah, telling him, that if he would attack the English, he would join them with his two battalions of Sepoys, and 600 horse. The English, it would appear, had intelligence of this; for, on the 13th January, they suddenly marched secretly from Tulicanoon, taking Roganaut-Row with them, and leaving their baggage and tents standing, under the protection of 200 Europeans, and one battalion of Sepoys, with eight pieces of cannon, to make the Marattas believe that their whole force was at Tulicandoon.—Siccaram, however,

however, got private intelligence of their march; and he, with Nana Furneze, Sindiah, and Holkar, went to cut off their march. At the same he sent a body of horse to Tulicaneon, where the rest of the English were encamped. The Marattas, as usual, fell upon the plunder, and a smart engagement ensued between them and the English. The detachment, who had marched with Roganaut-Row, had not proceeded far, returned to the assistance of those in their camp. A heavy cannonade was kept up by the Marattas from midnight till four o'clock the next day; the English were not able to march one foot of way, and all their firing took no effect; 150 Europeans, with many of their officers, and 800 Sepoys were killed. The Marattas surrounded them, and kept patrols going all night, to prevent any from escaping. On the 14th, the Marattas commenced their cannonading again, 50 Europeans, and 400 Sepoys were killed. The English ceased firing, seeing that it had no effect. In the evening of that day, the servant of Roganaut-Row, and that of Mr. Carnac, brought a letter to Madah Row, acquainting him that they would send a trusty person to confer with him upon some matters, if leave was given. The Sardars read the letter, and sent an answer by the same person, that they were willing to cease hostilities, until a person was sent. They, however, took care to keep a strict patrol round the English camp all night. On the 15th the Marattas Sardars went to the trenches, and began firing again; but it was not answered from the English camp: soon after, Mr. Farmer (a gentleman who was some time ago at your Highness's court) came from the English camp, and the fire of the Marattas immediately ceased. The Marattas sent for him into the presence, and Mr. Farmer said to them, "We are only merchants.—When disputes prevailed with you, Raganaut-Row came to

“ us, and demanded our protection. We thought he
 “ had a right to the government, and gave him our
 “ assistance. Nothing but ill fortune attends him, and
 “ we have been brought to this miserable state, by
 “ keeping him with us. You are masters to keep him
 “ from us. We shall henceforth adhere to the treaties
 “ that have formerly taken place between us. Be
 “ pleased to forgive what had happened.”

The Minister answered. “ Raganaut-Row is one of
 “ us. What right could you have to interfere in our
 “ concerns with him; We now desire you to give up
 “ Salsette and Bassin, and what other countries you
 “ have possessed yourselves of; as also the Circars, those
 “ of the Purgunnahs of Baroch, &c. which you have
 “ taken in Guzzart. Adhere to the treaty made in
 “ the time of Bajalee Row, and ask nothing else.”——
 Mr. Farmer heard this answer, and returned to his
 camp. While this negociation was carrying on, 15,000
 Maratta horse were sent against some out-posts where
 the English had entrenched themselves, and set fire to
 them, putting every one they met with to death. They
 did the same at the fort of Choul, where the English
 had fortified, I heard all this from Nana Furnize;
 whether it be true or false, I am not certain.

On the 6th at noon, Mr. Farmer returned, and told
 Schindiah that he had brought a blank paper, signed
 and sealed, which the Maratta Chiefs might fill up as
 they pleased. Schindiah told the Ministers, that although
 they had it in their power to make any demands they
 pleased, it would not be advisable to do it at this time.
 “ For our making large demands, would only sow re-
 “ sentment in their hearts, and we had better demand
 only what is necessary. Let Roganaut-Row be with
 “ us, and the treaty between us and the English will
 “ be

" be adhered to. Let Salsette and the Purgunnah in
 " Guzzarats, &c. be given back to us. Let the Ben-
 " gal army return back. For the rest let us act with
 " them, as it is stipulated in the treaty with Balagoe
 " Row ; let the jewels mortgaged by Roganaut-Row be
 " restored, and nothing demanded for them. Let all
 " these articles be wrote out on the paper which they
 " have sent." Which was accordingly done.

" It is likewise conditioned, that till this treaty is re-
 " turned, signed and sealed by the Governor of the Coun-
 " cil, and select Committee, under the Company's
 " seal, and till Salsette and the other countries be
 " given up, the nephew of Captain Stewart and
 " Mr. Farmer shall remain in the Maratta camp as host-
 " ages for the due performance of the articles of this
 " treaty. The English soldiers who have escaped with
 " their lives, fasted for three days, and are now in a mi-
 " serable condition. The Europeans and Sepoys have
 " all grounded their arms.—On the 17th the treaty was
 " sent to the Maratta camp. The articles were written in
 " Persian, Maratta, and English, sealed with the Com-
 " pany's seal, and signed by Mr. Carnac and seven offi-
 " cers. After this the Maratta Sardars sent them victu-
 " als, which they needed much. The English marched
 " out, escorted by 2000 Maratta horse ; but Roganaut-
 " Row, not finding a lucky hour, did not go to the
 " Maratta camp, but will go after 12 o'clock to-mor-
 " row, &c."

Copy of a Letter from SICCARAM PUNDIT, Prime-Minister of the Poona Government, to Governor-General HASTINGS.—Received in Bengal the 7th of December, 1778.

At the time when some of the Company's Chiefs were engaged in disputes and hostilities with the Chiefs of this government, actuated by a wish to promote the good and happiness of mankind in general, which suffered by those troubles, you interposed your friendly mediation, to remove the causes of complaint, and to put a stop to them; and deputed Colonel Upton for this purpose, to the presence of my master Scrimasut Row, Row Pundit Pinkhami, Pishaw Saib.

At the time of the ratification of peace, I objected to there being no person of rank and credit present on the part of the governor of Bombay, to which the Colonel made answer, "That the Governor and Supreme Council of Calcutta were invested with authority over all settlements of the English Company, and that their acts were binding on the Chiefs of all the English settlements." On the faith of this declaration, I made peace between this Government and the Company's Chiefs, and concluded a treaty; but the Governor of Bombay, has in every instance of his conduct since, excited troubles and commotions, in violation of the ties of friendship; and notwithstanding your express orders to expel Roganaut-Row from the Company's dominions, and to settle all points between the two states, in conformity to the treaty, he has performed nothing thereof. And an envoy from the King of France arrived here with a letter, interested persons, and inventors of

of falsehoods, conceiving this a lucky opportunity to obtain credit to their lying reports, without examination or reflection, represented it in the manner best calculated to answer their malicious purposes.

I call God to witness, that out of regard to the friendship and alliance of the Company and the English chiefs, I dismissed the said Envoy, without negotiating, or even conversing with him. I have lately heard that some of your people have hostilely possessed themselves of the fort of Calpee, which belongs to this government. This measure is widely removed from the faith of the solemn treaty executed by the English.

When the governor of Bombay, in former times, put on the mask of friendship for the purposes of deceit, and aided the enemies of this government; regarding you, Sir, as superior to all other Chiefs, I made peace and friendship with you; and these are the fruits produced by this friendship.

You write that the maintaining of friendship and strict union between our respective states, is your wish. Is it in effect for the preservation of friendship that you trouble the decisions of this government? Such a mode of conduct is inconsistent with the maxims and measures of high and illustrious Chiefs. It is mutually incumbent on us to preserve inviolate the terms of the treaty. Should any deviation arise therein, they are effects of the will and dispensation of God.

A. No. VI.

From the same. — Received in Calcutta, the 24th
December, 1778.

I have been favoured with your letter under date the 2d Trematoy Alliance (17th July) on the subject of the preservation and increase of the friendship between the two states, and intimating that it is your first resolve to maintain every article of the treaty, so long as it is adhered to by the Pahlwa; that the troops have been sent solely for the reinforcement of the settlement of Bombay; and that the commanding officer had strict injunctions to observe such a conduct in every respect, as is consistent with the friendship subsisting; that the several letters you have lately received from this quarter, meaning from me, contain a declaration to maintain the treaty of friendship between us; yet that my having hitherto evaded to grant passes for the march of the troops through the government dominions, causes you great afflictment. That if I still refuse to comply therewith, you are remediless, and the blame will fall on me. This letter, containing the above, and other particulars, which I shall notice before I conclude, reached me on the 4th of Shabann (26 August) and afforded me great pleasure.

“It is universally allowed, that there is nothing in the world more excellent than friendship and harmony, which are blessings to mankind in general. The maintenance of every article of the treaty, is equally incumbent on both parties. — It is so stipulated in any article of the treaty, that either party may send forces through dominions of the other, without putting him beforehand, and cause trouble and distress.

to the people.——To what rule of friendship can be attributed the stationing of garrisons in the forts, and taking collections in the country of the other party.——*What has happened, it then accrues to English faith.* In proof of this assertion, he is answered, that Colonel Leslie, the Commanding Officer of the Dutch garrison, has kept within him Ragomah's tax, and, in conjunction with him, collects money from the dominions of the government, by intimidating its subjects.——This being the case, what becomes of your assurances before received, that the treaty should be scrupulously adhered to, on your parts, so long as it was maintained by my master? or what degree of credit can be given thereto?

“From time immemorial, no forces of the maritime European nations, have marched by land through the dominions of the government: but the routes of all the trading and European nations has been by the ocean! Nor is it contained in the treaty, that the English detachments shall have a passage through the government territories. Respect, mutually on this point, then determine, on whose side the blame rest.——The first suggested pretext should proceed from you, in a matter of the highest importance, to think that might and power should be allowed to act in direct opposition to the faith of a sworn engagement.——You are pleased to write, that if the Presidency of Bombay, shall still continue to require the troops, you can in no degree retract them.——The matter is finally decided by the King of England, and the English Government have placed confidence in the Supreme Council of the island, invested it with authority to make the necessary statements. The acts of the Government of Calcutta are binding on the government, and the Company's settlements. Having given this

his assurance, he proposed the form of a treaty, such as the critical situation of the times rendered necessary. — You transmitted a treaty conformably thereto, under the seal of the English Company. — It was from the beginning the earnest wish of the government of England, that a friendly connection should be established between the two States, and here even, they were striving to overtake it. And notwithstanding the conclusion of the treaty, they kept Ragoba with them. How then, was it to be expected, that they should recall their troops, which were disturbing the peace of the government dominions? It even appears, to a conviction, that they persuaded Ragoba to the measures he has pursued. How then does the supreme authority of the Council of Calcutta from the King of England appear, since the Chiefs of the different settlements, do not regard engagements made by you, as binding on them, but make no scruple to break them, and thus, the treaty is rendered of no avail. — You have even acted, in your measures, in direct violation of the provisions of the treaty. — You have even sent something to Ragoba, which was not permitted by the treaty.

It is the duty of the British Government, to see that the treaty is not violated, and that the peace of the country is not disturbed. — You have even sent something to Ragoba, which was not permitted by the treaty. — You have even sent something to Ragoba, which was not permitted by the treaty.

It is the duty of the British Government, to see that the treaty is not violated, and that the peace of the country is not disturbed. — You have even sent something to Ragoba, which was not permitted by the treaty. — You have even sent something to Ragoba, which was not permitted by the treaty.

The pacific disposition of the Maratta Court, and their refusal to treat effectually with St. Lubin, will appear from the following passage in a letter from the Governor's friend, the Rajah of Berar.

A. No. VII.

I formerly intimated in my letters to Calcutta, the purport of what the Poonah Ministers wrote to me, That they neither had, nor would have, any friendship or connection with the French nation; and that the French agent came to Poonah, solely for the purposes of trade; and that out of friendship to the English they had sent him away, that I should therefore write to the Nabob Amand-ul-Dowla, (meaning the Governor General) to be perfectly satisfied with respect to them, they being steady to their engagements.

The Out Lines of the Rohilla War.

THE extensive rich provinces called Rohil-cund, inhabited by a nation distinguished under the appellation of the Rohilla's, is placed, for the most part in that beautiful and fertile site which extends between the two great rivers, Ganges and Jumna, from the boundary of Corah to the confines of Agra and Delhi; it occupies a large district of country on the North side of the Ganges, reaching Eastward to the provinces of Oude, and to uninhabited mountains Northward, and it crosses the Jumna between Agra and Delhi. The revenues, without oppression, exceeded two Crores of Rupees annually, (two millions English) and their military establishment of cavalry and infantry, were about eighty thousand; a brave warlike race. The body of the people were composed of Hindoos, of a stature, complexion, constitution, and disposition, infinitely superior to those of the lower countries; but the sale of war procured to a set of martial Patan Muhomedans, an absolute dominion under the denomination of Chiefs or Rajahs. As they were numerous, single chiefships were not powerful, but united as branches sprouting from the same stock, and in a common cause, they were always deemed formidable.

These people lived on good terms with, and bore loyal attachment to the Emperor of Hindostan. The proximity of their Southern provinces, exposed them often to the ravages and depredatory incursions of the Marattas.

Marattas. To these depredations, may all their misfortunes be ascribed, which furnished a pretext to the aspiring ambition and restless impetuosity of Sujah-ul Dowla, the Vizier of the Empire, and Nabob of Oude, to usurp the dominion of a country, whose wealth, power, and vicinity would serve him as ascending steps to mount the Imperial Throne of Delhi. He artfully insinuated to the Rohilla Chiefs, that he was desirous to enter into an alliance with them, and to assist against the Marattas, as a common enemy; but as they were to reap the chief benefit, it was proper that a subsidy should be paid for the services which his troops were to perform on remote expeditions. He had, previous to this measure, caused Mahomed Kouli Khan, the Nabob of Iliabad and Corah, to be basely assassinated when at his religious devotion, and then he usurped the dominion of his country, and thus brought his own provinces close home to those Rohilla provinces, which were the fields of plunder and rapine to the flying Maratta parties.

The Rohilla Chiefs, although they knew and suspected his general character, doubted not his sincerity on an occasion, which evidently accommodated himself, and they consented to pay Sujah-ul-Dowla forty Lacks of Rupees, if he would lend a powerful army immediately to join their forces, in repelling and driving the Marattas marauders out of their country. The Marattas availing themselves of the Vizier's slow movements, and in the security which the promised successes from the Vizier had created in the Rohilla Chiefs, even to a relaxation of the necessary precaution, renewed their incursions and depredations with redoubled fury and alacrity, and with so much success, so that the Company's troops under the command of Sir Robert Barker,

on

on the part of the Vizier, only entered the Rohilla country, for its defence, after all the mischief had been irretrievably perpetrated. The Rohilla Chiefs were, by that means, so reduced in their finances, that besides mildly stating the non-performance of contract by Sujah-ul-Dowla, they were obliged by necessity to desire a respite in the complete payment of what he would be found to have any equitable claim to, by periodical installments, and proposed to make the presidency of Fort William the sole judges thereof; as all overtures were refused, they at length yielded to the measure of paying the whole original specific sum, upon condition of accommodating them with such reasonable terms, suited to the reduced state in which the late Maratta incursions, and the Nabob's own dilatory observance of the treaty, had left their countries.

This was the indentical object of the Vizier's policy; and it is not inconsistent with his ambition, treachery, and brutality, to suspect and believe, that he had his emissaries amongst the Marrattas, to stimulate and excite them to commit the late depredation, upon a promise from him, that his armies, notwithstanding the treaty he had concluded with the Rohilla Chiefs, should not obstruct their operations, until the year following, imagining, as it happened, that the pleas of necessity and equity, on the part of the Rohilla Chiefs, would furnish him with pleas for instant hostility and extermination.

Matters were in this state of suspense, when Mr. Hastings and his Council, resolved on a Committee of Circuit to settle the revenues, adjust the administration of the Dewannee, and liquidate other commercial and revenue concerns in the provinces of Bengal and Bahar,

har, and with Sujah-ul-Dowla, about the middle of the year 1773. A rupture, artfully contrived, separated the Members of Circuit on the day of their departure from Calcutta, and it fell to the pre-concerted lot of Mr. Hastings *solo*, to tune the instrument, correct the musical measures, and harmonize the discordant faculties of the Vizier Sujah-ul-Dowla; The Governor repaired to Benaras, the field of action, charged with discretionary powers in relation to matters of trade, and adjustment of the subsidy. There were several Members of Council, Sir Robert Barker the Commander in Chief of the army, and several senior servants of the Company, either by appointment, or in suite, at that time, in Benaras. But secret deeds dislike the light; and upon the principles of the negotiation between the Governor and the Vizier, it would have been impolitic and dangerous in the extreme, to have had assistants or witnesses. Sir Robert Barker, resented the indignity offered to his military and civil stations in the Company's service, and as a man of probity, who set a proper value on the faith and honor of his nation, reprobated the treaty, as unjust, and dishonourable, which appears upon the public minutes of Council after their return to Calcutta. The presence and names of these gentlemen were only made use of, to witness the execution, and interchangeable delivery of the *public* articles of the treaty, upon the 18th September 1773. There were others of a much more intricate nature, not proper to be promulgated, reserved for the influence which the Governor's return, and improved condition, to the presidency, could only bring to bear by his *real* presence in Council, the act of Council being found indispensable to give it efficacy.

By this *public* treaty, the Vizier was to be invested, (and immediately to possess, as an estate in perpetuity,) with the Emperor's rights to the provinces of Illiabad and Corah, which had been solemnly secured to him by several sacred treaties in 1765, and ratified by the Company openly, and impliedly by the nation; for this bold concession, he was to give the Company forty lacks of Rupees, as a consideration for a perpetual revenue of 45 lacks, under a wise administration; and the tribute of 26 Lacks to the Emperor, from the Nabobship of Bengal, was, by these two Contractors, declared to have been forfeited from the 28th February 1772, except two sums which the Vizier, and Nudji^m Cawn (a colleague on this occasion) pretended to claim as a private debt from the King to them, both amounting to £. 92,800 sterling.

The first part of the *secret* treaty which transpired, confusedly, cautiously, and by piece-meal, several months thereafter, contained the barbarous and shocking tragedy, which a British Commander in Chief, and an army officered by British subjects, and paid by the British East India Company, were made to act, in massacring and exterminating a whole nation, distinguished in Hindostan for many superior qualifications, and putting Sujah-ul-Dowla in the full possession of their country, he paying the Company for the inhuman use of these mercenaries, the paltry pittance, (in proportion to the annual revenue, and of the plunder) of 50 lacks of Rupees, (as a balsam to their wounded consciencies) by four annual installments.

It is not very consistent, with human ideas to conceive far less to believe implicitly, that Mr. Hastings
 ot. 1784
 should have formed so firm and insuperable an attachment,

ment, or personal friendship for a prince whose character was universally obnoxious, a perfect stranger to him, and who had received into his bosom (joined with them as the Company's enemies) those persons who, not long before, had inhumanly and perfidiously butchered in cold blood, his own colleagues and most intimate friends and companions, the members of the Council of Parna, and others; his secret motives or gratifications are subjects of suspicion, but they are obscured beyond the reach of legal proof. Every virtue that can dignify humanity, were the wanton offerings to gratify the ambition and sanguinary thirst of the most savage of his species. § He engaged deliberately in an unnatural, unprovoked,

§ That Sujah-ul-Dowla should have protected and befriended Cossim Alli Cawn and Sombro, the murderers of Messrs. Hay, Ellis, Chambers, &c. will not be a matter of surprize, after the simple relation of the two following anecdotes, out of a hundred more.—Captain H——r, who was in the Company's service, and also in the Vizier's, had a boat with some merchandize, stopped by the Revenue Officers, for want of the proper permit. Without suspecting any tragical consequence, he mentioned it to the Vizier.—He was awaked at middle-night, and the head of the Phouzdar, (chief Magistrate) of the district, presented to him in a basket. A circumstance which shocked Captain H——r to that degree, that he scarce recovered his spirits when in India.

Colonel G——d, hunting one day in Rohileund, some villagers whose hogs were killed by the dogs, threw a stick at one of the dogs.—The Colonel came to Sir R. B——r's tent, where the Vizier was at breakfast, and accidentally mentioned the trifling circumstance. The Vizier whispered to one of his attendants, and before the breakfast was over, the attendant returned and informed the Vizier, that the village was destroyed, and man, woman, and child, put to the sword.

provoked, cruel war, to destroy an unoffending, industrious people, to whom the same mercenary arms had yielded succour, and friendly relief the preceding year. He sacrificed the sacred inherent rights of the Emperor, to raise the Emperor's own servant and subject, by an act of open rebellion and high treason. He violated the solemn treaties, upon which all the claims to trade, and the territorial revenues, accorded to the Company and nation, are founded and established, to the same unwarrantable purposes. He withdrew the tribute, which constituted the sole legal and political consideration for the Company's pretensions to the Dewannee, and the rights of the British nation, without consulting with his constituent, or his council, and against a ratified treaty, and ceded the Emperor's own provinces of Illiabad and Corah, to the Emperor's own minister, a mere temporary officer, removeable at his pleasure.—He, even, with an assurance and indecency, scarce to be equalled, avows, that the unauthorized treaty of Benares, and the secret conditions, which were only known to the two negotiators, and not even committed to paper, were, to all intents and purposes, binding and obligatory on the Company; and in particular, he asserted, that the general tenor of the treaty, implied a positive obligation on the Company, to secure the Musnad to Sujah-ul-Dowla *and his posterity*, in the undisturbed possession of the Nabobship of Oude, together with the countries usurped by the sacrilegious murder of Mahomed Kouli Khan, and the treaty of Benaras; although in the same breath he acknowledges, that at the time of making the concessions, he had declared to the Vizier, *That he was acting and consenting to measures against the peremptory orders of his superiors.*—All these are conceptions and concessions, of so extravagant and preposterous a nature,

ture; so foreign to the utmost extension of the Company's power, and so shameful and inglorious to the British nation, that the iniquitous and inhuman purposes expressed in them, are sufficient, in the eye of reason, as well as law, to declare the whole null and void from the beginning; and that nothing less, than the vilest prostitution of trust could have produced such a treaty, or dared to avow so absurd and impudent a construction upon it.

Mr. Hastings contrived, to bring the majority of his Council, to approve the *public* treaty; and his subsequent equivocations and sophistry in Council, concerning the *joint* conditions stipulated between the Vizier and himself, in relation to the conquest of the Rohilla provinces, demonstrated beyond a doubt, that he thought them of a texture and complexion, not proper for public discussion.——This allegation, as well as private considerations for the sacrifices in question, are pretty distinctly implied in the appointment of a Resident at the Vizier's Court, where none had before been deemed necessary, upon his own special motion, claiming, authoritatively, an independent right to appoint and recall the proposed Resident, of his own free will and mere motion; that such Resident shall be considered as his (the Governor's) *private agent* and correspond *only with him*.——Mr. Hastings's minutes and report upon the occasion, are to the following purpose, and nearly literal. "*That it was my intention to convince the Vizier, that in his concerns, with the Company, the immediate dependence was upon the Governor alone, and to establish a direct correspondence, between him and myself, without any intervention.*"——Could Mr. Hastings have adopted a surer maxim or language, or asserted a stronger line of influence

fluence, to obtain an Asiatic recompence? He then proposed, "To appoint a person for trans-
 "acting such matters of correspondence and com-
 "munication with the Vizier, as he, (the Governor)
 "shall think proper to entrust to his management;
 "and he offers it, *frankly*, as his opinion, that if the
 "Board shall entrust him with the sole nomination of such
 "a Resident, and the power of recalling him whenever he
 "pleases, it may be attended with good effects, but not other-
 "wise."—What construction can be put on such decla-
 rations, recorded on the Companys' own proceedings,
 but that the result of the visit to Sujah-ul-Dowla, had
 placed the author, beyond the reach and power of his
 employers?—The confidential instructions to the Resi-
 dent, and the correspondence with him and Colonel Cham-
 pion, corroborate these surmises in pretty direct terms.
 By the instructions to Mr. Middleton, the Resident, he
 expressly "forbids any European, whether English or
 "not, civil or military, in or out of the Companys'
 "service, on any pretext, to visit the Vizier, or the Ra-
 "jah Cheyt Sing, but particularly the Vizier; not even
 "the European Officers in the Vizier's own service, ex-
 "cept the Commander in Chief."—As Mr. Hast-
 ings obtained for the Rajah Cheyt-Sing, the Zemindary
 of the Provinces of Benaras Ghazipore, &c. and to his
posterity, for 22½ lacks of Rupees yearly rent, it may be
 supposed, that the son and heir of the rich Rajah Bul-
 want Sing, was also very liberal to his friend and
 benefactor; and therefore the prohibition to Eu-
 ropean visitors, was a necessary measure of pru-
 dent policy.—Mr. Hastings having written a
 private letter to Sujah-ul-Dowla, without any commu-
 nication, as usual, through the Resident; the jealousy,
 or the fears of Mr. Middleton were roused, and he col-
 lected resolution enough to complain with some bit-
 terness

terness of the slight and diffidence which it implied, in a letter to Mr. Hastings, dated the 4th June, 1774, wherein he says, "that having expressed his uneasiness to the Vizier, he was told by him, *that it was only a private complimentary letter.*"—And Colonel Champion, in a *private* letter to the Governor, before their quarrel, dated 30th May, 1774, uses these very suspicious and deep-meaning expressions.

" Dear Sir,

" In consequence of what passed between us at parting, I have mentioned Colonel Upton's claim to the Nabob, and requested he would be kind enough to discharge it. *His Excellency was very concise in his reply, that he had settled all money matters with Mr. Hastings.*"

What can be inferred from this, but that Mr. Hastings, had undertook to shut up all private claims and applications. And the reiterated strenuous endeavours, of Mr. Hastings, by uncommon application, and indirect insinuations, to prevail on Colonel Champion to dismiss from his service as Banyan, the very faithful and intelligent Collychurn, while upon the expedition, betrays a dread of his discovering, in the course of business, and negotiations with the army, and at Lucknow, the secret springs which led to the treaty of Benaras. A Mr. Hall, whose address and management had procured him a general intercourse with the natives of condition, in and about the Vizier's court, and metropolis, having come down to Calcutta, somewhat involved, and finding no method to get extricated, bethought him of communicating the outlines of certain pieces of private knowledge, to a confidential friend of Mr. H ; declaring that in
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his present distress, if he was not relieved, he must be under the necessity of laying his mind open to General Clavering: It had the intended effect, his debts were forthwith paid. But Mr. Hall *wisely* said, that he must have future subsistence, and more money for immediate use;—he received an order on Cossimbazar for present supply, and an appointment at Futtigur, upon express condition of going instantly, and remaining there, to execute it in person.

Colonel Champion was appointed to the command of the Company's troops, on an expedition, near 1500 miles by water conveyance up the country, against the Rohilla's, with peremptory orders to be directed in all his motions and actions by the Vizier, Sujah-ul-Dowla, whose commands he was implicitly to obey on all occasions. The Colonel put himself accordingly, at the head of the army, and took the field, under the absolute command of a prince, whose object was savage barbarism and inhumanity, and who wanted manly courage to hazard, either his own person, his army, or even his artillery in action, to secure the success of what he was so solicitously ambitious to obtain.—— The fatal battle was fought, upon the 23d day of April, 1774, which iniquitously decided the melancholy fate of the brave, industrious, populous, and inoffensive Rohilla nation; at a time that Sujah-ul-Dowla, withdrew, with his army, artillery, and baggage, to a distance of several miles from the field of action:—Nay, he positively refused to the application of Colonel Champion, a part of his cavalry in order to attack the enemy at a certain quarter, to which the numbers of the Company's troops could not extend without imminent danger to the whole; and he also pointedly refused to spare a few pieces of his artillery, to serve in another

another very necessary quarter. These refusals, created uneasy suspicions in Colonel Champion's mind, of foul treachery on the part of the Vizier, in case the success of the day favoured the Rohillas, which would place the vanquished army between a victorious enemy, and a treacherous friend. Such an idea might not be wanted to enimate the British General, but it might have pushed him to a determined resolution, to conquer, or fall.—The Company's brave General and their troops, unassisted, gained a decisive, but in truth a disgraceful, victory. Their artillery were so judiciously stationed and pointed, that to the immortal honor of the brave Rohillas, it was asserted, they left 4000 men lying dead upon the field, before they retreated.

The surviving Chiefs, surrendered at discretion to the victorious army, and were delivered into the hands of Sujah-ul-Dowla, except Fyzulla Cawn, who fled to the mountainous part of his country, by which means he was able to stipulate conditions, yielding up his camp and towns as plunder to the Vizier, but he could not, notwithstanding, obtain such other terms, as were consistent with either policy or humanity.—The other Chiefs were forced, together with their families, to submit to the most disgraceful imprisonment, and the most mortifying and humiliating treatment; their Zenanas, which are sacred sanctuaries in India, even against the violences and outrages of savages, were plundered, and the wives, daughters, and sisters of princes were violated and abused. Children under puberty were sacrificed to the lust of an old distempered debauchee. Some shocking circumstances have been alledged.—The plunder received into the possession of the Vizier, has been estimated at a crore and a half of Rupees, or 1,500,000/. sterling; and yet to this hour, or the be-

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gimling of the current year 1786, 20 lacks 60,608 Rupees, part of the subsidy due for this conquest, --- yet owing to the Company, besides ten Lacks promised as a donation to the army, in lieu of the plunder, which he had treasured to his own use.

It is conjectured, that about 500 thousand industrious husbandmen and artists, who were also, for the most part, able warriors, together with their families, were deliberately driven, openly, over the Jumna, to receive an asylum from their late enemies and plunderers, the Marrattas.---Fyzulla Cawn was obliged to condition, that he should not entertain more than 5000 persons under his dominion.---The latter end of 1777, under the vague pretence that Fyzulla's country was flourishing, and becoming more populous than was stipulated by treaty, Mr. Middleton, as the Company's Resident at Lucknow, in concert with his friends and protectors at the presidency, without any notification to the Supreme Board, or asking their consent, undertook to delegate Mr. Daniel Barwell, as an ambassador to the quiet, timid, Fyzulla Cawn, who, wrapt up in his garment of innocence, suspected nothing less than a charge of violating the compact, or the presence of an European ambassador, to adjust the imaginary violation. It is said, that although the allegation appeared to have been without foundation, the minister found the means of procuring, by way of escort back to Lucknow, several Elephants and Camels, loaded with eight to ten Lacks of Rupees in specie. The minute of Mr. Francis, upon the occasion of the Governor General's motion, to approve the proceedings, as expedient, on the 9th March 1778, is worthy of the space it occupies upon record.

He, (Mr. Francis,) calls it, " One of the grossest
 " pieces of management he met with in India. Mr.
 " Daniel Barwell quits his station at Benaras without
 " leave, and goes to Lucknow without leave; Mr. Mid-
 " dleton instantly discovers, that Fyzulla Cawn is car-
 " rying on some design prejudicial to the interest of the
 " Nabob, and that the Nabob gives cause for such de-
 " signs, by his treatment of his subjects; at the same
 " time, that nothing is more notorious, than that the Na-
 " bob, has no more power in his own country, than he
 " (Mr. Francis) has. To put a stop to these effects,
 " which mutual jealousies must produce, a treaty must
 " be made, the guarantee of the Company must be
 " given, and Mr. Daniel Barwell finds himself very op-
 " portunately, at Lucknow, ready to execute the com-
 " mission."

The Rohilla Provinces are now a barren waste, and almost totally deserted by their remaining inhabitants. The Chiefs, or their children, are continued in the most miserable state of confinement, deprived of the common necessaries of life. As the proceedings of the Supreme Council in Calcutta, in 1775 and 1776, are printed, many of the particulars will appear in them, and in the letters of Colonel Champion, and other papers having relation to that barbarous measure. The remarker, having only his memory to recur to, is less perfect in the detail than he would wish to be, because the annals of that history require public investigation, by the nation whose arms stained its fame and glory with indelible impressions, which cry aloud for justice, reparation, and exemplary punishment.

Narrative

Narrative of Proceedings in the Ordnance Department, and in the Office of Military Store-keeper.

AN accurate enquiry into the application of military stores, will bring peculations of magnitude into public view, either committed by direct authority, or under a collusion of high authority, which is the more dangerous in its consequences, by being less suspected. Military stores comprehend so large a portion of the Company's capital, that the Directors have long laboured to develop from the cloud of intricacies which obscured from their knowledge, the real value, as well as the regular expenditure and application thereof. To this judicious end, they pointedly instructed and enjoined their presidencies in India, and particularly in their several general letters to Bengal, under dates, 17th June, 1748, paragraphs 8 to 17 inclusive, 7th April, 1773, paragraph 4 and 5, and 7th January, 1774, paragraph 9. By these letters, the Company solemnly created the ostensible department of *military Store keeper*, on the abolition of, and to supercede the office of *gunner and gun-room crew*: the office to be executed by a *covenanted servant*,* who was to receive from the gunner, *and to retain in future in his actual possession and charge, and under his special care* (standing accountable out of his own private estate for all deficiencies) *all the ordnance, carriages, arms, powder, shot, shells, tools, instruments, stores, and habiliments* of

* The limitation to a *covenanted servant* was clearly meant to preclude military officers from that trust.

of war whatsoever; to have charge of the gun-room, and different magazines, and places where military stores were, or should be deposited; with a special and peremptory injunction as to the mode of keeping the several books and accounts of his office, as well with respect to the receipts, and issues of all stores, having relation in any degree, to the service of war; whether at the presidency, or subordinate settlements, or on ship-board, transmitting copies annually, with explanatory observations, to the Court of Directors; and requiring obedience from him to the commands of the Governor and Council, who, only, should have authority to order the receipt and delivery of stores, after the *quality*† had been certified by the Major and next officer of artillery. Ordaining also, as a branch of the Store-keeper's duty, that he take care to prevent the stores receiving *avoidable* damage, and to keep them from time to time in repair; that stores appropriated occasionally for immediate expenditure, shall, *only*, be delivered to the separate charge and custody of the *Director of the Labrotary* (now denominated *Commissary of stores*.) And that *all* applications for supplies, issues, and payments, shall pass through the military Store-keeper, to the Governor and Council, for their warrant to accomplish it.

To the same ends, and in proper obedience to the commands of the Court of Directors, it appears by a letter upon record, from Claud Ruffel, Esq; military Store-keeper to the commissary of stores, on the 26th July, 1768, that from a firm belief of abuses committed in

† The *quality* and not the *quantity* on application, is alone to be certified, this confirms the check intended to be invariably preserved, over the military interfering in a line, meant to be civil.

in the magazines by the embezzlement of stores, it was necessary to compell a strict observance of the *established regulation of the military Store-keeper's office*, which regulations were for similar good purposes, and likewise to preserve the constitutional authority, superintendency, and essential check of the Store-keeper (on the 24th January, and 10th February, 1774,) claimed and exercised by the Honourable Charles Stewart, the then military Store-keeper, in letters to the board of inspection; and effectually established, by a resolution of, and notice from the Board, to Mr. Stewart of the latter date; which he accordingly communicated officially, to the commissary of stores, on the 17th of the same month.

By a studied violation of these wise, salutary, and positive institutions, it may be made to appear, that stores, to a very considerable amount, have been deficient, and *commanded to be wrote off*, the expenditure of which doth not appear in any record, or any formal enquiry into the causes. ¶ That the department created by the Court of Directors, to controul issues and disbursements, and to be responsible for stores deposited, is, *in effect*, abolished, apparently for the purpose of abuse, in all senses, and by all means, with impunity. § The ostensible office of Store-keeper, is rendered *ineffectual*, and

¶ See the Store-keeper's letter of October 1778, concerning cartouch-boxes, &c. and the deficiencies on the survey in 1779; abstracted in several minutes and letters in this narrative.

§ See the Governor General's minutes abstracted throughout this narrative, particularly in October 1778, 25th February, 8th July, and 19th August, 1779; and Colonel Watson's of the 5th January 1780.

and declared nominal, by the heads of administration, while the sole power of indents, receipts, issues, and applications, is vested in the person, who, in the very terms of the consolidated charge, ought not to have it.* The Store-keeper, (a covenanted civil servant,) having neither the power of creating demands for supplies, nor to apply them when issued. Whereas, the Commissary, in whom *partiality*† has vested the accumulated power before mentioned, by holding also the second rank and command in the artillery corps, however fair and unexceptionable his conduct and character in private life, possesses in this public instance, the incomparable privilege of indulgence, of creating wants, indenting for supplies, furnishing many of them and their expenditure, if he chuses to exercise the complicated vestiture improperly.‡ The names and denominations of stores, and the mode of keeping the accounts were mutilated, seemingly for the purpose of perplexing, and to counteract the orders of the Directors, as the means of deception with facility, to cover

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* See abstracts of the Governor's minutes, on the October 1778, 25th February, 8th July, and 13th July, 1779, and those of Mr. Francis, and Mr. Wheeler in reply.

† The application of the word *partiality*, has been justified on many occasions. One instance may serve to judge of others by. Flints are rated in the Store-keeper's agency at 10 per thousand, and he had abundance ready to deposit when wanted; Colonel Green, the Commissary was nevertheless contracted with, and he supplied them into store, at the advance price of 40 Rupees per thousand.

‡ See abstracts from Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler's minutes, of 8th July, and 19th August 1779,

and disguise deficiencies. § The Store-keeper was ordered to desist from keeping books in his office, which constituted an essential branch of the check over receipts and expenditures, and at last he was stripped of the only remaining, and equally essential controul, which a joint lock and key with the Commissary, gave him over the stores.* Positive orders, and pointed instructions were infraacted, and disobeyed with contempt, and the contempt attempted to be justified upon the Companys' own record.† In-direct menaces, and insinuations of dismissal, were uttered in terrorem, to prevent the faithful discharge of public duty, and obstruction to favorite, but destructive measures.‡ Arms fit for *actual service*, and others *reparable*, were sent out of store (at a period of danger, and when the arsenal was very incomplete) as totally *unserviceable*; without survey, or the authority of the controuling Board, and without the knowledge or concurrence of the military Store-keeper.§ *Serviceable* arms were in like manner converted into ship's kentledge, and rendered for ever *unserviceable*.||

These

§ See Companys' records, Board of Ordnance; observations by the Secretary on the survey, and the Store-keeper's explanations.

* See the subsequent abstracts in this narrative.

† See abstracts from minutes in this narrative.

‡ See the abstracts of minutes by Mr. Hastings, the 8th July, 19th August, and September, 1779, in the subsequent narrative.

§ See abstract from Mr. Livius letter, 27th November, 1779.

|| See the letters of Mr. Secretary Auriol, Mr. Livius, and Mr. Petric.

These censures, being of a serious nature, call for some evidence to secure a degree of faith, if not according to the very strict letter and practice of the courts of law in all cases, at least to carry ample conviction to the minds of the public. With this view, however tedious it may prove in the recital, the only doctrine proposed, will be abstracted from the Companys' own records, which will at the same time serve as a concise narrative of the strange proceedings, on a subject so materially important to the English East India Company.

The general letters recited at the beginning of this enquiry, (1748, 1773, and 1774,) shew the principles on which the military Store-keeper's department was constituted, distinguish the official duty and responsibility of the officer, direct the mode of keeping the books and accounts of his office, and apply injunctions concerning *reparable and irreparable stores*.

By a regulation of the Board of Ordnance, the 17th June, 1775, to prevent inconveniences and impediments in the emission of daily stores, the charge and responsibility of such, as the Commissary should indent for, and receive from the Store-keeper for the use of the Commissary's office, shall be vested in the Commissary alone, being accountable to the Store-keeper, &c. for the application and expenditure of them.*

In the proceedings of the Board of Inspection, on the 25th September, 6th November, and 19th December

* See the proceedings previous to this resolution in 1748, 1773, and 1774.

ber, 1777, &c. it appears, that upon Mr. Hastings's motion, the orders of the Court of Directors, in relation to the military Store-keeper's office and duty, are annulled, without a plea of propriety or expediency to justify the measures. He is particularly commanded to desist from keeping a journal and ledger. The Store-keeper having, in discharge of duty, used the freedom to make judicious representations with deference and delicacy on the 28th November, the subject thereof was referred on the 9th December, to the Accomptant General for his opinion.

On the 22d January following, the Accomptant General reported in support of the Store-keeper's reasoning. The impropriety and inexpediency of *unnecessary* disobedience, influenced the majority to yield, upon this occasion, to the arguments of the minority, and the Store-keeper was permitted to resume the use of a journal and ledger in his office. The Board again referred to the Accomptant General for a more perfect form of keeping the books of the Ordnance and Store-keeper's offices, in greater conformity with each other, by having the same denomination to the principal acc^tompts.

October 1778. The military Store-keeper, as a member of the Board of Ordnance, entered a minute and motion, *concerning deficiencies unaccounted for*, and positively refusing, without an order of council, to comply with the resolution of that Board, *by writing off, as if expended on service*, 3500 cartouch boxes, and divers other articles, *said to be lost or deficient*, which could not be made appear to have been expended; representing the loose and imperfect state of the Store-houses and stores, without check or controul; and therefore

therefore, in order to obviate all future deficiencies, in correctness, and difficulties, he moved, that a survey of all stores, now in store, be made, in order to correct the books with the goods actually existing, and balance the deficient accounts by opening another account under the denomination of profit and loss, with the consent, and by the express authority of the Governor and Council; and in order that in future the Store-keeper shall (as in Europe) be responsible for all effects committed to his charge.

Proceedings of the Board of Inspection, 17th December 1778, with the Accomptant General's plan for keeping the accounts of the military Store-keeper; and the proceedings of the Board of Ordnance. The Board ordered a survey in terms of the Store-keeper's motion on the 10th October at the Board of Ordnance, to be completed on the 30th day of April following: and that the books of the subordinate departments be corrected and adjusted in conformity to the stores which shall actually be then ascertained in store. And that a like annual survey shall be made on the 30th of April. Upon this occasion Mr. Hastings, in an elaborate minute, discovers his views, a partiality to the Commissary of stores, and inclination to suppress the controul of the military Store-keeper, and he committed this singular declaration upon record, thus, "*I am myself less solicitous about the books of the military Store-keeper, as they are now either totally useless, or useful only as checks on the receipts and issues of the Commissary of stores.*" It merits peculiar attention, that the Commissary over whom this "*totally useless check*" is acknowledged to be held, is the person in whose province it is to receive and appropriate most of the stores issued, and to indent for, as well as to furnish by contract

tract and agency, a considerable part of them. Another fact equally notorious in this minute is, that the Governor-General is either totally unacquainted with the nature of accounts and the forms of book-keeping, or that he openly meant, by an exertion of a temporary power, to remove all controul from such persons as he might favour in future, as well as to cancel past transgressions, however injurious to the interests of his employers, and dangerous to their existence in Asia.

Mr. Wheler's reply to the Governor's minute, while it discovers a steady and faithful attachment to the duties of the trust reposed in him, shews him also to have a clear idea of books and accounts, as well as of the real spirit of the orders of the Court of Directors; and the utility, as well as necessity, of so sensible a controul throughout the several civil and military departments; and generally approved the mode of the Store-keeper's books, as essential for those purposes, although still capable of further improvement.

The proceedings of the Board of Inspection, 25th February, 1779, with a letter from the military Store-keeper, dated 23d current, complaining that the Commissary of stores had refused obedience to the order of the Board, for affixing a lock and key to the store-rooms according to custom, because, "*That the receipts and issue of stores in the department, are not regulated by any particular time of the day.*" The Store-keeper justifies the complaint upon principles equally consistent, irrefutable, and official. The refusal on the other part, with the subsequent language of Mr. Hastings, in vindication and support of the Commissary's independence, favour strongly of a conclusion incompatible with their respective duties to the Company.

Company. The Governor proposes, with a singularity peculiar only to his own sagacity, impenetrable (he supposes) to all others, " That each store-house shall be *separately* surveyed, and that *during the examination*, the military Store-keeper may place his " key upon the *particular* store-house, *immediately* under " examination, and *instantly* thereafter to be taken off."

Thus, according to Mr. Hastings's mode of survey, if it was necessary to conceal deficiencies, nothing could be more easy and simple than to remove stores from the store-houses already surveyed, into any other that remained to be surveyed, as the Commissary possessed *all* power except over that *immediately under examination*. It is astonishing, that the open fallacy of such a measure, did not occur, even to the authors, as it could not possibly escape their opponents, although delicacy may have restrained the application by language to defeat it.

The Governor in a subsequent minute on the same day, in reply to Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Francis, obstinately persists in the measure, and says, " That " he objects to Mr. Wheeler's motion, requiring two " locks to be continued on each store, as well *after* " as *during* the examination, i. e. the Store-keeper's " lock, and the Commissary's lock, as mutual checks, " because, (the Governor alledges) the motion of Mr. " Wheeler is made without a reference to the reasons " which induced the Board to place the super-intendancy in the fort, under the immediate charge of " the Commissary of stores ; and because he considered " Mr. Livius (the military Store-keeper) as in effect

" a con-

“ a contractor for stores, and not Store-keeper, although
 “ that title be still allowed him of courtesy.”

Mr. Wheeler, in answer to the governor's first minute, moved “ for the survey of each apartment *separately*,
 “ and that the military Store-keeper, and commissary of
 “ stores should *severally* entertain locks and keys on
 “ each apartment, as well *after*, as *during* the *entire*
 “ examination, agreeably to the original establishment
 “ of the two offices. *i. e.* That the two locks and keys
 “ be kept upon each Store-room; one key to be kept
 “ by the Commissary's Circular*, and one by the mili-
 “ tary Store-keepers.”

Mr. Francis concurred in opinion with Mr. Wheeler, and added, “ that the military Store-keeper was the
 “ natural and official check over the expenditure of
 “ stores by the Commissary. That he had uniformly
 “ disapproved very much of removing that check, by
 “ depriving the military Store-keeper of a lock and
 “ key upon the stores, as other methods might have
 “ been taken to facilitate the dispatch of business, sup-
 “ posing the joint trust to have been a cause of some
 “ occasional delay therein.”

And in reply to Mr. Hastings's second minute, Mr. Francis says, “ that the alteration in question (or-
 “ dering the *temporary* application of a second lock and
 “ key) was made by the Board of Ordinance, which
 “ had not the authority to repeal an alteration made by
 “ government. That he could not agree, that the in-
 “ dulgence allowed the military Store-keeper, and to
 “ the

* By Circular is meant, a Hindoo writer.

" the other heads of offices to supply a part of the stores
 " in their respective departments, vacated their offices.
 " *That if the military Store-keeper had any concern in the*
 " *expenditure of the stores, the indulgence would have been*
 " *highly improper. He had none. But as the military*
 " *Store-keeper ought to have a check upon that person who*
 " *has the expenditure of the stores, and over whom there is*
 " *at present no controul.* That with respect to the supply
 " of stores, by the heads of offices, and by the military
 " Store-keeper in particular, it was a measure strongly
 " recommended by the Governor General himself,
 " for reasons which did then, and do now appear
 " to him (Mr. Francis) to be solid and un-
 " answerable."

Mr. Whaler, in further reply to the Governor
 General's second minute, desired, " That the resolution
 " of the Board of Ordnance, the 17th June 1775, be
 " entered, in order to shew, that the responsibility of
 " such stores *only* as the Commissary shall in future
 " indent for, be intrusted to him *alone*. Hence, he
 " concluded, that stores not indented for, and not
 " immediately in demand, were to remain in the
 " arsenal, under the united charge of the Commissary,
 " and the military Store keeper. That he was con-
 " vinced the resolution would go no farther, and on
 " that ground only, would he accede to it. That he,
 " at the same time, maintained the propriety of his
 " former proposition, *i. e.* that all stores, not falling
 " under that description, be again returned to the
 " charge of both offices."

The Governor General and Mr. Barwell, having
 three votes between them, carried in favor of the
 Governor's motion, and the Commissaries independ-
 h dance,

dance, and absolute power over all the Ordnance and military stores whatsoever.

Proceedings at the Board of Inspection on the 8th of July 1779. The Governor General expressed in pointed terms, his fixed dissatisfaction at the pretensions of the minority in support of the military Store-keeper's right to controul the Commissary of stores and his determined purpose, not to suffer, under any pretence, the check constitutionally established in the military Store-keeper, by the custody of another key on the store-houses; in the course of his opposition, he advances as a new doctrine, "That the title of military Store-keeper, which Mr. Livius originally bore, with the actual charge implied by it, but which from a tenderness to him has been suffered to remain, although the charge was removed, has furnished him with grounds for various pretensions. That in effect, he is not the military Store-keeper. The only substantial connexion that he has with that office, by any appointment of the Board is as a contractor for stores, and in that character, he is the last person in the service, whom the Board should chuse to be a check upon the Commissary."

Let it be decided by any disinterested person, whether Major Green, to whom the stores are issued in his military capacity, who indents for, and expends the stores in the military capacity, and who is also a contractor for, and manufacture of many capital articles, is not less qualified to act as a Commissary, than Mr. Livius, (tho' only a civil covenanted servant) is to act as a Store-keeper? and whether the Governor's insinuations, do not directly tend to intimidate Mr. Livius from the due

due exercise of the duties and claims inherent in his office, to avoid the threatened dismissal?

Proceedings at the Board of Inspection, on the 19th August 1779. The Governor continues to pursue his favorite maxim, of favoring his favorites, against all opposition, and by all manner of means, with a vehemence and warmth, which denounced dismissal and vengeance on those, whose probity and fidelity were accidentally thrust as stumbling-blocks to obstruct the rapidity of his career.

The Governor acquaints the Board, " That he was
" this morning informed by the Commissary of Stores
" that he had delivered his report to the Board of
" Ordnance, and that Mr. Livius's locks *still* re-
" mained affixed to the store-rooms. That he, there-
" fore, moved, *that Mr. Livius be peremptorily or-*
" *dered to remove them; and that the sole charge of*
" *the store-rooms be left with the Commissary of*
" *Stores.*"

The Commander in Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, agreed to the Governors motion.

Mr. Wheeler referred the Board to the positive in-
junctions contained in the general letters of 17th June,
1748, 7th April 1773, and 7th January, 1774.—
Observing in conclusion, "*how impossible it will be*
"*for the Store-keeper to comply with their order,*
"*if the keys which constitute this trust are delivered*
"*solely to the charge of another; but that if the*
"*Board think proper to set aside, both the orders of the*
"*Court of Directors, and the regular official plan of*
h 2 carrying

"carrying their orders into execution, they must answer the consequences."

The Governor General, in reply, minutes thus, *"whatever the Company's orders may prescribe in this case, however necessary it may be, that the Store-keeper should have a joint charge of the stores with the Commissary, still it would be highly improper upon the present occasion, to allow it in disobedience to a positive order of the Board, which must first be repealed, before such a regulation can take place."* §—The Governor again files Mr. Livius, *"The com. Stor of stores, for he is no Store-keeper,"* And in addition to his former motion, he desires, *"that Mr. Livius may be called upon again, to inform the Board of the reasons why his locks are still upon the store-rooms. And that when the Board shall have received his answer, they will then judge, whether he has, or has not, been guilty of a disobedience of their orders."*

Mr. Francis observed, *"that the military Store-keeper had not (in his idea) disobeyed the orders of the Board, because it does not appear that he could have obeyed them sooner."*

Mr.

§ How severely the Governor lashes himself whose disobedience, and repeated violation of orders, set the dangerous example to all the inferior servants? Does not the same argument hold more powerfully against the violation of the orders of the Court of Directors, by the establishment of the order in question, without waiting for the repeal of the original order in Leaden-hall-Street.

Mr. Wheeler declared, that he would not justify any irregularity against the Orders of the Board. He finishes a very sensible and faithful minute, in these words, " *If, as the Governor-General says, Mr. Livius is the Contractor of stores, and no Store-keeper, by the same propriety of argument, Major Green, acting likewise in the character of a Contractor, has as little pretensions to the sole charge of the stores, and has as little right to the title of Commissary of stores, as Mr. Livius has to that of military Store-keeper.*"

The Governor-General's minute, in September 1779, in council, on the subject of Mr. Belli's contract for victualling Fort William, gave birth to fresh charges and insinuations against, and investigations of the office of military Store-keeper. Although the contract under consideration did not bear the most remote affinity, or similitude in any sense whatever, to the military Store-keeper's appointment and duty, yet the Governor having the unperishable seed of resentment implacable on the one side, and partiality on the other, sowed in a fertile mind, levelled a most illiberal, and unjust blow at Mr. Livius, and through him at Mr. Francis, in these violent terms. " *Mr. Livius has an Agency, with 15 per cent on articles rated by former charges of Commissaries, of course, greatly above the real cost.*" And in continuation, he adds, " *Mr. Livius is professedly patronized by Mr. Francis, who passes his bills, and nine or ten Lacks paid to him, are yet unaccounted for.*"

On this occasion Mr. Hastings's Indian moderation abandoned him, or he wittingly yielded the truth a sacrifice, to convict himself of a falsehood; and in special terms avowed his own infidelity, in the discharge

charge of the public duty, in order to intimidate, and deter the opponents to one of his destructive favorite measures. He consented to give a commission of 15 per cent on stores, which he ingenuously acknowledges, were charged by the Agent, "*greatly above the real cost.*" Thus admitting, that besides a very high advantage upon the purchase, the Agent was to have a commission of 15 per cent, not upon the real cost, or purchase price, but upon the cost and advance, conjointly.

Mr. Francis procured, both for himself and the Store-keeper, ample satisfaction in the sequel, which forced Mr. Hastings to *retract* his malignant declaration, and to minute the retraction upon the face of a public record.

Mr. Francis having been absent for health, when Mr. Hastings rashly charged him with conniving in Mr. Livius's *imaginary* peculations, and the *possession of large sums unaccounted for*. He replied to that part of the Governor's minute by letter, dated Houghly the 2d of October, 1779, thus, "the Governor General's minute was transmitted to me this morning. "If recrimination does not imply an admission of the charge, it certainly is no defence against it. I cannot allow that one abuse is justified by another. Nor am I bound to answer any objections, whether valid or not, to the Agency of stores held by Mr. Livius.—The Governor General and Mr. Barwell, had just as much concern in giving it to him, as I had.—If it be liable to abuse, why is it not corrected? If his profits have been too great, why have they not been reduced? Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell have had absolute power in their hands for
" three

" three years.—It is said, that Mr. Livius has an
 " Agency, with 15 per cent, or articles rated by former
 " charges of Commissaries, of course great above the
 " real cost. —If the assertion were true in terms, it
 " remains to be explained, even on the principle of
 " precedents, how the giving 15 per cent to one agent,
 " justifies the giving 30 per cent to another. Messieurs
 " Robinson, Killean, and Crofts, reported that twenty
 " per cent per annum, would be a reasonable commission
 " to Mr. Belli. Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, ne-
 " vertheless gave him thirty.—With respect to the mili-
 " tary Store-keeper's book of rates, the fact is, that
 " it was formed by the late Colonel Dow, with the ap-
 " probation of the Board of Ordnance; *not by the*
 " *former charges of the Commissaries*, but by an enquiry
 " into the actual Bazar prices of that period. Whether
 " Mr. Livius gains or loses by these rates, is unknown
 " to me; I believe that occasionally he may do both,
 " nor does it concern the service in question". It is
 " said, " that Mr. Livius is professedly patronized by
 " me." I recommended him to the office of military
 " Store-keeper, and I will maintain him in the just
 " right belonging to it, *on the same principles on which*
 " *I would insist on his performing the duties of it*. Thus
 " far my patronage of Mr. Livius had extended."

" But it is now said, that I pass his bills, the asser-
 " tion as it stands expressed, may be supposed not to
 " be a mistake. The Governor well knows that I
 " resigned the employment of *Comptroller of the Offices*,
 " from the end of December 1778; and that I have
 " repeatedly urged to him the necessity of requesting
 " some other Member of the Board, to undertake it
 " from that period. Places of influence and profits,
 " are

"are not often so easily relinquished.* If the ac-
 "counts of the public offices, have not since been ex-
 "amined, the Governor General, I presume, will
 "assign his reasons for it to the Company. Neither
 "is it true, that I even passed Mr. Livius's bills
 "in the sense plainly implied by the Governor.
 "They were constantly examined by Mr. Baugh and
 "his assistant, with the utmost strictness, before they
 "came to me for their final confirmation. My diary
 "is before the Court of Directors. It was not possi-
 "ble therefore, that I could favor Mr. Livius, or
 "any body else, unless Mr. Baugh and I acted in col-
 "lusion. I desire that he may be examined at the
 "Board, upon his oath, and in my absence, concerning
 "the manner in which I executed my part of the exa-
 "mination; and I most earnestly request of Mr.
 Wheeler

* to shew the jealousy of power, and the evils consequential
 thereof, the following detail will evince. Mr. Francis, *as youngest*
Member of Council, had been nominated from the beginning, to
 examine the accounts of contractors, agents, offices, and general
 disbursements, and to controul all expenditures whatever, under
 the denomination of *comptroler of the offices*, which duty he regu-
 larly performed weekly. Sometime after the appointment and
 arrival of Mr. Wheeler, whose official duty, *as youngest Member*,
 it then became, Mr. Francis then relinquished it at Christmas
 1778, and moved at the board to name the successor. His resigna-
 tion was received, but no successor appointed. In about a month
 he renewed the motion, it was slighted. In a further time,
 he proposed the nomination of Mr. Wheeler, *as youngest Member*,
 it was once again neglected. And upon a fourth peremptory
 proposition to the same effect, it was objected to by Mr. Hastings,
 with a frank avowal, "that it was conferring too popular a power in
 "an individual," and it was over-ruled. In which state the dis-
 bursements still continue, without any controul or examination,
 not even by the whole board.

“ Whether to make a motion in my behalf to this ef-
 “ fect, at the next Board of Inspection I will leave
 “ it to Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, to put such
 “ questions to him as they think fit. It would be
 “ much beneath me to make any other reply to the
 “ conclusion evidently meant to be drawn from the
 “ supposed fact, of my passing Mr. Livius's bills, but
 “ that I receive it as it deserves.

Again it is asserted, “ That nine or ten Lacks, thus
 “ paid to Mr. Livius, are yet unaccounted for. I do not
 “ know what the amount of the Military Store-
 “ keeper's disbursements may be since December last,
 “ having no concern in the examination of his ac-
 “ counts. The Secretary has the monthly accounts
 “ before him, and I desire he will state the amount,
 “ during that period, in this place, (by the Secretary it
 “ was filled up,) current Rupees 4 lacks, 13,965,13,6
 “ the Military Store-keeper's accounts of his disburse-
 “ ments being given in to him, every month,
 “ and a balance struck before he receives a further
 “ allowance for the ensuing month. It cannot truly
 “ be said, that the sums he received since December
 “ last, are unaccounted for. If his accounts are not
 “ examined, it is not his fault.

“ Any person unacquainted with the transaction of
 “ business in the Military Store-keeper's office, and
 “ who saw only in what circumstances, and with
 “ what apparent view, it is asserted, that 9 or 10 Lacks
 “ thus paid to Mr. Livius since December last, are
 “ yet unaccounted for, would naturally conclude, that
 “ this money was all on account of his agency, for
 “ the provision of Military Stores. For if it were
 “ not so, the comparison between his supposed profits,
 “ and

“ and those of Mr. Belli, (to ~~which~~ which, Mr. Li-
 “ vius’s name, and office, are manifestly introduced)
 “ proves nothing, and falls to the ground. Now the
 “ fact is, that the greatest part of the monthly sums
 “ issued to Mr. Livius, are advanced to him *as Mi-*
 “ *lit-ry Store-keeper*, not as *agent*. Out of these he pays
 “ his own office charges *by a fixed establishment*; the
 “ *establishment* of the Commissary’s Office, with the
 “ price of all the articles furnished by Lieutenant Co-
 “ lonel Green *by contract*; the price of all the powder
 “ furnished monthly, by the *powder Contractor*; and
 “ many other contingencies. In th^e management of
 “ all these disbursements, the Military Store-keeper
 “ pays as fast as he receives, and has no profit whatso-
 “ ever, not even that of having a sum of public money
 “ for a short time in his hands. It is a fact, not un-
 “ worthy of notice in this place, that all the other
 “ heads of offices receive their monthly advances,
 “ twenty days before the Military Store-keeper does,
 “ owing to some difficulty of adjustment, between
 “ him and the Commissary, by which in this respect,
 “ they both suffer.”

“ The following settlement, which I have desired the
 “ Secretary to fill up, will show what proportion the
 “ foregoing disbursements bear to the total amount of
 “ advance to the Military Store-keeper since De-
 “ cember last.”

1, Total

1. Total amount of advance to the Store-keeper, from January 1779, inclusive

R AP

Current Rupees

4,42,105:7:6

2. Amount of Military Store-keeper's office charges *per* establishment R A P
6,899: 8: 2

3. Amount of money paid to Lieutenant Colonel Green, for charges of office, and for supplies. 16,321: 7: 8,

4. Amount of the Powder Contractor's bills paid. 1,24, 605:15: 9

5. Amount of all other contingent charges paid: 1,22, 116: 2:10

Disbursements, without benefit to the Store-keeper. 2,69, 943: 1: 3

Difference being for supplies by the Store-keeper. 1,72, 162: 6: 3 4,42,105:7:6

In consequence of a motion sent in circulation by Mr. Wheeler, at the request of Mr. Francis, Mr. Baugh attended the Council Board on the 1st November 1779. The Governor-General declined to put questions in the mode prescribed, thinking it irregular, and alledging, that so *unimportant* did he consider Mr. Francis's last minute, which regarded three capital offices very materially, " *that he had not even given it an*
i 2 *intire*

intire perusal, although he had it by him for some time."
 Whereupon Mr. Wheeler, after expressing the disagreeable task, which the Governor's declining it, had put on him, of asking answers to some queries from Mr. Baugh, and then delivered the following questions.

Question 1st. " Whether it is not your duty, as assistant to the Comptroller of the offices, to examine the monthly accounts of each office, before they are seen by the Comptroller, and to furnish him with whatever remarks may have occurred to you thereon."

Answer, " Preparatory to the Comptroller's examining the accounts of the offices, they have always been examined by my assistant, so far as respected their calculation and addition; after which, they have been compared by me with the vouchers delivered with them. I have then compared such charges as were established, with the fixed establishments, also such charges for stores provided by contract, or by agency, with the terms of the different engagements for those supplies; and if upon this examination I have discovered any deviation from either, I have pointed them out to the Comptroller, who has either immediately deducted the difference, or applied to the head of that department, whose accounts were under examination for an explanation."

Question 2d. " Whether you have not constantly done so ?

* From 3d October to 1st November, being, 9 days.

Answer

Answer. " Yes, I have."

Question 3d. " Whether you have ever observed, that Mr. Francis in examining the accounts of the Military Store-keeper, or of any other of the public offices, or in passing their bills, or in any other instance whatever, has favoured the Military Store-keeper, or any other person, or has ever suffered an error or overcharge in his or their accounts, to pass without correction and censure ?

Governor General " I beg that Mr. Baugh may be dispensed from answering that third question. If there is a necessity for it, it is highly improper, on many accounts, considering the wide difference between Mr. Baugh and Mr. Francis, that he should be obliged to answer to such a question. *I do not recollect what words of mine have given occasion for it, but if I have made use of any, which either directly lay such a charge to Mr. Francis's account, or imply it, I retract them, without accounting at this time, for the manner in which any such expressions may have escaped me, as they are now entirely out of my memory. The object of the question therefore is removed.*

Mr. Francis. " I am satisfied; and desire the question may be waved.

Question 4th. " To what point of time, have the Military Store keeper's accounts been examined, and passed by the Comptroller ?

Answer. " To the end of December 1778.

Question 5th. " What is the intire amount of the several monthly sums issued to him from the treasury,

ry, for the disbursements of his office, including
 “ his agency since December, 1778, to the end of Sep-
 “ tember last.”

Answer. “ The advances made to the Military Store-
 “ keeper from the Treasury, between the 1st of Janu-
 “ ary, and 30th of September, 1779, amount to,
 “ current Rupees, 4,24,000, but in this sum, is not
 “ included, his advance on account of September, be-
 “ ing 42,000 Rupees, because it did not pass the
 “ Board in time to be issued during that month. The
 “ order on the Treasurer was not signed ’till the 30th
 “ of September; and I observe by the estimate of the
 “ Store-keeper’s disbursements for October, that the a-
 “ mount was not received ’till the 6th of the last men-
 “ tioned month. In Mr. Francis minute of the 2d.
 “ October, the amount of the advances issued to the
 “ Military Store-keeper to the end of August, is stated
 “ by me at current Rupees, 4,42,105:7:6, but it is
 “ proper to remark, that in this sum is included the
 “ monthly payments made to him by Mr. Robert
 “ Stuart, on account of the new powder works, and
 “ his receipts for ready money sales.”

Question 6th. “ Has the Military Store-keeper deli-
 “ vered in his monthly accounts regularly to the
 “ Comptroller’s office, since December last ?

Answer. “ Yes, to the end of September.

Governor General. “ I desire to put the two follow-
 “ ing questions to Mr. Baugh.”

1st. “ Have Mr. Livius’s accounts ever appeared
 “ before the Board ?

2d. “ What

2d. " What is the amount of Mr. Livius's receipts
 " and disbursements, from the time he first had charge
 " of the present office, to the date of my minute in
 " September ?

" If Mr. Baugh cannot answer the last of these questi-
 " ons from his own official knowledge, I desire him
 " to obtain proper official information to compleat his
 " answer.

Answer to the Governor's 1st Question.

" They never have appeared before the Board. It
 " was not the intent of the regulation, constituting the
 " Comptroller's office, that they should be laid before
 " the Board."

Ditto to the 2d.

" Not having the necessary materials in my possession
 " for furnishing the account required by the Governor-
 " General, I applied for it to the Military Store-
 " keeper, and beg leave to lay before the Board, the
 " following Abstract, which I have in consequence
 " received from him, of his receipts and disbursements,
 " from April, 1775, to September, 1779, inclusive."

" The receipts amounting to, current Ru-
 " pees, - - - 23,16,074:13:3

" The disbursements, to - - 23,16,783:1:3

" Balance advanced by, and due } - 708:4:
 " to the Store-keeper,* - }

" Mr.

* This balance of 708 Rupees and 4 Annas in favour of the Military Store-keeper, differs materially from Mr. Hastings's charge of his having nine or ten lacks of Rupees in his hands, unaccounted for.

“ Mr. Livius was appointed to the office of Military Store-keeper, on the 20th of March, 1775, and the Governor’s Minute is dated in September, 1779.

“ I think it proper to acquaint the Board, that my application for this account, would have been made to the Accomptant General, and not to the Military Store-keeper, could the former have finished it complete. But the General Books, being balanced only to the 30th of April, 1778, it could not have been prepared from them to a period subsequent to that time. I believe also, that the Entries in the General Books, are adjusted from the Abstracts of the receipts and disbursements supplied to the Accomptant-General, by the heads of the different Offices.”

To shew, as well the truth of the facts alledged in their deepest colours, as their dangerous consequences, throughout the deliberate train of abuses : “ Two recent transactions carry an aspect, which unite the links to render the chain of circumstances, as convictive, as it is consistent with moral probability to obtain, until time, in the course of his revolutions, shall develope, those mysteries, which are yet obliured from general knowledge, and only committed in mutual confidence to the principal performers.

When a survey was made of the stores in the grand arsenal and store-rooms last year, amongst many, a deficiency appeared, of 21,979 stands of arms, and 40,047 bayonets, the chief part of which, stood on the Store-keeper’s books, as *complete and new*, and as *serviceable*. — As there appeared but from ten, to eleven thousand stands in the grand magazine, where
the

the Company intended that there should never be less than forty thousand, which number, they imagined were then actually in store; a number scarce adequate to the troops entertained by the Presidency of Bengal alone;—So alarming a deficiency, at so critical a period, when all India as well as Europe were in motion, apparently with hostile designs against Britain, it could not fail to excite such an astonishment, as produced an enquiry; when it appeared that without the leave of the Board of Inspection or the Board of Ordnance, and without the concurrence or knowledge of the military Store-keeper, those arms were sent by the Commissary of stores to the public Vendue office, in order to be sold by public out-cry. After having lain many months in a damp cellar, where they must have contracted a sufficient degree of rust, to render the best and highest polished arms in the tower of London, unserviceable; upon a survey, by the military Store-keeper, he found them to his surprise, in the good condition (notwithstanding the humid air and total neglect of them for so long a time) which he represented in a letter, written officially, but tenderly, to the Board of Ordnance, of which the following is a literal abstract.

“ November 27, 1779. I beg leave further to submit another observation to the Board, that the 21,979 stand of arms, and 40,047 bayonets, appeared on the survey not to have been in so bad a state as I had at first apprehended; the militia were since supplied from them, and in my opinion, many more may be made fit for service, *as there is an establishment in this department for repairing them.* If it were the pleasure of the Board, I would recommend it to them to appoint three or four military gentlemen

" men of the Ordnance department, or other mili-
 " tary officers, high in station, to review them, be-
 " fore they are exposed to sale, as I would not chuse to
 " take upon myself to condemn so large a quantity of
 " valuable arms, from my own observation. At all
 " events the opinion of competent judges, can be had
 " at this time at the presidency; I could even wish
 " the final orders regarding them were submitted to
 " the Governor and Council, *some of the arms standing*
 " *upon the books of this department as complete and new.*
 " *Another reason which induces me to recommend this to*
 " *the attention of the Board, is, the consideration that*
 " *there are only 10 or 11,000 serviceable arms in the*
 " *grand magazine, and that 40,000, have been always*
 " *deemed the proper and necessary establishment in store,*
 " *for the defence of Bengal on emergency."*

A deficiency of 3503 cartouch-boxes, which the
 Store-keeper was commanded to write off in his books,
 as if regularly expended on service, together with his
 refusal to comply, originated the fortunate idea of a
 general survey, and that it should be continued an-
 nually.

Previous to the second annual survey, January 5th,
 1780, in consequence of an order from the Board of
 Inspection to the Board of Ordnance, two questions
 were sent in circulation to the members of the latter
 Board, reviving the controversy concerning the ad-
 ditional lock and key of the Store-keeper on each se-
 perate store-room, while that particular room was un-
 der examination, and instantly when it's contents were
 surveyed, the Store-keeper's lock and key to be taken
 off, and left in the sole charge of the Commissary.
 " Whether this be adopted as a standing regulation,
 " with

“ with respect to all future surveys? And whether
 “ it shall extend to the surveys of all subordinate
 “ magazines?”

Colonel Watson, in a minute annexed, seemed to have ridiculed the whole proceeding, having observed (doubtless) ironically, *“ That he did not understand for what reason the order was given, as he was of opinion that the Lieutenant Colonel Green only, can be made answerable for deficiencies, in future, the Store-keeper being nominal only.”*

Mr. Wheeler maintained his original principle on the subject; said, “ That a Store-keeper without his key, is a contradiction in terms, and that he will venture to affirm, is not to be met with in any other service than this; therefore, he moved that the military Store-keeper’s key, be not only affixed to each apartment, during the survey, but that it do likewise continue affixed to the same, when the survey of the stores shall be compleated; by which means the Store-keeper will become answerable with the Commissary, for the property committed to their charge.”

Mr. Francis concurred with Mr. Wheeler; and Mr. Livius added six constitutional, and indeed incontrovertable reasons to support his concurring opinion.

A circumstance which belongs more properly to another place, is nevertheless obtruded now, by the connection it holds with the subject under censure, as a strong corroborating evidence of the dangerous views of the chief administration in India.

At a time when the Company's territories were threatened with foes and invasion, internal and external; at a time when their arsenals were almost empty; and at a time when economy was essential to preserve their credit, even in India, did they expend 57,000 Rupees in the kentledge of the Royal Charlotte,* and that kentledge consisted in military and Ordnance stores from the arsenals, amongst which were 5859 new musket barrels, although there were not double the number remaining in the grand magazine:† To prove that these were sent on board without authority from any person constitutionally qualified to order it: A reference to the letters from the Council to the military Store-keeper, will yield ample satisfaction; of which the following are true copies.

“ Council-Chamber, 28th January, 1780.

To Mr. George Livius, Military Store-keeper.

“ Sir,

“ It appearing from the books of the Ordnance department, that 5859 *Serviceable* musket barrels have been sent on board the ship, Royal Charlotte, to serve as *kentledge*. I am directed by the Honorable the

* The Resolution also, was at the same time balasted with Bangalore pig iron, of the value of 22,000 rupees, by immediate purchase with ready money.

† Why did they not send, as kentledge, the *irreparable* arms in the Vendue office? But that would not answer the intended end. The Indian powers, at enmity with the Company, wanted European arms, and they had their agents at Calcutta. And arms ~~required~~, might be *resold* to the Company at high country prices, although bought for a mere trifle at public auction.

“ the Governor General and Council, to call upon you,
 “ to assign your reasons for having delivered such muskets
 “ for the purpose of kentledge ; and to inform the Board,
 “ whether all or any part of them have been delivered
 “ back into store”

“ I am Sir,

“ Your most obedient servant.

(Signed) “ J. P. Auriol, Secretary.”

In answer. Mr. Livius lays before the Board a detail of facts, consistent with the station to which he was reduced, and a reasonable rebuke for the inconsistent application for information, to a Store-keeper whom that Board has deliberately stripped of the prerogatives of his office, as their application, according to their own regulations, should have been *solely* directed to Colonel Green, the Commissary of Stores, and the *actual* Store-keeper.

“ Fort-William, 29th January, 1780.

“ To J. P. Auriol, Esquire, Secretary.”

“ Sir, I have received your letter of yesterday's date. I received no order from the Board of Ordnance, to issue the 5859 serviceable musket barrels, *which* inform me, were sent on board the ship Royal Circ lotre ; nor does the Ordnance department (*by no orders from the Governor General and Council and the Ordnance standing regulations*) issue any but those *sent of the Store-keeper*. It is therefore out of my and to assign reasons, (*for which you called upon*ed by having delivered such musket barrels for the main- of kentledge ; *they were issued without my* and In reply to your second requisition, whether have been delivered back into store, I do

" honor to inclose a copy of the indent¹ of stores re-
 " turned from the Master Attendant, *this day*, which
 " are all that I have any account of.

" I am, Sir,

" Your most obedient servant.

(Signed) " G. Livius, M. S. K.

Mr. Livius that day received from Mr. John Petrie, acting Marine Paymaster, the letter which is referred to in the above answer to Mr. Secretary Auriol, viz.

To George Livius, Esquire; M. S. K.

" Sir,

" You will please to order to be received into the
 " honourable Company's arsenal, the following iron
 " kentledge, *which remain on board the ships Royal Char-*
 " *lotte and Resolution.**

" On board the Royal Charlotte.

" Musket barrels, <i>serviceable</i>	5859	} 11,922
" Ditto, - - <i>unserviceable</i>	6063	
" Ordnance iron guns, <i>ditto</i> , -	-	176
" County iron shot, <i>serviceable</i> , -	-	4053
" Ditto, <i>unserviceable</i> , -	-	7313
" Some pig iron.		

" On board the Resolution.

" A quantity of small iron kentledge.

" I am, Sir,

" Your most obedient servant,

" Marine Pay-office (signed) J. Petrie, A. M. P. M.

" 29th January, 1780.*

This

* The Royal Charlotte was laid up on the 21st of the preceding August, and serviceable arms continued on board. The return is an exact copy of the indent, by which it was originally received on board from the marine department.

This transaction is so distinct, that it needs no comment, but it is presumable, that *serviceable* musket barrels, stowed as kentledge in a ship's hold, from July, 1773, to February, 1780, must have been rendered *unserviceable*; and that in all probability, they, and the other stores, would have remained on board, without thought or care, and be sold with the ships, had not the matter been happily suggested to a member of Council, who, until then, was a stranger to the whole clandestine management and abuse.

Under such perplexing and injurious predicaments, with a deliberate design, open to the licenced rapacity of such as conceive upon a fixed principle of faith, which is become proverbial in that settlement, that no plunder or peculation from the Company is dishonest or unjust, and that no action can be offensive or criminal, while the actors are favoured by a majority of Government) is not only the Company's property exposed, but the very safety and existence of their possessions and trade, staked, to humour the caprice of some principal servants, and to enrich themselves and their partizans, in Bengal. It is therefore incumbent upon the Directors, as a distinguishing proof of fidelity to their constituents, and loyalty to their country, either to enforce their orders, and assert their legal authority, with manly spirit, or to sink under the influence of corruption, and yield up their mock-power to the ministers of their own creation abroad; taking special care, in order to be consistent throughout, to dismiss from their service, as unworthy of public confidence, those, whose *private* virtues, have dared to be *publicly* honest, and who, with becoming deference, have endeavoured by indefatigable assiduity and unremitting pains, to maintain the authority of the Company, and the dignity and honor of the British nation in Hindostan.

